Rich thank you for reminding me about ‘The History of the Philippines Army’. The examples you gave at the web address. I bow to a master to selective snipping. Bu there is suggestion that the American Officers and some NCO only being able to speak English as being part of the problem. A fact that is supported by Morton and the language problem among the Philippines as being somewhat of an after thought. I Para phrase other entries in the history
But the one I like best is for Page 14. I think you should read this again as it deals with the early history of the Scouts an area that you say is not relevant. However it does seem to prove some of my assertions.
According to Page 14; each of the Early Scout Companies were recruited from a particular district and kept together to ease language problems (a system used by the PA until it broke down on Mobilization) and were not allowed to serve in their own area, language problems?
Question is; Keeping them together eased who’s language problem. I would suggest the Officers.
It goes on to say something like they were valuable because they knew the country and the language. But surely if the Philippines was such a tower of Babel, what language would they have know . Again I would suggest a Malaya dialect. What would you suggest?
On page 102 of Torres; In 1938 20,000 PA troops going on Manoeuvres with the US Army, In two separate areas of the Philippines. Although no specific defence problems were solved Torres Says ‘but the mobilisation of troops was conducted very credibly and Macarthur praised the Manoeuvres’. No language problems are mentioned, could it be that there were non or if there was they were insignificant and put right or were ignored by the US.?
Again on Page 102, it tells of the PA used to put down strikes, language problems?
On Page 148 of Torres: Test mobilisations for the PA were carried out in 1939 and 1941. Another test in 1940 was cancelled for lack of money. No language problems were reported Any problems in 1939 surely would have been sorted out and if urgent the test of 1940 would unquestionably have been carried out what ever the cost.
On Page 203: In 1941 after Mobilisation the PA 51st Division carried out 13 weeks training followed by Battalion level training, To complete this length of time training would it not be reasonable for any language problems arising being mentioned.
Although we have discussed the rifle problems, and according to the official history the rifle and language problem contributed to the fall of the Philippines, perhaps to be thorough we should look further, especially when page 205 complains about the lack of dependable ammunition, it being old and not tested. We see that spare parts for weapons were missing and the Machine guns were incomplete.
This mention of poor ammunition caused me to look closer at the Official History (Morton) and I found these examples:
Page 131 - ’but the .30 cal machine guns dropped out of action because of faulty ammunition’.
Page 118 - ‘the flares may have been caused by American and Filipino troops firing faulty tracer ammunition’.
Page 288 - ‘3inch Stokes mortars with Ammo that contained a high proportion of duds’.
Page 508 - ‘the greatest draw back o training was the shortage of reliable ammunition’.
I suppose we should throw in the faulty torpedoes fired by the US Navy submarines.
I have to add that the only real language problems seemed to be among the American Generals when trying to blame or deny responsibility for any set backs
This awful rifle the Enfield; Page 29 of the official history it says;
‘Every man was equipped with a rifle, the .30-caliber Enfield rifle used by American troops in World War I. The stock was too long for the small Philippine soldier and the weak extractor often broke and could not be replaced.’
I find the stock being to long difficult to fathom I assume he means the butt. The original British P14 had the butt made in three sizes to accommodate small men and Ghurkhas. The Americans standardised the butt like the Springfield 03. To shorten a butt was and is a unit armourers job and could have been carried out by a village carpenter.
The extractor is a more complicated issue .When the rifle was converted to take the .03-06 Ammunition, the substitute extractor was of an inferior metal to the Enfield 1917 bolt which was of nickel steel. The American replacement extractor when put under extra tension by a ‘hard extraction’ could break, to prevent this the ‘Dough boys’ pushed a bit of rubber under the bolt above the extractor. The British had designed the rifle to be extremely tough on the battle field. Experts on both sides of the Atlantic rate the Enfield’s as probably the most robust rifle ever produced. And the cock on closing device prevented any extra strain being put on the extractor when withdrawing the expended cartridge from the rifle, especially if the cartridge was dirty or damaged before firing in a hot breech. Between the wars the Remington Armoury changed the rifle to ‘cock on opening’. This was to make the action ‘slicker’ I find this strange that the US Army standard for rapid fire was 5 to 10 aimed shots a minute the British standard was 15 to 20 aimed shots with many professional soldier achieving 30.
Rich your website on the demise of the Enfield rifle is to say the least very inaccurate. I find it odd to find that the decision deciding the fate of the USA’s battle rifle was decided on a target range and not from experience on the battle fields of France. The Enfield P14 had been in service with the BA since 1914 as a sniper rifle and continued as such until 1943. Of coarse the Springfield original sights were changed in 1919 to the one similar to the Enfield and moved to above the magazine charger guide, to the rear of the breech like the Enfield. The small of the Butt of the Springfield was also changed to the more ergonomic ‘British Pistol Grip Butt’ of the Enfield ( allows better trigger manipulation and therefore accuracy). The heavier barrel of the Enfield was more accurate over longer ranges than the Springfield.. The change of the Enfield to cock on opening in the 20s and 30s made the rifle more acceptable on the range but disastrous on the battlefield, especially when the official history (above) points out the problems with inferior ammunition
http://www.worldwar1.com/dbc/dbrifle.htm I cannot see any problems with the Enfield, do you see that there is a comparison between the PA and the Dough boys regarding training
http://www.odcmp.org/503/rifle.pdf - The shooting competition referred to in this article took place approximately 4 months before the end of the war and before the US Army had been in a major battle, apart from those serving with the British and French
In conclusion , it would seem obvious to any but the most casual observer That if the US had have taken its responsibilities to the Philippines more seriously and treated them the same as the National Guard on the mainland the PA would have been better armed and equipped The reorganisation by Macarthur created problem. The surplus of men were formed into new units. If the original Regiments, Battalions, Companies and Platoons were recruited along ethnic lines, surely disbanding sub units of any size and distributing the men among units of a different ethnic background would have created language problems especially when the language problems seem to have arisen after the mobilisation of 1941. But really are the rifle and language problems perhaps a myth to cover the overall poor management of the PA. Perhaps a PA of fewer divisions rather than spreading the better trained men thinner. Incorporating the PS into the PA would have ensured that the PA had a backbone of skilled experienced soldiers in every unit. What ever arguments against the amalgamation of the PA, PC and PS, the outcome in 1941 could not have been any worse for the PA.
During the whole period of the development of the PA Macarthur, Eisenhower and Orr until his death, in their reports never reported anything that would indicate that the PA would not be able to able to defend itself and the Philippines in fact it seems that there were no reports that were anything but complimentry about the fledgling Army.