robdab wrote:Judging by the way that Rich follows me around from website to website, I can only conclude that he remains very interested in both my historical and AH topics of discussion.
Rob, considering that you jumped back into this on 14 September about two posts after steverodgers reopened this and my first post was elicited from your stunningly egregious disinterest in historical or logical verisimilitude nearlt two months later on Armistice Day, my “following” of you can’t have been too energetic on my part. And even that response required the priming of your even more egregious nonsense regarding U.S. Navy ammunition loading to get me to start responding. You have this truly odd idea that the Internet revolves around your posts and those that "persecute" poor little old you because of those posts. It's about time you get over yourself.
Your case shortly after that was summarized by you as “I remember as being on page 474 (?). Since I don't have my copy at hand I'll have to confirm that page # tomorrow but Prange indicates therein that Nagumo and Kusaka, his Kido Butai second, had decided even BEFORE the KB left the Kuriles that there would be NO second air attack on Oahu installations of any kind. In clear violation of Japan's general attack orders if this "Seperate Volume" is to be believed ?”
The problem is that decision was actually made by consensus – the Japanese tradtion, not a unilateral decision by two independent actors – of the senior admirals long before the Kido Butai left Hitokappu Bay. During the second war game session on 13 October, Genda and Yamamoto’s ASO, Akira Sasaki, talked about the possibilities of repeated attacks before and after the war games. Without effect, since the consensus was that the risk to the carriers was too high unless a single strike of two waves and a rapid withdrawal was employed. As Prange put it, “a swift getaway, then [as of 13 October], constituted a basic element of Nagumo’s strategy.” (Prange 229-230.)
In other words, it was neither secret nor any surprise that Nagumo did what he did. Fuchida’s postwar posturing was just that – he sucked in Prange, but more recent scholarship shows that the events that Fuchida so dramatically described as occurring the morning of 7 December on Nagumo’s flag bridge never happened or, at best, did not happen the way he described it. Of course, it’s surprising that Prange got sucked into Fuchida’s trope, since the evidence was against such a notion from the very beginning. For example,
1. The attacks on Pearl Harbor were not continued or followed up by surface craft bombardment because the sole objective of the attack was to destroy the capital ship strength of the United States Pacific Fleet in order to delay any United States advance across the Pacific. Hence, since this objective was achieved by air attack, no further attack was considered necessary. Also, since the whereabouts of the American carriers was unknown and the chances of locating them by air search were small, it was considered that a quick withdrawal would be most advantageous.
Consideration was also given to the probability of a counterattack by the estimated 50 or more large land-based planes that remained in Hawaii after the attack.
2. No landing operation was planned because insufficient time was available to make all preparations during the month of November and also it was recognized that the problems of ship speed and logistics would have made it impossible to execute the initial attack without detection during the approach.
(USSBS, The Campaigns of the Pacific War, (Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1946), p. 20.)
Or Yamamoto’s orders to Nagumo,
Combined Fleet Ultrasecret Operation Order—(essentials).
Flagship NAGATO HIROSHIMA-WAN
22 Nov. 41
YAMAMOTO, Isoroku CinC Combined Fleet
Combined Fleet Order
A. The Task Force will move out from HITOKAPPU-WAN and proceed to the HAWAII area, maintaining the greatest secrecy as to its movements and a close watch against submarine or air attacks. At the opening of hostilities the Task Force will attack the main strength of the UNITED STATES Fleet in the HAWAII area and inflict crippling damage on it.
The first attack will be at dawn on X-Day (to be given in a later order).At the conclusion of the air attacks the force will regroup and withdraw immediately to JAPAN,
being prepared at all times to meet enemy counterattacks.
And the Task Force orders from Nagumo that resulted,
Task Force Ultrasecret Operation Order 1 (essentials).
Flagship AKAGI, HITOKAPPU-WAN
23 Nov 41
Task Force Commander
Task Force Order
A. The Task Force will proceed to the HAWAII area, taking every precaution to insure the secrecy of its movements. The force will attack the enemy fleet in the HAWAII area and attempt to cripple it.
The first air attack has been set for 0330 hours on X-Day.When the attacks have been completed the force will quickly withdraw.
Upon returning to JAPAN the force will be re-equipped and supplied and then assigned a task in the Second Phase Operations.
(Pearl Harbor Attack, Hearings before the Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack Congress of the United States, Part 13, Joint Committee Exhibits Nos. 7 and 8, (Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1946), p. 418.)
The Combined Fleet operational order also is available, and makes no mention of the Kido Butai remaining to interdict American logistics, unsurprising since that order was given to Sixth Fleet, whose Advance Striking Force was under Nagumo’s operational command, while the Kido Butai was in Hawaiian Area waters engaged on its mission
II. Combined Fleet Course of Action.
a. General Operations
1. With the forces in Second Fleet, Third Fleet, Combined Expeditionary Fleet and Eleventh Air Fleet as a nucleus destroy enemy fleet in the Philippines, British Malaya and Netherlands Indies.
Early stages of operations.
First occupy British Borneo and then as quickly as possibly occupy Dutch Borneo, Celebes and Southern Sumatra. The above to be followed by occupation of Molucca Islands and Timor.
Establish air bases in all of the above named places. Utilize air bases for subjugation of Java and then occupy Java. After capture of Singapore, occupy northern Sumatra and then at an opportune time commence operations in Burma. Cut supply routes to China.
2. Forces of the Fourth Fleet.
Defend the South Seas Islands, patrol, maintain surface communications, capture Wake. At opportune time attack and destroy enemy advanced bases in South Pacific Area. In cooperation with Army capture Guam and then Bismarck Area.
3. Forces of the Fifth Fleet.
Patrol the area east of the home islands. Make preparations against surprise attacks by enemy. Make reconnaissance of Aleutians and defend Ogasawara. Maintain surface communications. Be on guard against Russia.
4. Forces of the Sixth Fleet. (Submarines)
Make reconnaissance of American fleet in Hawaii and West Coast areas and by surprise attacks on shipping destroy lines of communications.
5. Forces of First Air Fleet. (Carriers)
Attack enemy fleet in Hawaii and reduce its strength. Thereafter support 4th Fleet operations and assist in capture of Southern Areas.
6. Main body of Combined Fleet.
Support operations in general. Operate as suitable.
7. Part of Combined Fleet.
Destroy enemy lines of communication in the Pacific and Indian Oceans.
b. Second Phase of Operations.
1. Forces of Sixth Fleet. (Submarines)
Make reconnaissance and surprise attacks on main forces of enemy fleet. Destroy enemy surface communications in cooperation with a part of Combined Fleet.
At opportune time make surprise attacks on enemy advanced bases.
2. Forces of First and Eleventh Air Fleets. (Carriers and land-based bombers)
Search for and attack enemy forces. Destroy enemy advanced bases.
3. Forces of Third Fleet, Expeditionary Fleet and other forces as necessary.
Defend occupied points in Southern Area. Operate patrols, maintain surface communications, search for and destroy enemy shipping in Southern Area, attack and destroy enemy advanced bases on our perimeter.
4. Forces of Fourth Fleet.
Defend and patrol points in South Sea Islands and Bismarcks. Maintain surface communications. Search for and attack enemy shipping. Make surprise attacks and destroy enemy bases on our perimeter.
5. Forces of Fifth Fleet.
Defend Ogasawara and patrol area to north of those islands and east of home islands. Maintain surface communications. Search for and attack enemy fleet should it appear in the area. Attack and destroy enemy bases in the Aleutians.
6. Part of Combined Fleet.
Destroy enemy surface communications in Pacific and Indian Oceans.
7. Main Body of Combined Fleet.
Support all operations. Operate as required.
8. In case of attack by strong American Force.
Maintain contact with part of Sixth Fleet. Reduce enemy strength by air and submarine attacks. At suitable opportunity assemble major portion of Combined Fleet and destroy enemy.
(USSBS, p. 47.)
But maybe OP is right, the need to reply to you evaporated long ago when you proved you had nothing new to bring to the table; just the same old tired misconceptions and twistings of facts.