Phillipines abandoned even before war began

[megjur]

Based on alot of material I've read, it seems that Washington pretty much abandoned the Phillipines even before the start of the war. The idea that the Pacific fleet would somehow come to the rescue was even discounted by the navy which figured on at least a 2 year battle to get back to the Phillipines after a Japanese attack, and this was before Pearl Harbor! The reinforcing of the islands was pretty much for show, since the pride of the US would not permit honesty in admitting that if the Japanese attacked it was a given that the Phillipines would be lost. Washington hoped, but didn't really expect, that the B-17's sent to Luzon would be a deterrent. I think I may do a whole other post as to why MacArthur wasn't court martialed for not allowing the B-17's to bomb Formosa on Dec 8th. Any thoughts on this topic?

[Takao]

I guess you could say the Philippines were technically abandoned with the signing of the Washington Navy Treaty of 1922, which forbid the building of bases in the Pacific. A "Status Quo" was to be maintained and the signatory nations were allowed only to modernize the bases.

At the time the Navy realized it could not support the Phillipines in a time of war, but the USAAF had the awnser with the B-17. During the 1930's the Bomber was the cure-all for any nation's military. Specifically, the B-17 flew faster than most fighters, carried a sizable bomb load, and was able to find and hit targets a good distance away. However, it was produced in numbers so small to make it relativly useless. But the USAAF generals had convinced themselves that the B-17, even in small numbers, could be able to defend the Philippines.

IMHO, those in charge at the time had hoped for the best, but expected the worst. The Philippines would buy the Allies time to gather their forces and prepare a counter-attack.

[sand digger]

MacArthur certainly was responsible for the dismal failure to use what was available properly in any sense. He treated the Phillipines as his own personal kingdom and was responsible for changing the original defensive plan to something else which, aside from his subsequent tactical failure, was a retrograde step in itself.

In performance, MacArthur was far worse than Percival who was in a similar situation re Malaya/Singapore. And Percival was hardly a quality commander.

[fredleander]

Based on alot of material I've read, it seems that Washington pretty much abandoned the Phillipines even before the start of the war. The idea that the Pacific fleet would somehow come to the rescue was even discounted by the navy which figured on at least a 2 year battle to get back to the Phillipines after a Japanese attack, and this was before Pearl Harbor! The reinforcing of the islands was pretty much for show, since the pride of the US would not permit honesty in admitting that if the Japanese attacked it was a given that the Phillipines would be lost. Washington hoped, but didn't really expect, that the B-17's sent to Luzon would be a deterrent. I think I may do a whole other post as to why MacArthur wasn't court martialed for not allowing the B-17's to bomb Formosa on Dec 8th. Any thoughts on this topic?

I would like to restart this thread as I find the conclusion of the final poster utterly wrong and, as many other postings on this subject, quite superficial. The subject is much more complicated than this. First of all, MacArthur did not take command of the US (and Philippine forces) untill July '41. From then on he worked tirelessly to have Washington speed up supplies of men and materiel to satisfy the new strategic role of the island nation, that of an offensive role. While this wasn't formalized till November 1941 it had been in the cards since the Japanese started expanding their role in Indo-China following the French defeat in Europe. This role could not be fulfilled by an US force blockaded on the Bataan Peninsula. While MacArthur was of the same opinion and had prepared his command for such a change it was not his responsibility as such. It was a political decision.

Before taking up his position as CO of the USAFFE in July '41 his role had been that of an advisor to the build-up of the Philippine forces after the establishing of the development of a future Philippine state in 1935. Within that was the organizing of Philippine forces, land, sea and air. The creation and expansion of this force had to be funded by the Philippines itself. Initially, this force should consist of 10 small army divisions with support branches and a small air force and navy. This was what MacArthur had to work with from 1935 to 1941, marginally subsidized by US resources. But, before the establishing of the USAFFE, an ambitious supply program had been initiated by Washington to speed up the creation of his army. Only after MacArthur came into play was the mobilization of the Philippine army started, a matter outside of his control, the first regiments of each division was called up September 1st 1941, the complete divisions to be crewed up by December. That was the beginning. The organizing of the army was based on the quite meager past budgets therefore very little infrastructure was ready when the various units moved in. Much time, that should have been used for training, had to go to building camps, ranges and roads. There was not ammunition for fire practice and much general equipment was missing. When the Japanese attacked about 100 shiploads of personnel and equipment was on its way, or planned to go, to Manila.

So, how could it be that all this didn't matter in the end? Because the US leadership completely lost its head after the first Japanese successes. Instead of speeding up what was already on its way, supply ships were called back, rerouted and delayed. Instead of being used to fight the Japanese in Philippine waters and escort the supply ships to their destinations the whole US Asiatic Fleet, three cruisers, 13 destroyers, 27 submarines and a number of tenders and support ships were "given" to the British to support the supply of Singapore and Malaya and the defense of the Western part of the Dutch East Indies. No new naval forces were sent westwards to reinforce the Asiatic Fleet. The carrier fleet that had survived the Pearl Harbor attack was used for costly and time-consuming pinpoint attacks around the Eastern Pacific that didn't disturb the Japanese more than fly-shit.

Both the President and General Marshall urged "everybody" to do what they could, no holds barred, to assist the forces in the Philippines. Cost was no objection and much money was used to hire in freighters to go to Luzon and other islands but nothing was done to ensure their safe journey. Not once! Worst of all, Washington would not listen to MacArthur's insisting pledges that the Japanese did not control the waters around the Philippines, which was quite true. The Japanese were over-stretched and this fact had actually been confirmed by army and navy analysts before the war. They had found that if the Japanese continued their engagement in China they would only have resources for one more major campaign. Now they were fighting both in China, in Malaya and on the Philippines. And in Hong Kong and Wake. History shows this to be correct. Their frog-leaping conquests were dependent on their not being stopped completely at any point. The stubborn defense of Bataan resulted in the Visayas with Mindanao being in American hands till after the surrender on Bataan on April 9th 1942. Only in the end of April started the Japanese assault on Mindanao in earnest. At that time a net of US airfields had been constructed on all the larger islands. A dozen of these could accommodate large bombers. There were technical personnel of all sorts but all sorts of equipment was still lacking. Some small shipments of small-arms ammunition had arrived in Mindanao by air and submarines. A minimum of influx of personnel and supplies from the outside would have done wonders. The Pensacola convoy arrived in Brisbane on December 22nd after having been sent around the Pacific. Aboard was a complete artillery brigade with heaps of extra equipment, dive bombers and fighters. Much of it eventually ended up in Java where it had to fight it out under terrible odds instead of reinforcing the large US forces in the Philippines which were eagerly waiting for them. The ones to be court-martialled was the leadership at home.

The comparison made in a posting here, between the British General Percival and MacArthur, is laughable in the extreme. Particularly when one compares the difference in support given to the two parties.

As for bombing Formosa on the first day of hostilities that would probably have ended in even greater losses for the bomber force.

My conclusion is that the Philippines weren't abandoned before the war, but after it started.

Fred

[durb]

How important was the destruction of bulk of US air force resources in Clark Field on 8.12.1941? It certainly made things easier for Japanese and helped them to gain air superiority quite easily. I think that when it comes to air force resources, there were reasonable number of them allocated to Philippines, but the problem was that so many planes were destroyed on the ground. I think that MacArthur is not to be blamed of the disaster. There should have been early air warning system - I do not know if such was built, but if it was, it did not work on 8.12.1941.

[fredleander]

Hi, Durb - the events of Dec. 8th are so intricate that you really need to read a book about it to understand it. I recommend Bartsch: "Doomed from the start." Even if the FEAF had got through the first days without the terrible losses on the ground they would eventually have foundered, anyway. There was an air warning system, both radars and an observer corps. In my opinion, there were two main reasons for their demise. Firstly, the air warning system did not work. No one in particular can be blamed for this except maybe the normal scapegoat, the boss himself. In this case that would have to be General Brereton, CO FEAF. I would say their system simply was not good enough, they could have learnt a lot from the British. Even if they had trained with this the two weeks preceding the Japanese assault. Radio procedures were ineffective, even the discipline of the pilots to follow ground instructions. It was not as of they were not prepared, the readiness had been increased gradually. If anything, they were probably too high-wrought. If somebody cried "Tally Ho, Clark Field" on the radio every airborne plane went for it.

The other main problem was their materiel. The P-40E was a lousy interceptor. The pilots actually preferred the earlier model the "B" because it was lighter and therefore climbed and turned faster. It also had .30 machine guns in the wings that worked (plus two .50 caliber guns), contrary to the newly installed .50's in the "E" version. The only way the American pilots could save themselves as soon as the Zero escort showed up was to dive away. Ironically enough, the P-36 would probably have been more effective in that scenario.

Fred

[rcocean]

No offense, but I really wonder why people constantly repeat the same old nonsense over and over about the Japanese air attack on Dec 8th. First the FEAF was not "Wiped out", and it was not caught "unprepared - just like Pearl Harbor"- in summary probably 35 P-40s and 17 B-17 were destroyed on the ground or while taking off because somehow the Radar operators didn't get the word to Clark Field in time.

That's it. Yet, even History Professors and Book Authors can't help themselves and start screeching about "MacArthur's Pearl Harbor!!!" or "The FEAF was destroyed on the ground!!"

[durb]

One should not take in account not only those planes destroyed immediately on 8.12.1941 but also those damaged so severely that they did not take part in combat for several days. There were also further Japanese attacks on FEAF airfields in 10.12.1941 eliminating more US planes from the combat - almost all Tomahawks (P-40 B) were destroyed on the ground. The remaining P-40 E´s could fight back as demonstrated by pilots like Boyd "Buzz" Wagner.

I looked from the web what can be found about this matter, these came up with different interpretation on what happened and evaluating MacArthur´s role:
http://www.militaryhistoryonline.com/ww ... ction.aspx
http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USA/USA ... -PI-5.html

The question why reinforcements were not sent to Philippines in early 1942 may be just the fact that at that point there were not realistic chances to get the reinforcement convoys through Japanese dominated air space and sea areas without very heavy losses. Maybe there were not even necessary shipping resources and US/Allied were very much on defensive on Dec. 1941 and spring 1942. Probably the Japanese resources were also undervaluated and it was though that the troops already stationed in Philippines were well enough to deal with Japanese (evaluation based on false intelligence information or even racial prejudices?).

One thing often forgotten is that the defence of Philippines was not 100 % American enterprise. There were also nascent Philippine Defence Forces including small Philippine Army Air Corps (PAAC). I have read that they fought quite well. The PAAC pilots even managed to get some air victories with their obsolete P-26´s. Maybe the Philippine resources were undervaluated and they could have been mobilised more?

[steverodgers801]

rcocean, the FEAF was rendered ineffective on that one day. The disaster was even worse for Mac because he had warning, but because of his Sutherland, the airforce sat around when they could have tried to strike Formosa and possibly hurt the Japanese air force. Regardless of whether Brereton asked for permission or not to attack, it was Mac's job to ensure his supposed orders were carried out.

[ChristopherPerrien]

rcocean, the FEAF was rendered ineffective on that one day. The disaster was even worse for Mac because he had warning, but because of his Sutherland, the airforce sat around when they could have tried to strike Formosa and possibly hurt the Japanese air force. Regardless of whether Brereton asked for permission or not to attack, it was Mac's job to ensure his supposed orders were carried out.

While I hold that Macarthur did not authorize recon or bombing raids because his patron Quezon hoped to avoid a Japanese attack and Mac got paid handsomely for not doing so; plus maybe some effect of the voided war-warning - "if hostilities cannot be avoided the United States desires that Japan commit the first overt act" It did not matter in the grand scheme of things. The IJA/IJN air forces on Formosa (+ IMJS Ryojo)were formidable and greatly out-numbered USAAF in PI, (about 600:125).The USAFFE didn't stand a chance and would have been shot out the sky or destroyed on the ground in short order even if they got a first strike on Formosa and also fought better than historic through the BoPI.

As to the ground war, Sure Mac could have avoided being out-generaled/maneuvered by Homma, and stockpiled more supplies on Bataan and held out longer, but that would not have mattered either, it would have just delayed the eventual fall, as again the Japanese out-numbered trained US ground forces ( est. 60K/30K). http://www.history.army.mil/books/wwii/5-2/5-2_13.htmAnd no convoy , was ever going to get through before at least until the end of the Solomon's campaign (early 43 I'd say).

Over-all for the topic, I'd say the Philippines were "written-off" on Dec12, 1941 when the "Pensacola Convoy" bound for the Philippines was re-routed to Australia instead. I guess that is the "abandonment day".

[Takao]

The Philippines were "abandoned" years before December 12th...
December 12th is only the date that the Joint Chiefs of Staff saw thru MacArthur's delusion of defending the entire Philippine Islands. MacArthur would persist in his delusion until the night of December 23rd, when he issued his order "WPO-3 is in effect."

[OpanaPointer]

Rainbow 5

[ChristopherPerrien]

The Philippines were "abandoned" years before December 12th...
"

Your earlier mention of the Washington treaty points, I don't think are relevant here.While new fortifications were prohibited, it said nothing about improving current ones. US coast defenses around Manila/Subic bay were the best in the world for close to 30 years. It matters not if more could have been built as they were all vulnerable from a land-side attack.

Macarthur simply could not train 100,000 Filipinos fast enough as he was an old man and only a figurehead even if he believed and said otherwise. If there was any earlier "write off", it was the fact Macarthur took off for the Philippines in the 1930's in light of his earlier personal relations with the ruling junta(Quezon) of PI and that Roosevelt astutely saw a method in 1941, to avoid a potential republican presidential opponent in 1944 by federalizing Macarthur from Field Marshal of the Philippine Army back into the US Army..

So yea, maybe July 26 1941, is a better date politically speaking , but it was a military certainty on 12 Dec 1941 with the re-routing of the Pensacola Convoy.

[OpanaPointer]

Dugout wasn't doing the physical training, he had troopers for that. He served another ten years, IIRC.

[Takao]

You seriously believe all of that Chris?

Of course new fortifications matter, as they could be built where they would be of the most use...Who says that they have to be built to protect Manila/Subic. Why not build them to protect they few identified beaches on Luzon where a sizable force could be landed. All of the locks on your front door are not worth a darn if you do not have any locks on your back door, and there were no locks on Luzon's back door, and this was well known.

MacArthur's training mistake was to break up his well-trained Philippine Army units and spread them amongst the many lesser trained army units. Thus leaving him without any reliable fighting forces.

MacArthur was only a "figurehead"? Most of the literature I have read points to quite the contrary.

The earliest "write off" goes back to the early years of the creation of War Plan Orange which foresaw that the Philippines would likely be lost.

Odd that you state that FDR "astutely" saw a method, in 1941, to avoid a potential republican presidential opponent...If so, it was not very "astute" of FDR to pull his butt out of the Philippines. It was also not very "astute" to "give" MacArthur the CMOH for losing his command. Further, It was not very "astute" of FDR not to court martial MacArthur for losing his command. It was not very "astute" of FDR to allow MacArthur to be placed in another prominent position. Finally, if MacArthur wanted to run for President, he could simply resign his command. All in all, if FDR wanted to "get rid" of a political opponent, he went about it in a a quite idiotic way by building said General into a great American hero..