Defense. Along the Abucay Line.

Discussions on WW2 in the Pacific and the Sino-Japanese War.
User avatar
tigre
Member
Posts: 10578
Joined: 20 Mar 2005, 12:48
Location: Argentina

Defense. Along the Abucay Line.

#1

Post by tigre » 23 Nov 2009, 02:40

Hello to all :D; a new topic about this forgotten fight during the first months in the Pacific struggle..........

Defense Along the Abucay Line.
Lieutenant Colonel H. K. Johnson, Infantry Instructor, Command and General Staff College.

A CCOUNTS of small unit actions during the early phases of World War II should have a definite place in the reading program of the military student. Every day that passes tends to lead us away from the realities of combat and into the realm of the theoretical. This tendency is especially pronounced with relation to the problerns that were faced by elements of the United States Army in outlying bases at the outbreak of World War II.

While a desire to study these actions may exist, there are few accounts available in our military libraries to ‘assist’ the student or the casual reader in pursuing a particular study. Many histories tend to omit the instances of poor performances or failure to accomplish a mission in the mistaken belief that to recall such incidents is a reflection on the unit. Much can be learned from studying and analyzing the reasons for failures. Other lessons can be learned from studying successful actions.

There is much to be learned from a study of the first four months of the war in the Philippine Islands. It is not the purpose of this article to discuss the state of preparedness for war in the Philippines; rather, I propose to take one small unit of the force in the Philippine Islands on 7 December 1941 and examine one action in which that unit participated to determine the lessons that may be of value under similar conditions in the future.

Defense of the Philippines.

Until August 1941, the defense of the Philippine Islands in the event of attack was predicated on holding the peninsula of Bataan to deny Manila Bay to the enemy until such time as reinforcements could arrive on the island of Luzon with which to defeat or force the, withdrawal of the hostile forces. While lip service was paid to the defense of the beach in the event of attack, primary concern rested with plans for withdrawing the largest possible force into Bataan for the purpose of establishing a defense that could resist any hostile attack. Maximum delay was to be effected during the withdrawal period. Plans were constantly revised in an effort to achieve longer delay and to provide the best defense in Bataan.

The island of Corregidor dominates the entrance to Manila Bay (Map 1). In turn, the southern tip of Bataan dominates Corregidor, so that Bataan must be held to insure the integrity of Corregidor and deny Manila Bay to a hostile naval force. It was contemplated that Bataan would be held by occupying a series of positions across the entire peninsula (Map 2). The first position was a delaying position in the vicinity of Layac Junction, which was not an integral part of the position defense, but which was deemed suitable for effecting additional delay. Positions farther to the rear were to be held in strength. Early plans—that is, prior to 1940—provided for two positions, one from Orion on the east coast to Bagac on the west coast of Bataan, and a reserve position farther to the rear pivoting on Mt. Mariveles.

Source: Defense Along the Abucay Line. Military Review (February 1949).

Cheers. Raúl M 8-).
Attachments
image002.gif
image002.gif (36.34 KiB) Viewed 2136 times

johnbryan
Member
Posts: 52
Joined: 03 Apr 2002, 23:36
Location: Holly, Michigan, USA

Re: Defense. Along the Abucay Line.

#2

Post by johnbryan » 24 Nov 2009, 19:51

Good stuff tigre! I hope you'll be posting more about the fighting along the Abucay Line!


User avatar
tigre
Member
Posts: 10578
Joined: 20 Mar 2005, 12:48
Location: Argentina

Re: Defense. Along the Abucay Line.

#3

Post by tigre » 26 Nov 2009, 23:39

Hello to all :D; thanks johnbryan. More of it..........

Defense Along the Abucay Line.
-Lieutenant Colonel H. K. Johnson, Infantry Instructor, Command and General Staff College.

With German successes in Europe in 1940 apparently attributable, in part, to a combination of air power and increased mobility, an effort was made to establish the first line of defense in Bataan as far forward as possible consistent with the size of the force available to man the defenses, in order to permit more dispersion and greater flexibility in the conduct of the defense.

Surveys were initiated with a view to establishing a fortified line, but no construction was undertaken. However, the surveys and detailed reconnaissance did result in establishing the initial defensive position on a general east-west line from Mabatang, just north of Abucay, on the east coast, to Moron, on the west coast, and running generally just north of Mt. Natib. Mt. Natib was the dominant terrain feature in the area and its upper slopes were generally accepted as being unassailable to a force of any consequence.

The first lesson can be learned from the casual acceptance of terrain as being impregnable. This view was adopted despite intelligence reviews of the German campaign in Greece, which had definitely established that there are always some means of overcoming any handicaps imposed by terrain. This defensive position was later turned because an inadequate force defended the area in question. It is essential that even greater care be exercised in the future in analyzing terrain in view of the innumerable capabilities of vertical envelopments.

Source: Defense Along the Abucay Line. Military Review (February 1949).

Cheers. Raúl M 8-).

User avatar
Peter H
Member
Posts: 28628
Joined: 30 Dec 2002, 14:18
Location: Australia

Re: Defense. Along the Abucay Line.

#4

Post by Peter H » 28 Nov 2009, 11:37

Interesting article.

The author
http://www.arlingtoncemetery.net/hkjohnson.htm

Captured at Bataan 1942,later US Army Chief of Staff 1964-68.

User avatar
tigre
Member
Posts: 10578
Joined: 20 Mar 2005, 12:48
Location: Argentina

Re: Defense. Along the Abucay Line.

#5

Post by tigre » 29 Nov 2009, 14:50

Hello to all :D; thanks Peter great complement. Now more of it..........

Defense Along the Abucay Line.
-Lieutenant Colonel H. K. Johnson, Infantry Instructor, Command and General Staff College.

In August 1941, the decision was made to call the Philippine Army into the service of the United States and establish a firm defense of the Philippine Islands. The bulk of both Philippine Army and United States forces was disposed for the defense of Luzon because that island is the center of population and had the greatest importance from both political and economic points of view. With the additional force available, it was deemed feasible to defend on the beaches, and to constitute a powerful reserve to repel any successful landings.

BY 7 December 1941, about 70 per cent of the Philippine Army had been mobilized. The training of the units was far from complete and the equipment was neither adequate nor up-to-date. In addition to the Philippine Army units, there were 12,000 Philippine Scouts and.about 22,000 United States troops, The regular troops constituted one infantry division at about 60 per cent strength, antiaircraft artillery, two tank battalions, some seacoast artillery, some air force units, and service troops.

Source: Defense Along the Abucay Line. Military Review (February 1949).

Cheers. Raúl M 8-).
Attachments
image002.gif
image002.gif (71.26 KiB) Viewed 2060 times

User avatar
tigre
Member
Posts: 10578
Joined: 20 Mar 2005, 12:48
Location: Argentina

Re: Defense. Along the Abucay Line.

#6

Post by tigre » 07 Dec 2009, 22:04

Hello to all :D; more of it..........

Defense Along the Abucay Line.
-Lieutenant Colonel H. K. Johnson, Infantry Instructor, Command and General Staff College.

57th Infantry (PS).

This account is concerned primarily with one of the infantry regiments of the Philippine Division, the 57th Infantry, Philippine Scouts (PS). For a more complete understanding of the operation it is advisable to examine the organization of the Philippine Division, the only United States division in the islands. At the outbreak of the war, this division, unnumbered was composed of both United States and Philippine Scout units. All officers were officers of the United States Army, either regular or reserve. Two, of the infantry regiments were composed of Philippine Scouts, while the third regiment, the 31st Infantry, was composed entirely of United States soldiers. The three field artillery battalions were composed of Philippine Scouts as were the Medical Battalion, the Engineer Battalion, and the Quartermaster Battalion. The Division Headquarters and Headquarters Company and the Military Police Company had both United States and Philippine Scout soldiers. Two batteries in each artillery battalion were equipped with 75 mm guns, while the third firing battery was equipped with 2.95 inch mountain howitzers. Equipment in the hands of the infantrymen was the same as that in use in the United States at that time.

The 57th Infantry (PS) was organized under a special Table of Organization and Equipment that had been approved for the Philippine Department. The organization of the infantry regiment followed, to a certain extent, current organization in the United States at that time, although the strength was considerably under that authorized. When the Philippine Army was called into federal service, the Regular Army units of the United States were required to provide training cadres which served to reduce the strength of the Philippine Scout regiments. Approximately 2,300 Philippine Scouts were on duty with the Philippine Army, not all from the Philippine Division. Officer strength was reduced to a greater degree, and at the outbreak of the war there were never more than two officers per company, and usually only one.

Source: Defense Along the Abucay Line. Military Review (February 1949).

Cheers. Raúl M 8-).

User avatar
tigre
Member
Posts: 10578
Joined: 20 Mar 2005, 12:48
Location: Argentina

Re: Defense. Along the Abucay Line.

#7

Post by tigre » 13 Dec 2009, 00:31

Hello to all :D; more of it..........

Defense Along the Abucay Line.
-Lieutenant Colonel H. K. Johnson, Infantry Instructor, Command and General Staff College.

A second lesson can be learned from conditions surrounding the training of the Philippine Army. Due to prevailing circumstances at that time, there was probably no alternate solution. However, if the divisions in being are expected to repel initial enemy attacks, it is neceseary that they have available those means considered essential for the accomplishnient of that mission. Plans must be prepared well in advance for training units without decimating those elements we expect to use in combat in the initial stages of a future conflict. These plans cannot be prepared and filed, but must be kept up-to-date, and the details must reflect current conditions, not a set of assumptions that may or may not be applicable. This point is made because it affected the 57th Infantry ( PS) directly.

The 57th Infantry (PS) had the best equipment available at that time, with the exception of transportation. However, while the 81-mm and 60-mm mortars were in the hands of troops, there was no ammunition available for either. The 60-mm mortars were abandoned to save space in the limited transportation. Old 3“ mortar ammunition was fired from the 81-mm mortars. In addition to the inaccuracy inherent in this ammunition, gunners were plagued with more than 60 per cent duds. Riflemen were armed with the Ml rifle, but there were no carbines or sub-machine guns. There was one .50 caliber machine gun per battalion. The antitank company had one platoon of three M3 37-mm guns and two platoons of three M1916 37-mm guns each. The antitank armament was actually a blessing in disguise, because there were few hostile tank attacks and then in limited numbers only, while the light 37-mm gun was highly successful against caves and small point targets in the jungle. The regiment had the authorized signal communications of the day, although batteries for SCR 195s were not available in sufficient quantity to effect replacements as required. Transportation was far below that authorized, and was from six to seven years old for the most part, but the addition of busses from nonmilitary sources overcame this handicap and achieved the desired degree of mobility.

Source: Defense Along the Abucay Line. Military Review (February 1949).

Feliz Navidad - Feliz Natal - Frohe Weihnachten - Joyeux Noël - Merry Christmas. :wink:

Cheers. Raúl M 8-).

User avatar
tigre
Member
Posts: 10578
Joined: 20 Mar 2005, 12:48
Location: Argentina

Re: Defense. Along the Abucay Line.

#8

Post by tigre » 21 Dec 2009, 00:54

Hello to all :D; more of it..........

The 57th Infantry (PS) had one unit which was peculiar to that regiment alone, and which is worthy of comment. In view of the mission of the Regiment under the pre-war plans, which was to provide the seasoned troops to defend some 11,000 square miles of territory, including twenty six miles of beach in a probable landing area, it was felt that-the regimental commander should have a reconnaissance agency of some sort.

A small reconnaissanee detachment within the intelligence platoon was organized to fulfill this requirement. It consisted of three sections of five men each with two vehicles per section. This unit was trained for some six months before the war and upon’ the outbreak of war could be sent some distance from the Regiment and be depended upon to provide accurate and reliable information of the area to which it had been sent. The unit did not function in combat as it was intended because the regiment did not operate in an area large enough to utilize the maximum ‘capabilities of the section.

Source: Defense Along the Abucay Line. Military Review (February 1949).

Feliz Navidad - Feliz Natal - Frohe Weihnachten - Joyeux Noël - Merry Christmas. :wink:

Cheers. Raúl M 8-).

User avatar
tigre
Member
Posts: 10578
Joined: 20 Mar 2005, 12:48
Location: Argentina

Re: Defense. Along the Abucay Line.

#9

Post by tigre » 25 Dec 2009, 14:40

Hello to all ; more of it..........

The Abucay Line.

At the time of the occupation of the Abucay Line, the position had been partially organized by the 31st Infantry Regiment (US). The 41st Division (PA) was on the left of the 57th Infantry (PS), and the 51st Division (PA) was on the left of the 41st Division (PA). The 41st Division occupied about normal frontages for the defense. The 51st Division was disposed as a security force on the flank, rather than as a defensive force.

The terrain in the sector of the 57th infantry (PS) was almost bare of cover, and slightly rolling. On the right, or Manila Bay, side of the main road in Bataan the area was covered with fishponds divided by high dikes. Fox holes had to be very shallow or the water came into them at high tide. To offset the disadvantage of these fish ponds, there were advantage: from the point of view of establishing a defensive position. Fields of fire were excellent. Tanks could not approach or operate in the area except over one road, which had numerous bridges that could be blown easily and replaced only with difficulty. West of the main road, a thin line of trees marked the trace of the main line of resistance. Fields of fire to the front were good, except on the extreme left where a canefield came within four hundred yards of the front.

The sector of the 41st Division on the left was heavily wooded, and as the ground rose toward Mt. Natib, it became more rugged and the dense jungle growth was an obstacle to both the attacker and the defender.

In defending its sector, the 57th Infantry (PS) was not only responsible for its front, but for the flank resting on Manila Bay.

Source: Defense Along the Abucay Line. Military Review (February 1949).

Feliz Navidad - Feliz Natal - Frohe Weihnachten - Joyeux Noël - Merry Christmas. :wink:

Cheers. Raúl M 8-).

User avatar
tigre
Member
Posts: 10578
Joined: 20 Mar 2005, 12:48
Location: Argentina

Re: Defense. Along the Abucay Line.

#10

Post by tigre » 02 Jan 2010, 00:56

Hello to all :D; more of it..........

The Abucay Line.

Organization of the Position.

In occupyin the position, two battalions were placed on the main line of resistance, the lst Battalion on the right with responsibility for the main road, and the 3d Battalion on the left. The 2d Battalion was charged with organization of the regimental reserve line and security of the open flank. However, the 2d Battalion was detached from the Regiment for the purpose of furnishing half of a special task force to occupy the Layac Junction position pending the withdrawal of elements of the 45th Infantry (PS) and as a result this battalion was not as fresh as it might have been when it returned to regimental control on 6 January 1942.

On 7 January 1942 the Layac Junction position was overrun. The withdrawal was so rapid that all contact with the enemy was lost. The reconnaissance section was utillized, on foot, to, re-establish contact, which was done the following day. At the same time, G Company was used to establish an outpost line.

Source: Defense Along the Abucay Line. Military Review (February 1949).

Feliz Año Nuevo - Happy New Year - feliz Ano Novo - gluckliches Neues Jahr - Bonne Année - Felice Anno Nuovo!!! :lol:

Cheers. Raúl M 8-).

User avatar
tigre
Member
Posts: 10578
Joined: 20 Mar 2005, 12:48
Location: Argentina

Re: Defense. Along the Abucay Line.

#11

Post by tigre » 06 Jan 2010, 04:41

Hello to all :D; more of it..........

The Abucay Line.

Defects of the Defense.

Two outstanding defects in the defense became apparent at this time. First, there was no contact between units on the OPLR. While the outpost established in front of the 57th Infantry ( PS) was on a clearly marked terrain feature, Calaguiman River, (Map 3) there was no contact with the unit on the left.

In retrospect, this can probably be attributed to a failure to inspect on both the part of battalion and regiment and to the late date at which the outpost was established.

The second defect resulted from a failure to effect and check coordination between the 3d Battalion, 57th Infantry (PS), on the left, and the right unit of the 41st Division.
This defect was corrected before there were any adverse effects on the defense.

OPLR: outpost line of resistance.

Source: Defense Along the Abucay Line. Military Review (February 1949).

Cheers. Raúl M 8-).
Attachments
image002.gif
image002.gif (63.53 KiB) Viewed 1900 times

User avatar
tigre
Member
Posts: 10578
Joined: 20 Mar 2005, 12:48
Location: Argentina

Re: Defense. Along the Abucay Line.

#12

Post by tigre » 08 Jan 2010, 16:05

Hello to all :D; more of it..........

The Abucay Line.

Enemy Strikes the Line.

On the night of 11-12 January the enemy struck the main line of resistance of the 57th Infantry (PS) for the first time (Map 3). During daylight hours on the 11th, he had attempted to advance through the fish pond area, but his movements could be observed from the steeple of a church in Abucay which served as an infantry CP and an artillery OP. The attack was dispersed before it came within rifle range.

Some reorganization was effected during the daylight hours of the 12th. Shortly before midnight that same night, the enemy struck again. This time all of the artillery at hand was employed. One battalion of artillery was in direct support, and a two-battery battalion reinforced the fires of the direct-support battalion. 155-mm guns were in general support, but they were not employed to lay down normal barrages. Tons of ammunition were poured into the canefield.

The position of I Company of the 3d Battalion was precarious in the hours before daylight. The Battalion launched a counterattack with L Company (in reserve) an hour before daylight, without effect. E Company of the regimental reserve was released to the battalion commander of the 3d Battalion at about daylight. This company was within two hundred yards of restoring the main line of resistance when its advance was halted and it was pinned to the ground by fire.

By utilizing E Company to stem the advance of the enemy, it was felt that the balance of the 2d Battalion could occupy the reserve position and hold the reduced impetus of the attack. The 3d Battalion occupying the sector originally was completely and hopelessly mixed up. All of the officers and key noncommissioned officers of I Company were casualties. L Company had become lost in the dark and intermingled with K Company on the main line of resistance in the battalion sector. E Company from the regimental reserve was able to block the breach in the line, although it was unable to restore the position.

Source: Defense Along the Abucay Line. Military Review (February 1949).

Cheers. Raúl M 8-).

veevee
Member
Posts: 13
Joined: 22 Jan 2008, 16:57
Location: Southeast PA

Re: Defense. Along the Abucay Line.

#13

Post by veevee » 08 Jan 2010, 19:21

Hello All,
I visited the Mabatang battle site in Dec. 2007 and took pictures. These are some of the research materials I used to find the battlefield where the 57th Infantry Philippine Scouts defended against the Japanese attack at the start of the "First Battle of Bataan." Mabatang was the eastern anchor of the Abucay line.

(click for bigger)
Image Image Image Image Image

Here is a page from the book the "Philippine Scouts" printed by the Philippine Scout Heritage Society.

Image

------------
From the Book "Fall of the Philippines" by Louis Morton

The 57th Infantry, under the command of Col. George S. Clarke, was the first unit on the II Corps line to come under heavy infantry attack. Along the main line of resistance were the 1st Battalion on the right and the 3d Battalion on the left. The 2d Battalion was in reserve. On 11 January a reinforced company of the reserve battalion, which had established an outpost line south of the Calaguiman, came under attack by the advance elements of Colonel Imai's eastern column, the 2d Battalion, 141st Infantry. Soon the Japanese began to cross the Calaguiman, about one mile north of the main line of resistance. By 2300 the Japanese battalion had reached a cane field on the left front of the 57th's 3d Battalion, directly before Company I. This cane field, about 150 yards in front of the main line of resistance, had not been cleared on the assumption that artillery would effectively prevent its use by the enemy as a route of approach.

That night the Japanese in the cane field moved out against the main line of resistance. First came an artillery and mortar barrage, which was answered by concentrated fire from the 75-mm. guns of the 24th Field Artillery (PS). Hardly had the 24th opened fire than the Japanese infantry jumped off in a banzai attack across the moonlit patch of ground in front of Company I. Wave after wave of screaming Japanese troops hurled themselves forward in the face of intense fire. Men in the leading wave threw themselves on the barbed wire entanglements, forming human bridges over which succeeding waves could pass.

Despite the appalling effects of the pointblank fire from the 75's, the Japanese continued their ferocious attack until Company I, its commander seriously wounded and its executive officer killed, finally gave ground. Company K on the right immediately refused its flank and the battalion commander threw his reserve, Company L, into the fight. When this force failed to halt the Japanese, Colonel Clarke committed a company of the reserve battalion and the Japanese attack stalled. At the approach of dawn, the Scouts began a counterattack which took them almost to the original line. When the action was broken off on the morning of the 12th, there were an estimated 200 to 300 dead Japanese on the field of battle.

During the night a number of Japanese had infiltrated into the 3d Battalion area, on the left of the regimental line. The 57th Infantry spent most of the next day routing out the infiltrators, man by man, in hand-to-hand combat. After a number of Scouts had been killed, a more efficient scheme for the elimination of the infiltrated Japanese was devised. Sniper parties consisting of riflemen assisted by demolition engineers were formed and these began to comb the 3d Battalion area systematically. By the end of the day most of the Japanese had been found and killed. It was as a result of his action as the leader of one of these sniper parties that 2d Lt. Alexander R. Nininger, Jr., was posthumously awarded the Medal of Honor.

His was the first of World War II, although Calugas received his award for heroism in the earlier fight at Layac Junction.

(ommitted text)

On the 12th, as the Japanese moved into position for the attack, all units on the II Corps line found themselves under increasingly heavy pressure. On the right, in front of the 57th Infantry, the Japanese succeeded in establishing themselves again on the south bank of the Calaguiman; in the center they pushed back the outpost line before the 43d Infantry.15 It was on the left of the corps line that the Japanese made their most important gains on 12 January, when they tore a gap in the 51st Infantry sector. A counterattack by a reserve battalion regained some of the lost ground but at a heavy cost. By nightfall it was evident that the Japanese, thwarted in their advance on the east, were shifting their effort westward.

The threat to the eastern anchor of the line was still too serious to be ignored. Though the 57th Infantry had beaten back all attempts by the 2d Battalion, 141st Infantry, to pierce the main line of resistance, it was still hard pressed on the left and was beginning to feel pressure on its right. Late on the evening of the 12th, therefore, General Parker released the two-battalion 21st Infantry (PA) from corps reserve and gave it to Colonel Clarke. With these fresh troops Clarke made plans for an attack the next morning with the 21st Infantry's 2d Battalion and the same numbered battalion of the 57th. That night the 2d Battalion, 21st Infantry, took over the left of the line and the 3d Battalion went into reserve to free the 2d Battalion, 57th Infantry, for the counterattack.

At 0600, 13 January, on the heels of a rolling artillery barrage, the 2d Battalion, 21st Infantry, jumped off in the counterattack. Its task was made more difficult by the fact that the Japanese had pushed a deep salient into the left of the 57th line during the night. The Filipinos advanced quickly and aggressively, pushing the Japanese back across the bloodied ground. It soon became evident to Capt. Philip A. Meier, the battalion's American instructor, that the gap was too large to be filled by his men alone and he moved east to tie in with the 1st Battalion, 57th Infantry, on his right, thus creating a hole between his men and the 41st Infantry on his left. Colonel Clarke, the 57th commander, thereupon ordered the 3d Battalion of the 21st Infantry from reserve to plug the gap. As the battalion began to move up at about 1300 it came under Japanese artillery fire and was pinned down. When the artillery fire ceased three hours later, the 2d Battalion, 57th Infantry, counterattacked and advanced to within 150 yards of the original line. By late afternoon the gap had been closed and the Japanese were left in possession of only a small salient on the left of the 57th Infantry line, a meager return indeed for four days of hard fighting.

The counterattack by the 21st Infantry on the morning of the 13th had forestalled the Japanese offensive in that sector, leading General Nara to complain that "the battle did not develop according to plan."

-----------

This is the road heading east toward Mabatang. This is the road that ran parallel and behind the main line of resistance.
Image

This is the view from the road looking north - panning from northweset to northeast. This is roughly the position of the 3rd battalion, 57th Infantry PS. The sugarcane field no long exists. The area is cultivated for rice, and there is a small housing development in what would have been the middle of the 3rd battalion positions.

Image Image Image Image Image

This is from the middle of the field looking west toward Mt. Natib. The Japanese eventually broke through the lines around the slopes of Mt. Natib in the 51st Division area where the terrain was more rugged and porous.
Image Image

This is from the middle of the field looking east beyond the housing development toward Mabatang town.
Image

A pair of carabaos stand guard in the middle of the field. The carabao's head is the symbol on the patch of the Philippine Division.
Image

Looking further north. Beyond the trees is the Calaguiman river.
Image

This is Donnie Calara, the young man who the tills these fields. He didn't know the history of his land but told me that every once in a while they dig up spent cartridge casings and artillery round casings. I hope he doesn't dig up a dud round.
Image Image

A carabao wallow. It explains what I thought were artillery shell craters looking at the satellite images.
Image

Me, holding the maps and satellite images I used to locate the battlefield.
Image

Walking back to the road. The fields are peaceful now and kids play on the hardened earth prior to rice planting.
Image

This is looking south of the road. Somewhere here, Lt. Nininger earned his Medal of Honor hunting snipers, infiltrators and stragglers.
Image Image Image

Moving on... the road dead-ends on to the Bataan east road. Turned south to go to Abucay.
Image Image

The Abucay church which was used as an aid station and casualty clearing station during the battle.
Image

Cheers,
Victor

veevee
Member
Posts: 13
Joined: 22 Jan 2008, 16:57
Location: Southeast PA

Re: Defense. Along the Abucay Line.

#14

Post by veevee » 08 Jan 2010, 19:27

And in Feb. 2009, I visited the western edge of the line at the Abucay Hacienda area...

This is the area that we visited. The place is big and we were there from 9:30 in the morning till about 4pm. We spent the morning checking out the general area where the second battalion 31st Infantry advanced through and defended. In the afternoon we looked at the area northwest of the college close to the Balantay river. This is the 1st Battalion 31st Infantry and the 3rd battalion 45th Infantry Philippine Scouts' area of defense.

click for bigger
Image

Pictures from the east-southeast area
Image Image Image Image

Image Image Image Image

Second battalion moved through this area
Image Image

Looking south; the 31st infantry would have advanced coming from this direction towards you looking at the photo
Image

The college can be seen from the east, looking west
Image Image Image

A century old mango tree that would have been witness to the battle
Image Image Image

The folks who showed us around their property which the second battalion 31st Infantry fought through
Image

no more time... I'll post more pictures later

edit: here are more. I also added to the previous pictures


The spot between a tree's roots where he found two grenades. He threw them into the creek at the bottom of the ravine.
Image

Other relics they showed us
Image

Mortar shell fuses?
Image

This is an old foxhole that they planted on. This one overlooks the ravine
Image

Another one
Image

Pointing to a foxhole or where he found relics... can't remember
Image

The smaller ravine... probably the first one that the 31st infantry ran into
Image Image Image Image

A carabao wallowing in the small creek at the bottom of the ravine; Be careful carabao... there are lots of grenades thrown away into that creek.
Image Image

Opposite side of the ravine
Image

Heading toward the second and bigger ravine parallel to the smaller one
Image

However this spot in the ravine may not have been the area that the second battalion crossed
Image Image

Ravine overlooking the Balantay river. This one is northwest of the college in the vicinity of the 3rd Battalion, 45th Infantry PS... or could have been in the 31st Infantry's 1st battalion area
Image Image Image Image

An overgrown depression on the ground, don't know if it was an old foxhole but sure had a good field of fire overlooking sloping ground
Image

More info:

The local who showed us around his property have found shells, grenades within his property. He usually gets rid of them by throwing them into the bottom of the ravine into the creek. The last one he found was a clip of garand ammo which he also threw down the creek. I asked him if he usually finds them when digging, he said no. It's usually plainly on the ground but overgrown and it's just a matter of chancing upon them. He also found a sword which he kept in his house in town.

A local woman said when they were growing up and about 12 years old, they'd find bayonets and grenades around. They get rid of them but kept the aluminum canteens to this day for whatever use they have for them. She also said that the area across from the Letran college, there were lots more relics and even bones and skulls.

User avatar
tigre
Member
Posts: 10578
Joined: 20 Mar 2005, 12:48
Location: Argentina

Re: Defense. Along the Abucay Line.

#15

Post by tigre » 09 Jan 2010, 00:06

Thanks veevee, great complement :wink:. Cheers. Raúl M 8-).

Post Reply

Return to “WW2 in the Pacific & Asia”