JApanese logistic weakness and carrier operations

[steverodgers801]

Again Im not saying Japan couldn't have, but because of their doctrine of fighting the main battle near Japan, there was no need to worry about supplying ships far away. This is one of the problems Japan had in the Guadalcanal campaign.

[glenn239]

Yes but that is the amazing thing and really high-lights the topic header "Japanese logistic weakness and carrier operations"

The carrier was combat-capable when entering Pearl Harbor.

The Skokaku was similarly damaged in the same "Sea" and it took the Japanese 6 weeks to fix her.

Yorktown was not fully repaired, just patched up for the battle. Shokaku took 2 more bomb hits and was fully repaired.

That really showed their weaknesses in this respect; And a serious oversight on Yamamoto's part, not getting those 2 carriers fixed , or at least one for Midway.

It certainly exposed the weakness of not having any 1st-line air groups in reserve.

Remember all the discussions we had on replacement pilots/aircrew after Pearl Harbor/for the 1st Airfleet/IJN in general. It seems they had hundreds yet they could not fill out one replacement carrier air group, after Coral Sea.

The reserve aircraft after Pearl Harbor were all 2nd line aircraft - the A5M4, B5N1, D1A. Reserve aircrews would all need few weeks working up, just like Shokaku's after she was repaired towards the end of June 1942, (but not operational for another month and a bit).

[ChristopherPerrien]

Again Im not saying Japan couldn't have, but because of their doctrine of fighting the main battle near Japan, there was no need to worry about supplying ships far away. This is one of the problems Japan had in the Guadalcanal campaign.

Exactly, they "had" a pre-war plan and a policy of conducting a war based on a strategy of interior lines and defeating the US plan Orange. The trouble was once they established their "Greater Eastern Co-Prosperity Sphere" which could have also used interior lines, They continued to try to expand. Port Moresby, Midway, And Guadalcanal campaigns. The minute they had one arm slapped down(Coral Sea) and then another cut-off at Midway, instead of continuing expansion actions, they should have switched back to an "interior line" defence.

[ChristopherPerrien]

The Skokaku was similarly damaged in the same "Sea" and it took the Japanese 6 weeks to fix her.

Yorktown was not fully repaired, just patched up for the battle. Shokaku took 2 more bomb hits and was fully repaired.

Both the Yorktown and the Shokaku , took 3 dive-bomber hits at Coral Sea(IIRC). I do not remember the bomb sizes offhand.

[Ironmachine]

Both the Yorktown and the Shokaku , took 3 dive-bomber hits at Coral Sea(IIRC). I do not remember the bomb sizes offhand.

While Shokaku took three direct hits at Coral Sea, Yorktown took only one bomb hit. There were also some near misses (estimated as eight) of which only two caused some damage to the ship (one of them produced a small oil leakage). The damage report made on 20 May 1942 can be seen here:
http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USN/shi ... tml#pageH1
Regards.

[Eugen Pinak]

The Skokaku was similarly damaged in the same "Sea" and it took the Japanese 6 weeks to fix her. And also they could not manage to form one air-group from the Shokuku/Zuikaku/ and "JAPAN/all the IJN" to sail on the Zuikaku for Midway.

That really showed their weaknesses in this respect; And a serious oversight on Yamamoto's part, not getting those 2 carriers fixed , or at least one for Midway.

Remember all the discussions we had on replacement pilots/aircrew after Pearl Harbor/for the 1st Airfleet/IJN in general. It seems they had hundreds yet they could not fill out one replacement carrier air group, after Coral Sea.

Who told you, that IJN couldn't fill out one replacement carrier air group after Coral Sea? They could and they did. The problem was, that IJN top brass saw no need for "Zuikaku" at Midway.

[glenn239]

The minute they had one arm slapped down(Coral Sea) and then another cut-off at Midway, instead of continuing expansion actions, they should have switched back to an "interior line" defence.

Same dilemma as Lee before Gettysburg - go turtle in hopes of riding it out, or try an offensive to get terms before the material weight of the enemy crushes you.

[glenn239]

Who told you, that IJN couldn't fill out one replacement carrier air group after Coral Sea? They could and they did. The problem was, that IJN top brass saw no need for "Zuikaku" at Midway.

I see Shokaku's TROM that the ship was repaired end of June and it was operational mid-August. Was the delay the working up of the new air group, or was it the reorganisation after the defeat at Midway?

[ChristopherPerrien]

Who told you, that IJN couldn't fill out one replacement carrier air group after Coral Sea? They could and they did. The problem was, that IJN top brass saw no need for "Zuikaku" at Midway.

Find me a source that says they had the Zuikaku air group reconstituted by 27May1942, the sailing date for the 1st Airfleet for operation MO, or even 30May1942, the date the mighty USS Yorktown, sailed from Pearl Harbor to settle WWII .


They all say the thing. Here is Combined fleet for flagship Akagi.

27 May 1942:
At 0600 (JST), AKAGI departs Hashirajima for the Invasion of Midway as flagship of CarDiv 1 of Vice Admiral Nagumo's First Mobile Force, Carrier Strike Force also consisting of CarDiv 2's HIRYU and SORYU, BatDiv 3/2's HARUNA and KIRISHIMA, CruDiv 8's TONE and CHIKUMA, DesRon 10's light cruiser NAGARA with DesDiv 4's NOWAKI, ARASHI, HAGIKAZE and MAIKAZE, DesDiv 10's KAZAGUMO, YUGUMO and MAKIGUMO and DesDiv 17's URAKAZE, ISOKAZE, TANIKAZE and HAMAKAZE.
CarDiv 5 is unable to participate, due to damage to SHOKAKU and aircraft losses to ZUIKAKU suffered at Coral Sea on 8 May.

Here is Zuikaku

21 May 1942:
- 0153 ZUIKAKU and destroyer are detected by USS POLLACK in position 31-71'N, 131-32'E on course 080 making 20 knots. Having initially mis-identified the target type and speed POLLACK has little time to close before ZUIKAKU crosses her path from left to right, and opts to fire four torpedoes at 2,000 yards at ZUIKAKU's starboard side at 0208, but all four miss.
- Arrive at Kure. Once back in Japan, her air crews are not immediately reconstituted. This was due to the fact that transfer of personnel to other units had already been scheduled before Coral Sea to replace other vacancies and transfers. Further, at this time, the rule of `one aircrew per aircraft' generally applied, and losses in either one could upset the balance. Such obstacles and shufflings could not be easily overcome or reversed. Since the Japanese felt they had sunk two carriers and won the Battle of Coral Sea, such measures seemed unnecessary. ZUIKAKU had thus also been dropped with her battle-damaged sister from the first phase of the Midway Operation line-up.

This topic is about "Japanese logistic weakness and carrier operations" and comparative analysis to US Carrier ops are the best thing , since they are the closest in representation and happened at the same time. No more a perfect comparative example is possible than the damaged USS Yorktown sailing for Midway with an air-group, and the undamaged Zuikaku not having an air-group on the same day.

Sure the Japanese cooked up all kinds of reasons and justifications for not sending the Zuikaku , but they could not have sent her on May 27 42 even if they had wanted too.
They stated as such. More Combined Fleet Troms record

14 May 1942:
Combined Fleet receives report that both CarDiv 5's carriers have suffered losses in air crews and wouldn't be available for the MI Operation.(Note 2).

So the Japanese actually broke the tip(1/3)(2 best newest carriers)of their glass sword at Coral Sea and could not glue it back together by Midway , where they managed to break it totally.

[ChristopherPerrien]

Yorktown took only one bomb hit. There were also some near misses (estimated as eight) of which only two caused some damage to the ship 1[/url]
Regards.

Been a long time since I looked at Coral Sea, I stand corrected on my "IIRC" wording, 1 hit , 2 damaging near misses.

[steverodgers801]

Japan did not have hundreds, they did not even have enough naval air crews to start the war with the addition of the Z and S plus the other light carriers. Add in the losses from combat and Japan was already in its death spiral for naval air. There were still the ground pilots, but they were not trained for naval opperations

[glenn239]

Been a long time since I looked at Coral Sea, I stand corrected on my "IIRC" wording, 1 hit , 2 damaging near misses.

I imagine that Shokaku will have had a few of those herself, in addition to the three hits.

[glenn239]

Steverodgers801 - Japan did not have hundreds, they did not even have enough naval air crews to start the war with the addition of the Z and S plus the other light carriers.

At the front of the book “Zero” you can find the TO&E for the Japanese carrier force at the time of Pearl Harbor, including frontline and reserve carrier aircraft. The frontline types were A6M2, D3A1, B5N2, while the second line were A5M4, D1A, B5N1. IIRC, about 450 frontline and maybe 250 second line. Given Yamamoto’s willingness to lose a good chunk of his carrier air at Hawaii, the intention was perhaps to use the 2nd line if necessary to fill in for the southern operation, if necessary.

Add in the losses from combat and Japan was already in its death spiral for naval air.

The Solomons crushed the IJN’s aviation programme between 1942 and 1944 – about 8,000 aircraft lost. Even this is somewhat of a misnomer, because in 1944 the IJN's aviation was still perfectly capable of recovery, even in its exhausted form, given enough time to do so. USN carrier operations in 1944 were of a tempo that this did not happen.

There were still the ground pilots, but they were not trained for naval operations.

All carrier pilots were “ground” pilots before they were assigned to carrier training, which was a course the any "ground" pilot could be assigned to at any time.

[ChristopherPerrien]

Lord, I see I might have to go look at that air-crew stuff we were talking about years ago. The bottleneck for the IJN was not "air-craft" or even "pilots/aircrew" , but "carrier qualified" pilots/aircrew.

The ability to take-off, conduct ops at sea, and find and land on a carrier at sea , are the hardest things a pilot/aircrew can do. And it takes constant and up to date training to be able to do so reliably. This is where the IJN was lacking.

Or perhaps the Rich or OP monsters will show up so and prevent such a "quest".

[Eugen Pinak]

Who told you, that IJN couldn't fill out one replacement carrier air group after Coral Sea? They could and they did. The problem was, that IJN top brass saw no need for "Zuikaku" at Midway.

I see Shokaku's TROM that the ship was repaired end of June and it was operational mid-August. Was the delay the working up of the new air group, or was it the reorganisation after the defeat at Midway?

There is nothing in "Shokaku" TROM that says she was operational only in mid-August.