Lack Of Japanese Anti-Submarine Tactics

[OpanaPointer]

Japan only had, IIRC, 20% of the industrial capacity of the US, and US capacity was severely under-employed in 1940. The "Two Ocean Navy Act" changed that as did the Army's build up. The Act laid out what ships we planned to build but I haven't looked at it for quite a while, so I can't say how many escorts of what type were meant to be built.

The US ASW program was immature in 1941, I agree there.

[OpanaPointer]

Two-Ocean Navy Act of 1940

The Act authorized the procurement of:[1][4]
18 aircraft carriers
2 Iowa-class battleships
5 Montana-class battleships
6 Alaska-class cruisers
27 cruisers
115 destroyers
43 submarines
15,000 aircraft
The conversion of 100,000 tons of auxiliary ships
$50 million for patrol, escort and other vessels
$150 million for essential equipment and facilities
$65 million for the manufacture of ordnance material or munitions
$35 million for the expansion of facilities

[LWD]

... The US ASW program was immature in 1941, I agree there.

Thus my point, both the US and Japan were a bit behind the power curve as far as ASW went in 41. The US though had the resources to fix this in fairly short order and still improve the situation in other areas the same is not true of Japan. Even if they had recognized the need what could they give up to get there?

[OpanaPointer]

... The US ASW program was immature in 1941, I agree there.

Thus my point, both the US and Japan were a bit behind the power curve as far as ASW went in 41. The US though had the resources to fix this in fairly short order and still improve the situation in other areas the same is not true of Japan. Even if they had recognized the need what could they give up to get there?

I believe Japan didn't have a chance of meeting most of their needs, and their philosophy prevented them from prioritizing the defense of the resources they had just captured.

[ChristopherPerrien]

... The US ASW program was immature in 1941, I agree there.

Thus my point, both the US and Japan were a bit behind the power curve as far as ASW went in 41. The US though had the resources to fix this in fairly short order and still improve the situation in other areas the same is not true of Japan. Even if they had recognized the need what could they give up to get there?

US behind the power curve? Hell we were fighting the Battle of the Atlantic in 1940 and well toward carrying 1/2 the ball in 1941- Defending all convoys on this side of the Altantic , and putting gobs of ASW aircraft on all those ex-British bases/islands, that they did not have the planes to use from those bases anyway, effectively patrolling the entire Atlantic -minus the airgap that we eventually closed. And giving numerous assets to the UK fight other half, like the 50 Destroyers. That was all long before Pearl Harbor.

Stimson or Hull said of the "Destroyers for Bases agreement", "We are in it now, in all but name" in Sept of 1940. And after Nov 1940, with Roosevelt re-elected, whether it was "declared war or un-declared war", the whole point became moot.

[OpanaPointer]

The question is rather how well we planned for this role, I think.

[Felix C]

Everyone states that the US's use of unrestricted submarine warfare played a crucial war in fatally weakening Japan's ability to conduct the war, primarily by cutting of oil shipments from the Dutch East Indies as well as the transport of other crucial raw materials to the Japanese Home Islands. I have seen may authors claim that the Japanese never developed effective counter-measures such as the Allies used in the Atlantic against the German U-boats. They didn't even organize a convoy system. One argument said the Japanese Navy was never interested in the problem because it had an offensive doctrine and guarding merchant ships didn't fit in with this (actually the professional officers of the British Royal Navy also didn't like escorting convoys, but the RN did get around to providing the convoys with protection anyway).

My question is if the Japanese leadership saw the country was being strangled by the American submarine offensive, why didn't they crack the heads of the Navy and the merchant marines to do something about it? I am quite puzzled by this.
Does anyone know the answer to this?

Having read numerous USN submarine memoirs I disagree with a few points: Japanese did use both escorted ship and a convoy system(akin to that used in the Med by the Italians) and there were units which showed considerable expertise in counter-attacking submarines.

[LWD]

... The US ASW program was immature in 1941, I agree there.

Thus my point, both the US and Japan were a bit behind the power curve as far as ASW went in 41. The US though had the resources to fix this in fairly short order and still improve the situation in other areas the same is not true of Japan. Even if they had recognized the need what could they give up to get there?

US behind the power curve? Hell we were fighting the Battle of the Atlantic in 1940 and well toward carrying 1/2 the ball in 1941- Defending all convoys on this side of the Altantic , and putting gobs of ASW aircraft on all those ex-British bases/islands, that they did not have the planes to use from those bases anyway, effectively patrolling the entire Atlantic -minus the airgap that we eventually closed. And giving numerous assets to the UK fight other half, like the 50 Destroyers. That was all long before Pearl Harbor.

Stimson or Hull said of the "Destroyers for Bases agreement", "We are in it now, in all but name" in Sept of 1940. And after Nov 1940, with Roosevelt re-elected, whether it was "declared war or un-declared war", the whole point became moot.

That would explain why we didn't have any DE's until 43 wouldn't it?
http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USN/ships/ships-de.html
Or the fact that subchasers in 41 were limited to half a dozen converted yachts and 15 WW1 left overs that were all either decomisssioned in 41 or 42 or handed over to the CG.
http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USN/shi ... sc.html#pc
The 20 PTC's not included in the above wouldn't have been of much use except in coastal areas.
http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USN/shi ... t.html#ptc

[steverodgers801]

It did take Admiral King some time to react to the dub threat in the Atlantic.

[ChristopherPerrien]

That would explain why we didn't have any DE's until 43 wouldn't it?
http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USN/ships/ships-de.html

:roll: , Actually it does, if you knew where the first 78 UK sub-chasers came from, they were the first US DE design built. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Captain_class_frigate

It similar to why the US was using mostly Grants and Stuarts in North africa, because the British had all the Shermans. I guess they thought of them first too.

Care to discuss where the 1st Escort Carriers(the ultimate ASW platform) were designed and built ?

But we digress, Let's get back to the Pacific

[Takao]

That would explain why we didn't have any DE's until 43 wouldn't it?
http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USN/ships/ships-de.html

:roll: , Actually it does, if you knew where the first 78 UK sub-chasers came from, they were the first US DE design built. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Captain_class_frigate

No it does not Chris.

The British didn't get their DEs until 1943 either. Look at the transfer dates...1943, 1943, 1943. Same as the US DEs. Some of those 78 Royal Navy DEs were still coming off the ways in 1944.