by Takao on 01 Sep 2003 17:17 Gabriel,
I find quarrels to be useful, as they usually lead me in new directions and to new information I did not possess before.
As for finding a hard and fast rule for comparing the displacement of carriers, or for that matter, any type of warship, I don’t think there is one to be found. Nations design their warships to meet different criteria. Japanese carriers were not designed to American or British standards, so why should we look for a “rule” that will fit all three? For that matter, why look for a rule governing one nation’s carriers? For example, taking the Japanese carriers, the Shokaku class was not designed along the same criteria as the Taiho or Unryu classes, so a “rule” for one, will likely not fit the others. Now, to the Americans to illustrate another factor: improvements over time. As a carrier progresses through its lifetime, it is modified to incorporate new technologies and equipment, thus changing its displacement. So, the “rule”, that suited the USS Enterprise in 1938, will not fit the USS Enterprise of 1945. Do you see what I’m driving at, your “golden rule”, so to speak, does not exist. So, even though Sam H’s “rule of thumb” is not perfect, it is the best around. As for me having one that is better, I have not the time, money, need, or motivation to find one a better one than Sam’s. As Tiornu has said, it’s a good starting point.
Now, I will offer my opinions on the quotes in my previous post.
Quote1:
The only aircraft that need to be maintained continuously in the air is a carrier’s Combat Air Patrol (CAP) and possibly Anti-Submarine Patrol(at least during daylight hours). This provides the necessary extended defensive ring to meet and engage any incoming threat/s. Search and Strike aircraft did not need to be constantly airborne. However, maybe you should restate your question as such: The relationship I am waiting for must show how long a carrier could maintain its air group over a given length of time.
Quote 2:
I wasn’t sure what you meant with authonomy, so I guessed it to be autonomy. If so, is it the autonomy of the Japanese commanders or the aircraft pilots? I took it for granted that you were referring to the autonomy of a Japanese pilot. If this is wrong, let me know. Popular literature has fostered the idea that Japanese pilots, of fighters, acted independently, with little thought given to team work. This has been proven to be untrue. If anything, early in the war (1941 through 1942), the American pilots(fighters) had more autonomy than their Japanese foes. American fighters were the ones that tended towards attempting single plane dogfights, while the Japanese fighter pilots fought in formation. This had to do with their difference in skill and training. The Japanese pilots trained often in team fighting. But for their team effort to work, all the pilots of a 3 plane Shotai needed to be highly skilled. As the war progressed and the skilled Japanese pilots were lost and not replaced by pilots of equal skill, this forced the Japanese to adopt different tactics. They switched from a 3 plane formation to a 4 plane formation. The 4 plane formation consisted of two elements, with the skilled pilots leading each element. This solution to the problem of unskilled pilots was not very successful because the skill and training of their American foes had increased dramatically from 1941 to 1943. American tactics were slow to focus on the need for team work in fighter combat. During 1942, American fighter tactics had begun to evolve and focus upon this need for team work. However, it would be 1943 before this evolution was completed.
If you are talking about autonomy of strike aircraft, this is also far from the truth. Air strikes against ships needed to be carefully coordinated to achieve maximum effectiveness. Examples are: dive bombers attacking from many points of the compass (avoids concentration of AA fire), torpedo bombers attacking from port and starboard of a target vessel (reduces target’s chances of “combing” the torpedoes), and level bombers attacking a target in formation (greatly increase the chance of bombs hitting the target). As I have shown independent action is not the key to a successful strike.
Quote 3:
There is no logical relationship between the displacement of a carrier and fuel carried, at least not on the Japanese side. Examples: the Kaga(after 1935 modernization) carried slightly less fuel than the Shinano, 8208 tons vs. 8904 tons. The Soryu, Hiryu, and the Unryu class all carried fuel equal to or greater than the Shokaku class.
Quote 4:
A ship’s engines will consume much more fuel than an aircraft engine, hence the much greater capacity of fuel oil when compared to AvGas. Besides, a ship’s engines were in continuous operation from the time it leaves port, not so for an aircraft’s engine (it only needs to be operational while the a/c is airborne.
Quote 5:
As I stated earlier, refueling operations between ships took place before or after a battle, not during. However, their was always a chance that an attacker could appear suddenly during refueling operations, but the chance was slim, and usually applied only to submarines.
Tiornu,
The paperclip means photos are in the thread.
For conversions you may wish to add Akagi and Kaga to the list. For armor, possibly Taiho(although unlike Shinano and Illustrious she had two hanger decks instead of one). For Operational Role the USS Enterprise can be added, as her air group shrank from 93 to 61 planes while being utilized for night operations by the USN.
Axis History Forum
This is an apolitical forum for discussions on the Axis nations, as well as the First and Second World Wars in general hosted by Marcus Wendel's Axis History Factbook in cooperation with Michael Miller's Axis Biographical Research and Christoph Awender's WW2 day by day.
There was a well defined strategical thought beyond such ratios, I guess.. Don't tell me it is a difficult matter, "experten" are Tiornu, Takao and Sam H.
