Both parties agree that, in principle, political movements should keep step with the Naval situation, but it is realised that this may be difficult to accomplish. Ioth parties also agree that the political ancl Naval measures of each nation should be kept in step with those of the other nation. To this end it is agreed that it is desirable that the arrival of the British Fleet at Singapore and the U.S. Fleet at Honolulu should, as far as possible, be synchronised. Nevertheless, it is realised that the circumstances, and particularly any incidents primarily affecting one nation rather than both, may make it difficult to carry out the above policy.
It is assumed that all waters of the British Commonwealth, including the Dominions, will be available for use of U.S. Naval Forces and that all waters of the United States, including the Philippines, will be available for use of the British Naval Forces.
It is understood that the Government of the United Kingdom cannot definitely commit the Governments of the Dominions of the British Commonwealth to any action in concert with the United Kingdom. The Admiralty feels sure, however, that Canada, Australia and New Zealand would co-operate with the United Kingdom against Japan in the circumstances under consideration.
The Admiralty is not at the present time anticipating any direct aid from the French or Dutch in the Far East, but they consider that it is possible that the latter might adopt a benevolent attitude of nieutrality. The Admiralty are not counting on any aid from Russia.
In the event of Germany proving hostile a most serious problem would arise. The Adniralty is not so seriously apprehensive of submarines as they believe that they can successfully deal with them. They are, however, seriously appre- hensive of British trade routes in the Atlantic, should the Gernans use their 3 Pocket Battleships and the 2 new 27,000 ton ships as commerce raiders.
An even more dangerous situation would arise should hostilities with Italy also supervene after the greater part of the British Fleet had proceeded to the Far East. It would be necessary for the Admiralty to rely entirely on the alternative route to the East via the Cape of Good Hope. In these circumstances the main problem in the Mediterranean would be to hold the Suez Canal and Egypt. The Admiralty would have to depend on the French Navy to hold the Western Mediterranean and some of her Naval Forces would have to be based on Gibraltar to secure the Western entrance. They would themselves, however, keep anti-submarine forces at Gibraltar. In this connection the Admiralty is of the opinion that the Straits of Gibraltar can be made hazardous for the passage of enemy submarines.
In the event of such a general European war it would almost certainly be necessary to effect a considerable reduction in the British strength in the Far East. With the reduction of British strength in the Far East under these condi- tions the possible necessity of direct tactical co-operation between the U.S. and British Fleets would require further consideration. Policy with regard to Forces now in the Far East
It is understood that the U.S. Navy Department would like the U.S. garrisons now in North China to be withdrawn and that in emergency the U.S. Asiatic Fleet would withdraw from Northern Chinese Waters.
The Admiralty is also concerned regarding the British garrisons in North China. Should parallel action in regard to the movements of the two Main Fleets be decided upon, consideration would have to be given to the accurate timing of the withdrawal of the British troops in North China to Hong Kong, and the major units of the British China Fleet would also have to withdraw to that place or to Singapore. Arrangements for inter-commiunication betweeni British and U.S. Fleets
It is agreed that since the two fleets will be widely separated at first and probably for some time there could not be unity of command in a tactical or strategic sense in the near future. It is, however, agreed that strategic co-opera- tion will be necessary and that such co-operation will require common com- munication facilities.
The following arrangements have been agreed upon to this end:-
(a) The Admiralty will distribute to all ships of the British Fleet, and arrange to deposit at the British Embassy in Washington, at Gibraltar and in the Far East for issue to the ships of the U.S. Navy, the necessary copies ot the following books:-
(1) A suitable Code
(2) Re-cyphering Tables for use with the Codle by the Higher Command.
(3) Re-cyphering Tables for use with the Code by the other Flag Officers.
(4) Re-cyphering Tables for use with the Code by all ships.
(5) A Key Memorandum containing simple recognition signals for use by both Fleets.
(6) A book of War W/T Call Signs for both Fleets.
(b) A copy of the British Naval W/T organisation wiVL be issued by the Admiralty with the books to be distributed to the U.S. Fleet.
(c) The U.S. Navy Department will make available the necessary copies of their Pacific and Asiatic Fleet W/T Organisation for distribution to the British Fleet. These will be deposited as soon as practicable with the U.S. Embassy in London, on board the Flagship of the U.S. Squadron in the Mediterranean, and on board the Flagship of the U.S. Asiatic Fleet.
(d) Commercial W/T procedure will be used for inter-communication.
(e) The Admiralty will propose frequencies for inter-communication if and when the occasion arises.
(f) Direct inter-communication by W/T between individual ships of the two Fleets will not normally be necessary unless tactical co-operation is envisaged.
The inter-communication procedure outlined above will be subject to adjust- ment between the Commanders-in-Chief of the two Main Fleets.
Interchange of Communication Personnel
To facilitate inter-communication between the two Fleets it is agreed that the following inter-change of personnel with experience in WIT would be desirable:
(a) 1 Officer and 1 rating from U.S. Asiatic Fleet to be lent temporarily to both Hong Kong and Singapore W/T Stations. (b) 1 Officer, if and when available, and 1 Chief Petty Officer Telegraphist to be lent temporarily from the British China Fleet to the U.-S. Asiatic Fleet Flagship.
(c) 1 Officer and 1 rating to be lent from the British and U.S. Navies to the U.S. and British Main Fleet flagships respectively.
(d) 1 British Officer to be appointed for duty with the U.S. Navy initially at Washington. One officer from U.S. Navy to be attached to the staff of the U.S. Naval Attache in London -and to be available for communi- cati on duties. General Liaison
Both parties agree that no further measures for general liaison purposes are necessary at the present time. Should, however, parallel action be decided upon by the two Governments, it would be necessary to appoint a British Officer with knowledge of war plans to Washington and a U.S. Officer with similar knowledge for duty in London. Strategical Policy
Should the Governments decided that a distant blockade is to be established, the British Naval Forces will be responsible for the stoppage of Japanese trade on a line running, roughly, from Singapore through the Dutch East Indies past New Guinea and New Hebrides, and thence to the Eastward of Australia and New Zealand.
The U.S. Navy will be responsible for operations against Japanese trade throughout the WVest Coast of North and South America, including the Panama Canal and the passage round Cape Horn.
The U.S. Navy will also assume responsibilitv for the general Naval defence of the West Coast of Canada. In these circumstances it is agreed that no hard and fast line of demarcation between the areas in which the two fleets will. operate need to be laid down at this stage.
(Sd.) R. E. Ingersoll, Captain, United States Navy.
(Sd.) T. S. V. Phillips, Captain. Royal Navy.
13th January, 1938.