Indo China Occupation 1940

Discussions on WW2 in the Pacific and the Sino-Japanese War.
Carl Schwamberger
Host - Allied sections
Posts: 10055
Joined: 02 Sep 2006, 21:31
Location: USA

Re: Indo China Occupation 1940

#16

Post by Carl Schwamberger » 06 Feb 2014, 03:15

That was a joke son.

OpanaPointer
Financial supporter
Posts: 5643
Joined: 16 May 2010, 15:12
Location: United States of America

Re: Indo China Occupation 1940

#17

Post by OpanaPointer » 06 Feb 2014, 03:30

Carl Schwamberger wrote:That was a joke son.
Just wondering if there was something I'd missed. I would have dated possible war with Japan to 1896. Ted Roosevelt in point of fact.
Come visit our sites:
hyperwarHyperwar
World War II Resources

Bellum se ipsum alet, mostly Doritos.


Carl Schwamberger
Host - Allied sections
Posts: 10055
Joined: 02 Sep 2006, 21:31
Location: USA

Re: Indo China Occupation 1940

#18

Post by Carl Schwamberger » 06 Feb 2014, 04:17

Hmmm... if we want to go over the top. I'll see your Rosevelt and raise you a Matthew Perry... After Commander James Biddles wholly rebuffed official expedition of 1846 came Captain James Glynns 1849 effort, which at least got a Japanese official to sit politely across the table for a brief time. Post expedition Cpt Glynn recommended the next expedition be a 'demonstration of force'. Not sure if that were his exact words.

Comodore Perry returned in 1853 with the steam frigates Mississippi, and Susquehanna, & sloop of war Plymouth and Saratoga, and threatened to shoot his cannon at the Japanese if they did not negotiate a trade treaty. Since this was a premeditated intent to use violence to achieve a political goal it fits Clauswitzs definition of war. So this would place US war plans vs Japan back to at least 1853. What the Japanese were intending then I'll leave for another moment.

OpanaPointer
Financial supporter
Posts: 5643
Joined: 16 May 2010, 15:12
Location: United States of America

Re: Indo China Occupation 1940

#19

Post by OpanaPointer » 06 Feb 2014, 12:18

I used to own one of Perry's revolvers that went to Japan with him.

But TR ordered the War and Navy departments to make plans for war with Japan after a little four-nation stand-off off Honolulu back in 1896. He was distracted by the Spanish-American War and we had to wait decades to fight the Japanese.
Come visit our sites:
hyperwarHyperwar
World War II Resources

Bellum se ipsum alet, mostly Doritos.

Carl Schwamberger
Host - Allied sections
Posts: 10055
Joined: 02 Sep 2006, 21:31
Location: USA

Re: Indo China Occupation 1940

#20

Post by Carl Schwamberger » 06 Feb 2014, 14:37

What was the political objective of the 1896 planning?

OpanaPointer
Financial supporter
Posts: 5643
Joined: 16 May 2010, 15:12
Location: United States of America

Re: Indo China Occupation 1940

#21

Post by OpanaPointer » 06 Feb 2014, 14:52

Carl Schwamberger wrote:What was the political objective of the 1896 planning?
Bottom line, TR wanted to fight Japan for the remaining unclaimed territories in the Pacific to insure we had coaling stations on friendly turf. . The stand-off involved USN, RN, IJN, and German warships. It was this incident that caused the planters to convince the US to "protect" Hawaii. I wrote a paper on this while I was at Purdue, "Seeds of Orange".
Come visit our sites:
hyperwarHyperwar
World War II Resources

Bellum se ipsum alet, mostly Doritos.

Carl Schwamberger
Host - Allied sections
Posts: 10055
Joined: 02 Sep 2006, 21:31
Location: USA

Re: Indo China Occupation 1940

#22

Post by Carl Schwamberger » 06 Feb 2014, 15:22

I was unaware the Japanese were also in military competition for those islands.

OpanaPointer
Financial supporter
Posts: 5643
Joined: 16 May 2010, 15:12
Location: United States of America

Re: Indo China Occupation 1940

#23

Post by OpanaPointer » 06 Feb 2014, 15:36

Carl Schwamberger wrote:I was unaware the Japanese were also in military competition for those islands.
They had an informal policy of "colonization by immigration", and Hawaii was a prime target for this. There were 160,000+ Japanese-ancestry people on Oahu on Dec. 7th, 1941.

Capt. Togo, of Tsushima fame, was in command of the largest warship there, a heavy cruiser. Germany had, once more, the smallest ship, a fact which irked the Kaiser no end.
Come visit our sites:
hyperwarHyperwar
World War II Resources

Bellum se ipsum alet, mostly Doritos.

cstunts
Member
Posts: 607
Joined: 17 Aug 2006, 05:45
Location: USA

Re: Indo China Occupation 1940

#24

Post by cstunts » 06 Nov 2014, 22:33

How well did Japans leaders understand the possible and probable attitude of the US government towards the occupation of Indo China? That is how well were they forewarned of the probabillty of the embargos, and was there any degree of 'denial' of any warnings?

Since this is an extremely interesting--and very complicated--area, and the actual question was not really answered at all, but instead a lengthy & irrelevant digression emerged (as usual)...it seems worth re-examining. Properly understood it was, after all, the governing factor in the war's outbreak.

The Japanese leaders? Which ones? The military? Army or Navy? Strike North or Strike South faction?
Politicians? Cabinet members? They weren't the real leaders at all. (Matsuoka Yosuke a prime example of this...)
No one seems to have mentioned or commented on the role played by the Tripartite Pact (27 Sept. 1940), which was very directly related to the Japanese moves in SE Asia.

Your last sentence/question may be answered pretty definitively, though.

The military understood quite well the likelihood of embargoes, and yes, there was an aspect of Denialism there.
Although the Japanese liked to use the 'cutting of the Burma road' argument as a rationale, & this may have been the original aim of the South China Area Army, the truth is that Indo-China was critical to the Southern Advance in general & when you get down to it, what was the IJN going to have to do with 'settling' the China Incident?

Or, for that matter, how would China solve Japan's strategic resources emergency? Answer: it wasn't. Even without considering a full-scale U.S. petroleum embargo, the Japanese military--foremost the IJN, along with various pseudo-businesses which were effectively in the hands of the navy--had been planning a move into the Dutch East Indies for many years...Much more so than any plans to attack Singapore in fact (where the actual operational plans came very late.)

The Philippines & Pearl Harbor were corollaries or secondary concerns, you might say, not primary ones--like the NEI & Singapore/Malaya. Critical strategic resources & geography help explain that.

For reasons which may never be crystal clear to Western minds, Matsuoka believed that the Tripartite Pact-- possibly including a fourth member: the USSR, (altho' this was more a scheme in the nutty brain of Shiratori Toshio than Matsuoka)--would dissuade the U.S. and afford the Japanese greater leverage. He also later fell into the most unfortunate position which had affected Ishiwara Kanji--that of being an advocate of one aggression (Manchuria for Ishiwara in 1931, N. Indo-China for Matsuoka in 1940) who then reformed his views about further territorial ambitions, but found himself overmatched by more aggressive & militant leaders (Ishiwara's opposition to enlarging the China Incident after 1936 & Matsuoka's opposition to the move into S. Indo-China in 1941)...

No one should be surprised that Matsuoka cooked his own goose (so to speak) by embarrassing The IJA's leader CofGS GEN Sugiyama twice in early 1941, once during an audience with the Emperor. After that his days were numbered, but all along he had believed that the Tripartite Pact would help deter the U.S. from becoming involved in war against the Axis powers, yet at the same time [!!] strengthen a much longer term relationship with the U.S. in the Pacific...

Technically speaking, the IJA's first formal commitment to the Southern Advance came in June, 1940, and was much inspired by the successes of Hitler's armies in Europe. At that time they were being told--by Oshima in Germany, among others, I assume--that Germany planned to invade & conquer Britain in August of that year (1940). There is no question that Hitler & the Nazis were definitely encouraging the Japanese to attack in SE Asia--meaning principally Singapore. The IJN table-gamed an amphibious expedition in May 1940 to seize the NEI oilfields in Borneo, but the results were not terribly encouraging. In fact, far from it. But ultimately it made no difference.

The Tripartite Pact follows on 27 Sept. 1940 then Japan moves into Northern Indo-China later that fall.

I am by no means sure that the Japanese fully realized the extent to which American rearmament had already started to gain ground (and this may have been much more clear to them after MacArthur resumes command in the P.I. and reinforcements begin arriving a year later, etc.)...but that's another subject.
In any case, one may say that the Japanese species of denialism then prevalent in their military was certainly tainted with a good deal of fatalism as well.

FWIW

OpanaPointer
Financial supporter
Posts: 5643
Joined: 16 May 2010, 15:12
Location: United States of America

Re: Indo China Occupation 1940

#25

Post by OpanaPointer » 07 Nov 2014, 00:08

Carl Schwamberger wrote:I was unaware the Japanese were also in military competition for those islands.
Allen and Polmar mention it en passim in Codename Downfall, first paragraph in the book proper. They credit Edward S. Miller's War Plan Orange: The US Strategy to Defeat Japan, 1897-1945.
Come visit our sites:
hyperwarHyperwar
World War II Resources

Bellum se ipsum alet, mostly Doritos.

Post Reply

Return to “WW2 in the Pacific & Asia”