American losses on Leyte
American losses on Leyte
Why were American army losses on Leyte relatively small, in comparison with the scale, length of operation and the number of troops incolved from both sides? On Leyte 50 000 japanese soldiers inflicted 15 000 losses to US army. But on Peleliu there were 10 000 japanese and the same number of American losses. The same proportion was on Iwodzima. But on Leyte, the proportion of losses was much more favorable to Americans. Which factors contributed to this?
Re: American losses on Leyte
Look at the proportion of Japanese troops per square mile of land mass.
Iwo Jima: about 2,500 Japanes troops per square mile.
Peleliu: about 2,200 Japanese troops per square mile.
and Leyte
about 19 Japanese troops per square mile.
Now, which of these three islands do you think will be the easiest to secure?
Iwo Jima: about 2,500 Japanes troops per square mile.
Peleliu: about 2,200 Japanese troops per square mile.
and Leyte
about 19 Japanese troops per square mile.
Now, which of these three islands do you think will be the easiest to secure?
Re: American losses on Leyte
I'm not sure I see the relevance.Takao wrote:Look at the proportion of Japanese troops per square mile of land mass.
Iwo Jima: about 2,500 Japanes troops per square mile.
Peleliu: about 2,200 Japanese troops per square mile.
and Leyte
about 19 Japanese troops per square mile.
Now, which of these three islands do you think will be the easiest to secure?
Did the Japanese try to defend every square mile of Leyte?
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Re: American losses on Leyte
There were several sigificant differences. I'll point out just one. On Pelieu & Iwo Jima the Japanese had heavily fortified the islands. Leyte had ordinary trenches, and log bunkers, but no deep tunnels, or steel reinforced concrete protection.
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Re: American losses on Leyte
There was also a huge difference between US Marine assault doctrine and US Army's more methodical and artillery firepower intensive approch to warfare.
The US Army commanders treated heavily fortified positions as a form of siege warfare, when they didn't have naval commanders breathing down their necks. Even Macarthur at Biak wasn't as bad at Admirals Turner and Nimitz were at both Iwo jima and Okinawa.
See this August 23rd, 2013 column on the Chicago Boyz web log on the subject:
History Friday: 81st ID’s Peleliu Lessons for MacArthur’s Invasion of Japan
http://chicagoboyz.net/archives/38212.html#more-38212
This passage is highly illuminating, as it talks about the 81st Infantry Divisions use of aerial tramways to move sand bags, 75mm howitzers and wounded troops on Pelieu and what it meant for the campaign survival rate of Army flamethrower operators:
The US Army commanders treated heavily fortified positions as a form of siege warfare, when they didn't have naval commanders breathing down their necks. Even Macarthur at Biak wasn't as bad at Admirals Turner and Nimitz were at both Iwo jima and Okinawa.
See this August 23rd, 2013 column on the Chicago Boyz web log on the subject:
History Friday: 81st ID’s Peleliu Lessons for MacArthur’s Invasion of Japan
http://chicagoboyz.net/archives/38212.html#more-38212
This passage is highly illuminating, as it talks about the 81st Infantry Divisions use of aerial tramways to move sand bags, 75mm howitzers and wounded troops on Pelieu and what it meant for the campaign survival rate of Army flamethrower operators:
The effect of these aerial tramway delivered sandbags was several fold. First, it took away much of the effectiveness of Japanese snipers and mortars, particularly their 50mm grenade dischargers, in producing a lot of American casualties.
Second, they gave American infantry a protected position to fight from with crew served heavy weapons (machine guns, mortars, light artillery) and artillery forward observers for Japanese counter attacks and infiltrations.
Third, it left American infantry _covered_ positions *closer* to Japanese positions to launch their “Blowtorch and corkscrew” flame/explosive attacks from. The 81st ID — unlike the 6th Marine Division at Sugar Loaf on Okinawa — didn’t have to cross the same ground over and over to get close enough to inflict attrition losses on underground Japanese positions. This was a very important development. At Biak, Leyte, Luzon, Tarawa, Saipan, Guam, Iwo Jima and Okinawa, flame thrower operators were dead men walking. This resulted in the U.S. Army’s Chemical Warfare Service having to train up a new generation of flamethrower operators for the next operation. This didn’t happen for the US Army after Peleliu. The 81st Infantry Division’s portable flamethrower operators actually survived the campaign. That was unheard of in Pacific Theater combat!
Last, when sand bag positions were placed around engineer roads for tanks and trucks, the 81st ID’s covered positions gave infantry close support to both the engineers and vehicles. Preventing the mining of those roads at night and allowing movement during the day. Thus allowing the application of huge “super-flame throwers” cobbled together from flame thrower guns, fire hoses, pump units and gasoline fuel trucks to flood out the largest multi-story “Cave Warfare” positions with thousands of gallons of fuel. What the 81st ID took on Peleliu was taken ONCE…and it stayed taken. That was the heart of what I call “Sandbag Constrictor” tactics.
It was absolutely certain that the 81st ID’s tramway and the sandbag “constrictor” tactics would have been used on Kyushu. (See the map below) And at some point that the Sixth Army would have copied them large scale. The only question in my further research was when and would that make a real difference to the proposed Kyushu campaign.
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Re: American losses on Leyte
Ironically the Army on Leyte included the support of two USMC manned 155mm cannon battlaions. Those & a Marine air group were left 'beached' in the South Pacific by the USN when they withdrew the Marines for use in the Central Pacific campaign. Kruegers 6th Army made use of them.Mil-tech Bard wrote:There was also a huge difference between US Marine assault doctrine and US Army's more methodical and artillery firepower intensive approch to warfare. ...
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Re: American losses on Leyte
That was a good reflection of the time and distance issues in the Pacific Theater that modern military history writers increasingly miss.Ironically the Army on Leyte included the support of two USMC manned 155mm cannon battalions. Those & a Marine air group were left 'beached' in the South Pacific by the USN when they withdrew the Marines for use in the Central Pacific campaign. Kruegers 6th Army made use of them.
The XXIVth Corps artillery was busy supporting the Marines in the Marianas when the Yap Operation was scheduled. There was not enough time to disengage, refurbish, mount in merchant shipping and stage the XXIV'th Corps Artillery in amphibious sea lift. So Two USMC 155mm gun battalions created from left overs by the reformation of Marine Defense battalions into anti-aircraft battalions was substituted.
When the Yap operation was canceled and the XXIVth Corps was sent to Leyte, these Marine 155mm Gun Btns came along.
The USMC NorAirSols fighter groups could fly from the Northern Solomons through MacArthur's string of air bases in New Guinea to Leyte, quickly, accompanied by a limited number of ground support personnel and spares in C-47 transports.
The Marine air groups showed up because the base building program on Leyte was behind and it was easier to add anti-ship capable USMC fighters -- and particularly night fighters -- to rough fighter strips than it was to build heavier air strips that could support twin engine B-25 Mitchell and P-61 Black Widow's Night Fighters.
The P-61's in the South West Pacific were a model that lacked a two stage supercharger and had inferior high altitude performance compared to the radar equipped F6F Hellcats and F4U Corsairs of the NorAirSols
After the Leyte campaign was over, some of the NorAirSols wound up in Luzon, where they supported the 1st Cavalry's drive to Manila and Volkman's USAFIP NL Philippine guerrilla 'Division'. Simultaneously the rest were sent into the Southern Philippines to support operations there, this freeing the P-51's of the the FEAF's Air Commando group to support the air campaign against Formosa as a part of the Okinawa campaign.
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Re: American losses on Leyte
First of all, total US-Filippino losses during operations on Leyte were probably around 50000 men, though majority were non-combat losses.teg wrote:Why were American army losses on Leyte relatively small, in comparison with the scale, length of operation and the number of troops incolved from both sides? On Leyte 50 000 japanese soldiers inflicted 15 000 losses to US army. But on Peleliu there were 10 000 japanese and the same number of American losses. The same proportion was on Iwodzima. But on Leyte, the proportion of losses was much more favorable to Americans. Which factors contributed to this?
Second, I'm not sure, that there were "50 000 japanese soldiers" on Leyte at any given time. Number Japanese troops at Leyte is said to be c.84000, but they were delivered and evacuated piecemeal.
Third, after the battle of Iwojima or Peleliu were over, there were no Japanese units around. At Leyte and Central Philippines Japanese had some organized troops (probably couple thousand) even by the time of Japan surrender - and, unlike Iwojima or Peleliu, they tied down some US and Filipino troops.
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Re: American losses on Leyte
Mr Pinak makes some important observations.
While these noncombat losses, largely from disease, were not inflicted directly by the Japanese they were a indirect result of their resistance. The longer the campaign the longer the exposure of the US soldiers. The Leyte campaign dragged out many weeks longer than MacArthurs staff, or the 8th Army staff allowed for. Preparations for this extended field operation were inadaquate, particularly for medical supplys sent with the army. The same problem occured on Luzon where casualties from disease reached 90,000 casesEugen Pinak wrote:First of all, total US-Filippino losses during operations on Leyte were probably around 50000 men, though majority were non-combat losses.teg wrote:Why were American army losses on Leyte relatively small, in comparison with the scale, length of operation and the number of troops incolved from both sides? On Leyte 50 000 japanese soldiers inflicted 15 000 losses to US army. But on Peleliu there were 10 000 japanese and the same number of American losses. The same proportion was on Iwodzima. But on Leyte, the proportion of losses was much more favorable to Americans. Which factors contributed to this?
The evacuation is a neglected item in the common histories of this campaign. As on Guadalcanal it was a substituted for a final massacre of the defenders that proved so bloody on the isolated islandsEugen Pinak wrote: Second, I'm not sure, that there were "50 000 japanese soldiers" on Leyte at any given time. Number Japanese troops at Leyte is said to be c.84000, but they were delivered and evacuated piecemeal.
Damm few survivors at all. Less than 1% were typically captured on the isolated islands. Those were usually wounded, and were predominatly Korean laborers or local militia in the case of Okinawa.Eugen Pinak wrote:Third, after the battle of Iwojima or Peleliu were over, there were no Japanese units around.
On Pelilu, Betio, Saipan, ect... there was the problem of eliminating every Japanese squad and individual from fortified defenses. Fortification being just that. The lightest being log and earth capable of withstanding direct hits from light artillery, the strongest of steel reinforced concrete and able to withstand heavy artillery.Eugen Pinak wrote: At Leyte and Central Philippines Japanese had some organized troops (probably couple thousand) even by the time of Japan surrender - and, unlike Iwojima or Peleliu, they tied down some US and Filipino troops.
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Re: American losses on Leyte
My point exactly.While these noncombat losses, largely from disease, were not inflicted directly by the Japanese they were a indirect result of their resistance. The longer the campaign the longer the exposure of the US soldiers.
I'd also like to point out, that no US source ever tried to sort out Japanese combat losses from non-combat. Every dead Japanese was by definition counted, as combat loss. This may be true on Iwojima, but certainly not on Leyte.
Re: American losses on Leyte
Are you sure? I an see records indicating Japanese military casualties but at what level was the decsion made that they were combat losses? There's also the question of who or how the assessement would be made. Could it be that at some point someone just assumed that the listed casualties were combat losses? On Iwo for instance a friend of my fathers served there and on at one point he and a buddy opened up a cave and found a bunch of Japanese bodies with either self inflicted wounds or no wounds. How would you catagorize this?Eugen Pinak wrote: ... I'd also like to point out, that no US source ever tried to sort out Japanese combat losses from non-combat. Every dead Japanese was by definition counted, as combat loss. ...
This site for instance mentions Japanese losses but doesn't state they were combat casualties:
http://www.history.navy.mil/library/onl ... wojima.htm
This one does list most of the Japanese casualties as KIA on the other hand most of the lists on US casualties on that site also are listed as MIA, KIA, WIA, etc as the second link shows:
http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/PTO/Iwo/Casualties.html
http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USMC/US ... a-III.html
This page also doesn't seem to confirm the "every dead Japanese was by defintion counted, as combat loss" either:
http://ftp.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USA/USA ... ml#page368
Although much of that was due to the casualty lists at the time being estimates of combat casualties from what I can see rather than estimates of total casualties.
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Re: American losses on Leyte
I don't know, who assumed what, but the very page, that, according to you "doesn't seem to confirm the "every dead Japanese was by definition counted, as combat loss" either", clearly say, that "The Sixth Army estimated that it had killed 56,263 and captured 389 men" - no non-combat losses at all. 8th Army indeed reported, that it "killed and found dead 24,294 and captured 439 Japanese" - but the original report clearly states, that those 24,294 belong only to killed enemy soldiers.Are you sure? I an see records indicating Japanese military casualties but at what level was the decsion made that they were combat losses? There's also the question of who or how the assessement would be made. Could it be that at some point someone just assumed that the listed casualties were combat losses?Eugen Pinak wrote:
... I'd also like to point out, that no US source ever tried to sort out Japanese combat losses from non-combat. Every dead Japanese was by definition counted, as combat loss. ...
BTW, all US casualties, mentioned on the same pages of this book, are combat losses, it can only further ensure reader, that author compares combat losses on both sides.
The second link also shows, that during 3 months of operations on Iwojima not a single US soldier become ill. Sorry - but I don't believe in fairy talesThis one does list most of the Japanese casualties as KIA on the other hand most of the lists on US casualties on that site also are listed as MIA, KIA, WIA, etc as the second link shows:
Re: American losses on Leyte
Actually "killed and found dead" implies that at the very least the cause of some of the dead was not determined. Furthermore it's not unreasonable that a unit would be interested in the opposing combat losses. Note that when Japanese records are used to confirm cause of death is not mentioned (at least in one of the sources. It looks to me like a mix of different statistics has been used and in some cases people weren't aware of the distinction.Eugen Pinak wrote:I don't know, who assumed what, but the very page, that, according to you "doesn't seem to confirm the "every dead Japanese was by definition counted, as combat loss" either", clearly say, that "The Sixth Army estimated that it had killed 56,263 and captured 389 men" - no non-combat losses at all. 8th Army indeed reported, that it "killed and found dead 24,294 and captured 439 Japanese" - but the original report clearly states, that those 24,294 belong only to killed enemy soldiers.Are you sure? I an see records indicating Japanese military casualties but at what level was the decsion made that they were combat losses? There's also the question of who or how the assessement would be made. Could it be that at some point someone just assumed that the listed casualties were combat losses?Eugen Pinak wrote:
... I'd also like to point out, that no US source ever tried to sort out Japanese combat losses from non-combat. Every dead Japanese was by definition counted, as combat loss. ...
I disagree. The US had very good information on it's own combat losses in most cases Japanese losses were only estimates and the cause of loss may or may not have been determined. Making assumptions as to whether or not they were combat losses is not warrented.BTW, all US casualties, mentioned on the same pages of this book, are combat losses, it can only further ensure reader, that author compares combat losses on both sides.
No it doesn't show that. It is a list of US combat losses and disease wasn't considered a combat loss at least if it was the only contributing factor.The second link also shows, that during 3 months of operations on Iwojima not a single US soldier become ill. Sorry - but I don't believe in fairy talesThis one does list most of the Japanese casualties as KIA on the other hand most of the lists on US casualties on that site also are listed as MIA, KIA, WIA, etc as the second link shows:
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Re: American losses on Leyte
Which part of "original report clearly states, that those 24,294 belong only to killed enemy soldiers" is unclear to you?Actually "killed and found dead" implies that at the very least the cause of some of the dead was not determined.
I've yet to see original Japanese data about losses of their own troops in official US sources.Note that when Japanese records are used to confirm cause of death is not mentioned (at least in one of the sources. It looks to me like a mix of different statistics has been used and in some cases people weren't aware of the distinction.
So what? Information on it's own combat losses and attempt to deceive reader of the official history book are two different things.I disagree. The US had very good information on it's own combat losses in most cases Japanese losses were only estimates and the cause of loss may or may not have been determined.BTW, all US casualties, mentioned on the same pages of this book, are combat losses, it can only further ensure reader, that author compares combat losses on both sides.
http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USMC/US ... a-III.html = Appendix III. CasualtiesNo it doesn't show that. It is a list of US combat losses and disease wasn't considered a combat loss at least if it was the only contributing factor.The second link also shows, that during 3 months of operations on Iwojima not a single US soldier become ill. Sorry - but I don't believe in fairy tales
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Casualty_(person) = A casualty in military usage is a person in military service, not necessarily a combatant, who becomes unavailable for duty due to death, injury, illness, capture, desertion, etc.
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Re: American losses on Leyte
>> The same problem occurred on Luzon where casualties from disease reached 90,000 cases
Please note that "many thousands" of that 90K disease on Luzon were from V.D.
There was "...a complete breakdown in command discipline" -- this is the term from US Army medical histories of Luzon -- that everyone up to and including MacArthur turned a blind eye towards US troops using Filipino prostitutes.
After two years in the howling wilderness of New Guinea, none of the 6th and 8th Army officers had the heart to stop their troops from getting laid.
Given the reality of penicillin and V.D. at the time, this wasn't an unreasonable attitude by MacArthur's officers.
Please note that "many thousands" of that 90K disease on Luzon were from V.D.
There was "...a complete breakdown in command discipline" -- this is the term from US Army medical histories of Luzon -- that everyone up to and including MacArthur turned a blind eye towards US troops using Filipino prostitutes.
After two years in the howling wilderness of New Guinea, none of the 6th and 8th Army officers had the heart to stop their troops from getting laid.
Given the reality of penicillin and V.D. at the time, this wasn't an unreasonable attitude by MacArthur's officers.