Chitose and Chiyoda, why absent at Midway?

[JAG13]

The IJN search arrangements at Midway are usually criticized, more or less justly, but I have always wondered, given the IJN love for floatplanes why didnt they assign at least one of their tenders to operate with Kido Butai? The Chitoses could do 29kts, not far from Kaga's speed, and even just one of them could have provided all the scouting muscle they could have needed.

[Takao]

The problem was not enough search planes, they had plenty. The problem was their poor search plan, which had been in use since Pearl.

[JAG13]

Well, not that many, 4 more plus whatever the Kongos could add but yes, they could have doubled the number of search planes, specially since their other recce measures failed.

However, at Coral Sea KB launched 12 Kates to search for the USN, and the next day 7 towards the more likely sectors with 7 more land based complementing them. That makes the dispositions at Midway even more curious given the far larger IJN force.

[glenn239]

The IJN search arrangements at Midway are usually criticized, more or less justly, but I have always wondered, given the IJN love for floatplanes why didnt they assign at least one of their tenders to operate with Kido Butai? The Chitoses could do 29kts, not far from Kaga's speed, and even just one of them could have provided all the scouting muscle they could have needed.

They were assigned to other missions. 1st Air Fleet never identified with Combined Fleet any scouting deficiency that it required reinforcements to make up, and judging from the way that Combined Fleet had rejected other 1st Air Fleet requests, I doubt that they'd have got either ship anyways.

[glenn239]

The IJN search arrangements at Midway are usually criticized, more or less justly, but I have always wondered, given the IJN love for floatplanes why didnt they assign at least one of their tenders to operate with Kido Butai? The Chitoses could do 29kts, not far from Kaga's speed, and even just one of them could have provided all the scouting muscle they could have needed.

They were assigned to other missions. 1st Air Fleet never identified with Combined Fleet any scouting deficiency that it required reinforcements to make up, (Kaga had 9 B5N'2 idle during the battle and Soryu perhaps 2 Judys, all available for the morning search), and judging from the way that Combined Fleet had rejected other 1st Air Fleet requests, I doubt that they'd have got either ship anyways.

[mescal]

However, at Coral Sea KB launched 12 Kates to search for the USN, and the next day 7 towards the more likely sectors with 7 more land based complementing them. That makes the dispositions at Midway even more curious given the far larger IJN force.

The main difference being that at Coral Sea, the Japanese knew that at least one American carrier was known to be in the area, whereas at Midway US carriers were not supposed to show up until later.

They were assigned to other missions.

And both within the Midway operation
Chitose was with Kondo's Midway invasion force, and Chiyoda (who actually carried midget subs and not planes) with Yamamoto's main body

[JAG13]

However, at Coral Sea KB launched 12 Kates to search for the USN, and the next day 7 towards the more likely sectors with 7 more land based complementing them. That makes the dispositions at Midway even more curious given the far larger IJN force.

The main difference being that at Coral Sea, the Japanese knew that at least one American carrier was known to be in the area, whereas at Midway US carriers were not supposed to show up until later.

Well, the Japanese werent sure so they did arrange for a recce flight over pearl and set up a couple sub lines to spot any USN forces approaching, problem is, first one failed and the second one left late, leaving the KB in the air in the face of hightened USN radio traffic that hinted that something was afoot... which is why the limited search effort is so crazy, they tried so find the US carriers, failed, and then didnt modify their minimal search arrangements when they could have easily done so... crazy people.

[Takao]

Well, not that many, 4 more plus whatever the Kongos could add but yes, they could have doubled the number of search planes, specially since their other recce measures failed.

However, at Coral Sea KB launched 12 Kates to search for the USN, and the next day 7 towards the more likely sectors with 7 more land based complementing them. That makes the dispositions at Midway even more curious given the far larger IJN force.

Coral Sea was not Kido Butai, just part of it...Carrier Division 5(Shokaku and Zuikaku), and they only had two heavy cruisers with them, Myoko and Haguro. And as can be seen with your example, as at Midway, the Japanese did not limit themselves to float planes alone. Thus, we are back to the Japanese having plenty of aircraft for reconnaissance work had the Japanese commanders felt it necessary to use them.

Well, the Japanese werent sure so they did arrange for a recce flight over pearl and set up a couple sub lines to spot any USN forces approaching, problem is, first one failed and the second one left late, leaving the KB in the air in the face of hightened USN radio traffic that hinted that something was afoot... which is why the limited search effort is so crazy, they tried so find the US carriers, failed, and then didnt modify their minimal search arrangements when they could have easily done so... crazy people.

However, the Japanese "shot themselves in the foot" with the submarine cordon lines...They assigned these lines mostly to their elderly boats, and boats that were to have taken part in the H8K Emily overflights of Pearl. The old I-boats were in no shape to perform the task assigned to them, and when the H8K mission was delayed, those submarines were unable to make their assigned stations in time.

That being said, the failure of the submarine cordon lines is irrelevant. Even had the cordon lines been established in time, the US carriers had already past that point some 24 hours earlier. So, Nagumo would still be none the wiser had the submarine cordons be established in time. Nagumo would still be unaware of the American carriers in the vicinity.

[steverodgers801]

A earlier mistake was when a PBY took off from French Frigate shoals just west of Pearl and dropped a couple of bombs on a mountain side. Alerting the US meant the occupation of the area and denying Japan a great spot that could have spotted the carriers leaving Pearl.

[flakbait]

Believe the aircraft in question were 2 H8K "Emily" patrol planes that landed at French Frigate Shoals in March 1942, were refueled from I boats and then flew to Pearl Harbor arriving at night and dropping several bombs that landed on a mountainside and provoked the Army and Navy to open up with a withering barrage of not so accurate AA fire that killed several civilians and wounded about a dozen more and several service members from all the falling shell shrapnel. The " Emily" both escaped with no damage. Afterwards the US intelligence personnel deduced exactly what had happened and since the Doolittle raid was scheduled to sail shortly Nimitz decided they could not risk a repeat and promptly occupied the shoals and then started to build a single runway and minimum base with dredged crushed coral which was completed in late 1942 and occupied for the remainder of WW2 with a radio homing beacon for flights to and from Midway...think it was abandoned about 1990.

[glenn239]

The main difference being that at Coral Sea, the Japanese knew that at least one American carrier was known to be in the area, whereas at Midway US carriers were not supposed to show up until later.

The biggest difference was the man in charge and his staff – Nagumo had a personal dislike for reconnaissance because these planes sometimes got lost and needed assistance, and because it cut down on striking strength. After a number of successes in achieving surprise, he continued to overrate his chances for surprise and failed to account for the potential costs, (in comparison to less risky raids earlier), if this calculation were wrong.

And as can be seen with your example, as at Midway, the Japanese did not limit themselves to float planes alone. Thus, we are back to the Japanese having plenty of aircraft for reconnaissance work had the Japanese commanders felt it necessary to use them.

Japanese doctrine was that up to 10% of carrier strength could be used for search. At Midway, Nagumo used 2 aircraft, less than 1% of available strength. He had up to 11 additional aircraft (9 B5N2 on Kaga and 2 D4Y on Soryu) that were otherwise idle, that could have been used for searching instead of doing nothing.

earlier mistake was when a PBY took off from French Frigate shoals just west of Pearl and dropped a couple of bombs on a mountain side. Alerting the US meant the occupation of the area and denying Japan a great spot that could have spotted the carriers leaving Pearl.

Operation K was planned for execution with two of the newest Emily type seaplanes. When the mission to Pearl Harbor was scrubbed, what 4th Fleet could have done was send these two seaplanes up to Wake Island, and then from there used them to do a search around Midway.

which is why the limited search effort is so crazy, they tried so find the US carriers, failed, and then didnt modify their minimal search arrangements when they could have easily done so... crazy people.

In trying to come to terms with the destruction of his well trained forces, Fuchida after the war told the reader that it was victory disease, or arrogance and contempt of the enemy that effected normal military precautions. Fuchida thought it was special to the Japanese somehow, but in fact this problem infects military organisations right up to the present day.

When the original plan was drafted, Nagumo would have had six fleet carriers. When it was executed, he was down to four. The difference was crucial – with six carriers the additional Zeros were available to perform all three missions – attack Midway, defend the fleet, counterattack US carriers. Whend down to only four, there simply were not enough fighters. (Chitose and Chiyoda would have helped here too, since their complement of 12 Pete biplanes each could serve as anti-torpedo plane fighters, allowing Zeros to go to higher altitudes. Another possible solution would have been to break out thirty six A5M4’s from storage, boosting fighter strength from 18 to 27 for the carriers at Midway).