I am looking for a detailed chronology of the December 1914 Battle of Łódź. Does anyone have any information, or sources they can recommend about this German-Russian clash?
The Battle of Lodz has often been characterized as "a tactical victory" for the Russians, but at the same time a strategic defeat. Any comments?
Battle of Łódź, 1914
no detailed infos available to me at this point but i'll offer a broad overview:
as i understood the german army tried to prevent the russians from advancing into silesia. the 5th army was assigned this task. 1st and 2nd army were supposed to protect the northen flank of the 5th army.
Hindenburg moved the 8th army by rail (800 trains) to the Thorn area and started the attack pushing between the 1st and 2nd army with the intent of getting behind the 5th army thus encircling the 2nd and 5th army. by Nov. 15th the 2nd army was pushed back to Lodz and was under imminent threat of being encicled. the 5th army was ordered to abandon the attack on silesia (started on nov. 14th) and relieve the 2nd army. the russians covered about 70 miles in 2 days and started attacking north. the 8th army now faced being cut off by nov. 25th and forced their way out of the pocket taking 16 000 russian prisoners with them.
if the goal of the 8th army was to destroy the russian 2nd, it wasn't accomplished. however, the attack on silesia was called off and severe losses were inflicted to the 1st and 2nd army. i'd say, could have been better, but could have been worse either. given the fact that, in nov. 1914 germany still had an absolute minimum of troops in the east and (just kile everyone else) had to deal with major ammunition shortages, i'd say the main objective was archived. until the end of the war no german province in the east was threatened by invasion again.
some call this campaign "blitzkrieg by rail".
certainly a topic that deserves further research. maybe something like the campaign series from osprey publishing, presenting units/numbers/equipment involved, battle description, outcome, losses.
as i understood the german army tried to prevent the russians from advancing into silesia. the 5th army was assigned this task. 1st and 2nd army were supposed to protect the northen flank of the 5th army.
Hindenburg moved the 8th army by rail (800 trains) to the Thorn area and started the attack pushing between the 1st and 2nd army with the intent of getting behind the 5th army thus encircling the 2nd and 5th army. by Nov. 15th the 2nd army was pushed back to Lodz and was under imminent threat of being encicled. the 5th army was ordered to abandon the attack on silesia (started on nov. 14th) and relieve the 2nd army. the russians covered about 70 miles in 2 days and started attacking north. the 8th army now faced being cut off by nov. 25th and forced their way out of the pocket taking 16 000 russian prisoners with them.
if the goal of the 8th army was to destroy the russian 2nd, it wasn't accomplished. however, the attack on silesia was called off and severe losses were inflicted to the 1st and 2nd army. i'd say, could have been better, but could have been worse either. given the fact that, in nov. 1914 germany still had an absolute minimum of troops in the east and (just kile everyone else) had to deal with major ammunition shortages, i'd say the main objective was archived. until the end of the war no german province in the east was threatened by invasion again.
some call this campaign "blitzkrieg by rail".
certainly a topic that deserves further research. maybe something like the campaign series from osprey publishing, presenting units/numbers/equipment involved, battle description, outcome, losses.
From http://www.astral.lodz.pl/bimar/lodz%20 ... iatowa.htm
Lodz after first areoplane strice
and Lodz Kaliska railway station
Russian evacuate Lodz
first German recon
German came in to Lodz
Russian POW’s
Lodz after first areoplane strice
and Lodz Kaliska railway station
Russian evacuate Lodz
first German recon
German came in to Lodz
Russian POW’s
Re: Battle of Lodz, 1914
Hello to all 
; a little complement.................
CAVALRY AT LODZ.
On 1 November 1914, Marshal von Hindenburg was made Commander in Chief of the German forces on the Russian front, and was given the mission of protecting Silesia which was then threatened by Grand Duke Nicholas' pursuit (Sketch Nro 1). Von Hindenburg estimated that the Austrian offensive spirit was nearly spent, that the situation was serious, and that he must rely alone on German troops. Consequently, he asked for, and received, reinforcements to the extent of a new army corps, all available trained reserves from Germany and the I Cavalry Corps, commanded by von Richthofen. Practically all of those reinforcements were grudgingly pared from the very busy troops engaged on the French Western Front.
Learning that the right flank of the main Russian force protecting Warsaw was not well covered, von Hindenburg planned to envelop the right flank of that force with the Eighth Army under Otto von Below. For the battle, von Below's Eighth Army rapidly concentrated at Thorn and on 15 November, delivered a surprise attack against the Russian right. The attack failed to envelop the Russian flank but it force the Grand Duke to withdraw his extreme right back to the Bzura River where it was covered by the Vistula.
The Ninth Army, under General Mackensen, attacked, 18 November, on the right of the Eighth Army. The Russian line held, but retreated to conform to the new line on the right. Von Woyrsch, With an army detachment, provisionally called the Tenth Army, attacked, 20 November, toward Lodz. The attack forced the Russian line back. The right wing of the Russian army, by 21 November, was engaged in a terrific battle. The Grand Duke was greatly embarrassed by lack of roads and railroads in getting reinforcements to the line, but succeeded in bringing forward enough to hold the line.
Since Marshal von Hindenburg was not making headway against the Grand Duke, he ordered General Mackensen to penetrate the center of the Russian right with his Ninth Army. The attack was successful. General Mackensen pushed two army corps through the gap to exploit the penetration (Sketch Nro 2).
Source: Review of Military Literature. March 1938.
Cheers. Raúl M
.
Feliz Año Nuevo - Happy New Year - Feliz Ano Novo - Gluckliches Neues Jahr - Bonne Année - Felice Anno Nuovo - Szczęśliwego nowego roku!!!.
; a little complement.................CAVALRY AT LODZ.
On 1 November 1914, Marshal von Hindenburg was made Commander in Chief of the German forces on the Russian front, and was given the mission of protecting Silesia which was then threatened by Grand Duke Nicholas' pursuit (Sketch Nro 1). Von Hindenburg estimated that the Austrian offensive spirit was nearly spent, that the situation was serious, and that he must rely alone on German troops. Consequently, he asked for, and received, reinforcements to the extent of a new army corps, all available trained reserves from Germany and the I Cavalry Corps, commanded by von Richthofen. Practically all of those reinforcements were grudgingly pared from the very busy troops engaged on the French Western Front.
Learning that the right flank of the main Russian force protecting Warsaw was not well covered, von Hindenburg planned to envelop the right flank of that force with the Eighth Army under Otto von Below. For the battle, von Below's Eighth Army rapidly concentrated at Thorn and on 15 November, delivered a surprise attack against the Russian right. The attack failed to envelop the Russian flank but it force the Grand Duke to withdraw his extreme right back to the Bzura River where it was covered by the Vistula.
The Ninth Army, under General Mackensen, attacked, 18 November, on the right of the Eighth Army. The Russian line held, but retreated to conform to the new line on the right. Von Woyrsch, With an army detachment, provisionally called the Tenth Army, attacked, 20 November, toward Lodz. The attack forced the Russian line back. The right wing of the Russian army, by 21 November, was engaged in a terrific battle. The Grand Duke was greatly embarrassed by lack of roads and railroads in getting reinforcements to the line, but succeeded in bringing forward enough to hold the line.
Since Marshal von Hindenburg was not making headway against the Grand Duke, he ordered General Mackensen to penetrate the center of the Russian right with his Ninth Army. The attack was successful. General Mackensen pushed two army corps through the gap to exploit the penetration (Sketch Nro 2).
Source: Review of Military Literature. March 1938.
Cheers. Raúl M
.Feliz Año Nuevo - Happy New Year - Feliz Ano Novo - Gluckliches Neues Jahr - Bonne Année - Felice Anno Nuovo - Szczęśliwego nowego roku!!!.
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Re: Battle of Lodz, 1914
Here's a map that I pulled a few years back a while back from a WWI era German atlas of the war. If you need the specific source I can most likely pull it out. I also recommend a paper titled "German Cavalry in the Lodz Campaign" that is available on-line. Gen. der Kavallerie von Poseck also wrote some on it in the German language book "Weltkrieg in der Oest", specifically the chapter titled "In Polen, Litauen und Kurland". The New York Times also had a few contemporary accounts -- although they may be skewed a bit by propaganda. Never the less, they often provide an interesting view from the time. Here's a couple of paragraphs from the biography of General Mackensen which was published as part of the Cavalry history published in the 20's. (Note that this is a quick-and-dirty Google translation.)
I hope that this helps.
Aside from these accounts, you'll most likely need to dig into the regimental histories for the units involved. There is also a discussion of the battle on a more personal level in the book "Forward March - Memoirs of a German Officer" by Ernst Rosenhainer.The success of Mackensen in many victorious battles and engagements and his tenacious perseverance before Warsaw soon found a high level of recognition. On the march to Silesia he was with his army corps comes straight up to the German border, as he received the appointment as "supreme commander of the 9th Army." With warm words he said goodbye to his brave XVII. Army Corps, to which he was confined fixed by mutual trust, an unlimited confidence, proven in war as in peace!
The new job was as honorable as a commander they could ever want. It was all about protecting Silesia against the threat of Russian invasion. There the bold and ingenious plan was conceived, the overwhelming Russian superiority to the German border only weak German troops as a thin veil, frontal oppose and proceed simultaneously with the closed forces of the 9th Army from the area south of Thorn on the Vistula along to surprise attack the Russian army in their right flank. The plan was perfect. In mid-November the Russian right wing in Wloclawek and Rutno was decisively defeated and the remaining part of the Russian army forced to stop the advance and to contract for the defense in Lodz. In massive marches, wide sweep in the back of the Russians sought the left wing of the Germans completely encircle the Russian army. But wiser by the defeat of Tannenberg, led the Russian commander in chief, Grand Duke Nicholas, in time from the interior of Russia considerable reinforcements approaching, now turn the bold sections around swinging left wing of the German army and sought to define. Through the glorious breakthrough in Brzeziny the German troops liberated from their perilous position and
now translated from the north their attacks against the Russian positions in Lodz on. After heavy fighting, the city finally fell on December 6 in the hands of the Germans and General v. Mackensen took his headquarters there. After the Russians had been pushed back until after the Rawka and had there entrenched strong, it was mid-December, also in this theater of war to the monotonous and exhausting trench warfare, the set unspeakably high demands on the endurance of the troops of the Russian winter. The result of this bold campaign but he fully met expectations: Silesia was liberated by the Russian threat, the enemy had been pushed back far into his own country! In recognition of his brilliant deeds General Mackensen was v. Promoted to Colonel-General. In humble piety of the commander wrote to his mother, to whom he always, hung from his earliest youth in heartfelt love: "I feel very small in front of opposite raised beyond all praise Lei¬stungen my troops. They are the ones who achieved the successes; God Almighty is the one who directs the thoughts and the fact adds happiness. To Him be praise, prize, honor and thanks! "
I hope that this helps.
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Re: Battle of Lodz, 1914
Oops. Just noticed that this is an 8 year old thread. oh well.
Re: Battle of Lodz, 1914
Hello pal ; do not worry about it.....................
. Thanks for all your input. Cheers. Raúl M .
Feliz Año Nuevo - Happy New Year - Feliz Ano Novo - Gluckliches Neues Jahr - Bonne Année - Felice Anno Nuovo - Szczęśliwego nowego roku!!!.
; do not worry about it.....................Sure someone will find it useful and interestingOops. Just noticed that this is an 8 year old thread. oh well.
. Thanks for all your input. Cheers. Raúl M .Feliz Año Nuevo - Happy New Year - Feliz Ano Novo - Gluckliches Neues Jahr - Bonne Année - Felice Anno Nuovo - Szczęśliwego nowego roku!!!.
Re: Battle of Lodz, 1914
Die Schlacht bei Lodz
http://digi.landesbibliothek.at/viewer/ ... 4534779/1/
http://digi.landesbibliothek.at/viewer/ ... 4534779/1/
Re: Battle of Lodz, 1914
Hello to all ; taken advantage of the info posted by jluetjen and Ken S...........................
CAVALRY AT LODZ.
Following the progress of the German XXV Corps and the I Cavalry Corps, note how the XXV Corps and its attached units raced southeast as direct as the crow flies and when Lodz was on the right and abreast it cut sharply to the west, winding up with its nose almost in the suburbs of Lodz. Further note how far and detached the XXV Corps was from Thorn, its home station. And while you are about the noting business observe how the Russian units west of Lodz side-slipped to the north and east so that they could cut the Germans off in the vicinity of Brzeziny near which place they were able to gain contact with Grand Duke Nicholas' reserves arriving from the east. There were other Russian units not engaged in side-slipping which were available to push from all sides.
On 21 November 1914, the envelopment of Lodz by the Germans had been definitely stopped. The forces comprising the XXV Corps were in an extremely difficult and dangerous position. The corps and attached units consisted of:
The 49th Reserve Division
The 50th Reserve Division
The 3d Guard Division
The 72d Brigade from the XX Corps, and The I Cavalry Corps made up of
The 6th Cavalry Division, and
The 9th Cavalry Division (less one brigade left at Plock east of the Vistula)
On the same date, 21 November 1914, the Germans realized they were stopped, the Russian High Command was determined to effect the capture of the Group of forces comprising the German XXV Corps. To effect the destruction of the XXV Corps the Russian Army cIosed its forces to the right and rear, west and south of Lodz. The Russian III Corps sent troops north towards Tuszin. Operating on the right of this force was Nowikow's Cavalry Corps. Still farther to the northeast, threatening Koluzki and Karpin was Charpentier's Cavalry Corps, operating on the left flank of the forces advancing from Lowicz and Skerniewice. The latter consisted of five divisions. The Russian troops from Brzeziny established contact with the defenders of Lodz north of Galkow forest and with elements of the Russian First Army at Lowicz.
Source: Review of Military Literature. March 1938.
Cheers. Raúl M.
; taken advantage of the info posted by jluetjen and Ken S...........................CAVALRY AT LODZ.
Following the progress of the German XXV Corps and the I Cavalry Corps, note how the XXV Corps and its attached units raced southeast as direct as the crow flies and when Lodz was on the right and abreast it cut sharply to the west, winding up with its nose almost in the suburbs of Lodz. Further note how far and detached the XXV Corps was from Thorn, its home station. And while you are about the noting business observe how the Russian units west of Lodz side-slipped to the north and east so that they could cut the Germans off in the vicinity of Brzeziny near which place they were able to gain contact with Grand Duke Nicholas' reserves arriving from the east. There were other Russian units not engaged in side-slipping which were available to push from all sides.
On 21 November 1914, the envelopment of Lodz by the Germans had been definitely stopped. The forces comprising the XXV Corps were in an extremely difficult and dangerous position. The corps and attached units consisted of:
The 49th Reserve Division
The 50th Reserve Division
The 3d Guard Division
The 72d Brigade from the XX Corps, and The I Cavalry Corps made up of
The 6th Cavalry Division, and
The 9th Cavalry Division (less one brigade left at Plock east of the Vistula)
On the same date, 21 November 1914, the Germans realized they were stopped, the Russian High Command was determined to effect the capture of the Group of forces comprising the German XXV Corps. To effect the destruction of the XXV Corps the Russian Army cIosed its forces to the right and rear, west and south of Lodz. The Russian III Corps sent troops north towards Tuszin. Operating on the right of this force was Nowikow's Cavalry Corps. Still farther to the northeast, threatening Koluzki and Karpin was Charpentier's Cavalry Corps, operating on the left flank of the forces advancing from Lowicz and Skerniewice. The latter consisted of five divisions. The Russian troops from Brzeziny established contact with the defenders of Lodz north of Galkow forest and with elements of the Russian First Army at Lowicz.
Source: Review of Military Literature. March 1938.
Cheers. Raúl M
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Re: Battle of Lodz, 1914
Hello to all ; more follows...........................
CAVALRY AT LODZ.
The German Ninth Army Headquarters, realizing that the capture and control of Lodz was utterly impossible, issued orders for the withdrawal at 19:00 hours on 22 November. The XXV Corps was directed to retreat to the east across the Miazga River during the nIght 22-23 November and turn north in the morning moving on Brzeziny where it would attack, crack apart the Russian troops which had cut them off, and then the whole XXV Corps was to race back to the protection of the old German line. A very simple maneuver to order, but a very difficult mission to accomplish.
On the evening of this day a telegram was received at Hohensalza from His Majesty the Emperor, directing the army commander to "express his thanks to the troops of the Ninth Army for the unshaken bravery shown during these glorious days against a far superior enemy, which was worthy of the highest commendation. The Emperor also sent his Imperial salutation and best wishes for the future." It was a timely telegram - the XXV Corps certainly needed best wishes.
Colonel von Poseck, Chief of Staff of the German I Cavalry Corps, gives an idea of the conditions of the troops at the time the withdrawal order was issued: "Even we cavalrymen were at the end of our strength now. Day and night at the throats of the enemy, in battle, on outpost, on patrol, working as messengers and orderlies, without replacements, without fodder for''-. our animals, generally without billets at night, without sleep and all this in the frightful cold. The restorative of a Victorious advance had kept us going up to this time-now the thought o retreat threatened to let our fatigue master us. In spite of this, though, we had to remain conscIous that the retreat of the corps depended on the watchfulness and preparedness of the cavalry."
The I Cavalry Corps was detached from the XXV Corps command and ordered to proceed to the vicinity of Bendkow, destroy the bridge at Wolborz and block the roads leading north from Piotrkow and Wolborz. (See 2nd Sketch)
The weather was intensely cold, 10 below zero. The roads were frozen and deeply rutted. To add to the difficulties of withdrawing with no reserve and all troops in contact, was the decision that all wounded numbering over 2,000, and prisoners numbering over 8,000, together with all trains and guns, were to be taken along. There was no food, ammunition was short and the men had been fighting continuously for 36 hours.
Source: Review of Military Literature. March 1938.
Cheers. Raúl M.
; more follows...........................CAVALRY AT LODZ.
The German Ninth Army Headquarters, realizing that the capture and control of Lodz was utterly impossible, issued orders for the withdrawal at 19:00 hours on 22 November. The XXV Corps was directed to retreat to the east across the Miazga River during the nIght 22-23 November and turn north in the morning moving on Brzeziny where it would attack, crack apart the Russian troops which had cut them off, and then the whole XXV Corps was to race back to the protection of the old German line. A very simple maneuver to order, but a very difficult mission to accomplish.
On the evening of this day a telegram was received at Hohensalza from His Majesty the Emperor, directing the army commander to "express his thanks to the troops of the Ninth Army for the unshaken bravery shown during these glorious days against a far superior enemy, which was worthy of the highest commendation. The Emperor also sent his Imperial salutation and best wishes for the future." It was a timely telegram - the XXV Corps certainly needed best wishes.
Colonel von Poseck, Chief of Staff of the German I Cavalry Corps, gives an idea of the conditions of the troops at the time the withdrawal order was issued: "Even we cavalrymen were at the end of our strength now. Day and night at the throats of the enemy, in battle, on outpost, on patrol, working as messengers and orderlies, without replacements, without fodder for''-. our animals, generally without billets at night, without sleep and all this in the frightful cold. The restorative of a Victorious advance had kept us going up to this time-now the thought o retreat threatened to let our fatigue master us. In spite of this, though, we had to remain conscIous that the retreat of the corps depended on the watchfulness and preparedness of the cavalry."
The I Cavalry Corps was detached from the XXV Corps command and ordered to proceed to the vicinity of Bendkow, destroy the bridge at Wolborz and block the roads leading north from Piotrkow and Wolborz. (See 2nd Sketch)
The weather was intensely cold, 10 below zero. The roads were frozen and deeply rutted. To add to the difficulties of withdrawing with no reserve and all troops in contact, was the decision that all wounded numbering over 2,000, and prisoners numbering over 8,000, together with all trains and guns, were to be taken along. There was no food, ammunition was short and the men had been fighting continuously for 36 hours.
Source: Review of Military Literature. March 1938.
Cheers. Raúl M
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Re: Battle of Lodz, 1914
Hello to all ; more follows...........................
CAVALRY AT LODZ.
Major von Wullfen, a staff officer, during the battle of Lodz paints a vivid word picture which is worth quoting: "The bloody-red sunset of the Sunday of death was followed by a continuously increasing frost. A cutting wind swept over the bare gray-yellow ridge of hills which in the dull November light appeared especially desolate. As the night sank over the battlefield and the guns gradually became silent and here and there only a flaring up rifle fire rent the beginning quietness, the firmament arched in a winterly star-brightness over the landscape. No moonlight and a bone-shivering coldness. After a 36-hour murderous battle everybody was half-starved and benumbed. No warm quarters, nothing to eat and no rest! At 10 degrees below zero the coffee had frozen in the canteens. Whoever had a piece of bread left. tried laboriously to thaw it out in his mouth.
"Hours passed until the withdrawal order reached all the places and until the troops were withdrawn from the combat line. The XXV Reserve Corps did not began the withdrawal until about 11 :00 PM. The responsible leader, General von Scheffer, together with the Commander of the I Cavalry Corps, rode with the advance guard of the 49th Reserve Division. The disengagement from the enemy, who was tired from fighting and paid no attention, proved successful. Had the Russians followed, a catastrophe would have been inevitable. But they slept, slept despite the noise caused by the assembly of our troops with all their trains, columns, transports and prisoners. The snorting of the hungry horses, the clanking and rattles of the wheels on the hard-frozen ground, interrupted the silence of the night . . ...”
The key to the successful retreat lay in the ability to keep the main crossing of the Miazga River open at Karpin. A company of the Guard Fusilier Regiment supported by the 6th Cavalry Division, was now guarding the bridge and in addition had built another bridge along side of it. (See Sketch No.9).
There was a little mounted action by small forces (squadrons) in the cavalry combat. Practically all defensive was dismounted using machine-gun and carbine fire. Horses were too underfed and exhausted, marching to and from positions, to be called on for mounted combat. No entrenching was done. The ground was frozen too hard for even hasty works. Barricades and entanglements of farm machinery and other debris were resorted to.
Led horses were near at hand and mobile at all times. The 6th Cavalry Division was directed to cover the crossings of the 49th and 50th Reserve Divisions at Karpin from the south and west. The 9th Cavalry Division was ordered to clear up the east side of the Miazga River opposite Bukowiec to the east and north. The 50th Division was ordered to march on Laznowska-Wola, cover the east, turn north on Brzeziny and protect the right flank of the Corps.
Source: Review of Military Literature. March 1938.
Cheers. Raúl M.
; more follows...........................CAVALRY AT LODZ.
Major von Wullfen, a staff officer, during the battle of Lodz paints a vivid word picture which is worth quoting: "The bloody-red sunset of the Sunday of death was followed by a continuously increasing frost. A cutting wind swept over the bare gray-yellow ridge of hills which in the dull November light appeared especially desolate. As the night sank over the battlefield and the guns gradually became silent and here and there only a flaring up rifle fire rent the beginning quietness, the firmament arched in a winterly star-brightness over the landscape. No moonlight and a bone-shivering coldness. After a 36-hour murderous battle everybody was half-starved and benumbed. No warm quarters, nothing to eat and no rest! At 10 degrees below zero the coffee had frozen in the canteens. Whoever had a piece of bread left. tried laboriously to thaw it out in his mouth.
"Hours passed until the withdrawal order reached all the places and until the troops were withdrawn from the combat line. The XXV Reserve Corps did not began the withdrawal until about 11 :00 PM. The responsible leader, General von Scheffer, together with the Commander of the I Cavalry Corps, rode with the advance guard of the 49th Reserve Division. The disengagement from the enemy, who was tired from fighting and paid no attention, proved successful. Had the Russians followed, a catastrophe would have been inevitable. But they slept, slept despite the noise caused by the assembly of our troops with all their trains, columns, transports and prisoners. The snorting of the hungry horses, the clanking and rattles of the wheels on the hard-frozen ground, interrupted the silence of the night . . ...”
The key to the successful retreat lay in the ability to keep the main crossing of the Miazga River open at Karpin. A company of the Guard Fusilier Regiment supported by the 6th Cavalry Division, was now guarding the bridge and in addition had built another bridge along side of it. (See Sketch No.9).
There was a little mounted action by small forces (squadrons) in the cavalry combat. Practically all defensive was dismounted using machine-gun and carbine fire. Horses were too underfed and exhausted, marching to and from positions, to be called on for mounted combat. No entrenching was done. The ground was frozen too hard for even hasty works. Barricades and entanglements of farm machinery and other debris were resorted to.
Led horses were near at hand and mobile at all times. The 6th Cavalry Division was directed to cover the crossings of the 49th and 50th Reserve Divisions at Karpin from the south and west. The 9th Cavalry Division was ordered to clear up the east side of the Miazga River opposite Bukowiec to the east and north. The 50th Division was ordered to march on Laznowska-Wola, cover the east, turn north on Brzeziny and protect the right flank of the Corps.
Source: Review of Military Literature. March 1938.
Cheers. Raúl M
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Re: Battle of Lodz, 1914
Hello to all ; more follows...........................
CAVALRY AT LODZ.
I CAVALRY CORPS, 22-23 NOVEMBER.
Lieutenant General von Richthofen, commanding the I Cavalry Corps, was in Karpin, to supervise the rear protection of the army group by the cavalry corps. To this end the 6th Cavalry Division first arrayed its forces near Palschew, Wardsyn and Kurowice, to provide security to the west and south, and the 9th Cavalry Division on the line: Laznowska Wola-railroad station at Rokiziny, to the south and east.
6TH CAVALRY DIVISION, 22-23 NOVEMBER.
During the night march (22-23 November) of the XXV Corps, the 6th Cavalry Division at first remained in its position on the line: PaIczew- Wardzyn-Kurowice, its front facing south, protecting troops retreating over the main highway. On and after 6:00 AM it was supported by the detachment from the 3d Guard Division {Reinhard) consisting of two battalions of infantry, one battalion of artillery and one squadron of division cavalry. This detachment took position at Wardzyn. At 8.00 AM 23 November, two battalions of the 72d Brigade of the XX Corps arrived in support. At noon the detachment of the 3d Guard Division and of the 72d Brigade retired to the north and east respectively to join their divisions.
The right flank of the 6th Cavalry Division (Baden 20th Household Dragoons), which had been subjected since 11:00 AM to artillery fire, and threatened by Russian infantry approaching from the west, was refused at Wardzyn. Thereupon the division, on order of the I Cavalry Corps, took up new defensive position on the heights of Kurowice on both sides of the road, fronting west, and shortly afterwards brought up the two troops of the 20th Dragoons which had been left at Brojce (1 mile north of Wardzyn) as rear guard. Toward evening, Wola Rakowa was set on fire by the shelling of the 1st Horse Battery, and enemy infantry columns advancing therefrom were taken under fire and halted thereby.
The cavalry division followed slowly to Kurowice where it took position with its 45th Brigade South of the highway; 28th and 33d Brigades north of the highway. From the market place at Kurowice the artillery attached to the 45th Brigade fired on the enemy advancing from Wola Rakowa. (See Sketch No. 10).
At 4:30 PM, under protection of the rear guard of the 49th Division (two battalions of infantry), the 6th Cavalry Division began its retirement toward Karpin, heavily shelled all the way. The 28th and 33d Brigades crossed the river and proceeded to the Karpin-Gora-Zielona area in reserve. The 45th Brigade with a battalion of the 21st Reserve Jägers, plus one machinegun platoon, occupied the west edge of Karpin to the road bend one kilometer to the north.
Under this protection the two battalions of the 49th Division were relieved, and crossing the river, joined their divisions. At 500 PM all German troops had crossed and the cavalry blew up the bridge. During the remainder of the night the 45th Brigade retained its position at Karpin. The 33d Brigade at Gora Zielona and the 28th Brigade in the south end of Borowo village in reserve. The division was not molested during the night.
Source: Review of Military Literature. March 1938.
Cheers. Raúl M.
; more follows...........................CAVALRY AT LODZ.
I CAVALRY CORPS, 22-23 NOVEMBER.
Lieutenant General von Richthofen, commanding the I Cavalry Corps, was in Karpin, to supervise the rear protection of the army group by the cavalry corps. To this end the 6th Cavalry Division first arrayed its forces near Palschew, Wardsyn and Kurowice, to provide security to the west and south, and the 9th Cavalry Division on the line: Laznowska Wola-railroad station at Rokiziny, to the south and east.
6TH CAVALRY DIVISION, 22-23 NOVEMBER.
During the night march (22-23 November) of the XXV Corps, the 6th Cavalry Division at first remained in its position on the line: PaIczew- Wardzyn-Kurowice, its front facing south, protecting troops retreating over the main highway. On and after 6:00 AM it was supported by the detachment from the 3d Guard Division {Reinhard) consisting of two battalions of infantry, one battalion of artillery and one squadron of division cavalry. This detachment took position at Wardzyn. At 8.00 AM 23 November, two battalions of the 72d Brigade of the XX Corps arrived in support. At noon the detachment of the 3d Guard Division and of the 72d Brigade retired to the north and east respectively to join their divisions.
The right flank of the 6th Cavalry Division (Baden 20th Household Dragoons), which had been subjected since 11:00 AM to artillery fire, and threatened by Russian infantry approaching from the west, was refused at Wardzyn. Thereupon the division, on order of the I Cavalry Corps, took up new defensive position on the heights of Kurowice on both sides of the road, fronting west, and shortly afterwards brought up the two troops of the 20th Dragoons which had been left at Brojce (1 mile north of Wardzyn) as rear guard. Toward evening, Wola Rakowa was set on fire by the shelling of the 1st Horse Battery, and enemy infantry columns advancing therefrom were taken under fire and halted thereby.
The cavalry division followed slowly to Kurowice where it took position with its 45th Brigade South of the highway; 28th and 33d Brigades north of the highway. From the market place at Kurowice the artillery attached to the 45th Brigade fired on the enemy advancing from Wola Rakowa. (See Sketch No. 10).
At 4:30 PM, under protection of the rear guard of the 49th Division (two battalions of infantry), the 6th Cavalry Division began its retirement toward Karpin, heavily shelled all the way. The 28th and 33d Brigades crossed the river and proceeded to the Karpin-Gora-Zielona area in reserve. The 45th Brigade with a battalion of the 21st Reserve Jägers, plus one machinegun platoon, occupied the west edge of Karpin to the road bend one kilometer to the north.
Under this protection the two battalions of the 49th Division were relieved, and crossing the river, joined their divisions. At 500 PM all German troops had crossed and the cavalry blew up the bridge. During the remainder of the night the 45th Brigade retained its position at Karpin. The 33d Brigade at Gora Zielona and the 28th Brigade in the south end of Borowo village in reserve. The division was not molested during the night.
Source: Review of Military Literature. March 1938.
Cheers. Raúl M
.- Attachments
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Re: Battle of Lodz, 1914
Hello to all ; more follows...........................
CAVALRY AT LODZ.
THE 9TH CAVALRY DIVISION, 22-23 NOVEMBER. (See Sketch Nº 9).
The 9th Cavalry Division began the crossing of the Miazga RIver at Bukowice at 4:00 AM (entirely too late should have crossed at 8:00 PM). The 11th Hussars charged across the bridge against approaching Cossacks and drove them to the north and occupied a hill one mile north of Gora Zielona. The artillery of the division assisted in the attack.
Upon being relieved by advancing infantry of the 3d Guard Division, the cavalry proceeded south on Laznowska Wola, its march objective. Soon after 8:00 AM the 14th Brigade detachment consisting of the 5th Uhlans, 2d Battalion of the 54th Infantry, one battery of artillery and one machine-gun platoon, moved to the hill south of Karpin. This covering task had been assigned the 50th Division which, halted by the confusion at the Karpin bridge crossing, did not reach Laznowska Wola until 10:00 AM. A Cossack squadron was driven off at 9:00 AM and a battery of Russians which had been firing into the infantry mass at the bridge at Karpin was silenced. The 9th Cavalry Division had by now been reorganized due to the absence of the 19th Dragoon Regiment left at Glowno. The 19th Brigade was made up of the 13th Uhlans and the 8th Hussars, the 13th Brigade of the 4th Cuirassiers and the 11th Hussars and one machine-gun platoon.
Since forenoon of 22 November the 14th Cavalry Brigade, had occupied hill 222 south of Karpin and positions in the southwest part of Laznowska Wola, facing to the south and southeast. (See Sketch No. 10) From 10:30 AM, on, the 19th Cavalry Brigade was located at Cisow, fronting south, and the 13th Cavalry Brigade at the railroad station at Rokiziny, fronting east. Although signal communications may have been inadequate during the fight, there is ample evidence of coordination and understanding between the high commanders. The Germans being on interior lines caused a natural crowding of rear establishments which included higher command posts. From German official documents we learn that Major General Count Eberhard von Schmettow, commanding the 9th Cavalry Division, after conferring in Karpin with Lieutenant General von Scheffer-Boyadel, commanding the I Corps, established himself and his command post in the church at Laznowska Wola. Here he was in the midst of the fighting and centrally located in his division.
In the afternoon of 23 November, the 2d Battalion of the 54th Infantry was moved to the railroad station at Rokiziny, which the Russians were shelling heavily. That infantry battalion was to assist the 13th Cavalry Brigade. Either the Russian 5th Cavalry Division or Nowikow's Cavalry Corps had appeared on the scene east and south of Rokiziny. That last discovered Russian force had apparently come from the vicinity of Bendkow and was gradually feeling its way north on the east side of the railroad line running northeast from Laznow.
Two companies of the German 2d Battalion of the 54th Infantry moved from Rokiziny to Stefanow and remained there during the night 23-24 November, while Russian cavalry bivouacked in the south edge of the same village. All during the afternoon, on all fronts, infantry as well as cavalry, severe fighting took place. The cavalry divisions were constantly under artillery fire.
At 3:00 PM, 23 Kovember, one squadron of the 4th Cuirassiers made a reconnaissance to the northeast to locate the two hostile cavalry divisions reported advancing. The squadron advanced to Bendzielin and made a stand. By spreading out on a wide front the commander deceived the Russians as to his real strength and contained the leading Cossack brigade. At the same time, much needed protection was given to the flank of the 50th Division just west of Bendzielin.
Source: Review of Military Literature. March 1938.
Cheers. Raúl M.
; more follows...........................CAVALRY AT LODZ.
THE 9TH CAVALRY DIVISION, 22-23 NOVEMBER. (See Sketch Nº 9).
The 9th Cavalry Division began the crossing of the Miazga RIver at Bukowice at 4:00 AM (entirely too late should have crossed at 8:00 PM). The 11th Hussars charged across the bridge against approaching Cossacks and drove them to the north and occupied a hill one mile north of Gora Zielona. The artillery of the division assisted in the attack.
Upon being relieved by advancing infantry of the 3d Guard Division, the cavalry proceeded south on Laznowska Wola, its march objective. Soon after 8:00 AM the 14th Brigade detachment consisting of the 5th Uhlans, 2d Battalion of the 54th Infantry, one battery of artillery and one machine-gun platoon, moved to the hill south of Karpin. This covering task had been assigned the 50th Division which, halted by the confusion at the Karpin bridge crossing, did not reach Laznowska Wola until 10:00 AM. A Cossack squadron was driven off at 9:00 AM and a battery of Russians which had been firing into the infantry mass at the bridge at Karpin was silenced. The 9th Cavalry Division had by now been reorganized due to the absence of the 19th Dragoon Regiment left at Glowno. The 19th Brigade was made up of the 13th Uhlans and the 8th Hussars, the 13th Brigade of the 4th Cuirassiers and the 11th Hussars and one machine-gun platoon.
Since forenoon of 22 November the 14th Cavalry Brigade, had occupied hill 222 south of Karpin and positions in the southwest part of Laznowska Wola, facing to the south and southeast. (See Sketch No. 10) From 10:30 AM, on, the 19th Cavalry Brigade was located at Cisow, fronting south, and the 13th Cavalry Brigade at the railroad station at Rokiziny, fronting east. Although signal communications may have been inadequate during the fight, there is ample evidence of coordination and understanding between the high commanders. The Germans being on interior lines caused a natural crowding of rear establishments which included higher command posts. From German official documents we learn that Major General Count Eberhard von Schmettow, commanding the 9th Cavalry Division, after conferring in Karpin with Lieutenant General von Scheffer-Boyadel, commanding the I Corps, established himself and his command post in the church at Laznowska Wola. Here he was in the midst of the fighting and centrally located in his division.
In the afternoon of 23 November, the 2d Battalion of the 54th Infantry was moved to the railroad station at Rokiziny, which the Russians were shelling heavily. That infantry battalion was to assist the 13th Cavalry Brigade. Either the Russian 5th Cavalry Division or Nowikow's Cavalry Corps had appeared on the scene east and south of Rokiziny. That last discovered Russian force had apparently come from the vicinity of Bendkow and was gradually feeling its way north on the east side of the railroad line running northeast from Laznow.
Two companies of the German 2d Battalion of the 54th Infantry moved from Rokiziny to Stefanow and remained there during the night 23-24 November, while Russian cavalry bivouacked in the south edge of the same village. All during the afternoon, on all fronts, infantry as well as cavalry, severe fighting took place. The cavalry divisions were constantly under artillery fire.
At 3:00 PM, 23 Kovember, one squadron of the 4th Cuirassiers made a reconnaissance to the northeast to locate the two hostile cavalry divisions reported advancing. The squadron advanced to Bendzielin and made a stand. By spreading out on a wide front the commander deceived the Russians as to his real strength and contained the leading Cossack brigade. At the same time, much needed protection was given to the flank of the 50th Division just west of Bendzielin.
Source: Review of Military Literature. March 1938.
Cheers. Raúl M
.Re: Battle of Lodz, 1914
Hello to all ; more follows...........................
CAVALRY AT LODZ.
THE XXV CORPS. Actions while the cavalry was performing the covering, defensive, mission.
Upon crossing the Miazga River the corps was to advance north in three columns. The 50th Reserve Division with the 72d Brigade attached via Rokiziny and Chrusty Nowe; the 49th Reserve Division on the main road through Borowo with its left on the Golo-Zielona Galkow road; the 3d Guard Division through the forest west of Borowo toward Galkow. The objective was Brzeziny.
The advance guard of the 49th Division started off toward the north to push back the Russians and gain room for the remainder of the troops in the vicinity of Karpin. Maneuver space was needed to get straightened out after the confusion resulting from the night withdrawal. The 50th Division rested an hour at Laznowska Wola before turning north. The 3d Guard Division was assembling its scattered units in the forest north of Gora Zielona. While the 50th Division was resting and the 3d Guard Division assembling, the advance guard of the 49th Division became separated at the railroad embankment north of Borowo and was annihilated by the Russians.
The 50th Division advancing in several columns through the woods, fought a desperate battle at Ruzyca which lasted well into the night and defeated a powerful Russian attack coming from the east toward the right flank. The 3d Guard Division pushed north through the woods south of Galkowck. That division left its artillery behind, made an all night forced march, and by a surprise attack forced an entry into Brzeziny at 3:00 AM, 24 November. Unquestionably this move saved the whole XXV Corps and the I Cavalry Corps.
General Litzmann, Commanding the 3d Guard Division, leaves record that he realized the desperate situation of the corps. So did everyone else. But he, Litzmann, had an old line trained outfit which made possible a rapid, controlled, forced night march. Record leaves no indication that Litzmann made an effort to communicate his plan to the corps or other division commanders. The Guard Division was thought lost, destroyed or captured by the remainder of the corps until news of its accomplishment leaked through the Russian lines. It is feared that Litzmann's piece of masterly tactics was the result of a wild dash for safety in the direction of home. At any event the maneuver was successful and saved the stranded forces.
At dark, 23 November, the situation as known to the corps commander (Scheffer) was most critical. No advance could be made north of the railroad extending across the front. All contact had been lost with the 3d Guard Division and no one knew where it was. We know it was safe in Brzeziny. The cavalry was being hard pressed to protect from the rear. On all sides the Russians were closing in. It is believed that the long column of 8,000 prisoners who were marched in a formation similar to a German division, deceived the Russians and delayed their attack, the Russians believing them to be reinforcements to the German corps. The night was bitter cold, eight below zero.
Source: Review of Military Literature. March 1938.
Cheers. Raúl M.
; more follows...........................CAVALRY AT LODZ.
THE XXV CORPS. Actions while the cavalry was performing the covering, defensive, mission.
Upon crossing the Miazga River the corps was to advance north in three columns. The 50th Reserve Division with the 72d Brigade attached via Rokiziny and Chrusty Nowe; the 49th Reserve Division on the main road through Borowo with its left on the Golo-Zielona Galkow road; the 3d Guard Division through the forest west of Borowo toward Galkow. The objective was Brzeziny.
The advance guard of the 49th Division started off toward the north to push back the Russians and gain room for the remainder of the troops in the vicinity of Karpin. Maneuver space was needed to get straightened out after the confusion resulting from the night withdrawal. The 50th Division rested an hour at Laznowska Wola before turning north. The 3d Guard Division was assembling its scattered units in the forest north of Gora Zielona. While the 50th Division was resting and the 3d Guard Division assembling, the advance guard of the 49th Division became separated at the railroad embankment north of Borowo and was annihilated by the Russians.
The 50th Division advancing in several columns through the woods, fought a desperate battle at Ruzyca which lasted well into the night and defeated a powerful Russian attack coming from the east toward the right flank. The 3d Guard Division pushed north through the woods south of Galkowck. That division left its artillery behind, made an all night forced march, and by a surprise attack forced an entry into Brzeziny at 3:00 AM, 24 November. Unquestionably this move saved the whole XXV Corps and the I Cavalry Corps.
General Litzmann, Commanding the 3d Guard Division, leaves record that he realized the desperate situation of the corps. So did everyone else. But he, Litzmann, had an old line trained outfit which made possible a rapid, controlled, forced night march. Record leaves no indication that Litzmann made an effort to communicate his plan to the corps or other division commanders. The Guard Division was thought lost, destroyed or captured by the remainder of the corps until news of its accomplishment leaked through the Russian lines. It is feared that Litzmann's piece of masterly tactics was the result of a wild dash for safety in the direction of home. At any event the maneuver was successful and saved the stranded forces.
At dark, 23 November, the situation as known to the corps commander (Scheffer) was most critical. No advance could be made north of the railroad extending across the front. All contact had been lost with the 3d Guard Division and no one knew where it was. We know it was safe in Brzeziny. The cavalry was being hard pressed to protect from the rear. On all sides the Russians were closing in. It is believed that the long column of 8,000 prisoners who were marched in a formation similar to a German division, deceived the Russians and delayed their attack, the Russians believing them to be reinforcements to the German corps. The night was bitter cold, eight below zero.
Source: Review of Military Literature. March 1938.
Cheers. Raúl M
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