Verdun
Verdun
Was this battle a turning point in the war? I remember reading an article by Mao which he said that Verdun was a turning point but the allies did not exploit it. Do you agree or disagree? What influence did this battle play in the war?
Verdun was not really a battle, but a well calculatd and exploited occasion to apply a new method in the use of artillery, the Trommelfeuer.
It was not a real battle in this that it had no goal. Seizing Verdun did not bring much to the germans. Gaining an opening to the south was quite impossible, the breakthrough would only have brought the HKL on a Saint Mihiel to Champagne line instead of the existing pocket.
But the loss of Verdun could not be accepted by the french, and therefore the efficacity of the Trommelfeuer on a defending army could be experimented. It worked very well the first period, the french losses were very high, and german unit could rapidly gain the hills north of the town.
But then the conspiracy got wrong, and losses began to rise very rapidly for the germans too. The meat-grinding planned only for the defenders did begin to mince also the attakers.
The confrontation went on too long. Both parties lost so many people that, combined with the Somme, they were compelled to stay quite all 1917 licking their wounds. The french army could not undertake to do a new offensive before the Chemin des Dames, and the germans had to reorganise their divisions in Graben and Sturm.
I fail to see which opportunities Mao would have seized from Verdun. On both side the soldiers were exhausted, and division decimated, headquarters were quarreling and the political and civilian powers rumbling.
Or does Mao think of revolutionnary possibilities ?. In this case he may be right. 1917 was going to see the first strikes in war industries
Verdun as a turning point ?. Probably yes. It was the end of any hope of return to an open field war, and the confirmation of the trench system.
It was not a real battle in this that it had no goal. Seizing Verdun did not bring much to the germans. Gaining an opening to the south was quite impossible, the breakthrough would only have brought the HKL on a Saint Mihiel to Champagne line instead of the existing pocket.
But the loss of Verdun could not be accepted by the french, and therefore the efficacity of the Trommelfeuer on a defending army could be experimented. It worked very well the first period, the french losses were very high, and german unit could rapidly gain the hills north of the town.
But then the conspiracy got wrong, and losses began to rise very rapidly for the germans too. The meat-grinding planned only for the defenders did begin to mince also the attakers.
The confrontation went on too long. Both parties lost so many people that, combined with the Somme, they were compelled to stay quite all 1917 licking their wounds. The french army could not undertake to do a new offensive before the Chemin des Dames, and the germans had to reorganise their divisions in Graben and Sturm.
I fail to see which opportunities Mao would have seized from Verdun. On both side the soldiers were exhausted, and division decimated, headquarters were quarreling and the political and civilian powers rumbling.
Or does Mao think of revolutionnary possibilities ?. In this case he may be right. 1917 was going to see the first strikes in war industries
Verdun as a turning point ?. Probably yes. It was the end of any hope of return to an open field war, and the confirmation of the trench system.
but only after Falkenhayn changed the original plan from not trying seriously to take Verdun into actually attempting it. Ft. Vaux, "Dead Man" were all useless battles after 3+ months since the start of the offensive, especially since at that time, the french poured every available reserve into Verdun day and night. it happens this way every time you change strictly military goals for prestige reasons.But then the conspiracy got wrong, and losses began to rise very rapidly for the germans too. The meat-grinding planned only for the defenders did begin to mince also the attakers.
and yes, you are right, taking Verdun would have been military worthless.
don't think so. as you stated yourself, taking Verdun would only eliminate the pocket. it wasn't the right place for a breakthrough anyways.Verdun as a turning point ?. Probably yes. It was the end of any hope of return to an open field war, and the confirmation of the trench system.
i'd say the Somme battle was more a confirmation of the trench system than Verdun, which was a complex of concrete pre-build fortifications.
Verdun was a turning point in the way commanders regarded their soldiers. from Verdun on, the regular soldier was no more than cannon fodder. the whole bleeding-dry concept is extremly cynical.
Re: Verdun
Hello to all ; I found this article about that battle and the point of view of the French General Sarrail against Joffre................
VERDUN IN SEPTEMBER 1914. By Major F. During, Infantry.
Abstracted from Militar-Wochenblatt, 4 September, 1934. "War Verdun im September 1914 einzuschlieszen und einzunehmen? Die Rolle der 3. französischen Armee und ihres Führers Sarrail."
The role played by General Sarrail during the battle of the Marne must necessarily be of great interest, because his actions were in direct opposition to the directions and orders given by Joffre, and consequently had a direct bearing on the operations of the German Fifth Army during August and September, 1914. The feeling between Joffre and Sarrail was rather strained. Sarrail believed, strongly in the offensive and was very outspoken in his views, and the strategic ideas of Sarrail differed in all fundamental points from those of the French General Headquarters. According to Sarrail, Joffre ordered the counteroffensive by the English Army and the French Fifth, Fourth, and Third Armies only after he had permitted the Germans to occupy, without opposition, the rich land around Lille.
On 24 August Joffre ordered the retirement of the French troops, because (according to Sarrail) Joffre was confused by the reverses met by the French Fourth and Fifth Armies. On 25 August the left flank of the French Third Army was severely defeated near Marville and driven back to the Meuse at Sivry.
During the night 25-26 August Joffre ordered the withdrawal of all French forces to the line: La Fere-Laon-Craonne -Guignicourt-Vouziers. General Sarrail wanted to make a stand along the Meuse, but on 1 September Joffre ordered the French Third Army to withdraw to the vicinity of Bar Ie Duc.
This order came as a blow to Sarrail, for it meant to him that Verdun would be given to the Germans without opposition and that the loss of Verdun would be a terrible blow to the morale of the French people. Therefore Sarrail decided to disregard the orders to withdraw and to keep in contact with Verdun and at the same time remain in contact with the retiring French Fourth Army-a practically impossible task. On 2 September Joffre again ordered Sarrail to withdraw, this time to the line: Pone sur Yonne-Arcis sur Aube-Brienne Ie Chatheau-Joinville, a distance of about 50 miles south of Verdun. This order was again disobeyed by Sarrail ("desobeissance de Sarrail devant Verdun," according to the French). "Were I to obey orders, Verdun would be surrounded and my army would be 50 miles away. All fortresses would fall quickly. Verdun and Paris are the main points of our line and the place from which our counteroffensive must start." Sarrail wanted to save Verdun and at the same time keep in contact with the French Fourth Army. Joffre had intended to leave Verdun to its fate.
It was Sarrail who kept the army of the German Crown Prince from surrounding Verdun. In September 1914 this fortress was poorly manned (164th, 165th, and 166th Regiments and a few territorial regiments, whose combat efficiency was doubtful). The fortification was somewhat incomplete and the ammunition supply insufficient.
Source: Abstracts-Foreign Articles. Review of Military Literature. March 1935.
More follows. Cheers. Raúl M .
VERDUN IN SEPTEMBER 1914. By Major F. During, Infantry.
Abstracted from Militar-Wochenblatt, 4 September, 1934. "War Verdun im September 1914 einzuschlieszen und einzunehmen? Die Rolle der 3. französischen Armee und ihres Führers Sarrail."
The role played by General Sarrail during the battle of the Marne must necessarily be of great interest, because his actions were in direct opposition to the directions and orders given by Joffre, and consequently had a direct bearing on the operations of the German Fifth Army during August and September, 1914. The feeling between Joffre and Sarrail was rather strained. Sarrail believed, strongly in the offensive and was very outspoken in his views, and the strategic ideas of Sarrail differed in all fundamental points from those of the French General Headquarters. According to Sarrail, Joffre ordered the counteroffensive by the English Army and the French Fifth, Fourth, and Third Armies only after he had permitted the Germans to occupy, without opposition, the rich land around Lille.
On 24 August Joffre ordered the retirement of the French troops, because (according to Sarrail) Joffre was confused by the reverses met by the French Fourth and Fifth Armies. On 25 August the left flank of the French Third Army was severely defeated near Marville and driven back to the Meuse at Sivry.
During the night 25-26 August Joffre ordered the withdrawal of all French forces to the line: La Fere-Laon-Craonne -Guignicourt-Vouziers. General Sarrail wanted to make a stand along the Meuse, but on 1 September Joffre ordered the French Third Army to withdraw to the vicinity of Bar Ie Duc.
This order came as a blow to Sarrail, for it meant to him that Verdun would be given to the Germans without opposition and that the loss of Verdun would be a terrible blow to the morale of the French people. Therefore Sarrail decided to disregard the orders to withdraw and to keep in contact with Verdun and at the same time remain in contact with the retiring French Fourth Army-a practically impossible task. On 2 September Joffre again ordered Sarrail to withdraw, this time to the line: Pone sur Yonne-Arcis sur Aube-Brienne Ie Chatheau-Joinville, a distance of about 50 miles south of Verdun. This order was again disobeyed by Sarrail ("desobeissance de Sarrail devant Verdun," according to the French). "Were I to obey orders, Verdun would be surrounded and my army would be 50 miles away. All fortresses would fall quickly. Verdun and Paris are the main points of our line and the place from which our counteroffensive must start." Sarrail wanted to save Verdun and at the same time keep in contact with the French Fourth Army. Joffre had intended to leave Verdun to its fate.
It was Sarrail who kept the army of the German Crown Prince from surrounding Verdun. In September 1914 this fortress was poorly manned (164th, 165th, and 166th Regiments and a few territorial regiments, whose combat efficiency was doubtful). The fortification was somewhat incomplete and the ammunition supply insufficient.
Source: Abstracts-Foreign Articles. Review of Military Literature. March 1935.
More follows. Cheers. Raúl M .
Re: Verdun
Hello to all ; more follows................
VERDUN IN SEPTEMBER 1914. By Major F. During, Infantry.
Abstracted from Militar-Wochenblatt, 4 September, 1934. "War Verdun im September 1914 einzuschlieszen und einzunehmen? Die Rolle der 3. französischen Armee und ihres Führers Sarrail."
Before the battle of the Marne, plans had been made on the German side to surround Verdun and on 2 September the German Crown Prince received orders to take Verdun from two sides. He organized two artillery attack groups (one west and one east of the Meuse). The western group had to combat the weakest part of the fortress, and for this reason it was made the stronger group, consisting of the 6th and 12th Artillery Regiments (210-mm. mortars), two 100-mm. batteries, the 20th and 29th Engineer Regiments, the engineer siege train, and the balloon detachment No.4. The eastern group consisted of the Austrian mortar division (four 805-mm. mortars), a battalion of heavy howitzers (on 8 September another battalion was added), two battalions of light howitzers. The beginning of the battle of the Marne, however, made it necessary to disband the western group, in order to use this artillery in that battle.
The French Fourth Army was now a full day's march from the Third Army. This caused Sarrail some worry, as it offered the Germans a chance for a breakthrough between the two French armies. In the meantime, however, General Gallieni had changed Joffre's mind and he (Joffre) decided to start the counteroffensive at the Marne and not at the Seine, as he had first contemplated.
The situation of the French Third Army favored this and it also prevented a complete break between Joffre and Sarrail. On 6 September Sarrail unsuccessfully started the counteroffensive, but the German Fifth Army drove him on the defensive. His losses were enormous. The threat of a breakthrough by the Germans between the French Third and Fourth Armies became imminent and the French Third Army found itself in a precarious position. Only the timely arrival of the French XV Corps northeast of Sevigny saved the Third Army from becoming annihilated. The Germans, having failed to recognize the favorable situation, lost a marvelous opportunity to drive through the gap between the Third and Fourth Armies. On 8 September the situation of the French Third Army again became critical. In order to cut off the French Third and Fourth Armies, the Germans started an envelopment in a southerly direction. The French Third Army was attacked in center and on the right flank, while the left flank was threatened by an envelopment. At 6:00 PM, 8 September, Joffre ordered Sarrail to withdraw his flank to St. Mihiel. Had Sarrail followed this order, Verdun would have been lost, but Sarrail did not withdraw. During the night, 9-10 September, the German Fifth Army executed a successful night attack, which drove some of the French infantry, especially the reserve divisions, through their own artillery to the rear, leaving the artillery to fight it out alone.
Early on 10 September Fort Troyon reported that the situation was hopeless and at 11:00 AM, 10 September, the French Fourth Army reported that it was being severely attacked and that it had to draw in its right flank. The threat of a breakthrough between both armies appeared again.
It would have been very disastrous for Sarrail, had von Moltke adhered to his original plan of having the Army Group of von Strantz (V Corps, I Bavarian Corps, and the 33d Reserve Division) attack the outer forts; but von Moltke changed his plan and ordered the I Bavarian Corps through Belgium to the German right flank, but before it was ready to enter the battle the race to the sea had begun. The French Third Army was saved from destruction by the vacillation of Moltke.
On 10 September Sarrail dispatched his three reserve divisions towards the south, and on 11 September contact with was Verdun lost. Touant, a general staff officer on Sarrail's staff said that "nothing prevents the Germans now from taking Verdun from the south," but Moltke ordered the German Armies to withdraw to the north of the Argonne. Sarrail felt relieved and in his memoirs takes full credit for saving Verdun by disobeying orders of Joffre.
Source: Abstracts-Foreign Articles. Review of Military Literature. March 1935.
It's all folks. Cheers. Raúl M .
VERDUN IN SEPTEMBER 1914. By Major F. During, Infantry.
Abstracted from Militar-Wochenblatt, 4 September, 1934. "War Verdun im September 1914 einzuschlieszen und einzunehmen? Die Rolle der 3. französischen Armee und ihres Führers Sarrail."
Before the battle of the Marne, plans had been made on the German side to surround Verdun and on 2 September the German Crown Prince received orders to take Verdun from two sides. He organized two artillery attack groups (one west and one east of the Meuse). The western group had to combat the weakest part of the fortress, and for this reason it was made the stronger group, consisting of the 6th and 12th Artillery Regiments (210-mm. mortars), two 100-mm. batteries, the 20th and 29th Engineer Regiments, the engineer siege train, and the balloon detachment No.4. The eastern group consisted of the Austrian mortar division (four 805-mm. mortars), a battalion of heavy howitzers (on 8 September another battalion was added), two battalions of light howitzers. The beginning of the battle of the Marne, however, made it necessary to disband the western group, in order to use this artillery in that battle.
The French Fourth Army was now a full day's march from the Third Army. This caused Sarrail some worry, as it offered the Germans a chance for a breakthrough between the two French armies. In the meantime, however, General Gallieni had changed Joffre's mind and he (Joffre) decided to start the counteroffensive at the Marne and not at the Seine, as he had first contemplated.
The situation of the French Third Army favored this and it also prevented a complete break between Joffre and Sarrail. On 6 September Sarrail unsuccessfully started the counteroffensive, but the German Fifth Army drove him on the defensive. His losses were enormous. The threat of a breakthrough by the Germans between the French Third and Fourth Armies became imminent and the French Third Army found itself in a precarious position. Only the timely arrival of the French XV Corps northeast of Sevigny saved the Third Army from becoming annihilated. The Germans, having failed to recognize the favorable situation, lost a marvelous opportunity to drive through the gap between the Third and Fourth Armies. On 8 September the situation of the French Third Army again became critical. In order to cut off the French Third and Fourth Armies, the Germans started an envelopment in a southerly direction. The French Third Army was attacked in center and on the right flank, while the left flank was threatened by an envelopment. At 6:00 PM, 8 September, Joffre ordered Sarrail to withdraw his flank to St. Mihiel. Had Sarrail followed this order, Verdun would have been lost, but Sarrail did not withdraw. During the night, 9-10 September, the German Fifth Army executed a successful night attack, which drove some of the French infantry, especially the reserve divisions, through their own artillery to the rear, leaving the artillery to fight it out alone.
Early on 10 September Fort Troyon reported that the situation was hopeless and at 11:00 AM, 10 September, the French Fourth Army reported that it was being severely attacked and that it had to draw in its right flank. The threat of a breakthrough between both armies appeared again.
It would have been very disastrous for Sarrail, had von Moltke adhered to his original plan of having the Army Group of von Strantz (V Corps, I Bavarian Corps, and the 33d Reserve Division) attack the outer forts; but von Moltke changed his plan and ordered the I Bavarian Corps through Belgium to the German right flank, but before it was ready to enter the battle the race to the sea had begun. The French Third Army was saved from destruction by the vacillation of Moltke.
On 10 September Sarrail dispatched his three reserve divisions towards the south, and on 11 September contact with was Verdun lost. Touant, a general staff officer on Sarrail's staff said that "nothing prevents the Germans now from taking Verdun from the south," but Moltke ordered the German Armies to withdraw to the north of the Argonne. Sarrail felt relieved and in his memoirs takes full credit for saving Verdun by disobeying orders of Joffre.
Source: Abstracts-Foreign Articles. Review of Military Literature. March 1935.
It's all folks. Cheers. Raúl M .
Re: Verdun
Hello to all ; a little complament..................................
The Battle of Verdun.
Source: http://www.delcampe.net/page/item/id,28 ... age,G.html
Cheers. Raúl M .
The Battle of Verdun.
Source: http://www.delcampe.net/page/item/id,28 ... age,G.html
Cheers. Raúl M .
- Attachments
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- German trench in front of Douaumont .........................
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- Fort de Vaux...................................
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