Outcome of Khalkhin Gol for Japan

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Marcelo Jenisch
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Re: Outcome of Khalkhin Gol for Japan

#16

Post by Marcelo Jenisch » 24 Sep 2016, 03:22

Thanks for the informations, Takao.

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Re: Outcome of Khalkhin Gol for Japan

#17

Post by BobTheBarbarian » 24 Sep 2016, 05:16

Takao wrote: Not exactly...The Imperial Japanese Army saw as their main opponents the Soviets. The Imperial Japanese Navy saw as their main opponent the United States.
As soon as the United States put an embargo on Japan's oil supply any attack against the USSR was immediately out of the question. Prior to that, despite the growing tensions in the south the Japanese Army in Manchuria had been building up at a steady rate with the objective of achieving a readiness stance for a potential strike into Siberia. Confronted by a choice between opportunism and national survival the Japanese command chose the obvious path.

Were it not for their economic troubles with the US there was a high probability that Japan would have attacked the Soviet Union in the latter half of 1941.
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Marcelo Jenisch
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Re: Outcome of Khalkhin Gol for Japan

#18

Post by Marcelo Jenisch » 24 Sep 2016, 15:55

BobTheBarbarian wrote:
Takao wrote: Not exactly...The Imperial Japanese Army saw as their main opponents the Soviets. The Imperial Japanese Navy saw as their main opponent the United States.
As soon as the United States put an embargo on Japan's oil supply any attack against the USSR was immediately out of the question. Prior to that, despite the growing tensions in the south the Japanese Army in Manchuria had been building up at a steady rate with the objective of achieving a readiness stance for a potential strike into Siberia. Confronted by a choice between opportunism and national survival the Japanese command chose the obvious path.
Well, if in 1941 the Japanese really abandoned the idea of attacking the USSR because of fear that they would not have a favourable chance due to Soviet military strength, given their defeat in 1939, then this validates the mainstream historiographic view of the importance of Nomonhan (and actually as of yet, I have not read about a scholar arguing otherwise in regard to the importance of Nomonhan).
Were it not for their economic troubles with the US there was a high probability that Japan would have attacked the Soviet Union in the latter half of 1941.
Well, one could just argue that without economic troubles with the US, the Japanese would be even more committed to strike south. I personally think that this would be more interesting, given the non-aggression pact with the Soviets and their war with Germany. Then try settle the war in China, and only then evaluate the Soviet question. Exception of course, if it was quite clear that the Soviets would be defeated by Germany (actually this policy of attacking the USSR only if opportunity arised was detemined in an Imperial Conference some time after Barbarossa started).

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Re: Outcome of Khalkhin Gol for Japan

#19

Post by Marcelo Jenisch » 24 Sep 2016, 16:25

But I would like to address one thing that I disagree about the mainstream view of the Japanese options in 1941. And is regard to the vision that the Japanese had two options, but they decided to go south simply because they considered their chances to be quite small against the USSR. I think this vision is unfair because it desconsiderates the possibility of American intervention in a war against the USSR. Not necessarily direct military intervention, but specially economic (which in turn, as I already argued, could have well lead to a war with the Americans). In other words: I think the Japanese had more flexibility by going south. Going north was more complex because of the implications with the United States.

Needless to say, I think that Nomonhan may have well be the reason that the north strike became "more complex". As long as one assumes that it was Nomonhan that made the Japanese belive they could not achive a quick victory against the Soviets in '41, and hence they not attacked due to it.

So in the end - and I will assume here that the majority of historians have good evidence for making the "pro-Nomonhan" case - both Nomonhan and the presence of the United States were very relevant, perhaps decisive factors in the Japanese decision to not went north in 1941. That's my conclusion.

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Re: Outcome of Khalkhin Gol for Japan

#20

Post by BobTheBarbarian » 25 Sep 2016, 05:43

Marcelo Jenisch wrote: Well, if in 1941 the Japanese really abandoned the idea of attacking the USSR because of fear that they would not have a favourable chance due to Soviet military strength, given their defeat in 1939, then this validates the mainstream historiographic view of the importance of Nomonhan (and actually as of yet, I have not read about a scholar arguing otherwise in regard to the importance of Nomonhan).
It was not so much because they viewed their chances against the Soviets to be small (indeed, if they had gone ahead with the operational plan approved by Hirohito on 7 July 1941 the IJA would have concentrated a crushing superiority of forces against the Red Army in Primorye), it was because the US embargoes limited the amount of time the Japanese military economy could have functioned before it collapsed due to want of raw materials. If the Japanese attacked the Soviet Union they would have committed the bulk of their available land forces to a campaign that would only net them political dividends and do nothing to solve the existential economic crisis brought on by tensions with the United States - in fact it would have worsened it. With this in mind the only option available to the Japanese militarists (other than caving in to Uncle Sam) was to 'strike south.'

The lack of Japanese action against the USSR was more a case of the stars never quite aligning, or in their own terminology, "the persimmon never ripening enough" to merit an attack, rather than any fear of Soviet military prowess.
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Re: Outcome of Khalkhin Gol for Japan

#21

Post by Marcelo Jenisch » 25 Sep 2016, 17:55

So Bob, do you think that Nomonhan wasn't decisive (i.e. Indispensable) for the Japanese decision to not attack the USSR in 1941?

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Re: Outcome of Khalkhin Gol for Japan

#22

Post by BobTheBarbarian » 02 Oct 2016, 16:25

Marcelo Jenisch wrote:So Bob, do you think that Nomonhan wasn't decisive (i.e. Indispensable) for the Japanese decision to not attack the USSR in 1941?
I don't think the Khalkhin Gol battle singlehandedly ended Japanese thoughts of "Striking North," no. As I mentioned earlier, prior to the American oil embargo both Tojo and Hirohito approved a plan which, if executed, would have sent some 1.2 million men crashing into Soviet Primorye with the objective of isolating it from the rest of Russia. The Japanese would have attacked everywhere east of Blagoveshchensk and as far north as Skovorodino to cut the trans-Siberian line. Then they would have shifted west to deal with the Red Army in the Trans-Baikal area.

The acceptance of this plan did not necessarily mean that war was guaranteed, but prior to it's complete scrapping in favor of seizing the "Southern Resource Area" it did make obvious that Japan's policy with regard to the Soviet Union was offensive in nature.
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steverodgers801
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Re: Outcome of Khalkhin Gol for Japan

#23

Post by steverodgers801 » 04 Oct 2016, 02:23

It was important because itshowed the Japanese that attacking the Soviets would not be easy, THe primary factor was Japan had nothing to gain by going against the Soviets. Oil was critical and that was available in the south as well as other vital materials

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Re: Outcome of Khalkhin Gol for Japan

#24

Post by paulrward » 20 Nov 2016, 03:46

Hello All ;

To Mr. Steverodger801 :

How about this: It is November of 1941. The Wehrmacht is starting to stall in the snow of Russia, and the first divisions are starting to come down the Trans Siberian Railway to reinforce Moscow. At this point, the Japanese Ambassador in Berlin has a sit down with Adolph. it goes something like this:

" Now here's the deal.... You have already occupied France and the Netherlands. We just moved into French Indochina. It's ours. But, if you also give us a clear title to the Dutch Indies, we will hit Russia right in the old Siberias. This will halt the movement of troops west, give your army a bit more of an edge, and probably win the war for you. After all, if your army gets into Moscow, it's Game Over for Stalin...

Oh, c'mon ! You'll still get all that Rumanian and Russian Oil ! And the wealth of the Ukraine ! All we are asking for is some jungle islands out on the other side of the world, most of the names of which you probably can't even pronounce...

So how about it ? We get the Indies, you get RUSSIA !

Huh? What about America ? Look, they're a Democracy ! A bunch of chattering idiots. By the time they figure out what we've done, we will be filling up tankers bound for Tokyo, and you'll be admiring Stalin's head on a stick.....

So, what say. Is it a deal ? "






Respectfully ;

Paul R. Ward
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Tim Smith
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Re: Outcome of Khalkhin Gol for Japan

#25

Post by Tim Smith » 21 Nov 2016, 01:40

The Japanese did not need Hitler's permission to annex the Dutch East Indies to their empire. There's nothing Germany could have done about it even if Hitler had objected. So Japan didn't need to do Germany any favours at all, let alone one as risky as attacking the USSR.

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Re: Outcome of Khalkhin Gol for Japan

#26

Post by paulrward » 21 Nov 2016, 04:47

Hello All ;

To Mr. Smith ;

Ah, but think of the politics of it ! Since the Netherlands at that moment had a puppet government run from Berlin, having the puppet Dutch Government put their seal of approval on the transfer would mean that the United States would have no reason to protest the move. It would simultaneously put more pressure on British Malaya, virtually envelope the Philippines, and put Japan well on the way to her Greater East Asian Co Prosperity Sphere, while at the same time avoiding war with either Britain or the more dangerous United States, and only expose Japan to the more limited risk of having to fight the USSR in Siberia. As the Russians were by that time totally engaged in a war for survival fighting against Nazi Germany, and they had already started moving forces west, it would catch the USSR at the worst of possible moments.

Japan might gain a lot of territory in Siberia, and it would also end any Soviet support for either Chaing Kai Chek or Mao Tse Tung, making the conquest of China a more achievable prospect.

And, it still leaves Germany to do all the heavy lifting on the Eastern Front. A true military genius always lets his allies do the toughest fighting....

Respectfully ;

Paul R. Ward
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Tim Smith
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Re: Outcome of Khalkhin Gol for Japan

#27

Post by Tim Smith » 26 Nov 2016, 08:25

paulrward wrote:Hello All ;

To Mr. Smith ;

Ah, but think of the politics of it ! Since the Netherlands at that moment had a puppet government run from Berlin, having the puppet Dutch Government put their seal of approval on the transfer would mean that the United States would have no reason to protest the move.
The US government did not recognise the legitimacy of the puppet Dutch government in the German-occupied Netherlands. The US recognised the Dutch government-in-exile in London as the legitimate Netherlands government, because that government-in-exile still administered the Dutch East Indies.

So the US government would simply ignore the puppet Dutch government's seal of approval.

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Re: Outcome of Khalkhin Gol for Japan

#28

Post by steverodgers801 » 28 Nov 2016, 04:15

Japan had its rear handed to them first of all, twice; second is there weren't enough troops for a serious invasion of Siberia due to the demands placed on it fighting in China about 80% and finally, Japan had nothing to gain by invading Siberia.

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Re: Outcome of Khalkhin Gol for Japan

#29

Post by steverodgers801 » 28 Nov 2016, 04:18

by the way there was no Dutch government in Holland, it was administered as a province of Germany, as with Quisling, the leader of the miniscule Dutch Nazi party, Mussart, was not taken serious by either the Dutch or Nazis.

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Re: Outcome of Khalkhin Gol for Japan

#30

Post by paulrward » 28 Nov 2016, 07:30

Hello Mr. SteveRogers801 ;

You are correct that the Japanese were defeated twice by the Soviets. But, with the Soviet Union
occupied with Germany in the West, this means that there will be no re inforcements coming down the Trans Siberian to trouble the IJA.

Thus, a Japanese attack increases the probability that the USSR might collapse in the winter of 1941-42, and that leaves a power vacuum in Manchuria and Siberia that I am sure the Japanese would be only too willing to fill. So, even if Japan suffers some tactical defeats on the ground against the Soviets, if the USSR crumbles, Japan comes out the winner anyway.



As for the Dutch Government, everything you say is true. And, that makes it better and better. A German controlled government in the Netherlands approves a Japanese occupation of the NEI, and the only ones screaming will the the Dutch Government in Exile in London, and the Dutch nationals in the NEI.

Do you really think the United States would go to war over some other nation's colonies, especially a nation that is occupied by Germany, and can't even govern itself ?

Yeah, I can see that going over really big in the United States Senate........


As a result, Japan gets the Indies without the United States getting involved. It stalls off the start of the war even longer, and gives Japan time to amalgamate all of those lovely Oil Fields into the Greater East Asian Co Prosperity Sphere.

As the Tojo once said to Hirohito, " What's not to like ? "


Respectfully ;

Paul R. Ward
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