Was there really a Soviet landing threat to Japan in 1945?

[Delta Tank]

I have nothing to add, I just want to watch this thread and I do not how to do that unless I post something. So this is my something!

Mike

You can just say "bookmarking", or use a smilie.

But I don't know how to do that??!! I thought I saw that option once, but. . oh hell let me look really hard again! I can hear my wife now "It is right here in front of you face!" But, according to Rosanne Barr's comedy skit, you need a uterus to find stuff!! And I don't have one!!

computer clueless!
Mike

[OpanaPointer]

I have nothing to add, I just want to watch this thread and I do not how to do that unless I post something. So this is my something!

Mike

You can just say "bookmarking", or use a smilie.

But I don't know how to do that??!! I thought I saw that option once, but. . oh hell let me look really hard again! I can hear my wife now "It is right here in front of you face!" But, according to Rosanne Barr's comedy skit, you need a uterus to find stuff!! And I don't have one!!

computer clueless!
Mike

If you want to use that smilie, right click on it, select "view image", however that appears on your computer, and then bookmark the page. When you need it, copy the URL into the IMG tags.

You can also find it at rationalia.com/z, along with one or two others.

[Carl Schwamberger]

I may have something to add. Way back when paid to think about these things professionally I did sit though a class on Soviet amphibious ops in 1945. Not trusting my memory I'll leave the ill remembered details out. I will suggest folk with a interest in this study up on the actual operations conducted on Japanese held coast. Mostly Korea if memory serves me. The beach assualts were small scale, but the defenders were as well, but where the circumstances warranted the follow up forces were larger, the objectives were ports for further following forces. Amphib landings also supported the operations on Sakhalin island

While the assualts were small potatoes compared to the British/US operations the lecturer thought the Soviet planning and execution competent & reflecting some of the experience from 1943-44 operations on the Black Sea and Baltic coasts.

Glantz's 'August Storm' has some descriptions of the Soviet amphib ops against Japan.

http://books.google.com/books?id=IglgHK ... &q&f=false

[Sid Guttridge]

Glen - Thanks very much for some much needed hard facts. I'll have a closer look at them.

[glenn239]

You're welcome.

IMO, Hula finishes the thesis that the US dropped the A-bomb to warn the Soviets. Given the debate in support of that rather thin theory in the past, one wonders why Hula hasn't been cited by more historians as evidence the US was not only indifferent to Soviet gains in Japan, but was actively assisting Stalin to achieve them. Perhaps the connection was just overlooked.

[OpanaPointer]

Beware monocausality. There was no "one reason" the US dropped the bomb. And assigning percentages to every possible reason for dropping them would require that we knew every fact regarding every reason. Arbitrarily assigning greater value to one reason over all the others has the same problem.

[glenn239]

Why it was done is another thread and an endless debate. For the purposes here it is enough to suppose the United States would not both assist the Soviets to threaten Hokkaido and then drop the bomb for fear of the Soviets taking Hokkaido.

[Sid Guttridge]

Peter H posted the following on the Shumshu landing here on AHF in 2005:

In general, the campaign was executed with vigour and efficiency - the Soviet forces attacking the Kurils occupied them without much of a struggle, Shumshu alone proving a costly landing. This island can be considered to be the last battlefield of World War Two. The U.S.S.R. officially declared war on Japan on 9 August and on the afternoon of the 17th, two days after Japan's surrender, Major-General Aleksei Gnechko, commander of forces on Kamchatka, launched his amphibious operations against the Kuril Islands. He was given ten days to occupy the archipelago. His flotilla carrying the 101st Infantry Division approached Shumshu and facing him were 25,000 Japanese soldiers under Major-General Fusaki, with only three aircraft to aid him.

Gnechko's armada entered the straits around 4.00am on 18 August, were spotted and assaulted into a hellish crossfire around an hour later - 13 landing craft, packed with troops sank or exploded in the first wave. Shumshu's three fighter planes did what they could in the ensuing battle - in the last kamikaze dive of World War Two one pilot crashed his plane into a Soviet destroyer escort.4 The other two also inflicted serious damage before escaping to Tokyo. By the end of 18 August, 8000 Russians held a precarious foothold on Shumshu. The Russians insist the number killed coming ashore is exaggerated, despite a firm estimate that 2000 died.

Fusaki adopted a purely defensive posture after the Russians landed and the honeycombed hills of Shumshu made it hard for their enemies to dig them out. 19 August saw the Russians on Shumshu achieve a surrender with two key Japanese batteries destroyed around 7.00am. Paramushir was taken on 25 August, Matua on the 26th, Itrup the 29th, Urup the 31st, Kunashir and Shikotan on 1 September, and the Habomai Islands on 2-4 September, all with little or no resistance. It is interesting to note that during the first days of fighting on Shumshu, the Japanese were convinced they were engaging American troops and Fusaki sent an urgent message to Imperial Headquarters in Tokyo, protesting the breach of the cessation of hostilities between the U.S. and Japan, signed on August 19.

The Shumshu landing occurred two days after Japan's surrender and was not met with the usual fight-to-the death mentality exhibited by the Japanese defending island outposts before the surrender. Indeed, it would appear that Japanese losses were under 5% of the garrison and that Soviet losses were actually heavier.

In the above list of warships handed over by the USA to the USSR in 1945, only 34 were landing craft, each designed to carry about 200 men. This would give a total lift of some 6,800 men. This, of itself, is quite insufficient to attempt a landing on a major Japanese home island with any prospect of success.

In the Shumshu operation five of these were lost. Thus carrying capacity was reduced by some 1,000 men in attacking a minor Japanese Island not defended to the bitter end.

I must therefore still question whether there really was a Soviet invasion threat to Japan proper in August 1945?

[glenn239]

If I follow you argument, you are suggesting that the 180 vessels of the Hulu program would be all that would be forthcoming from the US Navy should an Allied invasion of Japan become necessary, and that attrition suffered along the way would not be replaced. I would be interested in what brings you to that conclusion, since it doesn't accord with the apparent intention of Hulu in the first place. To what end do you think the US Navy was arming the Soviet Union for amphibious warfare, if not for Japan proper?

The Soviets did not have anything near the capability for tackling the south coast of the Japanese Home Islands. Hokkaido was a different story. See Frank's Downfall to get an idea of how sparsely defended this island was.

[Sid Guttridge]

Glenn - I make no such assumption. I can only go on the evidence as presented, which I found very interesting in its own right as I was previously completely unaware of it.

All we seem to know so far is that of the 34 landing vessels with a capacity of about 6,800 men that were handed over to the USSR under the Hulu Plan, five, with a capacity of 1,000 men, were lost in a minor landing that the Japanese did not contest with their usual pre-surrender tenacity. This does not seem to hold out very good prospects for a landing with the same resources against a major Japanese home island under full wartime conditions.

There are two key gaps in our knowledge:

1) What landing capacity did the Soviet Far East Fleet have from within Soviet resources.

2) What follow-up to the Hulu Plan, if any, was envisaged.

It is clear that the vessels of the Hulu Plan were designed for operations against the Japanese, but it does not necessarily follow that they were sufficient for, or designed to, assist the Soviet Union in taking part in the occupation of Japan's main home islands - something not obviously to the US advantage in the post-war world. When the Hulu Plan was initiated the USSR had not yet overwhelmed the Japanese force in Manchuria and there was the possibility of all sorts of coastal landings on the Manchurian and Korean coasts and operations against outlying islands such as Sakhalin and Shumshu.

If you know of any planned follow-up to the Hulu Plan which would have given the Red Fleet greater amphibious capacity please tell us and we can factor it it in. However, in the absence of such information we can't make this assumption.

[glenn239]

If you know of any planned follow-up to the Hulu Plan which would have given the Red Fleet greater amphibious capacity please tell us and we can factor it it in. However, in the absence of such information we can't make this assumption.

Unless you can cite from US documents to the contrary, it would be unwise to assume that the 180 vessels of Hula would not be supplemented to account for attrition - for the simple reason that the motive for Hula becomes inexplicable unless Hokkaido is the objective. The Russians didn't need US help to take the Kuriles.

There are two key gaps in our knowledge:
1) What landing capacity did the Soviet Far East Fleet have from within Soviet resources.

See Frank’s Downfall on Russian planning. It is certain the Soviet army would have invaded Hokkaido in September of 1945 had the war gone on. The initial assault was to be brigade level, with rapid expansion to three divisions. Given that the Japanese defenders were on foot and spread out over a huge island without air or naval support, the invasion was not in doubt – by the time the landing site had been identified and troops mustered on foot from afar, the Soviets would be ashore in large numbers.

Frank’s narrative passes over the question of the fate of Hokkaido as a given, and assumes that by October 1945 the Soviets are preparing to land on Honshu from forward bases on Hokkaido.

[Sid Guttridge]

Glenn - Again, I make no assumption "that the 180 vessels of Hula would not be supplemented to account for attrition". I merely ask for evidence of this so that we can add to our sum of hard knowledge, rather than speculation.

I do not see why "The motive for Hula becomes inexplicable unless Hokkaido is the objective." When Hulu was initiated Hokkaido was almost completely shielded from assault by the Red Army because of Japanese possession of Manchuria, Sakhalin and the Kuriles. There were therefore quite a number of potential preliminary uses for the Hulu vessels before an attack on Hokkaido could reasonably be considered.

Whether they needed it or not, it would appear that the Russians did use Hulu resources to attack the Kuriles. Shumshu is the most northerly of the Kuriles and, as we have already seen, they suffered significant losses (including about 15% of its Hulu-supplied landing capacity) tackling this island after Japan's surrender and against lacklustre Japanese defence by wartime standards.

I am not in any way against there being a Soviet invasion threat to Japan's main islands but, from the hard information we have so far, this is far from established, even factoring in Hulu vessels,

If anybody has any more hard facts on this subject regarding either USA or USSR intentions, I would be most interested to hear of them.

[glenn239]

I do not see why "The motive for Hula becomes inexplicable unless Hokkaido is the objective."

The US objective was to force the unconditional surrender of Japan. The Soviets cannot contribute to this end if they do not participate in the invasion of Japan.

I am not in any way against there being a Soviet invasion threat to Japan's main islands but, from the hard information we have so far, this is far from established, even factoring in Hulu vessels,

For the invasion of Hokkaido, the Soviet First Far Eastern Front intended to assault from Sakhalin. The lead division would seize a bridgehead initially with only one rifle regiment. The rest of that division would follow, then two more divisions would land. With these forces, the Soviets aimed both to seize all of Hokkaido and to attack the Kurils from the south. They believed only three Japanese infantry divisions plus the Fifth Area Army HQ – about 50,000 men under arms – defended the entire island. Given the vast size of Hokkaido and its mountainous terrain, the Soviets expected that the Japanese could oppose their landing with only one division. The seizure of Hokkaido would confer important military and political rewards; a springboard for attacks on Honshu and a right to participate in the occupation of Japan.

A combination of stiff Japanese resistance and diplomatic action by President Truman saved Hokkaido from otherwise certain Soviet invasion”

Frank, Downfall, pp323

[Sid Guttridge]

Glenn - But did the USA want the USSR to "participate in the invasion of Japan"? After all, as your quote says ".....diplomatic action by President Truman saved Hokkaido from otherwise certain Soviet invasion".

Thanks for the sourced Downfall quote. It puts everything on a firmer footing.

The Hula-supplied landing vessels, with a carrying capacity of 6,800, could easily put ashore a rifle regiment

[glenn239]

The US objective was the unconditional surrender of Japan, which was achieved by mid-August 1945. At that point the US had no interest in the Soviets occupying Hokkaido because the US objective was already achieved. Without the Japanese capitulation the American choice is hundreds of thousands of casualties by going it alone or letting the Russians get a cut and taking off some of the heat. Not too difficult to see which of those two the Yanks would prefer.

The Russians for their part still wanted to go ahead with their invasion of Hokkaido even though the Japanese had just surrendered. This the Americans had no interest in because the war was over.