Loss of HMS Prince of Wales and Repulse

[David Thompson]

There is an interesting article on this subject at:

The loss of HMS Repulse and Prince of Wales: A participant’s account
http://www.warship.org/no11986.htm

[Kurt_Steiner]

I've found this. I hope this helps

http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/war/wwtwo/ ... s_01.shtml

Best regards

[Sewer King]

There are two things about the destruction of Force Z I had never heard of before:

In his book Midway: The Battle that Doomed Japan, Mitsuo Fuchida -- about whom there is some historical rewrite -- said that Japanese carrier planes later returned to drop memorial wreaths where Prince of Wales went down. The IJN had been modelled on the Royal Navy and looked to it as a sort of big brother, and enough Japanese naval officers had been happy to go to Britain in the years of cooperation.

The other item was that IJN divers tried to go down to the wrecks in search of their radar equipment, for Japan was well behind the other combatants in the field of electronics. This sounds hard to imagine for the condition of what could have been found, even if it could be reached, or for what could have been learned even if it could be salvaged.

[Peter H]

Colin Smith in his Singapore Burning blames Phillips for the whole thing,page 224:

Ultimately the humiliating sinking of the major part Force Z....must be the fault of the admiral:not because he tried,against considerable odds,to seek out the enemy and destroy him.This was all in keeping with Cunningham's '300 years of tradition' and,had he suceeded,a grateful nation would have had good reason to reward the daring of Lord Phillips of Kota Baharu or wherever.What was indefensible was maintaining radio silence off Kuantan long after it had become apparent that the Japanese had found them.Phillip's failure to call for air cover when he knew,from the destroyer Tenedos,that Japanese aircraft were not far away,and the persistent silver speck above them indicated that they too had been located,was simply incomprehensible.Although badly outnumbered,had the Buffaloes arrived some two hours earlier they might have saved the day.Vigors was certain that as few as six fighters 'could have made one hell of a mess of even fifty or sixty slow and unescorted torpedo bombers.'

[glenn239]

Vigors was certain that as few as six fighters 'could have made one hell of a mess of even fifty or sixty slow and unescorted torpedo bombers.'

Paper victories are always the easiest. The Admiralty had no business sending a small TF into harms way without arranging for sufficient air cover. And we’re talking Spitfires here, not crappy old Buffalos.

[cstunts]

Hello,

The Japanese did indeed locate one (or both?) of the British heavy ships sunk off Malaya...I have the name of the IJN vessel somewhere, but not w/me at the moment. If memory serves, this same vessel was able to locate HOUSTON and PERTH with more precision than anyone over the next quarter century. Something, perhaps a 4" gun was recovered from REPULSE, I believe...These ships are not in terribly deep water. But, on the subject Kevin Denlay would be the person to ask for definitive answers.

I think some word of this must have reached American ears--although the means & details were no doubt shadowy and vague--because there was worry in the USN that the Japanese might dive on the Allied cruisers at Sunda Strait. This concern was not about radars, but about the ECMs and classified materials carried by HOUSTON, a flagship, I imagine. As a result a submarine was vectored to the Sunda Strait area to possibly interdict any such Japanese recovery mission...Also, our former USN attache in Tokyo, Henri Smith-Hutton, during his repatriation trip on the GRIPSHOLM (?) in summer, 1942, noted that he was on the lookout for any Japanese diving activities in Sunda Strait for much the same reason...

[Juha Tompuri]

And we’re talking Spitfires here, not crappy old Buffalos.

Not that onld and:

Brewster was blamed for a disaster that might better have been attributed to faulty tactics, inexperienced pilots, and poor command decisions

http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic. ... t#p1547250

Regards, Juha

[Takao]

The Admiralty had no business sending a small TF into harms way without arranging for sufficient air cover. And we’re talking Spitfires here, not crappy old Buffalos.

So, what the whole RN is supposed to pack it in until they can be provided with Spitfires for protection?
Yeah, right! Like that's going to happen.
What's next, blaming the Admiralty because they put Admiral Phillips in charge?

Besides, even if the fighters had been Spitfires instead of Brewsters, they would still be sitting on the ground waiting for "Tom Thumb" to make his call requesting their presence. Which he never did! It was Capt. Tennant that requested air cover. Phillips, IIRC, only ever requested tugs and destroyers.

[Takao]

cstunts,

We briefly touched on Japanese salvage operations of the POW & Repulse back in 2009.
http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic. ... 5&t=152950

[Tim Smith]

Colin Smith in his Singapore Burning blames Phillips for the whole thing,page 224:

Ultimately the humiliating sinking of the major part Force Z....must be the fault of the admiral:not because he tried,against considerable odds,to seek out the enemy and destroy him.This was all in keeping with Cunningham's '300 years of tradition' and,had he suceeded,a grateful nation would have had good reason to reward the daring of Lord Phillips of Kota Baharu or wherever.What was indefensible was maintaining radio silence off Kuantan long after it had become apparent that the Japanese had found them.Phillip's failure to call for air cover when he knew,from the destroyer Tenedos,that Japanese aircraft were not far away,and the persistent silver speck above them indicated that they too had been located,was simply incomprehensible.Although badly outnumbered,had the Buffaloes arrived some two hours earlier they might have saved the day.Vigors was certain that as few as six fighters 'could have made one hell of a mess of even fifty or sixty slow and unescorted torpedo bombers.'

Six Allied fighters (Buffalos, Hurricanes, Spitfires, P-400's, doesn't matter what they are) cannot carry enough ammunition to shoot down sixty twin-engined bombers, not even ones without self-sealing fuel tanks. They might manage to shoot down eighteen, at the very most, if they're really, really well flown by ace pilots, but after that they'd be out of ammo and have to RTB. Most likely they'd only manage about a dozen bombers shot down. And with inexperienced pilots who open fire at very long ranges and hold the fire button down in very long bursts, spraying bullets all over the sky in the general direction of the enemy, it might only be half a dozen bombers.

To put it bluntly - six Allied fighters is not enough to stop the attack on POW and Repulse. Disrupt it, yes, stop it, no. The Japanese bomber pilots, unlike Italian ones over Malta, would not run away at the first sight of a British fighter.

[aghart]

Had Phillips informed Singapore that he was heading for Kuantan then you can forget about 50 or 60 bombers, a standing patrol of Buffalo fighters would only have to find then chase off/shoot down the single Japanese aircraft that found force Z and history is changed. No sighting report, no convergence of strike aircraft, no attack on Force Z and POW and Repulse reach Singapore to fight another day.

It is a proven historical fact that no other Japanese aircraft was tasked with searching the area off Kuantan, shoot down this one aircraft and it's job done!!

[Fatboy Coxy]

I'm not sure about the arguement Aghart puts up but we are judging Phillips with hindsight. We all know now how potent air power is now, but 1941 was the year Air Power came of age in Sea Warfare IMO. The British had demonstrated some of its potentials in 1940, with Torpedoing the Bismarck, the night attack on Taranto, and providing air support off Norway. But these were with limited resources, often using older aircraft. What could, and was done with modern aircraft flown by well trained pilots only really happened in 1941.

By mid 1941 the Royal Navy by experience, and others by noting, were aware how well land based aircraft could dictate terms. Most of this success had come from the short ranged dive bomber, Norway, Dunkirk, Crete etc. Torpedo attack from twin/three engined aircraft, ie JU 88 or SM 79 had been in limited numbers, and against much lighter armed ships, who were often handicapped with escort duties, or caught in confined waters.

Two capital ships, operating in open waters, with a destroyer screen, would be a much different proposition, being free to manouver, and able to put up a curtain of AA. I'm not saying there was no risk, but I don't think Phillips was aware the Japanese could field 30 plus torpedo bombers able to execute a perfect anvil attack. The more I think about what he knew, the more I feel his caluculated risk was, in general, worth taking.

Steve

[aghart]

I agree his calculated risk was worth taking, even to the extent that he kept radio silence when he aborted the mission north and diverted to Kuantan. Where he failed and this is not hindsight, just common sense, was the failure to inform Singapore of his position when he had been spotted by the Japanese recce plane off Kuantan and radio silence was no longer vital. Despite his confidence in his commands ability to defend itself against air attack, his failure to keep Singapore informed was arrogance in the extreme.

[LWD]

... Six Allied fighters (Buffalos, Hurricanes, Spitfires, P-400's, doesn't matter what they are) cannot carry enough ammunition to shoot down sixty twin-engined bombers, not even ones without self-sealing fuel tanks. They might manage to shoot down eighteen, at the very most, if they're really, really well flown by ace pilots, but after that they'd be out of ammo and have to RTB. Most likely they'd only manage about a dozen bombers shot down. And with inexperienced pilots who open fire at very long ranges and hold the fire button down in very long bursts, spraying bullets all over the sky in the general direction of the enemy, it might only be half a dozen bombers.

To put it bluntly - six Allied fighters is not enough to stop the attack on POW and Repulse. Disrupt it, yes, stop it, no. The Japanese bomber pilots, unlike Italian ones over Malta, would not run away at the first sight of a British fighter.

But all they have to do is disrupt it. Especially if they can disrupt one piece of the hammer and anvil attack. Given the fragility of Japanese bombers and the lack of escort I suspect 12 losses would be on the low side especially given how far they have to fly to find a friendly field.

[Fatboy Coxy]

To put it bluntly - six Allied fighters is not enough to stop the attack on POW and Repulse. Disrupt it, yes, stop it, no. The Japanese bomber pilots, unlike Italian ones over Malta, would not run away at the first sight of a British fighter.

Is it not reasonable for Admiral Phillips to think the Japanese torpedo planes would be put off by the heavy curtain of AA fire, and fail to deliver a textbook attack. But this also makes me asks how effective was the destroyer screen, was it deployed properly, or was the manoveuring of the POW and Repulse such that the destroyers couldn't hope to screen them.

Steve