Naval Gun Support During Amphibious Landings.

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Re: Naval Gun Support During Amphibious Landings.

#31

Post by OpanaPointer » 22 Feb 2015, 00:45

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Re: Naval Gun Support During Amphibious Landings.

#32

Post by Carl Schwamberger » 22 Feb 2015, 16:11

Thanks for that OP. The AAR of the 295th were a little depressing as they confirmed some points I'd heard elsewhere. It made it clear the leassons learned in the Pacific in 1942-43 were still not learned in the Pacific in 1944 or 45. The chronic complaints about bad maps when better maps were available, or the NGF annex of the operations order not distributed to the people for whom it is written, and the teams not assigned or reporting to the supported units until the last minute. Since both US 6th & 8th Army staff included members who had been involved in earlier amphib ops it is eye catching to see fundamentals neglected.
Graeme Sydney wrote:.. . But I don't think I've had a definitive answer as "how effective was US Naval Gun bombardment".
Its a broad questions. In the context of warfare in general NGF is very effective. Break it down to cases and results will vary. & of course 'effective' must be defined.

I'm surmising that BB's were good at pulverising large areas with sustained bombardment and it was hit or miss with specific targets.
At the arithmetic level big gun accuracy is not different from small gun, tho there are some planning considerations that are different & sometimes difficult to work around. A lot of technical details which are affected by decisions outside the gunnery computation. Incomplete knowledge or errors in the knowledge of the effects of the fires of various calibers was a large problem in wringing the maximum efficiency. Picking through the AAR & personal eyewitnesses accounts there is sometimes a disappointment in the post battle evaluation of the effects of NGF, or field artillery fires. More often than not this circles back around to a overestimation of the effects, or bad data for the effects of cannon fires. Too often the planners understanding of the effects on target extends to the idea that lots of dust and smoke means something. Keeping the effects tables and related material locked up in the classified documents vault does not help with this.

Destroyers and cruisers were better for accuracy and response time.
My second question was "Did the US Navy make variation with trajectory and ammunition for Naval Gun bombardment" and I think the answer is basically 'no'. I'm fairly certain it is a 'no' for BB's but the others I'm not so certain.


I dont have dates and nomenclature for the exact propellant charges manufactored, or the firing tables. Reduced charges were manufactored but their availability in general or at a specific time & place is the question. Also reduced propellant charges are not a full solution for the range/angle of fall problem. Positioning of the ship is a consideration which is not always ideal in the final plan or execution. Accuracy & effectiveness also comes back to the preparation and skill of the spotting team. Refer back to the complaints about the scale and general untility of the maps in the AAR of the 295th JASCO linked in the previous post.

I asked the question specifically about the Pacific but I'm also thinking of how it would apply to D day and even the Dardanelles in1915.[/quote]


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Re: Naval Gun Support During Amphibious Landings.

#33

Post by Carl Schwamberger » 22 Feb 2015, 17:08

RichTO90 wrote: Carl, the U.S. deployed Naval Shore Fire Control parties formed from the Joint Assault Signal Companies (JASCO). The JASCO were attached to the Engineer Special Brigades, on ONAHA the 293rd JASCO to 5th ESB supported the 116th Combat Team with seven NSFC parties and the 294th JASCO to the 6th ESB supporting the 16th Combat Team with nine NSFC parties. The remaining two parties of the 293rd JASCO were attached to the Provisional Ranger Group. On UTAH the 286th JASCO attached to the 1st ESB supported the 8th Combat Team with nine parties and the 82nd and 101st Abn with one party each. Each party normally was to consist of three observers (Army and Navy officers) and four enlisted men (Army and Navy) who were primarily radio operators.
Which like so much else brings me back around to the question of any of the teams in operation on Omaha beach from 06:35 to 08:20. The assorted casulaty estimates I've seen provide no clue & web searches have had low productivity. Is there much in Jonathan Gawne's 'Spearheading D-Day' '? It is suposed to have something about one of the spotting team members. I poked it a while back, but missed anything in it concerning NGF spotting. Is Gawnes research any good?

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Re: Naval Gun Support During Amphibious Landings.

#34

Post by RichTO90 » 23 Feb 2015, 03:21

Carl Schwamberger wrote: The AAR of the 295th were a little depressing as they confirmed some points I'd heard elsewhere. It made it clear the leassons learned in the Pacific in 1942-43 were still not learned in the Pacific in 1944 or 45. The chronic complaints about bad maps when better maps were available, or the NGF annex of the operations order not distributed to the people for whom it is written, and the teams not assigned or reporting to the supported units until the last minute. Since both US 6th & 8th Army staff included members who had been involved in earlier amphib ops it is eye catching to see fundamentals neglected.
Carl, I suppose you're referring to Charles Corlett? The problem is, the only Pacific "lessons learned" at that point were Betio and Kwajalein. Neither was an outstanding example of how to do naval gunfire support, so I'm not sure what lessons were immediately learned? Certainly the gunfire support at Saipan was better...but then they were isolated islands, where the defenders were unlikely to be reinforced when alerted by an extended bombardment. That was the ultimate concundrum the D-Day planners were unable to solve...and "experience" from the Pacific was no help to them. The there is the problem of Corlett himself...he tried to make himself appear a know it all from his two experiences in the Pacific, and annoyed one and sundry by making declarations like they shouldn't land the assault waves in anything except LVT (A), which they didn't have.
RichTO90 wrote:Which like so much else brings me back around to the question of any of the teams in operation on Omaha beach from 06:35 to 08:20. The assorted casulaty estimates I've seen provide no clue & web searches have had low productivity. Is there much in Jonathan Gawne's 'Spearheading D-Day' '? It is suposed to have something about one of the spotting team members. I poked it a while back, but missed anything in it concerning NGF spotting. Is Gawnes research any good?
The NGFS teams were in the same situation as everybody in the initial waves - terrible casualties to men and equipment (the reports I know of say that virtually all radios were lost in the first minutes) and so far as I know only one team was able to establish intermittent contact in the first hours. Unfortunately, my library is packed and I am TDY for the week, but when I get back I think some of the D-Day combat interviews talk about the NGFS...I'll see what I can find.

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Re: Naval Gun Support During Amphibious Landings.

#35

Post by Carl Schwamberger » 23 Feb 2015, 05:25

RichTO90 wrote:
Carl Schwamberger wrote: The AAR of the 295th were a little depressing as they confirmed some points I'd heard elsewhere. It made it clear the leassons learned in the Pacific in 1942-43 were still not learned in the Pacific in 1944 or 45. The chronic complaints about bad maps when better maps were available, or the NGF annex of the operations order not distributed to the people for whom it is written, and the teams not assigned or reporting to the supported units until the last minute. Since both US 6th & 8th Army staff included members who had been involved in earlier amphib ops it is eye catching to see fundamentals neglected.
Carl, I suppose you're referring to Charles Corlett?
No. I was refering to the AAR in the web site linked. those concerned Pacific events 1944-45.
... when I get back I think some of the D-Day combat interviews talk about the NGFS...I'll see what I can find.
We discussed this specific subject once before, but if you have any further information I am eager to see it. Thanks

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Re: Naval Gun Support During Amphibious Landings.

#36

Post by LostInNY » 27 Feb 2015, 04:48

Graeme Sydney wrote:Thanks for the replies guys, I have been following but without the time to reply.

A lot of interesting comments some of which I knew and some of which I surmised. But I don't think I've had a definitive answer as "how effective was US Naval Gun bombardment". I'm surmising that BB's were good at pulverising large areas with sustained bombardment and it was hit or miss with specific targets. Destroyers and cruisers were better for accuracy and response time.
I recomend that you download General Weller's report "NAVAL GUNFIRE SUPPORT OF AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS:
PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE" available at http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA051873. General Weller was the Naval Gunfire Officer, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific in WWII. The report covers NGFS in both the Pacific and ETO in WWII and Korea. It includes CEP and rounds per hit tables for all American naval gun systems used for NGFS.

The Marines in the South Pacific asked for many days of NGFS in order to have the time for the Naval Gunfire to finally neutralize point targets. They asked for 9 days at Iwo but only got 3. If you look at AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS - Capture of Iwo Jima COMINCH P-0012, which was declassified in 1987 (http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USN/rep ... html#index) you will see that they realized the inherent inaccuracy due to the nature of naval guns and realized that many days of accurate fire, spotting and assessment were required.

The Japanese knew the limitations of NGFS as well and the Japanese commander planned his defensers accordingly:

"From: Commander Cruiser Division Thirteen

The enemy knew from the terrain that the landings would have to come on the southeastern or southwestern beaches. He planned his defenses to resist to the utmost the advance up the long axis of the island.

He built defenses with an eye to naval gunfire, particularly to close fire. The terrain lent itself admirably. Few positions were built which could be reached by close-in fire because the trajectories were too flat at short ranges.

He also built against bombing by constructing a surprising number of small strongpoints, interconnecting but individual, so that bomb damage would be confined to a small area. That is, he dispersed by multiplied defense positions.

He played a very intelligent game in the use of weapons prior to and after the landing. He made all his guns count, seldom fired unless he had a good target; kept his flak positions concealed. He hid his mortars, antitank and inactive guns, until they could be used to advantage.

Thus he concealed his strength so that on D-day the United States High Command was in a good deal of doubt as to what the opposition would be despite the longer period of softening up and the vast amount of effort expended in advance."

One factor to remember about NGFS is that the ship's computers (mechanical or human) had to know where the ship was for accurate fire. Quickly establishing a datum for the ship wasn't possible. This made it difficult at times for the ship to respond with accurate fire if it was moving or had just come on station. If there was an offshore island available a landing on D-3 or so was usually made and an artillery park set up. The Navy wouldn't let the Marines do this at Tarawa but it was common later in the war. If this wasn't possible LVTs were loaded with 105s and ammo went to preselected areas and artillery was set up as soon as possible. Here's an excerpt from "Artillery in Landing Operations" by Captain Harold D. Shannon, U. S. M. C., Field Artillery Journal, Nov-Dec, 1934 (Available for free at CARL- Combat Arms Research Library)

"The first requirement of naval fire control against shore objectives is the ability of the firing ships to locate themselves accurately and continuously. This requires accurate bearings and ranges of navigation marks such as charted objects on shore, tangents of shore lines, or bearings and ranges of auxiliary marks specially placed for the purpose. This requirement, in connection with the necessity of observing the fire, practically precludes carrying out a support operation at night.
Naval artillery is designed and installed on ship board so as to be highly efficient for naval combat. It can not be safely used to place concentrations close to friendly troops after the manner of corps and division artillery, except under conditions where the target is visible from the firing ship."

Spotter planes (usually SOCs) were very impotant to adjust fire for accuracy
My second question was "Did the US Navy make variation with trajectory and ammunition for Naval Gun bombardment" and I think the answer is basically 'no'. I'm fairly certain it is a 'no' for BB's but the others I'm not so certain.
One thing that I've read about, especially in the Baltic, is that some ships were purposely listed to one side in order to get higher elevation for bombardment. Some capital ships were designed with limited elevation.

The Japanese used anti-aircraft shells (14" Type 3 with 470 submunitions) against Henderson Field on Guadalcanal.
I asked the question specifically about the Pacific but I'm also thinking of how it would apply to D day and even the Dardanelles in1915.
The Russian Caucasus Front commander General Yudenich made good use of NGFS for amphibious landings and general artillery support against the Turks (at about the same time as Gallipoli) on the eastern Black Sea coast of Turkey. He withdrew most of his troops from contact in the area of his main effort but left his artillery while he took his troops along the Black Sea coast covered by NGFS to attack the Turks and open up shorter supply lines to his main effort. The plan was to block most of Turkey's coal supply from reaching Western Turkey.

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Re: Naval Gun Support During Amphibious Landings.

#37

Post by RichTO90 » 28 Feb 2015, 06:35

Carl Schwamberger wrote:No. I was refering to the AAR in the web site linked. those concerned Pacific events 1944-45.
Sorry Carl, I guess I remain confused then? Sixth Army did not engage much in extensive naval gunfire support operations in New Guinea before the NEPTUNE operations and neither did Eighth Army, which wasn't activated until 10 June 1944. So where is the experience that should have been a lesson learned?
We discussed this specific subject once before, but if you have any further information I am eager to see it. Thanks
Sorry, I will get to it as soon as I can, but I'm off again, this time to Savannah, for a family emergency.

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Re: Naval Gun Support During Amphibious Landings.

#38

Post by Carl Schwamberger » 28 Feb 2015, 23:43

LostInNY wrote:.... If you look at AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS - Capture of Iwo Jima COMINCH P-0012, which was declassified in 1987 (http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USN/rep ... html#index) you will see that they realized the inherent inaccuracy due to the nature of naval guns and realized that many days of accurate fire, spotting and assessment were required. ....
That may very well have been the document The 12th Marines S3 was refering to back in 1984. Nice to know I could cite from that now, if I could remember reliably any thing from it. At least I can admit it exists.

Thanks for that & the rest of it. Looks like a pleasant evenings reading.

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Re: Naval Gun Support During Amphibious Landings.

#39

Post by RichTO90 » 05 Mar 2015, 20:36

RichTO90 wrote:
We discussed this specific subject once before, but if you have any further information I am eager to see it. Thanks
Sorry, I will get to it as soon as I can, but I'm off again, this time to Savannah, for a family emergency.
Hey Carl,

I've been through the various combat interviews compiled by Forrest Poague about two weeks after D-Day and there were none that I can find with personnel of the gunfire support parties. Neither reports of the 116th and 16th Infantry directly mention the NSCFP either.

The Action Report for TF 124 is also ambiguous WRT the problems encountered. They give a recommendation for the future, but dwell little on the specifics of the lessons learned. Each infantry battalion and each of the RCT FA battalions had assigned a NSFCP consisting of a FO Section (one officers and seven EM) and a Liaison Section (one officer and five EM). It turns out only one FO Section was attached to the airborne forces rather than an entire NSFCP. Each FO and Liaison Section was to have an SCR 609 FM voice set for primary comms, backed up by SCR 284 sets.

Part of the problem was that they had to provide for a joint (USN, RN, FFN, etc) capability, so modified the standard TTP as expressed in CSP 2156(A) (the USN SOP) in an attempt to compensate. However, critically, the USN support ships were unable to participate in the full-dress OMAHA rehersal exercise at Slapton Sands.

The NSFCP of the assault battalions landed at H+30 and none of them were initially able to establish communications, except for the party with Rudder's Ranger group on Pointe du Hoc. It is difficult to determine how many of the eight teams landed with the 116th and 16th Infantry ever established communications, but at least one (unidentified which unit it was attached to) remained in its LCV(P) and was able to direct fire from just off shore. Reading between the lines of the various accounts, it looks like it wasn't until later in the afternoon before any of the others gained contact. All firing was otherwise from aerial spotting or direct observation of targets of opportunity.

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Re: Naval Gun Support During Amphibious Landings.

#40

Post by Sheldrake » 13 Mar 2015, 10:27

RichTO90 wrote:
RichTO90 wrote:
We discussed this specific subject once before, but if you have any further information I am eager to see it. Thanks
Sorry, I will get to it as soon as I can, but I'm off again, this time to Savannah, for a family emergency.
Hey Carl,

I've been through the various combat interviews compiled by Forrest Poague about two weeks after D-Day and there were none that I can find with personnel of the gunfire support parties. Neither reports of the 116th and 16th Infantry directly mention the NSCFP either.

The Action Report for TF 124 is also ambiguous WRT the problems encountered. They give a recommendation for the future, but dwell little on the specifics of the lessons learned. Each infantry battalion and each of the RCT FA battalions had assigned a NSFCP consisting of a FO Section (one officers and seven EM) and a Liaison Section (one officer and five EM). It turns out only one FO Section was attached to the airborne forces rather than an entire NSFCP. Each FO and Liaison Section was to have an SCR 609 FM voice set for primary comms, backed up by SCR 284 sets.

Part of the problem was that they had to provide for a joint (USN, RN, FFN, etc) capability, so modified the standard TTP as expressed in CSP 2156(A) (the USN SOP) in an attempt to compensate. However, critically, the USN support ships were unable to participate in the full-dress OMAHA rehersal exercise at Slapton Sands.

The NSFCP of the assault battalions landed at H+30 and none of them were initially able to establish communications, except for the party with Rudder's Ranger group on Pointe du Hoc. It is difficult to determine how many of the eight teams landed with the 116th and 16th Infantry ever established communications, but at least one (unidentified which unit it was attached to) remained in its LCV(P) and was able to direct fire from just off shore. Reading between the lines of the various accounts, it looks like it wasn't until later in the afternoon before any of the others gained contact. All firing was otherwise from aerial spotting or direct observation of targets of opportunity.
I did not want to mention this first, out of concern for subverting the threat into a Brit v American tussle. However, the British writings about NGS D Day contrast the effectiveness of the British COBU organisation with the difficulties the Americans experienced on Omaha. British COBU observers landed on foot with the leading waves. Their support vehicles were armoured M3 half tracks not jeeps. They managed to establish a communications net with both the supported arm and the navy with redundant links through the field artillery, which also had LOs afloat.

By and large this worked well. The FOB with 41 Cdo broke up german counter attacks near Lion sur Mer. The artillery comms redirected the support ships onto the strong point at LaRiviere and helped distinguish friend from foe, and later stopped HMS Orion bombarding the 4/7 DG South of Cruelly. To a certain exttent it is taken for granted. The destruction of the German counter attack on Gold beach was accompanied by a lot of NGS.

The importance of NGS is best noticed when it broke down. E.g. One reason for the delay capturing strong point Hillman south of Sword beach was the loss of their FoB party, The loss of Capt Lee on 7 June was disastrous for 2nd Warwicks at Lebeisey and one reason the 9th Cdn Bde wwere badly caught by 25 SS PGR on 7 June was that comms failed at the critical moment to HMS Belfast, when Meyers grenadiers woujld have been very vulnerable to 9 x 6" gun rounds every 20 seconds.

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Re: Naval Gun Support During Amphibious Landings.

#41

Post by RichTO90 » 13 Mar 2015, 22:32

Sheldrake wrote:I did not want to mention this first, out of concern for subverting the threat into a Brit v American tussle. However, the British writings about NGS D Day contrast the effectiveness of the British COBU organisation with the difficulties the Americans experienced on Omaha. British COBU observers landed on foot with the leading waves. Their support vehicles were armoured M3 half tracks not jeeps. They managed to establish a communications net with both the supported arm and the navy with redundant links through the field artillery, which also had LOs afloat.

By and large this worked well. The FOB with 41 Cdo broke up german counter attacks near Lion sur Mer. The artillery comms redirected the support ships onto the strong point at LaRiviere and helped distinguish friend from foe, and later stopped HMS Orion bombarding the 4/7 DG South of Cruelly. To a certain exttent it is taken for granted. The destruction of the German counter attack on Gold beach was accompanied by a lot of NGS.

The importance of NGS is best noticed when it broke down. E.g. One reason for the delay capturing strong point Hillman south of Sword beach was the loss of their FoB party, The loss of Capt Lee on 7 June was disastrous for 2nd Warwicks at Lebeisey and one reason the 9th Cdn Bde wwere badly caught by 25 SS PGR on 7 June was that comms failed at the critical moment to HMS Belfast, when Meyers grenadiers woujld have been very vulnerable to 9 x 6" gun rounds every 20 seconds.
Hi Sheldrake,

I understand completely, but I think there needs also to be clarity on just exactly WHY the American system was the way it was at OMAHA and UTAH. [delete incorrect passage - see my next post for the correction] There was very little difference between the planned communications nets of the American NGFS teams and the British FOB's. Both designed in redundancies...almost all of which failed in the circumstances on OMAHA. The FM voice sets were backed up by morse-key sets in the observation teams and repeater sets in the liaison teams with the supported infantry and artillery battalions as well as afloat.

WRT the landing of the American team's vehicles, the simple reality is that it made little difference whether or not they were in Jeeps, half-tracks, or tanks on OMAHA, all were equally vulnerable to the German firepower and observation on OMAHA. In fact, large numbers of armored half-tracks were landed in the first tide assault, mostly as SP AAA, but also as artillery prime movers, and most never got past the high tide line.

The importance of NGS is also best noticed when it worked too. :D The team that got ashore at Pointe du Hoc was credited by Rudder as instrumental in his attrited force being able to hang on until relieved by the 29th ID.

Cheers!
Last edited by RichTO90 on 14 Mar 2015, 05:39, edited 1 time in total.

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Re: Naval Gun Support During Amphibious Landings.

#42

Post by Sheldrake » 14 Mar 2015, 02:04

What were the differences between American and British practices in calling fires?

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Re: Naval Gun Support During Amphibious Landings.

#43

Post by RichTO90 » 14 Mar 2015, 05:37

Sheldrake wrote:What were the differences between American and British practices in calling fires?
Thanks for asking, since in re-reading the passage on NGS in the WNTF AAR I find I completely misremembered what I read in there six years ago. :|

In fact, it was the British ships in the WNTF that were to use the American "line-of-sight spotting procedure" (NFI, but I suspect some of the USN doctrinal stuff at Gene Slover's site would clarify somewhat) rather than vice versa as I recalled. How that differed exactly from British practice I don't know, but evidently it was different enough for them to make note of it in the aftermath.

The problem the AAR actually focused on was that "it was deemed most practicable to keep the U.S. heavy fire supprt ships in the CLYDE-BELFAST area. These ships were thus unable to participate in the Force "O" full scale rehearsal of the operation."

Further, while the destroyers did participate in the rehearsals, their participation was "definitely limited by the low ammunition allowance possible." (NFI, but I would suspect a problem associated with the late allocation of most of the American gunfire support ships.)

It is also notable that the NSFCP were only embarked with their assigned vessels for the period of "about a week during which time the ships conducted several firings." The implication is that the NSFCP were never landed ashore during one of the exercises and never actually practiced directing the fires of their assigned ship in the conditions of even a practice landing. 8O (All quotes from page 100.)

All of which points up the last-minute and ad hoc nature of the USN participation.

BTW, I forgot to mention that it would also have been nice to have a couple of USN Brooklyn's on station. Try 15 6" salvos every 6.6 seconds. (okay, they only could sustain that rate for about five minutes before the gun crews collapsed from exhaustion, but... :D )

Cheers!

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Re: Naval Gun Support During Amphibious Landings.

#44

Post by Sheldrake » 15 Mar 2015, 12:15

RichTO90 wrote:
All of which points up the last-minute and ad hoc nature of the USN participation.
That speaks volumes. Why did no one in First Army or V Corps complain about this? My research on British pre Overlord fire-planning is that the BRA 2nd Army Brigadier Parham made a thorough nuisance of himself checking that everything possible that could be done was done to ensure the success and chased up anything that might have gone wrong.
RichTO90 wrote:BTW, I forgot to mention that it would also have been nice to have a couple of USN Brooklyn's on station. Try 15 6" salvos every 6.6 seconds. (okay, they only could sustain that rate for about five minutes before the gun crews collapsed from exhaustion, but... :D )
One reason why the Army equated a Cruiser with the firepower of a regiment of medium artillery.

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Re: Naval Gun Support During Amphibious Landings.

#45

Post by Carl Schwamberger » 15 Mar 2015, 13:09

Just caught up reading, or better - skimming the recent posts here. In general it supports the idea that the NGF spotting teams were not effective. in the first two hours of the battle on Omaha Beach. Maybe a through read will clarify this. Anyway thinks for the information & other bits. I'l try to get caught up here soon.

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