Naval Gun Support During Amphibious Landings.
Re: Naval Gun Support During Amphibious Landings.
Carl,
See the article in FA Journal September 1946, pp. 530-533 "Fire Control on OMAHA Beach".
Rich
See the article in FA Journal September 1946, pp. 530-533 "Fire Control on OMAHA Beach".
Rich
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Re: Naval Gun Support During Amphibious Landings.
This is the PDF link for FA Journal September 1946, pp. 530-533 "Fire Control on OMAHA Beach".
http://sill-www.army.mil/firesbulletin/ ... DITION.pdf
http://sill-www.army.mil/firesbulletin/ ... DITION.pdf
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Re: Naval Gun Support During Amphibious Landings.
Thanks for the link guys. I've worked my way up to 1931 in the FA Journal, but will make the exception to jump ahead in this case.
That has to be one of the slowest down loading sites in the universe. I usually pull the volume off the shelf at the library. Can skim them about four times the speed of the text from the web site. I guess the board of the FA Association are really proud of their 1990s web technology.
That has to be one of the slowest down loading sites in the universe. I usually pull the volume off the shelf at the library. Can skim them about four times the speed of the text from the web site. I guess the board of the FA Association are really proud of their 1990s web technology.
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Re: Naval Gun Support During Amphibious Landings.
Certainly not forgotten here. Hoepfully someday I'll obtain the relevant effects information & analyze just what the 8th AF could have done had the majority of the squadrons dropped on target. Its easy to say the little 45 kilo bombs would not penetrate much cover or kill many men. The morale/suppresion effects is another question. There were a few larger bombs in the mix & those might have contributed more.Mil-tech Bard wrote:Carl,
Also remember that Gen. Bradley was counting on the 8th Air Force heavy bombers to deliver part of that drenching fire a'la Monetcasino Italy.
...
A second point concerning massed bomber strikes in tactical support is their unreliability. This was not the first or even second time they failed. To drag out oft mentioned Betio island yet again. The amphib force disembarking off shore ceased the naval fire preparation and waited for the USAAF to make its heavy bomber strike. Nothing was seen the the defense got a 40 minute respite between the NGF preparation & the assault. The USN claims they made the request, the USAAF claim they never got the memo. Whatever the case the landing force and Japanese survivors observed no massed air strike that hour. Not the first, second or even the third time this happened before June 1944.
Re: Naval Gun Support During Amphibious Landings.
Carl,Carl Schwamberger wrote:Certainly not forgotten here. Hoepfully someday I'll obtain the relevant effects information & analyze just what the 8th AF could have done had the majority of the squadrons dropped on target. Its easy to say the little 45 kilo bombs would not penetrate much cover or kill many men. The morale/suppresion effects is another question. There were a few larger bombs in the mix & those might have contributed more.
The VIII Bomber Command dropped 17,639 x 100 lb. HE, 5,076 x 500 lb. HE, 146 x 1000 lb. HE and 503 x 120 lb. Fragmentation bombs. The fragmentation bombs would only have had effect on troops in the open, except by chance and the 100 lb. were little better. The light case 500 and 1000 lb. bombs were later found to be at best marginally effective against the German fixed concrete fortifications. Furthermore, all the bombs were instantaneous nose-fuzed to minimize cratering, so were unlikely to do anything more than concuss protected troops. However, more effect may have been gained if they had struck the seaward and landward obstacles or minefields. Since they were instantaneous nose-fuzed they would have done little cratering, but may have been very effective at clearing those obstacles.
Re: Naval Gun Support During Amphibious Landings.
The heavy bombers were orders to shift their MPI to fall 1000 yards south of the beaches to minimise the risk of the bombers hitting the assault troops. Had there been no cloud cover they Bombers might have been targeted on the beaches themselves.
Professor Blacker the Royal Navy's chief scientist caused a last minute panic when, in the last week of May, he objected to any use of heavy bombers anywhere near the navy. He had not read the fire plan when it was first circulated.
There was a worry that bomb craters might hinder rather than help the assault troops, which is why only 100lb bombs were dropped on the invasion beaches. I think the larger bombs were for the coastal batteries. No one expected the bombs to do more than temporarily suppress the defenders.
In the event they did more by damaging the telephone communications, and preventign the Germans form using ther coastal guns effectively. E.g Longues Suer Mer operated under gun control.
On Juno and Gold beaches there was a second line of resistance on the ridge about 1000 yards inland. The 8th AF seems to have been very effective in demoralising the defendes of these position and probably was respobsible for the annihilation of 8th Comany GR 736 which is recorded as simply vanishing. (paul Carell attributed this to naval gun fire,. but they were hit at the right place and time that two squadrons of B24s were scheduled to bomb..
Professor Blacker the Royal Navy's chief scientist caused a last minute panic when, in the last week of May, he objected to any use of heavy bombers anywhere near the navy. He had not read the fire plan when it was first circulated.
There was a worry that bomb craters might hinder rather than help the assault troops, which is why only 100lb bombs were dropped on the invasion beaches. I think the larger bombs were for the coastal batteries. No one expected the bombs to do more than temporarily suppress the defenders.
In the event they did more by damaging the telephone communications, and preventign the Germans form using ther coastal guns effectively. E.g Longues Suer Mer operated under gun control.
On Juno and Gold beaches there was a second line of resistance on the ridge about 1000 yards inland. The 8th AF seems to have been very effective in demoralising the defendes of these position and probably was respobsible for the annihilation of 8th Comany GR 736 which is recorded as simply vanishing. (paul Carell attributed this to naval gun fire,. but they were hit at the right place and time that two squadrons of B24s were scheduled to bomb..
Last edited by Sheldrake on 29 Mar 2015, 15:46, edited 1 time in total.
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Re: Naval Gun Support During Amphibious Landings.
Carl,>>I guess the board of the FA Association are really proud of their 1990s web technology.
Ouch! That left frost burns.
Last edited by Mil-tech Bard on 29 Mar 2015, 15:51, edited 1 time in total.
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Re: Naval Gun Support During Amphibious Landings.
That can lead to a long discussion, but we digress from naval gunfire.Sheldrake wrote:...
In the event they did more by damaging the telephone communications, and preventign the Germans form using ther coastal guns effectively. E.g Longues Suer Mer operated under gun control.
On Juno and Gold beaches there was a second line of resistance on the ridge about 1000 yards inland. The 8th AF seems to have been very effective in demoralising the defendes of these position and probably was respobsible for the annihilation of 8th Comany GR 736 which is recorded as simply vanishing. (paul Carell attributed this to naval gun fire,. but they were hit at the right place and time that two squadrons of B24s were scheduled to bomb..
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Re: Naval Gun Support During Amphibious Landings.
Carl,Carl Schwamberger wrote:Certainly not forgotten here. Hoepfully someday I'll obtain the relevant effects information & analyze just what the 8th AF could have done had the majority of the squadrons dropped on target. Its easy to say the little 45 kilo bombs would not penetrate much cover or kill many men. The morale/suppresion effects is another question. There were a few larger bombs in the mix & those might have contributed more.
A second point concerning massed bomber strikes in tactical support is their unreliability. This was not the first or even second time they failed. To drag out oft mentioned Betio island yet again. The amphib force disembarking off shore ceased the naval fire preparation and waited for the USAAF to make its heavy bomber strike. Nothing was seen the the defense got a 40 minute respite between the NGF preparation & the assault. The USN claims they made the request, the USAAF claim they never got the memo. Whatever the case the landing force and Japanese survivors observed no massed air strike that hour. Not the first, second or even the third time this happened before June 1944.
The Medium/Heavy bomber strikes on beaches in the SWPA worked as reliable tactical support because --
1. The 5th AF dropped visually below 10,000 feet (due to the much lower AAA capability of the Japanese),
2. The weather was better,
3. MacArthur et al didn't have any other options until Leyte.
See the 1st Marine AARs for its landings in the SWPA.
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Re: Naval Gun Support During Amphibious Landings.
The predominance of 100lb bombs was due to feedback from the JANET experiments in Florida. They found that instantaneous nose-fuzed 100-lb bombs did little cratering and did clear obstacles.RichTO90 wrote:Carl,
The VIII Bomber Command dropped 17,639 x 100 lb. HE, 5,076 x 500 lb. HE, 146 x 1000 lb. HE and 503 x 120 lb. Fragmentation bombs. The fragmentation bombs would only have had effect on troops in the open, except by chance and the 100 lb. were little better. The light case 500 and 1000 lb. bombs were later found to be at best marginally effective against the German fixed concrete fortifications. Furthermore, all the bombs were instantaneous nose-fuzed to minimize cratering, so were unlikely to do anything more than concuss protected troops. However, more effect may have been gained if they had struck the seaward and landward obstacles or minefields. Since they were instantaneous nose-fuzed they would have done little cratering, but may have been very effective at clearing those obstacles.
The key for accurate delivery was flying below 10,000 feet and for the proper pattern you had to fly a two dimensional as opposed to a 3-D "Javelin Down" type combat box.
This was not how the VIIIth Air Force flew the Normandy bombing runs.
Re: Naval Gun Support During Amphibious Landings.
While the latter part of your remarks are quite correct, the first sentence is not I'm afraid. The VIII Bomber Command main effort on the morning of D-Day was part of the "beach drenching" plan and was to commence at H-40. None of the identified coast artillery batteries in the OMAHA or UTAH zone were targeted - the target were the "beach defense localities" (see Revised Annex 12 to Operations Plan NEPTUNE, Prearranged Air and Naval Bombardment Plan, p. 1 and Appendix 1 to Revised Annex 12, p. 1, which lists the coast artillery battery positions and "defense localities" separately. It is quite clear that they are separate targets and different missions. Much of the D-Day attacks on the coastal artillery was conducted during the night by RAF Bomber Command and in the early dawn hours by IX Bomber Command.Sheldrake wrote:I think the larger bombs were for the coastal batteries. No one expected the bombs to do more than temporarily suppress the defenders.
In the event they did more by damaging the telephone communications, and preventign the Germans form using ther coastal guns effectively. E.g Longues Suer Mer operated under gun control.
The 2d Bombardment Division executed the mission against OMAHA with approximately one-third the total force and bombs described in my earlier post. It is notable that the low-level medium bombing mission at UTAH by IX BC was much more effective, primarily because they attacked parallel to the beach and visually. They largely used 250 lb. HE - 4,414 of them compared to 32 2000 lb. HE - in their mission, which surprisingly had considerable concussive effect on the troops in WN 5 (the 2000 lb. HE were instantaneously-fuzed and intended to clear beach obstacles).
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Re: Naval Gun Support During Amphibious Landings.
Given the demonstrated inaccuracy of RAF Bomber Command and VIIIth Air Force bombing radar bombing to that point, and the fact that VIIIth Air Force was flying directly over the invasion fleet at 20,000 feet perpendicular to the beaches to get the best water/land contrast for H2X radar bombing, I would have panicked too!Sheldrake wrote:The heavy bombers were orders to shift their MPI to fall 1000 yards south of the beaches to minimize the risk of the bombers hitting the assault troops. Had there been no cloud cover they Bombers might have been targeted on the beaches themselves.
Professor Blacker the Royal Navy's chief scientist caused a last minute panic when, in the last week of May, he objected to any use of heavy bombers anywhere near the navy. He had not read the fire plan when it was first circulated.
Moving the bomb line 1000 yards guaranteed the VIIIth Air Force would miss.
The better solution with H2X was dropping earlier, when the fleet was 1,000 yards further from the beach.
You would have given up the suppressive effects and kept the obstacle breaking power of the strike.
Missing the target for the sake of fleet safety meant neither suppressive effects nor the obstacle breaking effects happened.
There was a worry that bomb craters might hinder rather than help the assault troops, which is why only 100lb bombs were dropped on the invasion beaches. I think the larger bombs were for the coastal batteries. No one expected the bombs to do more than temporarily suppress the defenders.
In the event they did more by damaging the telephone communications, and preventing the Germans form using there coastal guns effectively. E.g Longues Suer Mer operated under gun control.
On Juno and Gold beaches there was a second line of resistance on the ridge about 1000 yards inland. The 8th AF seems to have been very effective in demoralizing the defenders of these position and probably was responsible for the annihilation of 8th Company GR 736 which is recorded as simply vanishing. (Paul Carell attributed this to naval gun fire,. but they were hit at the right place and time that two squadrons of B24s were scheduled to bomb..
I am going to strongly recommend Charles W. Arthur's "OPERATIONS ANALYSIS IN THE EIGHTH AIR FORCE IN WORLD WAR II" and in particular the chapter (Six) titled 'The Operations Research Section of the Eight Air Force January - 6 June 1944' . It covers the Transportation Plan, Crossbow Operations versus the V-1, Gee-H and the use of H2X on D-Day.
Chapter Severn,'Operations Analysis in the Eight Air Force 6 June 1944 - July 1944' covers troops support during the Normandy invasion plus Gee-H, Micro-H and H2X accuracy.
The comparisons of the three systems (Gee-H, Micro-H and H2X) accuracy comes later at Pages 231- 237 and again at pages 288 - 298.
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Re: Naval Gun Support During Amphibious Landings.
Yep.RichTO90 wrote: It is notable that the low-level medium bombing mission at UTAH by IX BC was much more effective, primarily because they attacked parallel to the beach and visually. They largely used 250 lb. HE - 4,414 of them compared to 32 2000 lb. HE - in their mission, which surprisingly had considerable concussive effect on the troops in WN 5 (the 2000 lb. HE were instantaneously-fuzed and intended to clear beach obstacles).
The more that the folks in the ETO used Kenney's tactics, the more successful they were.
The resistance to heavy bomber strikes parallel to the forward line of troops by the ETO Bomber Barons is why their troop support bombing failed.
Kenney getting a picture of the B-24/B-25 beach preparation bombings at Balikpapan parallel to and just ahead of landing craft lines in the closing issue of IMPACT was his rubbing that fact in Spaatz' and Doolittle's faces.
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Re: Naval Gun Support During Amphibious Landings.
FYI, I posted photos of the 8th and 9th Air Force D-Day operations on this thread --
http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic. ... 4&t=214039
http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic. ... 4&t=214039
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Re: Naval Gun Support During Amphibious Landings.
Judging by the past performance of Strategic bombers tactically supporting ground ops, I would think think this is a flat out no-go.
General McNair being a case in point.
I must say , the former SS Leibstandarte barracks in Berlin named after him ( McNair Barracks), had the best "chow" , I ever ran across in the US military. I am proud to have served in such a space for a small time.
General McNair being a case in point.
I must say , the former SS Leibstandarte barracks in Berlin named after him ( McNair Barracks), had the best "chow" , I ever ran across in the US military. I am proud to have served in such a space for a small time.