World War 2 at a Grand Strategic Level: Correcting Mistakes

[Galahad]

--I have to disagree with Dark Age's thesis that ignoring Moscow in favor of the drive into the Ukraine in 1941 was the correct strategy for Hitler. It wasn't.

--There was exactly one grand strategic objective in the western USSR that was achievable by the Germans in 1941, given that the Soviets didn't simply collapse. That was Moscow.

--Moscow was, I believe, the largest industrial complex in the USSR. It was the seat of the government and the political center of the nation. It was THE major rail hub for the USSR. And it was the nation's largest city. Combined, those made it the only target the Germans were capable of taking, which would also have both immediate and long-term negative strategic ramifications for the USSR. Nothing else came close to matching it.

--Except, of course, for actually destroying the Red Army, which was beyond the Wehrmacht's capability in 1941. There was too much Russia and too many Russians and too few German motorized units for that to have happened.

--Taking Moscow would have, first, eliminated the Soviet ability to move troops from north to south conveniently, by cutting the westernmost major north/south rail lines still in Soviet hands. The next north/south rail line was several hundred miles east of Moscow, plus the major east/west railroad hubbed at Moscow. Shifting troops, as the Soviets later did for their Stalingrad counter-offensive would have been much more difficult due to the lower capacity of the remaining north/south line.

--Take Moscow and you cut off rail (and road) communications to Archangelsk, Murmansk and Leningrad, all of which will then fall sooner or later, due to lack of support and supplies. That would eliminate outside help from Lend-Lease convoys, and would simplify the German operational situation by giving the Germans control of the area north and west of Moscow. There would be no siege of Leningrad for years in this scenario. It would have shortened the German line eventually and so freed up troops for use elsewhere.

--Loss of Moscow would have been a blow to the Soviet people's morale, given that so much of Soviet life centered on Moscow. It could have had political ramifications, as well. Losing it might have caused a coup against Stalin. Who knows?

--Given that Army Group South was closely engaging the Soviet forces south of the Moscow to Minsk highway, and that most of them were not motorized, it would have taken time before they could have mounted any kind of a creditable attack north against the German LOC to Moscow. The Germans, with control of the air, would have had warning of any serious attack and so have the time to shift their own forces. So I discount the threat from the Ukraine.

--Lastly, when Smolensk was taken in July of 1941, that put the Germans a little over 200 miles from Moscow, with two panzergruppen concentrated in the area and nearly 3 months of good campaigning weather remaining. It was within reach, and its loss would have hurt the Soviets worse than any other target the Germans were capable of going for. The two months lost sending the panzers south, plus the wear and tear on them, cost Germany the chance to take Moscow and simplify its strategic position.

--Strategically, it was the only target that the Germans could reach that could give them a winning position in the war.

[paspartoo]

I have to disagree with the judgement of Qvist about Hitler (as a military commander):although he made faults,the facts are
1)that most of his decisions were defensible and had a logical explanation
2)that none of his decisions prevented a German victory
3)that none of his decisions caused the German defeat
4)that for almost all his decisions,there was no alternative,meaning:a better solution .

I second that.

[Qvist]

I have to disagree with the judgement of Qvist about Hitler (as a military commander):although he made faults,the facts are
1)that most of his decisions were defensible and had a logical explanation
2)that none of his decisions prevented a German victory
3)that none of his decisions caused the German defeat
4)that for almost all his decisions,there was no alternative,meaning:a better solution .

Those are not "facts", those are opinions. I have no idea where you manage to find all these decisions that were "defensible" or had "a logical explanation", to say nothing of those where there was no alternative (if so, they would not in fact be decisions at all), because I haven't for my part come across them. Hitler's command in the East was as far as I can tell obviously incompetent, devoid of realism and had in important aspects a direct and major negative effect on the campaign. If you can find some touch of adequacy in his handling of other theatres, you must either have read something different from me, or you are easily impressed.

[ljadw]

Some exemples
1)The decision to undertake Barbarossa :this has been criticised,but,I haven't seen someone giving an alternative (which is an other solution with better chances to succeed)
2)The strategy,Hitler AND his generals were agreeing on for Barbarossa(defeating the Red Army as quickly as possible on the border):there was no substitute:it was the only strategy with a chance to succeed
3)Typhoon :there are no indications that Typhoon was possible in september
4)Hitler's stand order in december (later,he consented to retreats):there are no indications that a general retreat in the beginning of december would have produced better results
5)Fall Blau :there was no alternative
6)NA:Rommel advancing to Alamein :this was defensible,because,it was better for the Germans to fight at Alamein,than to fight at Tripolis,or Tunis .
7)I don't see that there was an other strategy possible for Normandy.
8)After Citadelle,the Germans had 2 possibilities :a voluntary general retreat,or,defending the existing frontline as long as possible and to retreat if needed:I don't see that a general voluntary retreat (till where ?) would have produced better results .Those who are arguing that a general retreat was better,have to prove that the Germans could stop the Soviets on a more western frontline.And,the facts are,that the Germans were not able to do this :the German frontline was situated more in the west in june 1944,but,this did not stop the Soviets.

[ljadw]

--I have to disagree with Dark Age's thesis that ignoring Moscow in favor of the drive into the Ukraine in 1941 was the correct strategy for Hitler. It wasn't.

--There was exactly one grand strategic objective in the western USSR that was achievable by the Germans in 1941, given that the Soviets didn't simply collapse. That was Moscow.

--Moscow was, I believe, the largest industrial complex in the USSR. It was the seat of the government and the political center of the nation. It was THE major rail hub for the USSR. And it was the nation's largest city. Combined, those made it the only target the Germans were capable of taking, which would also have both immediate and long-term negative strategic ramifications for the USSR. Nothing else came close to matching it.

--Except, of course, for actually destroying the Red Army, which was beyond the Wehrmacht's capability in 1941. There was too much Russia and too many Russians and too few German motorized units for that to have happened.

--Taking Moscow would have, first, eliminated the Soviet ability to move troops from north to south conveniently, by cutting the westernmost major north/south rail lines still in Soviet hands. The next north/south rail line was several hundred miles east of Moscow, plus the major east/west railroad hubbed at Moscow. Shifting troops, as the Soviets later did for their Stalingrad counter-offensive would have been much more difficult due to the lower capacity of the remaining north/south line.

--Take Moscow and you cut off rail (and road) communications to Archangelsk, Murmansk and Leningrad, all of which will then fall sooner or later, due to lack of support and supplies. That would eliminate outside help from Lend-Lease convoys, and would simplify the German operational situation by giving the Germans control of the area north and west of Moscow. There would be no siege of Leningrad for years in this scenario. It would have shortened the German line eventually and so freed up troops for use elsewhere.

--Loss of Moscow would have been a blow to the Soviet people's morale, given that so much of Soviet life centered on Moscow. It could have had political ramifications, as well. Losing it might have caused a coup against Stalin. Who knows?

--Given that Army Group South was closely engaging the Soviet forces south of the Moscow to Minsk highway, and that most of them were not motorized, it would have taken time before they could have mounted any kind of a creditable attack north against the German LOC to Moscow. The Germans, with control of the air, would have had warning of any serious attack and so have the time to shift their own forces. So I discount the threat from the Ukraine.

--Lastly, when Smolensk was taken in July of 1941, that put the Germans a little over 200 miles from Moscow, with two panzergruppen concentrated in the area and nearly 3 months of good campaigning weather remaining. It was within reach, and its loss would have hurt the Soviets worse than any other target the Germans were capable of going for. The two months lost sending the panzers south, plus the wear and tear on them, cost Germany the chance to take Moscow and simplify its strategic position.

--Strategically, it was the only target that the Germans could reach that could give them a winning position in the war.

The last sentence is questionable,but,this is not the decisive point :what's determining is the question if Typhoon was possible on 1 september,and,there is nothing that's indicating this,all indications are going for the opposite.
BTW:about Smolensk :the fall of Smolensk on 16 july does not mean that the battle of Smolensk was over.

[Qvist]

1)The decision to undertake Barbarossa :this has been criticised,but,I haven't seen someone giving an alternative (which is an other solution with better chances to succeed)

It was also however a decision that was generally supported by most. And which was the direct cause of Germany losing the war.

2)The strategy,Hitler AND his generals were agreeing on for Barbarossa(defeating the Red Army as quickly as possible on the border):there was no substitute:it was the only strategy with a chance to succeed

Well, that was the concept used by OKH planners from the beginning and as you say the only real option, so I don't see how that says anything much about Hitler's decision making.

3)Typhoon :there are no indications that Typhoon was possible in september

So?

4)Hitler's stand order in december (later,he consented to retreats):there are no indications that a general retreat in the beginning of december would have produced better results

Of course it would have produced better results, but thta is only clear with hindsight. The stand fast order I addressed in a previous point, and was in my opinion not a well-founded decision. Certainly there is no proof that it had the dramatic effects that has traditionally been attributed to it.

5)Fall Blau :there was no alternative

Oh come on, do try to be serious. Firstly, what do you mean "Fall Blau"? The concept? The actual plan? The execution? The level of resources devoted top it? And secondly, of course there were alternatives!

6)NA:Rommel advancing to Alamein :this was defensible,because,it was better for the Germans to fight at Alamein,than to fight at Tripolis,or Tunis .

7)I don't see that there was an other strategy possible for Normandy.

8)After Citadelle,the Germans had 2 possibilities :a voluntary general retreat,or,defending the existing frontline as long as possible and to retreat if needed:I don't see that a general voluntary retreat (till where ?) would have produced better results .Those who are arguing that a general retreat was better,have to prove that the Germans could stop the Soviets on a more western frontline.And,the facts are,that the Germans were not able to do this :the German frontline was situated more in the west in june 1944,but,this did not stop the Soviets.

This is not on a level that it is even possible to comment on, sorry.

[ljadw]

1)The decision to undertake Barbarossa :this has been criticised,but,I haven't seen someone giving an alternative (which is an other solution with better chances to succeed)

It was also however a decision that was generally supported by most. And which was the direct cause of Germany losing the war.

2)The strategy,Hitler AND his generals were agreeing on for Barbarossa(defeating the Red Army as quickly as possible on the border):there was no substitute:it was the only strategy with a chance to succeed

Well, that was the concept used by OKH planners from the beginning and as you say the only real option, so I don't see how that says anything much about Hitler's decision making.

3)Typhoon :there are no indications that Typhoon was possible in september

So?

4)Hitler's stand order in december (later,he consented to retreats):there are no indications that a general retreat in the beginning of december would have produced better results

Of course it would have produced better results, but thta is only clear with hindsight. The stand fast order I addressed in a previous point, and was in my opinion not a well-founded decision. Certainly there is no proof that it had the dramatic effects that has traditionally been attributed to it.

5)Fall Blau :there was no alternative

Oh come on, do try to be serious. Firstly, what do you mean "Fall Blau"? The concept? The actual plan? The execution? The level of resources devoted top it? And secondly, of course there were alternatives!

6)NA:Rommel advancing to Alamein :this was defensible,because,it was better for the Germans to fight at Alamein,than to fight at Tripolis,or Tunis .

7)I don't see that there was an other strategy possible for Normandy.

8)After Citadelle,the Germans had 2 possibilities :a voluntary general retreat,or,defending the existing frontline as long as possible and to retreat if needed:I don't see that a general voluntary retreat (till where ?) would have produced better results .Those who are arguing that a general retreat was better,have to prove that the Germans could stop the Soviets on a more western frontline.And,the facts are,that the Germans were not able to do this :the German frontline was situated more in the west in june 1944,but,this did not stop the Soviets.

This is not on a level that it is even possible to comment on, sorry.

1)That the failure of Barbarossa was the direct cause of the German defeat in WWII,is questionable,but,whatever:this is not proving that Barbarossa was a bad decision :it is only proving (with hindsight)that on 21 june 1941,Germany's chances to win were insignifiant
2)The strategy of Barbarossa :is an exemple of a defensible decision from Hitler
3)Typhoon :the decision to delay Typhoon till october was defensible
4)The stand order :while it is clear that it did not save the Ostheer (because the Ostheer was not in big danger),there are no proofs that a general retreat of AGC (till ?Smolensk? Minsk?)would have produced better results ,meaning :less German,and more Soviet losses?Afaics,the discussion about this subject on the Dupuy Institute ended without a general agreement .
5)Fall Blau :the concept (=taking the initiative,trying to hurt the SU where it was vulnerable) is not only defensible,but,there was NO alternative for it .Alternative being a solution with better chances to succeed and,if there was a success,better results .
Of course,a substitute for Fall Blau could be a local encirclment somewhere on the east front,but,what would be the benefit for the Germans?
That there were faults in the execution of Fall Blau(by Hitler and by his generals):yes,but,as these faults did not cause the failure of Fall Blau (this never has been proved),these faults are irrelevant .
About NA: if Hitler had ordered Rommel to stop after Tobruk and ordered to execute Hercules,this would not have prevented what happened in may 1943:the German capitulation at Tunis.While the postponing of Hercules and the advance of the AK to Egypt created the (I know:very small) chance for the Germans to finish the war in NA.
For the rest:I am waiting on exemples of desastrous decisions from Hitler,saying :this is not a level it is possible to comment on,is only a way to avoid the discussion .

[Qvist]

Sorry, but I'm not going to spend half an hour writing a treatise on bad Hitler decisions in order to illustrate the obvious. If anyone wishes to think he had a benign influence on the Eastern front or generally made sound, reasonable decisions, have a happy journey. I'll take the discussion when someone raises a point worth discussing.

[Mr.No one]

The point here is that Hitler didn't prevent a German victory over the USSR during the "Great Patriotic War",as the books by Erich Von Manstein,Friedrich Von Mellenthin or Heinz Wilhelm Guderian written after the war indicate and blame...

Like that "if just the German generals had been in command Germany would have won the war over the USSR".

I agree with you Qvist that Hitler did have a bad influence in things like intervening and micro-management sometimes(especially in the later years),but on the other hand i.e. he didn't result in the failure of Operation Zitadelle as is often said.



Best regards,Séan

[Qvist]

The point here is that Hitler didn't prevent a German victory over the USSR during the "Great Patriotic War",as the books by Erich Von Manstein,Friedrich Von Mellenthin or Heinz Wilhelm Guderian written after the war indicate and blame...

Like that "if just the German generals had been in command Germany would have won the war over the USSR".

I agree with you Qvist that Hitler did have a bad influence in things like intervening and micro-management sometimes(especially in the later years),but on the other hand i.e. he didn't result in the failure of Operation Zitadelle as is often said.



Best regards,Séan

There is no disagreement on that point.

[Mr.No one]

There is no disagreement on that point.

That's good course I'm new to this forum,so I'm glad I ain't screwing the whole thing up

[Qvist]

There is no disagreement on that point.

That's good course I'm new to this forum,so I'm glad I ain't screwing the whole thing up

Hehe, not to worry, doing fine so far.

[Kingfish]

For the rest:I am waiting on exemples of desastrous decisions from Hitler,saying :this is not a level it is possible to comment on,is only a way to avoid the discussion .

One would think the decision to retain complete control over half the available panzer divisions in the West, rather than releasing them to the theater commanders, would serve as a good example.

[pugsville]

Hitler

- Invading Poland in 1939 starting a war that Germany could Never win. Hitler was solely responsible for this German action , he totally miscalculated the French , British Response.

The Invasion of France in 1939. Hitler ordered it more than once, but His Generals refused, it was the Old sweep through Belgium strategy then, most likely it would had led to rapid complete defeat of Germany. Without the sickle cut plan, the French campaign in 1940 did not favour Germany.

Keeping Göring and the rest of the Idiotic Nazi Hacks. Really Hitlers loyalty to old party comrades and selection of them to positions regardless of the incompetence shown. Hitler's man management skills were crap.

[ljadw]

For the rest:I am waiting on exemples of desastrous decisions from Hitler,saying :this is not a level it is possible to comment on,is only a way to avoid the discussion .

One would think the decision to retain complete control over half the available panzer divisions in the West, rather than releasing them to the theater commanders, would serve as a good example.

Ahnthe Panzers on DDay myth
If I am not wrong,there were 3 (=THREE) PzD operational and capable to join the fighting on 6 june .The remainder were not operational/to far away .