US fortress in the Philippines 1941

[Galahad]

--If MacArthur's chief of staff, General Sutherland, hadn't prevented it, the B-17's wouldn't have been on the ground to be destroyed. They would have been returning from a dawn attack on Formosa. But the attack was put on "hold", despite what the CG USAAFFE, General Brereton, wanted. Likewise, if the Japanese hadn't had early morning fog on Formosa, which delayed the attack, the Japanese attack would have hit Luzon before the fighters had to refuel.
--No one has ever been able to properly account for the refusal to let the AF attack Formosa that morning. But it's fairly obvious that Sutherland wouldn't have overridden Brereton's orders without the backing of MacArthur.

[johnbryan]

Keep in mind too that Brereton had kept a number of B-17 crews at Clark Field to attend a big party in his honor in Manila, on the night before Pearl Harbor. The B-17 crews were almost on the verge of mutiny because of dis-satisfaction from not being rotated back to the US and the overall bad and primative conditions of life in the Philippine Islands. Time and events soon overuled all of this.

[johnbryan]

Greetings to both citizen Zaf1 and the community as a whole. Well sir, in light of your brief caption under the time stamp of Monday - May 17, 2010 - 1:49am, old Uncle Bob would really appreciate a clarification on what you base your assertion regarding the magnitude of the United States of America's degree of military preparadness within the Commonwealth of the Philippines. It has always been my understanding (rightly OR wrongly) that the United States Congress was less than enthusiastic to outlay adequate financial appropriations for the defense of a distant territorial archipelago which was already slated to be granted its independence of July 04, 1944. So, would you care to enlighten your disparate readership on what exactly contitutes "MUCH" in terms of the United States of America's overall efforts to prepare the Commonwealth of the Philippines from a potential military onslaught from the Imperial Japanese Empire? I can assure you that the defense of the soon to be Republic of the Philippines was not terribly high on ANYONE'S agenda in the District of Columbia. Thank you in advance for both your time and consideration in respect to this matter. Well, that's my initial two Yankee cents worth on this soon to be controversial topic - for now anyway. As always, I would like to bid you an especially copacetic day over in your corner of A.S.E.A.N.

Best Regards From My Side Of The Pacific RIm,
Uncle Bob

On the contrary, the reinforcement of the Philippines was moved up to the top of the list by mid-1941 by the movers and shakers in Washington DC. The Secretary of War was keen on the idea and gave top priority to reinforcing the PI with all available B-17's and B-24's at the expense of Lend Lease and US defense. In short, dozens of commands were stripped of aircraft that were crated up and sent to the PI, or in the case of the B-17's, flown there. Likewise, Congress appropriated and forwarded hundreds of thousands of dollars in airfield construction money to the PI in the latter half of 1941, so you see, the Philippines DID have top priority for the alocation of US bomber and fighter aircraft.

Continental US defense went a-begging in favor of Hemisphere Defense, according to US Air Force Documents. "The proposed transfer would have left only 17 B-17's within the continental US. Eleven of these were obsolete B-17 A and B models. Five B-17-E models were undergoing trial flights. 12 B-17's of the Hawaiian Department were also being readied for the flight to the Philippines." "General Spaatz expressed the hope that an additional 48 B-17's and B-24's could be dispatched" from the US to the PI by 6 December.

By my count, there would have been well over 500 aircraft in the PI by just March of 1942 alone, had the Japanese not attacked, given what was planned to be sent there by the US and what was already in the pipeline and this doesn't even begin to include what would have been available by September, 1942. The vast majority, if not all of the A-20's, B-25's and B-26's that fought over New Guinea would have been based on Luzon as well

[Takao]

Concerning the reinforcement of the Philippine Islands, you can read more about it here.
http://www.history.army.mil/books/wwii/ ... _3.htm#p37

However, the assertion that all these aircraft would be in the Philippines is a "perfect world" scenario. The "mover and shakers" were out of touch with reality. For how the air build-up really proceeded, you can read more here: http://www.airforcehistory.hq.af.mil/Pu ... ey_had.pdf

[Robert Rojas]

Greetings to both brother John Bryan and the community as a whole. Howdy John! Well sir, first and foremost, old Uncle Bob would like to convey his appreciation for your avicentric input as duly noted on Saturday - May 22, 2010 - 3:17am. Now that I have the social niceties out of the way, I have reason to believe that the both of us are approaching the weighty issue of military preparedness in the Commonwealth of the Philippines from two different perspectives in time. As you clearly illustrate, the United States of America was attempting to play military catch up during the course of year 1941. I would contend (rightly OR wrongly) that the genesis of the Commonwealth of the Philippines festering defense issues had its origins in the darkest years of the Great Depression in the decade of the nineteen thirites. Simply stated, American military spending took an understandable back seat to American social spending. As a result, across the board defense preparedness in the greater Philippine archipelago suffered exponentially. It is nothing short of miraculous that the Filipino armed forces performed as well as they actually did between December of 1941 and May of 1942. You see, geography is ultimately seized and held by GRUNTS and not by AIREDALES. It's just some sobering food for thought. Well, that's my latest two Yankee cents worth on this controversial topic of interest - for now anyway. In anycase, I would like to bid you and especially copacetic day over in the Wolverine State of Michigan.

Best Regards,
Uncle Bob

[Takao]

I wouldn't say your a dollar short Uncle Bob, only 50 cents.

the genesis of the defense issues of the Philippine Islands goes back further than the Great Depression, it was in 1922, with Article XIX of the Washington Naval Treaty.

Article XIX

The United States, the British Empire and Japan agree that the status quo at the time of the signing of the present Treaty, with regard to fortifications and naval bases, shall be maintained in their respective territories and possessions specified hereunder:

(1) The insular possessions which the United States now holds or may hereafter acquire in the Pacific Ocean, except (a) those adjacent to the coast of the United States, Alaska and the Panama Canal Zone, not including the Aleutian Islands, and (b) the Hawaiian Islands;

(2) Hong Kong and the insular possessions which the British Empire now holds or may hereafter acquire in the Pacific Ocean, east of the meridian of 110° east longitude, except (a) those adjacent to the coast of Canada, (b) the Commonwealth of Australia and its Territories, and (c) New Zealand;

(3) The following insular territories and possessions of Japan in the Pacific Ocean, to wit: the Kurile Islands, the Bonin Islands, Amami-Oshima, the Loochoo Islands, Formosa and the Pescadores, and any insular territories or possessions in the Pacific Ocean which Japan may hereafter acquire.

The maintenance of the status quo under the foregoing provisions implies that no new fortifications or naval bases shall be established in the territories and possessions specified; that no measures shall be taken to increase the existing naval facilities for the repair and maintenance of naval forces, and that no increase shall be made in the coast defenses of the territories and possessions above specified. This restriction, however, does not preclude such repair and replacement of worn-out weapons and equipment as is customary in naval and military establishments in time of peace.

[johnbryan]

Greetings to both brother John Bryan and the community as a whole. Howdy John! Well sir, first and foremost, old Uncle Bob would like to convey his appreciation for your avicentric input as duly noted on Saturday - May 22, 2010 - 3:17am. Now that I have the social niceties out of the way, I have reason to believe that the both of us are approaching the weighty issue of military preparedness in the Commonwealth of the Philippines from two different perspectives in time. As you clearly illustrate, the United States of America was attempting to play military catch up during the course of year 1941. I would contend (rightly OR wrongly) that the genesis of the Commonwealth of the Philippines festering defense issues had its origins in the darkest years of the Great Depression in the decade of the nineteen thirites. Simply stated, American military spending took an understandable back seat to American social spending. As a result, across the board defense preparedness in the greater Philippine archipelago suffered exponentially. It is nothing short of miraculous that the Filipino armed forces performed as well as they actually did between December of 1941 and May of 1942. You see, geography is ultimately seized and held by GRUNTS and not by AIREDALES. It's just some sobering food for thought. Well, that's my latest two Yankee cents worth on this controversial topic of interest - for now anyway. In anycase, I would like to bid you and especially copacetic day over in the Wolverine State of Michigan.

Best Regards,
Uncle Bob

Howdy, Uncle Bob! The weather today in the Wolverine State is a sunny 81 degrees. I hope you are enjoying comparable weather in Oregon.

Here's some additional information taken from the "Green Books."

"The schedule of shipments finally established in November provided for sending to the Philippines some 20,000 troops, about one third of them Air Force units, on eleven troopships to sail from fan Francisco between 21 November and 9 December 1941.32 The Holbrook, carrying 2,000 troops and equipment (the 147th Field Artillery Regiment and the 148th Field Artillery Regiment minus one battalion), and the Republic carrying 2,630 troops and equipment (the 2d Battalion of the 131st field Artillery Regiment, the 7th Bombardment Group, and 48 Air Corps officers), sailed from San Francisco 21-22 November. Convoyed by the USS Pensacola, they were due to arrive in the Philippines on 14 January 1942.

Sailings for 15,000 troops were scheduled for 5-9 December. The President Johnson with 2,500 troops the 2d Battalion of the 138th Field Artillery Regiment and three squadrons of the 35th Pursuit Group), the Etolin with 1,400 troops " including the 218th Field Artillery Regiment minus the 2d Battalion) and the Bliss sailed from San Francisco on 5 December 1941. The following day the President Garfield sailed from the same port with the remainder of the 35th Pursuit Group.33

In addition to the 30,000 U.S. Army troops present, and those due to arrive in the Philippines, there were 80,000 troops in the Philippine Army, including the ten divisions to be activated by 15 December. The total strength of General MacArthur's command--present, en route, and under orders--amounted to about 137,000, considerably less than the 200,000 he had estimated as sufficient for defensive operations.34

The Far Eastern Air Force had 35 four engine bombers and 107 P-40E's on hand, and 38 more P-40E's and 52 A-24's (dive bombers) were en route in the Pensacola convoy. In addition, 37 pursuits and 48 four-engine bombers were due to leave the United States by 6 and 10 December, respectively. As for ground force matériel, equipment for one antiaircraft regiment had recently arrived, as well as 105 tanks and 50 self-propelled 75-mm. guns (tank destroyers). Forty-eight 75-mm. guns were en route (with the Pensacola convoy), and more guns and a considerable amount of ammunition were scheduled to be shipped.35"

[johnbryan]

I just happened upon this information pertaining to MacArthur's request for an armored division to be sent to the pre-war Philippines:

II. SUMMARY

2. PRE-WAR BRIEF. Any evaluation of the operations of this unit mast take into consideration the precis, (See Addenda "A"), of its movement to the theater on the eve of the outbreak of hostilities, its organization 17 days before that, and the consequent lack of mutual acquaintance between the armored personnel and their supported associates, in a strange land and climate, and with weapons new to them, as well as to all present for the war except the Tank Group Commander. It was for this reason that he asked to remain with the Tank Group when division command was proposed on his arrival. In approving on 21 November, General MacArthur stated that he had asked for an armored division, to the command of which the Group Commander would succeed. The nucleus of this division was never augmented; although a medium G.H.Q. Tank Battalion had been completely equipped and was on 48-hour standby for departure for the Philippines when its orders were cancelled on 10 December 1941. ((Another light tank bn had been alerted))

Operations of the Provisional Tank Group in the Philippines 1941-42.

[johnbryan]

I recently read that a battalion of M-3 Grant/Lee medium tanks was in New Orleans, waiting trans-shipment to the Philippines, along with their crews and support equipment at the time of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. Can you imagine what a difference that 50+ of these heavy gunned tanks would have made in combat, had they arrived in time?. Armed with both a 75mm and 37mm gun, that's alot of firepower for a single tank. They later proved devestatingly effective in Burma against the thin skinned Japanese tanks that they faced there.

[johnbryan]

"In a letter prepared on 5 December 1941 but never sent, General Marshall outlined for General MacArthur what had been and was being done to strengthen USAFFE. "Reinforcements and equipment already approved," he said, "require over 1,000,000 ship tons." Fifty-five ships had already been obtained and approximately 100,000 ship tons of supplies were en route, with twice this amount ready for immediate shipment to ports of embarkation. Requests for equipment for the Philippine Army, except those for the M1 rifle, had been approved, and uncontrolled items of supply were being shipped as rapidly as they could be assembled and loaded on ships. "Not only will you receive soon all your supporting light artillery (130 75-mm. guns]," Marshall told MacArthur, "but 48 155-mm. howitzers and 24 155-mm. guns for corps and army artillery." Except for certain types of ammunition, the defense reserve for the U.S. Army by July of that year. Three semimobile antiaircraft artillery regiments were scheduled to leave the United States soon, but the 90--mm. antiaircraft gun could not be sent since it had not yet been fully tested. A sum of $269,000,000 had been requested from Congress for the support of the Philippine Army, and early passage of such legislation was expected. "I assure you," Marshall closed, "of my purpose to meet to the fullest extent possible your recommendations for personnel and equipment necessary to defend the Philippines."[65]
The last vessels carrying supplies to the Philippines were assembled in convoy in Hawaii and on 7 December were still on the high seas. In the convoy were the 52 dive bombers of the 27th Bombardment Group, 18 P-40s, 340 motor vehicles, 48 75-mm. guns, 3,500,00 rounds of .30- and .50-caliber ammunition, 600 tons of bombs, 9,000 drums of aviation fuel, and other heavy equipment and supplies. Also aboard were the two light field artillery battalions and the ground echelon of the 7th Bombardment Group (H)."

[johnbryan]

More information:

In July 1941 the air force in the Philippines was still a token force, unable to withstand "even a mildly determined and ill-equipped foe."30 Air Corps headquarters in Washington had been urging for some time that additional planes be sent to the Philippines and the Joint Board, early in 1940, had proposed an increase in air strength for the island garrison.31 The following July 1941 Maj. Gen. Henry H. Arnold, chief of the newly created Army Air Forces, came forward with the strongest proposal yet made for the reinforcement of the Philippines. This proposal called for the transfer to the Philippines of four heavy bombardment groups, consisting of 272 aircraft with 68 in reserve, and two pursuit groups of 130 planes each.32 These planes, wrote Brig. Gen. Carl Spaatz, chief of the Air Staff, would not be used for an offensive mission, but to maintain "a strategical defensive in Asia.33"

"By now the War Department was fully committed to an all-out effort to strengthen the air defense of the Philippines. General Arnold, in a letter to the commander of the Hawaiian Air Force on 1 December, expressed this view when he wrote: "We must get every B-17 available to the Philippines as soon as possible."42 His statement was not an exaggeration. On the outbreak of war there were 913 U. S. Army aircraft scattered among the numerous overseas bases. This number of aircraft included 61 heavy, 157 medium, and 59 light bombers and 636 fighters. More than half of the total of heavy bombers and one sixth of the fighters were already in the Philippines.43 Within a few months this number would have been raised considerably."

[Fatboy Coxy]

I think there's a lot of similarities of what the British faced in Singapore, such as the terrain and later even to the Japanese strategy of attacking from the rear rather a frontal attack against the heavily guarded naval base.

Regards

Zaf

Totally agree Zaf

Both the British and Americans were facing the difficulties of defending particular stratigic points, many miles away from home. And their weakness was compounded by being tied to these defensive fortresses. Command of the Air and Sea was critical, which was quickly lost, and their armies were very much second eleven. That said, they were both fast reinforcing and Japan's window of opportunity was closing fast. If Japan had waiting until March 1942, I'm not so sure they would have enjoyed such success.

The Allies realised their weaknesses, and through ABDA hoped to share resources, indeed Admiral Phillips (Force Z) was meeting Admiral Hart when hostilities began, trying to form a joint Naval task force.

The American retreat into Bataan was unexpected by the Japanese, and bought time, but I think the Japanese were really stretched to mount both operations at once, shipping being a problem for them even then!

The first photo of this thread shows three, what I think are 12 inch mortars. Are they deployed like this for the photo, surely they weren't fought as a battery of three, so close together?

Steve

[Hoist40]

The first photo of this thread shows three, what I think are 12 inch mortars. Are they deployed like this for the photo, surely they weren't fought as a battery of three, so close together?

Steve

There are actually four 12 inch mortars in that battery, there is one to the left of the photo. Later built mortar batteries only had two guns due to crowding. Sometimes the four gun batteries only manned up two guns at a time to prevent crowding

[Delta Tank]

To all,

I know that this can has been kicked down the road numerous times on the Philippines, and I have participated in a good many of them. It would be great if ever one read the official history, which is on-line and one of the posters has put it's URL in the thread. If you read the first 60 or 70 pages or so of the book entitled "The Fall of the Philippines" a lot of questions will be answered.

Now lets just go over the mighty B-17s which were stationed on the Philippines on 8 December 1941. Now it has been asked and stated many times that the B-17s were suppose to attack Formosa and apparently destroy the entire Japanese Air Force and the war would of ended on 9 December 1941 with a victory for the USA! Now some questions: Where exactly were the B-17s to drop their bombs? Did the air crews have target folders (I was never in the air force, so I don't know what they call this document) that showed the target, what exactly to bomb, etc. How many Japanese fighters were stationed on Formosa? How would the B-17s defend themselves from these Japanese fighters, they would be flying unescorted? And then the big question, the B-17s take off all 36 of them (of course none would be down due to maintenance) with around 40 tons of bombs and fly to Formosa and attack. . so what? What does that accomplish? Does it change the outcome? How many get destroyed on that mission? half? How many can fly tomorrow? Yes, I know the fields on Formosa was socked in with fog, so that delayed the Japanese attack and it would of prevented the US attack if it would of been launched.

Now a little discussed matter, why does everyone give the US Navy a pass on the defense of the Philippines? They had enough submarines stationed in the Philippines to sink the entire invasion force, yet as far as I know they did nothing or virtually nothing! Here is a list from Wiki:
* 1 heavy cruiser (USS Houston)
* 1 light cruiser (USS Marblehead)
* 13 World War I–era destroyers:
o USS Paul Jones
o USS John D. Edwards
o USS Alden
o USS Whipple
o USS Edsall
o USS Stewart
o USS Barker
o USS Parrott
o USS Bulmer
o USS John D. Ford
o USS Pope
o USS Peary
o USS Pillsbury
* 1 destroyer tender (USS Black Hawk)
* 29 submarines:
o USS Porpoise
o USS Pike
o USS Shark
o USS Tarpon
o USS Perch
o USS Pickerel
o USS Permit
o USS Salmon
o USS Seal
o USS Skipjack
o USS Sargo
o USS Saury
o USS Spearfish
o USS Snapper
o USS Stingray
o USS Sturgeon
o USS Sculpin
o USS Sailfish
o USS Swordfish
o USS S-36
o USS S-37
o USS S-38
o USS S-39
o USS S-40
o USS S-41
o USS Seadragon
o USS Sealion
o USS Searaven
o USS Seawolf[1]
* 5 gunboats:
o USS Asheville
o USS Tulsa
o USS Oahu
o USS Luzon
o USS Mindanao
* 1 yacht (USS Isabel)
* 6 minesweepers:
o USS Finch
o USS Bittern
o USS Tanager
o USS Quail
o USS Lark
o USS Whippoorwill
* 2 tankers:
o USS Pecos
o USS Trinity)
* 1 ocean-going tugboat (USS Napa)
* 4 seaplane tenders:
o USS Langley
o USS Childs
o USS William B. Preston
o USS Heron in support of Patrol Wing TEN (VP 101 and VP 102) with 28 PBY-4 Catalina flying boats
* 1 submarine rescue vessel (USS Pigeon)
* 3 submarine tenders:
o USS Holland
o USS Canopus
o USS Otus
* various other ships, including 6 motor torpedo boats that formed Motor Torpedo Boat Squadron Three
* 1 2-masted schooner USS Lanikai

Mike

[binder001]

I don't think the Navy gets a pass, but they don't get the blame as much as MacArtur. Biggest problems are that the surface force looks impressive until one sees that the IJN would be able to bring down a lot of their surface forces to support the invasion. The DDs were older ships with almost no AA defense. The cruisers wouldn't last long without air cover even if they weren't so badly outnumbered. The result would have been the same as happened off Java. The big disappointment was the performance (or more precisely the lack of performance) of the submarines. Many of the basic ships were fine, even the older "S" Boats should have been usable in the coastal defense role, but the ships were neutered by the failure of US submarine torpedoes. That left the submarines with no effective weapon. There were several instances of pre-war sub commanders not being up to wartime stress or lacking the temperment for close combat. In a "perfect world" the subs would have had functioning torpedoes and would have been coordinated with air recon. They wouldn't have stopped the invasion but they sure would have made it costly for the Japanese.

Oddly enough an invasion fleet should be like blood in the water to sharks. In theory the assembled ships tied to one geographic area should be frightfully vulnerable to submarine attack, but in the actual war this didn't happen in Europe or the Pacific.