Franco´s "wrong targets": Toledo and Valencia?

[durb]

When it comes to the military history of Republican side, the errors and blunders of their part have been well analyzed from the beginning to the ultimate defeat. But is the Nationalist story error free tale of continuing military success and choosing always the right thing to do? If it really would have been so, then the whole Civil War should have ended more quickly!

There has been some debate on Franco´s possible mistakes during the Civil War - meaning that he chose sometimes wrong targets which did allow the Civil War to continue more time than necessarily was the case. Although "wrong" decisions may have been rationally based, they nevertheless can be questioned by the light of later knowledge.

The first point made by some critics is that relieving the siege of Alcazar in Toledo diverted Nationalist column at south from strategically more important fast advance toward Madrid. Republicans were thus given some extra time to prepare the defences of Madrid and rearm enough to stop Nationalists taking Madrid and thus ending the Civil War more quickly. However I´m not sure about this - the relief of siege of Alcazar was a considerable propaganda and morale boosting victory and I´m not sure if going for Toledo did actually divert Nationalist troops seriously from "the more important" or "more direct" advance toward Madrid. According to what I have read Franco was a cautious commander (he had reasonably learned to be so for the hard lessons of Rif War). Franco tried always to keep the flanks protected to avoid any nasty surprises and this probably was more important reason why Madrid could not be taken by "direct push". Could he have taken more risks and push more quickly toward Madrid and actually take it in early autumn 1936?

Actually more controversial decision may have been to choose Valencia as attacking target in the spring 1938 after breaking through to the Mediterranean and splitting Republican zone at two parts. Valencia as a Republican capital was of course a logical choice, but that offensive can not be considered as a real success for Nationalists as their advance was effectively halted despite some (limited) territorial gains. The Republican forces at Catalonia however were weaker and more in disarray than those around Valencia (according to some commentators). Why Franco did not choose Barcelona and Catalonia as the primary target in spring 1938 and was it seriously suggested by some Nationalist generals/advicers at that time? Now we know, that time was wasted when trying unsuccessfully to break through strong defence lines of Valencia and thus Republican forces in Catalonia got valuable time to reorganize and rearm themselves to cause even a crisis situation at Ebro in late summer 1938.

Alfredo Kindelán and other supposed critics of Franco may have reason to point out that the Mediterranean offensive should have been continued by direct continuing attack against weaker Republican forces in Catalonia with the aim of taking Barcelona as soon as possibly. The retreating Republicans were in disarray and direct push toward Barcelona could have been much more successful than spilling in vain blood for Valencia and getting stopped with heavy casualties at XYZ line.

But Valencia and actually wasting men at unsuccessful breakthrough attempts at XYZ line was chosen, and the Civil War continued perhaps unnecessarily 3 - 4 months more. It could have been avoided by not letting retreating Republican forces in Catalonia to have any time to reorganize and rearm themselves. The whole Ebro crisis would have been avoided and the Civil War could have ended by the late 1938 and the whole war would have cost somewhat less combat casualties (of both sides).

It is of course easy later to critize some decisions with the current knowledge compared to that of of some decision maker of past, but maybe choosing Valencia instead of Barcelona during the spring of 1938 was Franco´s biggest military mistake during the whole Civil War?

It is always easy to see error of the losers of war, but it does not necessarily mean that the opposite story of winners is free from all mistakes and wrong decisions. Errors/mistakes may have been understable and even logical, but nevertheless they can be pointed out (nobody is perfect).

[Sid Guttridge]

The argument against the Toledo operation is that it may have cost the Nationalists their best moment to take Madrid. However, the Nationalists survived for years without holding the capital, so, provided their morale held up, so might the Republicans.

I think the Valencia/Barcelona proposition is plausible, but the failure of the Valencia offensive proved far from a fatal error. It seems that the Republicans were only in a position to buy time by then, not to achieve victory.

Sid.

[steverodgers801]

Once the Germans and Italians intervened Franco was going to win and while the Soviets sent some aid it was not enough.

[Ironmachine]

The usual reason given for Franco's rejection of an offensive against Cataluña in 1938 is the fear of a French offensive if National troops (which in that case meant also Italian and German troops) moved near the French border. Even if the French had no intention of launching such an offensive, it seems that German-Italian-Nationalist Spanish intelligence considered this offensive a real possibility at the time. On the other hand, Valencia (continuing then against Madrid) was "on paper" a much more decisive target than Cataluña, while Republican troops in the Región Central were not expected to offer much more resistance than those in the Región Oriental.
With all that in mind, choosing Valencia instead of Cataluña as the target for the spring 1938 offensive can hardly be considered a mistake. It ended being a failure, but that's a different problem.

[Sid Guttridge]

Hi Ironmachine,

By definition, if it ended in failure it can hardly be adjudged anything other than a mistake. Either the timing, the target, the balance of forces, the tactics used, or some other factor was at fault.

It is possible, of course, that the same Nationalist forces, if used to strike north prematurely, might also have been thrown back. It also might have given the Republicans to the south the possibility of assembling a counter-attack force in their rear, rather than expend reserves in defensive fighting. Who knows?

The European situation changed drastically between the drive to the Mediterranean in April 1938 and the over running of Catalonia in early 1939. Hitler consolidated the Anschluss with Austria and had gained Sudetenland, so, as you say, the ability of France to intervene in Spain was enormously reduced. As a result, an early strike on Valencia rather than Barcelona to avoid provoking the French, might have made more international political sense, but militarily it was a failure.

All we know for sure is that when the Nationalists did strike north on Catalonia, it brought the entire Republic down without the need to attack Valencia again. So North looks like the right move.

Cheers,

Sid.

[durb]

In military sense I guess that eliminating Catalonia would have been wiser move, although political considerations had to be taken in account. Probably Franco & Nationalist HQ had no idea how strong resistance their troops would meet at XYZ line, where the terrain was just too favourable for defence (and Republicans knew that they must hold Valencia at all costs). Maybe an error of simply underestimating enemy´s chances to make successfull defence around Valencia?

In early 1937 it was a right idea to give up of the too costly idea of overtaking Madrid first and starting to eliminate Republican "pockets" beginning with Northern provinces and probably it would have been better to leave well defended Valencia alone and eliminate first "the big pocket" around Barcelona. For the little I know, Barcelona would have probably fallen more easily and it would have made sense to cut the last landborder contacts of Republic with outside world. The bases in Baleares would have given also effective flank support to the invasion on Catalonia. On the other hand Franco and his HQ were professional soldiers and they surely evaluated carefully different possibilities and found enough reasons to go for Valencia in the spring 1938.

One theory is that specially German advisers wanted to direct Franco toward Valencia in order to deliberately prolong the Spanish Civil War and calculating that it would serve German interests to keep the ongoing Civil War still in media focus in 1938. This supposedly had following objectives:
1) to divert attention from German ambitions in Central Europe and to remind people that there was still "a war against bolshevism" going on in Spain, 2) the continuing images of war in Spain reminding other European people of the horrors of war and thus making them more "pacifist" to appease German interests. However, I do not know if there are any documents or any other real proof about this "German conspiracy" to prolong the Spanish Civil War.

Of the Italian side it has been claimed that Italians wanted to keep their bases in Baleares as long as possible and thus it would have been also in their interest to prolong Spanish Civil War as much as possible. And thus they also could have been diverting deliberately Franco toward "wrong direction" (Valencia instead of Barcelona). But of this I do not know if there is any real proof - perhaps on the contrary it was in Italian interest to get the Civil War over as quickly as possible due to heavy (at least short-term) economic burden which the involvement in Civil War caused to Italy.

[Ironmachine]

All we know for sure is that when the Nationalists did strike north on Catalonia, it brought the entire Republic down without the need to attack Valencia again. So North looks like the right move.

All we know for sure is that when the Nationals did strike north on Catalonia in December 1938, it was a success. So North looks like a right move in December 1939 though not necessarily "the" one and only right move for that date. But whether it was a right move in April 1938 is a different argument.

One theory is that specially German advisers wanted to direct Franco toward Valencia in order to deliberately prolong the Spanish Civil War and calculating that it would serve German interests to keep the ongoing Civil War still in media focus in 1938

Even supposing that the Germans had some interest in keeping the war ongoing (a AFAIK that was not the case), that theory would only make sense if the Germans knew at the time that Franco could not take Valencia, or that the fall of Valencia would not cause the collapse of the Republic, or that the fall of Cataluña in early 1938 would cause the collapse of the Republic, or that...
That is, this theory only make sense if the Germans knew a lot of things they had no way to know. And then, German interest were put on a National victory, the earlier the better, as was consistently shown during the SCW.

[Sid Guttridge]

Hi durb,

You write, "One theory is that specially German advisers wanted to direct Franco toward Valencia in order to deliberately prolong the Spanish Civil War and calculating that it would serve German interests to keep the ongoing Civil War still in media focus in 1938. This supposedly had following objectives:
1) to divert attention from German ambitions in Central Europe and to remind people that there was still "a war against bolshevism" going on in Spain, 2) the continuing images of war in Spain reminding other European people of the horrors of war and thus making them more "pacifist" to appease German interests. However, I do not know if there are any documents or any other real proof about this "German conspiracy" to prolong the Spanish Civil War"

Do you have a source for this theory?

Cheers,

Sid.

[durb]

The theory of Germans wanting to deliberately prolong Spanish Civil War is mentioned in more than one source - a list could be quite long. Among others it is mentioned in William L. Shirer´s book The Rise and Fall of Third Reich (1959):

"From the very beginning the Fuehrer's Spanish policy was shrewd, calculated and far-seeing. A perusal of the captured German documents makes plain that one of Hitler's purposes was to prolong the Spanish Civil War in order to keep the Western democracies and Italy at loggerheads and draw Mussolini toward him."


Other works regarding this theory are Weinberg 1980: The Foreign Policy of Hitler´s Germany, Starting World War II, 1937 - 1939, p. 298 and the theory is quite old because it is mentioned already in Wiskeman (1949): Rome - Berlin Axis, p. 91.

It has been repeated in later books of some historians (I recently came up with in one 2007 published Swedish biography of Franco), specially those popularising the history of Spanish Civil War for wider audience than professional scholars and students. However the theory has been also questioned by many historians like by John F. Coverdale in his book Italian Intervention in Spanish Civil War (1976). He puts it following way (p. 164 of his book): "It is true that Hitler did not do everything he might have to shorten to war, but that is far cry from deliberately prolonging it."

Leaving this larger context aside, the real question is if Franco and his HQ made right or wrong decision in spring 1938 when Valencia was chosen target. Looking from results it was a mistaken choice - lots of sacrifices for too limited gains (Castellón was a clear gain, but it was not the real point). Nationalists were effectively stopped at XYZ line with unsuccessful breakthrough attempts in which Nationalist casualties were heavier than those of defending Republicans.

But of course one should also give some credit to Republicans - they showed that they were still able to fight and by early 1938 the Civil War was not yet a easy walkover for Nationalists at all fronts. The basic mistake was probably to undervaluate the strength of Republican defence (or better said Republican capacity to build it) around Valencia which made it too hard nut to crack for Nationalists during early summer of 1938. Republicans knew well that that they had to keep Valencia at all costs and fought stubbornly (and perhaps one could say even bravely) to keep Valencia at all costs. In this respect some "easier" target should have been chosen in order to diminish Nationalist casualties and achieving more successful breakthrough at some other part of front. Could Catalonia have been that target?

Antony Beevor in "Spanish Civil War" (2009) thinks so: " Following the success of the Aragon Offensive resulting in the Nationalist armies reaching the Mediterranean Sea, the Republic was split in two; the Spanish Republican Army was in disarray and the road to Barcelona was open for conquest by the Nationalists. Even General Vicente Rojo said that Barcelona could have been taken with "less force and in less time" than in January 1939. The Nationalist generals and Francisco Franco's German and Italian allies expected a swift attack against Barcelona. Nevertheless, Franco decided to turn south against the capital of the Spanish Republic at Valencia." (see. p. 345)

Beevor considers the defense battle at XYZ line as a clear defensive victory for Republicans - in other words Nationalist offensive failed and the question is if it was doomed to be that right from the beginning (?) or should it at least have been stopped once it was clear that there would not be a breakthrough to Valencia with acceptable losses for Nationalists (probably the real point!). Like earlier with Madrid, Valencia with its strong defence lines could have been left for later - and eliminating first Republican resistance at some softer target which in late spring 1938 would have been Catalonia.

If this is right conclusion, then Franco and his HQ made a clear mistake choosing Valencia as "next target" for late spring offensive of 1938, no matter how logical and well weighed the decision was at its time. Or was it the idea right, but the execution of it just failed? Maybe it was not a mistake from the very start, but it turned out to be such.

[Ironmachine]

The theory of Germans wanting to deliberately prolong Spanish Civil War is mentioned in more than one source

Even if this is true, it does not immediately mean that "German advisers wanted to direct Franco toward Valencia in order to deliberately prolong the Spanish Civil War".

A perusal of the captured German documents makes plain that one of Hitler's purposes was to prolong the Spanish Civil War in order to keep the Western democracies and Italy at loggerheads and draw Mussolini toward him."

It would be interesting to see what documents are those. However, there was a clear limit to what Hitler could do to prolong the SCW, and it was a delicate equilibrium that could backfire badly for him. On the other hand, German military advisors and diplomats in Spain repeatedly complained about the slowness of the operations. So even if Hitler did tried to prolong the SCW (and AFAIK is far from clear that this is true), it seems that the "prolongation" of the war resulted directly from Franco's way of war, wich after all was the way that best suited his interests.

[Sid Guttridge]

Hi durb,

A good reply as to sources, though I still do not buy into the premise that Hitler was extending Spanish Civil War to provide cover for his own ambitions in central Europe.

I tend not to use Beevor as a source as he tends to be very derivative (all his books Crete, Stalingrad, Berlin, SCW tend to follow where others have led), but I should point out that your quote says "The Nationalist generals and Francisco Franco's German and Italian allies expected a swift attack against Barcelona. Nevertheless, Franco decided to turn south against the capital of the Spanish Republic at Valencia", thereby blaming Franco, not the Germans.

Cheers,

Sid.

[Ironmachine]

The theory of Germans wanting to deliberately prolong Spanish Civil War is mentioned in more than one source - a list could be quite long. Among others it is mentioned in William L. Shirer´s book The Rise and Fall of Third Reich (1959):
"From the very beginning the Fuehrer's Spanish policy was shrewd, calculated and far-seeing. A perusal of the captured German documents makes plain that one of Hitler's purposes was to prolong the Spanish Civil War in order to keep the Western democracies and Italy at loggerheads and draw Mussolini toward him."

Unfortunately (or perhaps conveniently ) those documents can not be perused because there is no reference to a source for that statement in Shirer's book. The only referenced statement that hints to an interest by Hitler in prolonging the SCW is the following quote:

More than a year later, on November 5, 1937, Hitler would reiterate his Spanish policy in a confidential talk with his generals and his Foreign Minister. “A hundred per cent victory for Franco,” he told them, was “not desirable from the German point of view. Rather we are interested in a continuance of the war and in keeping up the tensions in the Mediterranean.”

The source given is Documents on German Foreign Policy 1918-45, Series D, 1937-45, Volume I, p. 37. Washington, U.S. Department of State.
So perhaps (can anyone confirm the reference?) Hitler was interested in November 1937 in keeping the SCW going. Perhaps he even had the same interest after that date. But even if that was the case, I have never seen any support, and none have been given in this thread, for the theory that the attack against Valencia (instead of a campaign in Cataluña) in the spring of 1938 was instigated by the Germans to deliberately prolong the war.

Other works regarding this theory are Weinberg 1980: The Foreign Policy of Hitler´s Germany, Starting World War II, 1937 - 1939, p. 298

Well, the same author, in Hitler's Foreign Policy 1933-1939: The Road to World War II, while supporting the theory and quoting the same 5 November 1937 conference that Shirer quoted, adds a very revealing fact:

The comment on Franco’s military procedure of slow offensives [“If one takes into account the length of time Franco had used in his offensives up to now, the war could possibly last about another three years”] must be read as partly ironic; both the Germans and the Italians were periodically exasperated by the measured pace of the military operations of the Ntionalist armies.

So even if the Germans really wanted to prolong the war, they really didn't need to do anything. Franco was already doing the best for their interests.