HMAS Sydney II OP RESOLUTION update ; Limited Liability Germany and Japan 19th and 20th November 1941.

[david HMAS Sydney]

Hello All.

HMAS Sydney II OP RESOLUTION update:


SECTION ONE ]- Background to the 14 or so TOP=SECRET OPS at the time of the HSK KORMORAN / IJN I-67 /HMAS Sydney II altercation.

SECTION TWO ]- Background to the CODES used by the UK / AUST / GERMANY / JAPAN with reference to the HMAS SYDNEY II .

SECION THREE]- Standing Imperial Japanese Operational Order # 1 , 1941.

SECTION FOUR ]- Background to the operational decisions made by Detmers and Ohata within the context that two intelligent highly trained senior Offficers made catastrophic errors of judgement under very difficult conditions with a negative void of correct information available to them .

SECTION FIVE ]- On site 19th November 4pm off Dirk Hartog Island to 4pm 20th November 1941.


---------------------------------------------------------------

SECTION ONE :

The clash of a MINIMUM 14 separate TOP=SECRET OPS run separatly by,

The GERMAN MARINE , operating the illegal Hilfkruizer squadron in the Atlantic , Indian and Pacific Oceans.

The IMPERIAL JAPANESE FORCES about to enter WW2.

Priority ONE was the Oilfields of Indonesia , Priority TWO was to capture Singapore .

Japan had no oil , and Singapore guarded the ship access to the oilfields .

[ Whats not recognised in Modern History is that the Japanese Forces had made a deal with the 40,000 Indian troops prior , and the rearguard Indian Forces let the invading Japanese Forces through the back of Singapore ]

That's why Singapore fell within days.

The DUTCH NAVY [ delivering the monster 400 ton Bullion Load to the HMAS Sydney II on the 17th November 1941 .

CHINA STATION SINGAPORE with eight separate OPS.
1]- OP FISH for the Bullion run out of Singapore
2]- DUTCH NAVY Liason for the Bullion transfer.
3]- ROYAL AUSTRALIAN NAVY Liason for the bullion transfer, of what was a SEC=CLASSIFIED MOST=SECRET UK OP.
[ The Royal Australian Navy had ' lent' the HMAS Sydney II in Operational terms, To the UK.]
4]- The simple HMS AQUITANIA OP to pick up 6000 Troops from Fremantle West Australia to reinforce FORTRESS SINGAPORE on the eve of the original Dec 1st 1941 Pearl Harbour Strike.
5]- OP MATADOR on STANDBY STATUS to fight the Japanese Troops massed at the Thailand / Malay Border.
[ OP MATADOR cancelled on 4/12/1941 when the DEC 7th Pearl Harbour strike went STATUS GREEN ]
6]- CHINA STATION SINGAPORE SIGINT OP tracking the Japanese JN-25 coded Military Signals - PRIOR - to Japan entering WW2.
7]- CHINA STATION SIGINT OP tracking the Japanese JNA-20 ' PURPLE CODE ' Diplomatic signals with Germany.

- Official Japanese Embassy Request to Germany to assist stopping the Troopship AQUITANIA was read.
- PURPLE CODE reply to TOKYO with indication Germany would bring in a ' KRUIZER ' to stop the Troopship.

- Widespread panic at CHINA STATION SINGAPORE that German Kruizers were in the Indian Ocean on the eve of the Pearl Harbour strike.

- AND , one was made available within a 48 to 72 hour lead in for the OP.

8]- CHINA STATION emergency SIGINT OP to track the ' Foreign ENIGMA ' CODE used by the German Kruizer [ unknown Type ].

[ The British CLAIM they never cracked the FOREIGN ENIGMA , however the triple sinking and no rescue of the HSK ATLANTIS starting from the 21st November 1941 tells a different story ]

There would be wide spread panic at CHINA STATION SINGAPORE that Germany was able to bring in an unknown Kruiser at short notice into Australian waters on the eve of the Pearl Harbour Strike.

Easy to reason that a ' Pincer Movement ' from the Indian Ocean by German Kruisers to assist Japan for the Pearl Harbour OP was possible.

The operational level at CHINA STATION SINGAPORE was easily ' Frantic '

_______________________________________


SECTION TWO : JN-25 was cracked before Pearl Harbour.

The JN 25 code was long winded and went start to finish , in one go.

That made it vulnerable due to the 7 minutes needed for a minimum transmission.
It had a corporate structure to it , not a MILSPEC structure.

EG.

It started with " I have the great pleasure to inform his Excellency the ( I- 67 ) has received it's Imperial Order to proceed on a glorious mission for his Highness where we will be setting sail to 112.55 and 25.42 where we will be joining our Illustrious German Allies on a TOP=SECRET OP to stop the Troopship HMS AQUITANIA from reinforcing CHINA STATION SINGAPORE on the eve of the Pearl Harbor strike."

It's formatted as a formal letter .

(The unsecure JN-25 codes were probably how Japan lost the war)

[ By 1945 Japan had lost 95% of her Fleet.]

I reason the command briefing may have gone through in 13 parts " on the fly "

- I 67 stop Patrol . Wait for update.
- I67 acknowledge YES on receipt.
- I 67 stay on Freq 111.111 Longwave.
- I 67 your new ID code is " JD5-3 "
- JD5-3 go to 112.55 and 25.42 NOW.
- JD5-3 TOP SECRET run silent.
- JD5-3 meet disguised Allied warship on 18th Nov.
- JD5-3 you will be refueled at destination.
- JD5-3 switch to shortwave 54.5 on site when arrived, for our Allies.
- JD5-3 your radio ID CODE on site is ' GREEN '.
- JD5-3 Troopship MUST be stopped MAXIMUM PRIORITY.
- JD5-3 Target arriving 12 noon 19th Nov . OBSERVE ONLY.
- JD5-3 Report in once task done.

Etc.

Short burst emergency get there NOW on the fly .
Rendevous details were updated on the fly.

The OP was patched together at short notice in an Emergency mode.

CHINA STATION et al may have read them but didn't connect them as Japanese.

They may have been read as incomplete and false.

Didn't flag.

The COMM SIGINT Team working on the HMAS Sydney II Secret Bullion transfer didn't see them.

300 plus radio operators available on the vast TOP=SECRET Ceylon Radio SIGINT base.[ only declassified in the 1950"s ]

500 plus radio operators available at CHINA STATION SINGAPORE .

100 plus radio operators available in Australia from Frazer Island DF , Darwin , Geraldton RAAF , Perth and HMAS Radio Base in Canberra.

All listening for signals to this area using DF [ Direction Finding ] equipment .

DF could track position and an approximate distance.

No IJN JN25 traffic into or out of this area on 19th , 20th and 21st November 1941.

The German Government would have notified the Japanese Government the OP had failed and 'contact had been lost' with the sub when the LS-3 Torpedo crew reported in on the 21st November from 110 and 24.

The German Government may have withheld the Detmers error.

A barrage allegedly, of JN25 radio traffic heard to the Dirk Hartog area on the 22nd November 1941 asking for the missing sub to report in.

No answer received .

_________________________________________

SECTION THREE : Standing Imperial Japanese Operartional Order # 1 , for 1941.

IJN I-67 Commander Tadashi Ohata broke the Standing Imperial Japanese Operational Order # 1 on the 19th November 1941.

At the HMAS Sydney II Commission of Enquiry in 2009 , I was told point blank the ' Japanese Sub Theory ' was wrong because it would have broken the Standing Order issued .

ERGO , what lead to IJN I-67 Commander Tadashi Ohata 's somewhat ' irrational decision ' ??


" Navy Order No. 1
5 November 1941 Order to: Yamamoto, C in C, Combined Fleet
1. In view of the great possibility of being compelled to go to war against the United States, Great Britain and the Netherlands in the cause of self-existence and self-defense, Japan has decided to complete various operational preparations within the first ten days of December.
2. The Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Fleet will make the necessary operational preparations.
3. The details of the operation shall be directed by the Chief of the Naval General Staff.
By Imperial Order Chief of the Naval General Staff Nagano, Osami "

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

" Navy Directive No. 1
5 November 1941 Directive to: Yamamoto, C in C, Combined Fleet
1. The Combined Fleet will advance necessary forces at a suitable time to their preparatory points to stand by for the start of operations in the event of unavoidable hostilities against America,
[Page 2]

Great Britain and the Netherlands, in the first ten days of December. [1]
2. During the above-mentioned advance, strict watch will be kept against unexpected attacks.
3. The operational policy against America, Great Britain, and the Netherlands, in case of hostilities, is scheduled as cited in the separate volume. [2]
Chief of the Naval General Staff Nagano, Osami
Note:
Combined Fleet Operations Order No. 1 issued on 5 November 1941 and titled "Preparations for War and Commencement of Hostilities" was an 89-page volume covering all phases of war preparations. In general this order stated the following:
a. The Empire is expecting war to break out with the United States, Great Britain and the Netherlands. When the decision is made to complete all operational preparations, orders will be issued es-

[1]. Preparatory Points
Carrier Striking Task Force Hitokappu Bay Philippine Invasion Force Bako (Formosa) Malay Invasion Force Camranh Bay Main Body, Southern Force Samah (Hainan Island) Submarine Force Kwajalein
[2]. All copies of "The Separate Volume" were destroyed prior to the end of the war. Attached as appendix I is a reconstructed version prepared from personal notes and memory by Capt. T. Ohmae, former Chief, Plans Section, Naval General Staff.
[Page 3]
tablishing the approximate date (Y Day) for commencement of hostilities and announcing "First Preparations for War."
When these orders are issued, the forces will act as follows:
(1) All fleets and forces, without special orders, will organize and complete battle preparations for operations in accordance with "the Allocation of Forces for First Period Operations of First Phase Operations." When directed by respective commanding officers, they will proceed at a proper time to the pre-operation rendezvous points and wait in readiness.
(2) All forces will be on strict look-out for unexpected attacks by the U.S., British, and Netherlands forces.
(3) The commanding officers of various forces may carry out such secret reconnaissance as is necessary for the operations. "


--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

SECTION FOUR ; High Probability of Operational Confusion 18th, 19th and 20th November 1941.

37 plus on site factors that could have easily lead to an over-reacted separate response from Detmers and Ohata .

- Japanese OP to stop the HMS AQUITANIA reinforcing FORTRESS SINGAPORE on the eve of the original December 1st Pearl Harbour Strike.

- GERMAN MARINE OP on site to assist the Japanese to stop the HMS Aquitania.

- I-67 sub on site as an official observer ONLY.

- Detmers couldn't speak Japanese.

-Ohata couldn't speak German.

- Detmers though it was a German OP in Total.

- Ohata thought it was a Japanese OP in Total.

- It was a Japanese OP.

- Detmers held a higher Military Rank.

Direction and confusion abounded between the two AXIS Allies on the day.

- The HSK KORMORAN has been at sea for 12 months with little result for 24 hours a day for 365 days straight on Combat Alert. Crew on edge and tempers stretched .

- I-67 crew on edge re the extended patrol ontop of the covert surveillance OP off Indonesia .

- I-67 crew on maximum ' critical ' alert to STOP the HMS AQUITANIA.

- ( in operational terms the HSK Kormoran crew were at a cautious alert +/- 60% comittment level. The I-67 crew would have been at a nervous 101% commitment level.)

- Sea conditions offshore Dirk Hartog Island were rough on 19th November 1941.

- 16 knot winds , 15 foot swell.

All Warships humping and bumping over the difficult sea conditions.

All mariners struggling to stay on their feet 24 hours a day.

Standard conditions for sleep deprivation and physical fatigue would increase.

For the IJN I-67 sub on the heaving ocean swell [ I'm familiar with these waters on site ] the pitch and roll would be easily 10 foot up and down , with a 30 to 40 dergree roll at every wave crest.

The wave frequency in this area is at 20 seconds , 3 to a minute , 180 to an hour, 1060 per day.

Relentless.

There would be bruised elbows , shoulders , knees , knocked heads against the metal structure inside the cramped sub interior.

If a submariner lost his footing he would be flung hard against the inside of the sub.

Conditions on site were rough and physical fatigue and exhaustion would have easily crept in leading to a diminished ' survival mode ' mental response.


- The HMS AQUITANIA was late on 19th November 1941.

- The HMAS SYDNEY II turned up, vectored into the HSK KORMORAN.

- Germans astonished.

- Japanese astonished.

- TOTAL confusion just on the AXIS side.

- HMAS Sydney II hunting for a German Kruiser.

- HMAS Sydney II carrying 400 tons plus bullion.

-HMAS SYDNEY II astonished when the HSK KORMORAN opened fire flying a white flag Registered as a Dutch Neutral.

( HMAS SYDNEY II and HMS AQUITANIA should have been diverted to Darwin.)

- Germans worried their codes were compromised.

- Japanese worried their codes were compromised.

- CHINA STATION SINGAPORE worried their codes were compromised.

- HMAS SYDNEY II not at" Independent Action Stations STATUS".

- TOTAL confusion between Germany , Japan , Australia and the UK.

Conditions became ripe for unauthorized " wildcard " decisions.

It's a very plausible clear cut on-ground " cascading error " situation.

NOBODY knew what was going on.

Detmers opened fire flying a white flag masquerading as a Dutch Neutral.

He knew he had broken the International Maritime Law , and ALWAYS expected to be Court Marshalled.

Nobody ever took him up on it.

When the LS-3 crew reported in on the 21st November 1941 from 110 and 24 ONLY the British knew/ had the full story.

- The German Kruizer was illegal and had a warcrime to account for against the HMAS Sydney II.

- There was a IJN Japanese Submarine present that had sunk the out-of-commission HMAS Sydney II and executed the survivors.

- The bullion load was 346 metres below the ocean.

The UK realised their codes were safe, AND the Germans / Japanese were unaware of their breaches.

The German and Japanese crew were totally oblivious to the secret monster bullion load on the HMAS Sydney II.

If the KORMORAN and the IJN I-67 knew of the massive bullion load , they would have certainly acted differently.

Pearl Harbour was delayed by the cautious Japanese Forces for one week .

The UK needed the US in the war to defeat the AXIS Alliance.

Allegedly the US knew prior of the impending Pearl OP.

Allegedly.

The Brits waited 63 years to snatch the HMAS Sydney II bullion load.

No Limited Liability there.

Deliberate.

------------------------------------------------------------------------

SECTION FIVE : On site Irrational decisions made by two separate warship Captains in confusing difficult conditions.

12.00 Noon. Troopship HMS AQUITANIA late.

4.00 PM visual sighting of HMAS Sydney II by HSK Kormoran.

Kormoran sends QQQQ.

4.10 PM Kormoran sees the warship , expecting the troopship Aquitania.

-Widespread panic on the Kormoran and the I-67.

- Detmers reasons the Troopship has a Cruiser Escosrt.

- Bolts WEST then turns SOUTH WEST due to the heavy ocean conditions.

- IJN I-67 drops under the water and WAITS at the QQQQ spot.

5.30PM . Kormoran heaves to , with a white flag.

5.45 PM Kormoran opens fire.

6.15PM Kormoran out of range and off back to QQQQ.

8.30PM - Kormoran back at QQQQ spot .

Detmers and Ohata have a heated ' blame ' argument.

8.45PM Detmers decides to go up the International Shipping Channel ' looking for the Aquitania '

9.00PM Ohata decides to observe the HMAS Sydney II burning on the horizon.

10.15 PM I-67 arrives to find the SYDNEY on fire , down at the bows and stationary.

[ High Probability SYDNEY ordered to STAY exactly where she was by CHINA STATON to protect the Bullion load . Propellors turning at 4 knots etc to hold her exact in the 15 foot swell against a 16 knot wind. IF CHINA STATION SINGAPORE et al had picked up operational signals to and from the IJN I-67 from this area they WOULD have alerted the SYDNEY.

SYDNEY had the ability at minimum to move closer inshore to boost survival chances AND to put the Bullion Load into shallow water ]

Ohata notes there are no mariners on board from his position , and the SYDNEY appears as an abandoned burning hulk.

The warship is down at the bows , missing her B turrent [ easily 2000 tons of water in the forward structure of the ship].

There would be a high probability the waves are crashing OVER the bow region, and over the A turrent in the 15foot constant swell.

It is 4 hours after the altercation with the HSK Kormoran , with the probability that any survivors would have got off 3 to four hours prior and were hearing towards the shore.

[ In Military Terms the burning hulk would be referred to as a ' Tertiary Target ".]

Here is the critical part.

There are no IJN JN25 coded signals into or out of this area on the 19th , 20th and 21st November 1941.

The sub was ordered silent, and is silent.

Ohata has one eye on the burning Kormoran going up the International Shipping Lane , one eye into the dark void of the night which hides the Troopship Aquitania , and one eye on what looks like an abandoned burning hulk.

He knows the Troopship is out there, his Primary target.

Its not a problem for the KORMORAN to be on fire , because the AQUITANIA will slow down to assist what appears to bean unarmed burning merchant ship..

The burning hulk however is a problem , in as much as it could alert the AQUITANIA to trouble.

Especially if the Australian Cruiser was escorting the Troopship.

10.30 PM Ohata decides on his own recognisance to remove the burning hulk, without Official Clearance.

2 torpedoes at a range of 2 and a half miles fired .

The SYDNEY is cut in two.

THEN , to what could be his horror , 300 mariners jump off what looked like an abandoned hulk , into the water.

He makes a rash ' survival ' decision to remove the evidence.

Vietnam Veterans have a special term for this.

They call it a ' Cluster Fu@k ' when an another error is made to fix the original error.

In Management Terms its refered to as a ' Cascading Error '

10.30PM the Kormoran crew see the explosion on the horizon.

11.00PM Detmers lowers a rubber lifeboat with 40 of his wounded , [ that he has packed himself ] , into the water.

The rubber raft flips and all 40 are thrown into the water before Detmers eyes, and that of his on board crew.

[ Only 3 survivors are found.]

Detmers mind ' snaps '.

- He has accidently sent 37 of his wounded men to their deaths , by his simple mistake.

( Detmers had no one able bodied on the raft to handle it )

12.00PM all off the burning out of control KORMORAN, 31.5 nautical miles off the top of Dirk Hartog Island.

12.30PM the scuttling charges go off , and the 180 mines in the rear cargo section detonate and vapourize the rear end of the Kormoran.

1.00 PM Detmers sends the LS-3 Torpedo boat to find out what happened to the Sydney .

6.00AM the LS-3 crew return with the grim news.

Detmers may have lost his mind at this point.

He assumes, he is the man fully responsible for the entire mission.

10.00AM the I-67 returns to the QQQQ spot , still awaiting for the AQUITANIA.

12 00 NOON Detmers signals the I-67 for a rendezvous.

1.00PM Detmers goes past the bodies of the failed rubber lifeboat launch from the previous night.

2.00PM the LS-3 and the IJN I-67 meet at the QQQQ spot.

A dangerous and furious argument erupts.

Language barriers , and misinterpretation of Command hierarchy could have lead to a complete communication breakdown.

Detmers receives a diesel top up for the LS-3 , and some medical supplies.

3.00PM Detmers fires two unauthorised 45cm torpedoes into the IJN I -67.

4.00PM Detmers starts to collect his war dead from the failed rubber lifeboat deployment.

In 24 hours 811 mariners are dead.

3 warships destroyed.

HMS Aquitania survives.

The LS-3 Torpedo Boat reports in on what really happened on the 21st November 1941 from 110 and 24.

Only the British are listening.


David Angwin.
HMAS Sydney II.
OP RESOLUTION.

[Takao]

Still continuing with this fantasy piece I see.

Should not his be moved to the "What If" section?

[CharlesRollinsWare]

I cannot begin fathom the drugs you must be on to come up with this.

[aghart]

Japan does a pre war deal with the 40,000 Indian troops in Malaya? Really? Reading this rubbish I have just wasted 10 minutes of my life which I will never get back again.

[abc123]

I was bored until I read this tripe, now I am having a laugh, as it is said........the world is full of idiots and I have just read the amazing dribble written by one of them.

The mother of idiots is always pregnant

[ChristopherPerrien]

So there are 400 tons of gold($14 BILLION or so) in the Sydney? And no one is bothering to pick it up from a mere 500m?

[Takao]

I-67 was lost due to accidental causes over a year before David's "fantasy" takes place. He was supposed to get back to me on this, but he never has...Go figure.

So, obviously he won't let historical fact stop him from making other outrageous claims.

Remember, he has been searching around the coast of Australia, digging for the supposed "bodies"...and he has not found them yet.

His claims have long since been relegated to the "circular" file.

[david HMAS Sydney]

Hello All.

HMAS Sydney II OP RESOLUTION update:


SECTION ONE ]- Background to the 14 or so TOP=SECRET OPS at the time of the HSK KORMORAN / IJN I-67 /HMAS Sydney II altercation.

SECTION TWO ]- Background to the CODES used by the UK / AUST / GERMANY / JAPAN with reference to the HMAS SYDNEY II .

SECION THREE]- Standing Imperial Japanese Operational Order # 1 , 1941.

SECTION FOUR ]- Background to the operational decisions made by Detmers and Ohata within the context that two intelligent highly trained senior Offficers made catastrophic errors of judgement under very difficult conditions with a negative void of correct information available to them .

SECTION FIVE ]- On site 19th November 4pm off Dirk Hartog Island to 4pm 20th November 1941.


---------------------------------------------------------------

SECTION ONE :

The clash of a MINIMUM 14 separate TOP=SECRET OPS run separatly by,

The GERMAN MARINE , operating the illegal Hilfkruizer squadron in the Atlantic , Indian and Pacific Oceans.

The IMPERIAL JAPANESE FORCES about to enter WW2.

[Priority ONE for Japan was the Oilfields of Indonesia , Priority TWO was to capture Singapore .]

Japan had no oil , and Singapore guarded the ship access to the oilfields .

[ Whats not recognised in Modern History is that the Japanese Forces had made a deal for Indian Independence with some of the 40,000 Indian troops prior , and the rearguard Indian Forces allegedly let the invading Japanese Forces through the back of Singapore ]

That's probably why Singapore fell within days.

[ The Fall of Singapore was classic SUN TZU ' The Art of War " to the letter.]

The DUTCH NAVY delivering the monster 400 ton Bullion Load to the HMAS Sydney II on the 17th November 1941 .

CHINA STATION SINGAPORE with eight separate OPS.
1]- OP FISH for the Bullion run out of Singapore
2]- DUTCH NAVY Liason for the Bullion transfer.
3]- ROYAL AUSTRALIAN NAVY Liason for the bullion transfer, of what was a SEC=CLASSIFIED MOST=SECRET UK OP.
[ The Royal Australian Navy had ' lent' the HMAS Sydney II in Operational terms, To the UK.]
4]- The simple HMS AQUITANIA OP to pick up 6000 Troops from Fremantle West Australia to reinforce FORTRESS SINGAPORE on the eve of the original Dec 1st 1941 Pearl Harbour Strike.
5]- OP MATADOR on STANDBY STATUS to fight the Japanese Troops massed at the Thailand / Malay Border.
[ OP MATADOR cancelled on 4/12/1941 when the DEC 7th Pearl Harbour strike went STATUS GREEN ]
6]- CHINA STATION SINGAPORE SIGINT OP tracking the Japanese JN-25 coded Military Signals - PRIOR - to Japan entering WW2.
7]- CHINA STATION SIGINT OP tracking the Japanese JNA-20 ' PURPLE CODE ' Diplomatic signals with Germany.

- Official Japanese Embassy Request to Germany to assist stopping the Troopship AQUITANIA was read.
- PURPLE CODE reply to TOKYO with indication Germany would bring in a ' KRUIZER ' to stop the Troopship.

- Widespread panic at CHINA STATION SINGAPORE that German Kruizers were in the Indian Ocean on the eve of the Pearl Harbour strike.

- AND , one was made available within a 48 to 72 hour lead in for the OP.

8]- CHINA STATION emergency SIGINT OP to track the ' Foreign ENIGMA ' CODE used by the German Kruizer [ unknown Type ].

[ The British CLAIM they never cracked the FOREIGN ENIGMA , however the triple sinking and no rescue of the HSK ATLANTIS starting from the 21st November 1941 tells a different story ]

There would be wide spread panic at CHINA STATION SINGAPORE that Germany was able to bring in an unknown Kruiser at short notice into Australian waters on the eve of the Pearl Harbour Strike.

Easy to reason that a ' Pincer Movement ' from the Indian Ocean by German Kruisers to assist Japan for the Pearl Harbour OP was possible.

The operational level at CHINA STATION SINGAPORE was easily ' Frantic '

_______________________________________


SECTION TWO : JN-25 was cracked before Pearl Harbour.

The JN 25 code was long winded and went start to finish , in one go.

That made it vulnerable due to the 7 minutes needed for a minimum transmission.
It had a corporate structure to it , not a MILSPEC structure.

EG.

It started with " I have the great pleasure to inform his Excellency the ( I- 67 ) has received it's Imperial Order to proceed on a glorious mission for his Highness where we will be setting sail to 112.55 and 25.42 where we will be joining our Illustrious German Allies on a TOP=SECRET OP to stop the Troopship HMS AQUITANIA from reinforcing CHINA STATION SINGAPORE on the eve of the Pearl Harbor strike."

It's formatted as a formal letter .

(The unsecure JN-25 codes were probably how Japan lost the war)

[ By 1945 Japan had lost 95% of her Fleet.]

I reason the command briefing may have gone through in 13 parts " on the fly "

- I 67 stop Patrol . Wait for update.
- I67 acknowledge YES on receipt.
- I 67 stay on Freq 111.111 Longwave.
- I 67 your new ID code is " JD5-3 "
- JD5-3 go to 112.55 and 25.42 NOW.
- JD5-3 TOP SECRET run silent.
- JD5-3 meet disguised Allied warship on 18th Nov.
- JD5-3 you will be refueled at destination.
- JD5-3 switch to shortwave 54.5 on site when arrived, for our Allies.
- JD5-3 your radio ID CODE on site is ' GREEN '.
- JD5-3 Troopship MUST be stopped MAXIMUM PRIORITY.
- JD5-3 Target arriving 12 noon 19th Nov . OBSERVE ONLY.
- JD5-3 Report in once task done.

Etc.

Short burst emergency get there NOW on the fly .
Rendevous details were updated on the fly.

The OP was patched together at short notice in an Emergency mode.

CHINA STATION et al may have read them but didn't connect them as Japanese.

They may have been read as incomplete and false.

Didn't flag.

The COMM SIGINT Team working on the HMAS Sydney II Secret Bullion transfer didn't see them.

300 plus radio operators available on the vast TOP=SECRET Ceylon Radio SIGINT base.[ only declassified in the 1950"s ]

500 plus radio operators available at CHINA STATION SINGAPORE .

100 plus radio operators available in Australia from Frazer Island DF , Darwin , Geraldton RAAF , Perth and HMAS Radio Base in Canberra.

All listening for signals to this area using DF [ Direction Finding ] equipment .

DF could track position and an approximate distance.

No IJN JN25 traffic into or out of this area on 19th , 20th and 21st November 1941.

The German Government would have notified the Japanese Government the OP had failed and 'contact had been lost' with the sub when the LS-3 Torpedo crew reported in on the 21st November from 110 and 24.

The German Government may have withheld the Detmers error.

A barrage allegedly, of JN25 radio traffic heard to the Dirk Hartog area on the 22nd November 1941 asking for the missing sub to report in.

No answer received .

_________________________________________

SECTION THREE : Standing Imperial Japanese Operartional Order # 1 , for 1941.

IJN I-67 Commander Tadashi Ohata broke the Standing Imperial Japanese Operational Order # 1 on the 19th November 1941.

At the HMAS Sydney II Commission of Enquiry in 2009 , I was told point blank the ' Japanese Sub Theory ' was wrong because it would have broken the Standing Order issued .

ERGO , what lead to IJN I-67 Commander Tadashi Ohata 's somewhat ' irrational decision ' ??


" Navy Order No. 1
5 November 1941 Order to: Yamamoto, C in C, Combined Fleet
1. In view of the great possibility of being compelled to go to war against the United States, Great Britain and the Netherlands in the cause of self-existence and self-defense, Japan has decided to complete various operational preparations within the first ten days of December.
2. The Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Fleet will make the necessary operational preparations.
3. The details of the operation shall be directed by the Chief of the Naval General Staff.
By Imperial Order Chief of the Naval General Staff Nagano, Osami "

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

" Navy Directive No. 1
5 November 1941 Directive to: Yamamoto, C in C, Combined Fleet
1. The Combined Fleet will advance necessary forces at a suitable time to their preparatory points to stand by for the start of operations in the event of unavoidable hostilities against America,
[Page 2]

Great Britain and the Netherlands, in the first ten days of December. [1]
2. During the above-mentioned advance, strict watch will be kept against unexpected attacks.
3. The operational policy against America, Great Britain, and the Netherlands, in case of hostilities, is scheduled as cited in the separate volume. [2]
Chief of the Naval General Staff Nagano, Osami
Note:
Combined Fleet Operations Order No. 1 issued on 5 November 1941 and titled "Preparations for War and Commencement of Hostilities" was an 89-page volume covering all phases of war preparations. In general this order stated the following:
a. The Empire is expecting war to break out with the United States, Great Britain and the Netherlands. When the decision is made to complete all operational preparations, orders will be issued es-

[1]. Preparatory Points
Carrier Striking Task Force Hitokappu Bay Philippine Invasion Force Bako (Formosa) Malay Invasion Force Camranh Bay Main Body, Southern Force Samah (Hainan Island) Submarine Force Kwajalein
[2]. All copies of "The Separate Volume" were destroyed prior to the end of the war. Attached as appendix I is a reconstructed version prepared from personal notes and memory by Capt. T. Ohmae, former Chief, Plans Section, Naval General Staff.
[Page 3]
tablishing the approximate date (Y Day) for commencement of hostilities and announcing "First Preparations for War."
When these orders are issued, the forces will act as follows:
(1) All fleets and forces, without special orders, will organize and complete battle preparations for operations in accordance with "the Allocation of Forces for First Period Operations of First Phase Operations." When directed by respective commanding officers, they will proceed at a proper time to the pre-operation rendezvous points and wait in readiness.
(2) All forces will be on strict look-out for unexpected attacks by the U.S., British, and Netherlands forces.
(3) The commanding officers of various forces may carry out such secret reconnaissance as is necessary for the operations. "


--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

SECTION FOUR ; High Probability of Operational Confusion 18th, 19th and 20th November 1941.

37 plus on site factors that could have easily lead to an over-reacted separate response from Detmers and Ohata .

- Japanese OP to stop the HMS AQUITANIA reinforcing FORTRESS SINGAPORE on the eve of the original December 1st Pearl Harbour Strike.

- GERMAN MARINE OP on site to assist the Japanese to stop the HMS Aquitania.

- I-67 sub on site as an official observer ONLY.

- Detmers couldn't speak Japanese.

-Ohata couldn't speak German.

- Detmers though it was a German OP in Total.

- Ohata thought it was a Japanese OP in Total.

- It was a Japanese OP.

- Detmers held a higher Military Rank.

Direction and confusion abounded between the two AXIS Allies on the day.

- The HSK KORMORAN has been at sea for 12 months with little result for 24 hours a day for 365 days straight on Combat Alert. Crew on edge and tempers stretched .

- I-67 crew on edge re the extended patrol ontop of the covert surveillance OP off Indonesia .

- I-67 crew on maximum ' critical ' alert to STOP the HMS AQUITANIA.

- ( in operational terms the HSK Kormoran crew were at a cautious alert +/- 60% comittment level. The I-67 crew would have been at a nervous 101% commitment level.)

- Sea conditions offshore Dirk Hartog Island were rough on 19th November 1941.

- 16 knot winds , 15 foot swell.

All Warships humping and bumping over the difficult sea conditions.

All mariners struggling to stay on their feet 24 hours a day.

Standard conditions for sleep deprivation and physical fatigue would increase.

For the IJN I-67 sub on the heaving ocean swell [ I'm familiar with these waters on site ] the pitch and roll would be easily 10 foot up and down , with a 30 to 40 dergree roll at every wave crest.

The wave frequency in this area is at 20 seconds , 3 to a minute , 180 to an hour, 1060 per day.

Relentless.

There would be bruised elbows , shoulders , knees , knocked heads against the metal structure inside the cramped sub interior.

If a submariner lost his footing he would be flung hard against the inside of the sub.

Conditions on site were rough and physical fatigue and exhaustion would have easily crept in leading to a diminished ' survival mode ' mental response.


- The HMS AQUITANIA was late on 19th November 1941.

- The HMAS SYDNEY II turned up, vectored into the HSK KORMORAN.

- Germans astonished.

- Japanese astonished.

- TOTAL confusion just on the AXIS side.

- HMAS Sydney II hunting for a German Kruiser.

- HMAS Sydney II carrying 400 tons plus bullion.

-HMAS SYDNEY II astonished when the HSK KORMORAN opened fire flying a white flag Registered as a Dutch Neutral.

( HMAS SYDNEY II and HMS AQUITANIA should have been diverted to Darwin.)

- Germans worried their codes were compromised.

- Japanese worried their codes were compromised.

- CHINA STATION SINGAPORE worried their codes were compromised.

- HMAS SYDNEY II not at" Independent Action Stations STATUS".

- TOTAL confusion between Germany , Japan , Australia and the UK.

Conditions became ripe for unauthorized " wildcard " decisions.

It's a very plausible clear cut on-ground " cascading error " situation.

NOBODY knew what was going on.

Detmers opened fire flying a white flag masquerading as a Dutch Neutral.

He knew he had broken the International Maritime Law , and ALWAYS expected to be Court Marshalled.

Nobody ever took him up on it.

When the LS-3 crew reported in on the 21st November 1941 from 110 and 24 ONLY the British knew/ had the full story.

- The German Kruizer was illegal and had a warcrime to account for against the HMAS Sydney II.

- There was a IJN Japanese Submarine present that had sunk the out-of-commission HMAS Sydney II and executed the survivors.

- The bullion load was 346 metres below the ocean.

The UK realised their codes were safe, AND the Germans / Japanese were unaware of their breaches.

The German and Japanese crew were totally oblivious to the secret monster bullion load on the HMAS Sydney II.

If the KORMORAN and the IJN I-67 knew of the massive bullion load , they would have certainly acted differently.

Pearl Harbour was delayed by the cautious Japanese Forces for one week .

The UK needed the US in the war to defeat the AXIS Alliance.

Allegedly the US knew prior of the impending Pearl OP.

Allegedly.

The Brits waited 63 years to snatch the HMAS Sydney II bullion load.

No Limited Liability there.

Deliberate.

------------------------------------------------------------------------

SECTION FIVE : On site Irrational decisions made by two separate warship Captains in confusing difficult conditions.

12.00 Noon. Troopship HMS AQUITANIA late.

4.00 PM visual sighting of HMAS Sydney II by HSK Kormoran.

Kormoran sends QQQQ.

4.10 PM Kormoran sees the warship , expecting the troopship Aquitania.

-Widespread panic on the Kormoran and the I-67.

- Detmers reasons the Troopship has a Cruiser Escosrt.

- Bolts WEST then turns SOUTH WEST due to the heavy ocean conditions.

- IJN I-67 drops under the water and WAITS at the QQQQ spot.

5.30PM . Kormoran heaves to , with a white flag.

5.45 PM Kormoran opens fire.

6.15PM Kormoran out of range and off back to QQQQ.

8.30PM - Kormoran back at QQQQ spot .

Detmers and Ohata have a heated ' blame ' argument.

8.45PM Detmers decides to go up the International Shipping Channel ' looking for the Aquitania '

9.00PM Ohata decides to observe the HMAS Sydney II burning on the horizon.

10.15 PM I-67 arrives to find the SYDNEY on fire , down at the bows and stationary.

[ High Probability SYDNEY ordered to STAY exactly where she was by CHINA STATON to protect the Bullion load . Propellors turning at 4 knots etc to hold her exact in the 15 foot swell against a 16 knot wind. IF CHINA STATION SINGAPORE et al had picked up operational signals to and from the IJN I-67 from this area they WOULD have alerted the SYDNEY.

SYDNEY had the ability at minimum to move closer inshore to boost survival chances AND to put the Bullion Load into shallow water ]

Ohata notes there are no mariners on board from his position , and the SYDNEY appears as an abandoned burning hulk.

The warship is down at the bows , missing her B turrent [ easily 2000 tons of water in the forward structure of the ship].

There would be a high probability the waves are crashing OVER the bow region, and over the A turrent in the 15foot constant swell.

It is 4 hours after the altercation with the HSK Kormoran , with the probability that any survivors would have got off 3 to four hours prior and were hearing towards the shore.

[ In Military Terms the burning hulk would be referred to as a ' Tertiary Target ".]

Here is the critical part.

There are no IJN JN25 coded signals into or out of this area on the 19th , 20th and 21st November 1941.

The sub was ordered silent, and is silent.

Ohata has one eye on the burning Kormoran going up the International Shipping Lane , one eye into the dark void of the night which hides the Troopship Aquitania , and one eye on what looks like an abandoned burning hulk.

He knows the Troopship is out there, his Primary target.

Its not a problem for the KORMORAN to be on fire , because the AQUITANIA will slow down to assist what appears to be an unarmed burning merchant ship.

The burning hulk however is a problem , in as much as it could alert the AQUITANIA to trouble.

Especially if the Australian Cruiser was escorting the Troopship.

10.30 PM Ohata decides on his own recognisance to remove the burning hulk, without Official Clearance.

2 torpedoes at a range of 2 and a half miles fired .

The SYDNEY is cut in two.

THEN , to what could be his horror , 300 mariners jump off what looked like an abandoned hulk , into the water.

He had accidently bought Japan into WW2 on the wrong day , and the wrong target .

He makes a rash ' survival ' decision to remove the evidence.

Vietnam Veterans have a special term for this.

They call it a ' Cluster Fu@k ' when an another error is made to fix the original error.

In Management Terms its refered to as a ' Cascading Error '

10.30PM the Kormoran crew see the explosion on the horizon.

11.00PM Detmers lowers a rubber lifeboat with 40 of his wounded , [ that he has packed himself ] , into the water.

The rubber raft flips and all 40 are thrown into the water before Detmers eyes, and that of his on board crew.

[ Only 3 survivors are found.]

Detmers mind ' snaps '.

- He has accidently sent 37 of his wounded men to their deaths , by his simple mistake.

( Detmers had no one able bodied on the raft to handle it )

12.00PM all off the burning out of control KORMORAN, 31.5 nautical miles off the top of Dirk Hartog Island.

12.30PM the scuttling charges go off , and the 180 mines in the rear cargo section detonate and vapourize the rear end of the Kormoran.

1.00 PM Detmers sends the LS-3 Torpedo boat to find out what happened to the Sydney .

6.00AM the LS-3 crew return with the grim news.

Detmers may have lost his mind at this point.

He assumes, he is the man fully responsible for the entire mission.

10.00AM the I-67 returns to the QQQQ spot , still awaiting for the AQUITANIA.

12 00 NOON Detmers signals the I-67 for a rendezvous.

1.00PM Detmers goes past the bodies of the failed rubber lifeboat launch from the previous night.

2.00PM the LS-3 and the IJN I-67 meet at the QQQQ spot.

A dangerous and furious argument erupts.

Language barriers , and misinterpretation of Command hierarchy could have lead to a complete communication breakdown.

Detmers receives a diesel top up for the LS-3 , and some medical supplies.

3.00PM Detmers fires two unauthorised 45cm torpedoes into the IJN I -67.

4.00PM Detmers starts to collect his war dead from the failed rubber lifeboat deployment.

In 24 hours 811 mariners are dead.

3 warships destroyed.

HMS Aquitania survives.

The LS-3 Torpedo Boat reports in on what really happened on the 21st November 1941 from 110 and 24.

Only the British are listening.


David Angwin.
HMAS Sydney II.
OP RESOLUTION.

[Takao]

He is now quoting himself...

Where does he get such wonderful drugs?

and who is his doctor writing those prescriptions?

[Rob Stuart]

300 plus radio operators available on the vast TOP=SECRET Ceylon Radio SIGINT base.[ only declassified in the 1950"s ]

The sigint station on Ceylon, HMS Anderson, did not exist in November 1941. Work on it began on 14 January 1942, when the Far East Combined Bureau main body arrived at Colombo from Singapore aboard the transport Devonshire.

I know it's futile to offer facts to anyone who can come up with or believe the fantasy which has been posted here, but I'm curious about how our friend may react.

One thing which puzzles me about the conspiratorial theories around the loss of Sydney is why the Germans or Japanese would be so concerned about the threat posed by a mere light cruiser that they would go to such lengths to sink it?

[Takao]

I know it's futile to offer facts to anyone who can come up with or believe the fantasy which has been posted here, but I'm curious about how our friend may react.

Yes, I have been waiting years for him to explain how I-67, which was sunk on maneuvers over a year prior to this, magically reappeared to figure so prominently in this "fiction."

Of course, I have yet to receive an answer.

[david HMAS Sydney]

Hello All.

Hello Rob Stuart.


" One thing which puzzles me about the conspiratorial theories around the loss of Sydney is why the Germans or Japanese would be so concerned about the threat posed by a mere light cruiser that they would go to such lengths to sink it? "

Interesting point.

HMAS Sydney II is still CLASSIFIED=TOP SECRET by the British.

The Royal Australian Navy still has 628 RAN mariners listed as ' missing ' from 1941.

Germany has a warcrime issue against the Royal Australian Navy to deal with at some point , and an apology to Japan if Detmers had attacked the crew of the ' attendant Axis Submarine ' .

My understanding is Germany and Japan are discussing this at present.

David Angwin.
HMAS Sydney II
OP RESOLUTION.

[Tom from Cornwall]

David,

What do you mean by Classified Top Secret in this context? A file that is withheld from public view at an archive?

Tom

[david HMAS Sydney]

Hello Tom.

Correct.

The UK has all the paperwork for the HMAS Sydney II total loss from 19th and 20th November 1941.

HMAS SYDNEY II was ' on loan ' to China Station SINGAPORE for the OP FISH bullion delivery.

Its still CLASSIFIED=TOP SECRET , and may even be CLASSIFIED=MOST SECRET.

Especially for the OP FISH bullion delivery to the HMAS Sydney II on the 17th November 1941.

The 74th Anniversary for the total loss comes around soon.

Still unresolved.

The 400 plus ton bullion load was allegedly recovered in 2004 by TSOL UK.

TSOL had 7 tons Commonwealth bullion on board that belonged to Singapore Commonwealth Funds.

They had full legal rights to recover that bullion at will.

The other 393 tons however, belonged to other Nations.

The contractor for the recovery was allegedly david mearns.

A giant ' GRAB 6000 ' claw was allegedly used.

There would have easily been 200 mariners entombed on the wreck.

6 Royal Navy Officers on board the HMAS Sydney II.


David Angwin.
HMAS Sydney II.
OP RESOLUTION.

[Tom from Cornwall]

David,

Just on the Most Secret and Top Secret issue. These are in fact the same. Most Secret was Brit terminology before and early in WW2, but it was decided to change to "Top" Secret to align with U.S system.

Do you have a file reference that shows you that something is being withheld at UK National Archives as I go regularly and could check current status for you.

Tom