Battle of Leyte Gulf TF 34

[captain_wright]

I'd like to know how strong a force Admiral Halsey would've had at his command had he formed Task Force 34 and detatched it to carry out its' mission at the battle of Leyte Gulf before heading north to engage the Japanese?
Did Halsey make a mistake in not detaching TF 34?

James

[mescal]

Here what I have :
the preliminary order of battle scheduled on 06 october, should a surface action occur :
(source : Operation Order CombatPac No 13-44)


TG 34-1 : Battle Line :
TU 34-1-1 : BatDiv 7: Iowa, New Jersey
TU 34-1-2 : BatDiv 8: Massachusetts, Washington
TU 34-1-3 : BatDiv 9: South Dakota, Alabama

TG 34-2 : Right Flank
TU 34-2-2 : CruDiv 14: Vincennes, Houston, Miami
TU 34-2-3 : DesDiv 103 : Owen, Miller, The Sullivans, Stephan Potter, Tingey
TU 34-2-4 : DesDiv 104 : Hickocs, Hunt, Lewis Hancock, Marshall

TG 34-4 : Left Flank
TU 34-4-2 : CruDiv 13 : Santa Fe, Birmingham, Mobile
TU 34-4-3 : DesDiv 99 : Bronson, Cotten, Dortch, Gatling, Healy
TU 34-4-4 : DesDiv 100 : Cogswell, Caperton, Ingersoll, Knapp

TG 34-9 : Supporting Carrier Group
TU 34-9-1 : San Jacinto + DesDiv 24 (Wilkes, Nicholson, Swanson)
TU 34-9-2 : Cowpens + DesDiv 23 (McCalla, Grayson)

Total : 6 BB, 6 CL, 2 CVL, 23 DD


However, it was *not* the deployment scheduled in the preliminary order sent by Halsey on the 24th.

The units supposed to guard San Bernardino were
Washington
Alabama
Iowa
New Jersey
with 2 CA (Wichita, New Orleans),
3 CL (Miami, Vincennes, Biloxi),
14 DD (DesDivs 99, 103, 104)
[note that I'm not 100% sure these were precisely those ships which were designated, but the numbers should be roughly correct]
plus Massachusetts and South Dakota, which however did not rejoin the force until late in the night (around midnight), probably also accompanied by escorts..



Regarding your second question, it's very difficult to answer. Note however one little forgotten fact : when Halsey chose not to detach TF 34, he was acting according to the orders he received for the campaign.

[kgbudge]

Halsey's orders were broad enough that he would not have been violating them to detach the task force.

To me, it seems glaringly obvious that not detaching TF34 was a great mistake. As it is, Halsey did not leave so much as a picket destroyer to guard San Bernardino Strait, one of the most strategic waterways in the region -- and he ignored the advice of several gifted subordinates in doing so.

[captain_wright]

Am I correct in thinking no action was taken against Halsey for his lack of action to lend support to those naval units which were supposed to support the landing of MacAruthor's troops, the taffy units?

James

[Delta Tank]

James,

James wrote: Am I correct in thinking no action was taken against Halsey for his lack of action to lend support to those naval units which were supposed to support the landing of MacAruthor's troops, the taffy units?

I believe you are correct no action was taken. IIRC Halsey's mission was two fold, defend the beaches and the transports and if possible destroy any portion of the Japanese Navy. Prior to Leyete, Admiral Spruance (?) was highly critized for protecting the landing force and not taking the oppurtunity presented to defeat a large portion of the Japanese fleet. I can not remember which landing this was, Saipan? I read a book several years ago, okay maybe a decade ago on Leyte Gulf written by a US Naval officer, can't remeber which one!
http://www.amazon.com/s/ref=nb_ss_1_8?u ... x=leyte+gu

Mike

[Peter H]

Some have criticised Spruance for being too battleship-orientated,in pulling back to cover Saipan on the night of 18-19th June 1944.Like Jellicoe at Jutland he let the enemy fleet slip away.

Mitscher's aviators did continue the fight,but at an extended range.The fliers returning from the evening strike on Ozawa though lost a third of their planes being ditched or in deck crashes,fuel being low.Around 160 crewman were pulled from the water but 49 were lost.

[Delta Tank]

Peter H,

The way I see it, Admiral Spurance did his job and accomplished his mission, Admiral Halsey was given conflicting orders and a near disaster almost ensued. His primary mission was to protect the landing force, which he failed to do and only by the grace of God and bad decisions made by the Japanese Naval Commander saved our ass!

But, as MacArthur said "No one will criticize Admiral Halsey, he is a fighting admiral, and I like him!" or words to that effect.

Mike

[clifford13]

Basiclly 6 BB 2 ca and 5 cl formed tf 34 supported by 7 dd. The real problem was having the cvl's mixed in the task groups with the Cv's.

Had the cvl's been formed in 2 groups with the bigger cv's in theother 2, Halsey could have covered the beaches with them , while the Cv's went hunting. As it was, Halsey was left with a mess to start with. I believe Lee [commander , battleships, Pacific] was due for a stint with "Tf-58" the light carrier groups, to cover San bernando strait.

fact is , the intellegence appriciations, stating it was unlikely for Japan's surface forces to come out, was off to start with. This was "Home turf". Expect the big boys.

C.M.Deal,
Ex-Army.

[clifford13]

MacArthur: "Leave that man alone. He Fights."
From "Afternoon of the rising sun." a 1998 book.

[clifford13]

Myself, I'd like to know where the Guam And Alaska, a pair of 12 inch battle-cruisers we had about then, got off to..

[clifford13]

humm...

[jaidev]

Hasley leave the battle group because of his tentative plan.

[LWD]

Myself, I'd like to know where the Guam And Alaska, a pair of 12 inch battle-cruisers we had about then, got off to..

Just looking at wiki
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/USS_Alaska ... ce_history
Alaska didn't even get to Pearl until 13 January of 45 and Guam
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/USS_Guam_(CB-2)
didn't get there until 8 Febuary.
By the way they were rated large cruisers not battle cruisers in part because they lacked features typical of such ships (a TDS for example).

[clifford13]

True, but those 12 inch Guns would have had me re thinking that classification.
I still believe CINPAC ops orders at the beginning of September, when the whole operation started , prior to the Formosa [Taiwan] raids were a bit too bulky. having photographed battleships in Japan and Singapore, and cruisers in Taiwan, the 3 rd fleet set up for an op of this size, covering over 100 islands, not just 1 or 2 as previously attacked, needed re thinking. That channel between the islands was a ready made ship trap, if you could manage an end run and catch the IJN between 2 [3] forces.

[clifford13]

Did some digging in my home library today: given that Halsey was roughly 25 % short on his force total, with J.S.McCain's task group detached to re-supply from sevron 10, detaching tf 34 would have reduced Halsey by about 2/3 of his available battleships, and 1/10 of his lighter escorts. I do not think this would have reduced him teribly in hind sight, but rember the reports he was getting at the time. A carrier group and a battle group to the north...[even though the Ise and Hyuga were actually part of the carrier screen, just running a few miles ahead of the carriers..]
He couldn't be certain there wasn't more just over the horizon, given there was NO satellite servaillance those days..