Hello to all
; a little contribution IOT share an old article on this subject...........................
The Rumanian Campaign of 1916 – By Lieut. Col PAUL R. DAVISON, Cavalry.
King Carol, the Teutonic king of the throne, was definite in his choice. The King’s antecedents, long German training, and the strong friendship with the rulers of the Central Powers, all combined to hold his sympathies on the Teutonic side of the conflict. The Rumanian government, however, took a less prejudiced view. The feelings of the king on one hand and the government and the army on the other, called for a decision. Therefore, on 4 August, 1914, the king called a special advisory council, to which ministers and leaders of the Opposition Party were invited. The result of the vote was a majority in favor of neutrality, and the army, when the question was submitted to it, gave the same decision.
Prior to 1914 the European political situation held Rumania in a peculiar strangle hold. Germany and Austria had built up economic Rumania and since the early eighties had held a firm grip upon her trade. They had systematically secured control of her important industries, railroads, oil fields, forests and finances. The natural trade channels ran westward to Austria and Germany, where her raw materials were converted into manufactured articles which, in turn, found a ready market in Rumania. The Central Powers had grown to be her logical allies in trade and, moreover, an understanding had long existed between the three nations, binding them closely together. There existed a party, however, with strong leanings toward France, based upon traditional friendship and a feeling for that country and for Italy of blood relationship, which served to counterbalance the pro German sentiment of the King and his court. For Russia, there was a feeling of distrust on all sides, arising from the seizure of Bessarabia from Romania after the Russo-Turkish War, and from the fact that Rumania realized she lay directly in the path of Russian ambitions on the Straits.
The death of King Carol, in October 1914, completely changed the complexion of things. The new king did not have the decided German tendencies of his father, and his queen, an English princess, threw her strong influences into the scale in favor of the Allies. As the war progressed, Rumania became more and more valuable to the Central Powers.
From a strategic standpoint, as a neutral or ally, she stood between Russia and the Oriental Railroad, the very life vein of Germany’s eastern Allies. In addition, she guarded Constantinople against Russian aggression from the east. Of great importance, too, a matter which became especially apparent as the Allied war of attrition made itself felt to the Central Powers, was the wealth of raw materials, notably grain and oil produced by Rumania, which supplied to a large extent the deficiencies of the Teutonic Allies. Rumania’s pre-war exportation of grain amounted to a huge figure. The great Rumanian oil fields located in Old Rumania were then and still are the only big source of natural oil supply in Europe west of Soviet Russia. This oil field still retains its importance, for many experts believe that even today Germany’s production of coal and oil is insufficient for her needs in a major war of any duration.
In July 1916 the German High Command estimated that as soon as the time was opportune, Rumania would join the Allied Powers. To meet this expected enemy, Field Marshal von Mackensen was designated as commander-in-chief of the new front and told to make the preliminary plans and to carry out the necessary reconnaissance, He moved into Bulgaria and there assembled such Bulgarian, Turkish, Austrian, Hungarian and German troops as could be spared from other fronts. There in BuIgaria Mackensen awaited developments.
The necessary troops not being immediately available to fight Rumania, the German Foreign Office prolonged the negotiations with Rumania as long as possible. In August, representatives of Germany, Austria, Bulgaria and Turkey determined upon the plan of campaign and set aside the required quotas of troops for the purpose.
The geographical position of Rumania, as well as the military situation at the time when hostilities were commenced against the Central Powers, severely limited the plans of action open to the Rumanian staff, and in fact reduced them to two-first, an offensive to the south from Dobruja, or second, operations to the west into Transylvania. The first plan had to recommend it the hope of effecting a junction with General Sarrail’s forces at Salonika, and so of crushing Bulgaria, but it was rejected as entirely too hazardous in view of the French general’s apparent reluctance to advance from his base. The other alternative was far more attractive, but on political and military grounds Transylvania was the Romanian Alsace-Lorraine, where the invader would be certain of finding popular sympathy on his side—an asset which he would certainly not possess in any invasion of Bulgaria-while the Romanian flanks would be protected by the Russians in Galicia and by Wallachia itself; these advantages, it was hoped, would more than counterbalance the fact that the Transylvanian railway system favored the enemy. It was accordingly decided to make the offensive to the west. For that purpose three armies, each consisting of about four divisions, were formed, and on the night of 27-28 August they began their advance in a general northwesterly direction into Transylvania. Three divisions were detailed to hold the line of the Danube, and an equal number were left to guard the Dobruja, whiter the Russians had promised to send one cavalry and two infantry divisions.
Source: Review Military Literature. Jun 1939.
Why not neutral? Was not a good option at that time? TIA. Cheers. Raúl M
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