Questions on artillery methods and doctrine

[Simon K]

Thanks Mike

Actually mate they are rapidly being answered. Just wondered if any primitive calculators or aids like that were used? If it was all done on paper..while being shelled..my admiration grows by the min.

Simon

[JonS]

I find it interesting that no one has mentioned Col. Georg Bruchmuller.
http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/top ... ruchmuller

Well, this thread is about WWI, rather than WWII, but yes. Actually, Juha instigated a boisterous and amusing exchange of PMs in which Bruchmuller did come up. This is what I had to say about him (Bruchmuller, not Juha):

"... a lot of people [have] read Gudmundson and one or two other things about Bruchmuller, think they know everything there is to know about artillery in WWI, and loudly declare Bruchmuller the be-all and end-all of WWI artillery. He - Bruchmuller - was probably the best gunner Germany came up with during the war, but even at his peak his methods were basic compared to those of the other Western Front players."

Did the Finnish Army of World War II conduct "hip shoots"?

The British called that a "Crash Action". Spike Milligan tells an amusing tale about learning the technique in "Adolf Hitler : My Part In His Downfall". In training they got the time down from receipt of fire order to first adjusting round fired to 25 seconds.

[Simon K]

Ah ha..so thats what a crash action is.

Gnr Milligan was training at Larkhill, Salisbury Plain IIRC

[Harri]

Couple of comments that I want to make from reading the thread:
The reason why the US Army updated its doctrine three (?) times during the war may be because that the damn organization is too large to do it by word of mouth!! How many FA battalions were there in the US Army during World War II? 500-600 battalion? I don't know. The Finns could probably go around and brief everyone on the changes in their doctrine, how many battalions were there? How far away from their FA school were they? Lets see Fort Sill to the Philippines is quite a ways, then to the mainland of Asia, and then to Europe! Think huge distances!! Writing is easier to get it done.

That is a good point.

500 - 600 does not sound very good to me because there were divisonal artillery, corps and army artillery.

At the beginning of the Winter War late in 1939 Finnish Army had 33 artillery battalions, in June 1941 77 (of which 20 heavy) and in June 1944 86 (of which 37 heavy and three super heavy). Additionally between 1941 - 1944 there were also fortress artillery battalions (about 10, some were later converted to field artillery). Coastal artillery didn't have battalion sized coastal artillery units but mostly batteries. In 1941 a few so called Field Battalions were fromed from separate field batteries.

It is true that all higher officers and commanders knew eathothers and all training was very identical for all of them. During the Continuation War a special Artillery Shooting School was established in East Karelia at Suvi-Kumsa for improving firing techniques and training level of higher artillery officers. About 220 officers working in front units were graduated from 7 courses between April 1943 - June 1944. These courses lasted about one and a half months. School had its own training battalion and all activity could be practiced in real conditions.

Okay maps! So what was Finland's answer to no maps? Yep! We had a procedure to fire FA with no maps! Did that ever happen to the Finns? If it did then you guys were incompetent! But in a fast paced offensive action were units are advancing on a large scale, 20-30-40 miles a day for week at a time, you run off your maps. I think it was called "unobserved firing charts", I have my old FM 6-40 in the basement and if this becomes an issue I will look up the procedure.

Of course there were methods for all possible situations (also captured Soviet maps were used) but as far as I know the fast artillery maps were the primary ones used. Finnish Blenheim IV bombers photographed large areas (at least the detected and known defense lines as well as road and railway lines) very quicly. The maps were usually ready for the planned direction of the attack. Of course we had good maps on the former Finnish areas.

Now, a general observation and don't you guys in Finland take this the wrong way. But, you know, I think you guys suffer from some sort of sickness, I don't what it is, but you guys have something, it may be "Hubris"

Absolutely not. Perhaps the reason is that almost all Finns in this forum are reservists and proud of the achievements of our fathers and grandfathers during the WW II and this may lead to "too confident" comments (I have seen that same on the other side too, additionally there is a "professionals" vs. "conscripts" effect). We do have a rather good general view on the armies and their capabilities.

Every army does things slightly differently, some better, some worse, but hey if it works for them, who cares?!!

I agree. To me the results achieved are more important than the doctrines or the quality of equipment.

On day I was reading a thread about the Brewster Buffalo, a piece of shit aircraft that we forced guys to fly against the Japanese because that is what we had. Then a Finn comes up and low and behold I find out that the Brewster Buffalo is the greatest aircraft in the world, better than F-15, F-16, F-22, as long as a Finn is flying it and the Finnish modifications were done prior to combat. Yep, the Americans were too stupid to fly it or figure out these modifications, oh well, Yankee ingenuity down the drain!

I think you have not fully understood what was meant. Finns had learned their lessons during the WInter War and been eyes open in Europe in the 1930's. How much "Yankees" learned from the Finnish lessons?

I am keeping a copy of this response since I am afraid that the moderator will delete it as being offensive. There is nothing in this response that is offensive

To me there is nothing offensive but it is partly off-topic (sometimes that is although difficult to avoid). I think only messages containing personal insults or totally off-topic matters have been deleted. Opinions are allowed of course.

[Simon K]

Time for my drink

[Juha Tompuri]

By means of a singnal-communication net specially organized for this purpose, every forward observer was able to deliver fire with all batteries of the regiment. In the defence it was even possible to deliver fire with all medium and heavy mortars. The forward observers of the mortars in turn were able to do the same.

Seems that it was really secret to the germans that actually the FO was able to deliver fire of all the guns and mortars able to fire at the area.

Regards, Juha

[Seppo Koivisto]

Just wondered if any primitive calculators or aids like that were used? If it was all done on paper..while being shelled..my admiration grows by the min.

In the Finnish system all calculation was done in a cozy tent at the battery, with the help of graphical calculators, like the correction converter (korjausmuunnin) posted on the first page.

I think Finnish army did not practice "hip shots" or adjusting rounds, because every time you shoot, you reveal your positions and loose the advantage of surprise.

As for the no map situation. If you know your relative position to your pieces you are all right, if you don´t you are in throuble procedure or not.

[Delta Tank]

JonS,

JonS wrote: The British called that a "Crash Action". Spike Milligan tells an amusing tale about learning the technique in "Adolf Hitler : My Part In His Downfall". In training they got the time down from receipt of fire order to first adjusting round fired to 25 seconds.

We never came close to that time, but we also had to go to the next firing point in order to shoot (peace time restraint), so if we had the freedom to fire from anywhere, for example the road, maybe we could get the first round out that fast. But, I will tell you it would just be a shot fired from a gun that is laid for direction by compass, by the gun chief, and the FDC would just tell them the charge and elevation and let it go! Maybe, just maybe you could get it down to that time, but I don't know that is pretty quick. Obviously this was done with a self propelled gun, it would be impossible with a towed gun to do it that fast. Yes, I have done it with both types of howitzers.

Now on light mortars 60mm I saw a technique where the mortars fired a round almost instantaneously with contact to the front. But, they had some special advantages. 1. The range was short. 2. Their goal was to get a round out in front of their leading element, far enough not to hit any friendlies and close enough (jungle) to be seen and adjusted. 3. They knew what range and direction they were going to fire because they were moving in the company formation.

Mike

[Simon K]

How were OPs manned? Were procedures FC/OP doctrines different in the US and Commonwealth armies? Thats where the shoot calculations seem to have been done in the British army (Milligan actually has some brilliant recollections of "dodgy" i.e.bloody dangerous - OPs.)

Seppo did the Finns suffer badly from counter battery fire? Seems like both sides can be artillery offensive and artillery defensive. Though that sounds very WW1 "dominating the enemies guns" doctrine.

[John T]

VT fuzes are great, but hey, didn't we have regular old timed fuzes? We had a crude version in the Civil War and when I was in the indirect fire business 1974-1979, we had mechanical time super quick fuzes, they work too!! Three burst in the air and three hit the dirt, successful mission!!! Now VT fuzes all would burst in the air (or pretty close to all), so yes they are more effective, but timed fuzes work too!

Was it correct that Finnish artillery did not use timed fuzes during the Winter War?
and in such case how did finns do in deep snow ?
Cheers
/John T.

[RichTO90]

That is a good point.

500 - 600 does not sound very good to me because there were divisonal artillery, corps and army artillery.

Why is that a "good point"? It is a simple statement of fact, neither a "good" or "bad" point. Your response is a tautology - what else are they if they aren't divisional, corps, or army artillery? Why is having 500-600 battalions "bad" and 33-86 battalions "good"?

At the beginning of the Winter War late in 1939 Finnish Army had 33 artillery battalions, in June 1941 77 (of which 20 heavy) and in June 1944 86 (of which 37 heavy and three super heavy). Additionally between 1941 - 1944 there were also fortress artillery battalions (about 10, some were later converted to field artillery). Coastal artillery didn't have battalion sized coastal artillery units but mostly batteries. In 1941 a few so called Field Battalions were fromed from separate field batteries.

So when the Finnish Army completed mobilization and re-equipment in the fifteen-month period March 1940-June 1941 following the Winter War it more than doubled (an increase of 233%) and then increased another 11.6% in the next 36 months. That is different just how from the US Army Field Artillery expanding from 263 battalions on 31 December 1941 to 414 battalions on 31 December 1942, 568 on 31 December 1943, 649 on 30 June 1944, and 657 on 30 April 1945? More than doubled in 24 months (216 percent). It is a difference in scale that would be expected, given the much larger US population and Army.

It is true that all higher officers and commanders knew eathothers and all training was very identical for all of them. During the Continuation War a special Artillery Shooting School was established in East Karelia at Suvi-Kumsa for improving firing techniques and training level of higher artillery officers. About 220 officers working in front units were graduated from 7 courses between April 1943 - June 1944. These courses lasted about one and a half months. School had its own training battalion and all activity could be practiced in real conditions.

And you think they didn't in the US Army? Or that the training wasn't "very identical"? Or that they didn't have an "Artillery Shooting School"? OOOOO! Seven one and a half month artillery course that graduated 220 officers. BTW, the US Field Artillery Advanced Course during the war was 12 weeks and postwar it was 37 weeks.

Of course there were methods for all possible situations (also captured Soviet maps were used) but as far as I know the fast artillery maps were the primary ones used. Finnish Blenheim IV bombers photographed large areas (at least the detected and known defense lines as well as road and railway lines) very quicly. The maps were usually ready for the planned direction of the attack. Of course we had good maps on the former Finnish areas.

You still don't get it, do you? FM 6-49 Field Artillery Manual Firing:

111. MAPS AND GRIDS (AR 100-15 and TM 2180-5).--If an accurate map or map substitute of suitable scale is available, it is used for the firing chart. If suitable maps are lacking, as will usually be the case, composites, mosaics, or provisional fire-control data sheets may be used to build up firing charts. Single vertical air photographs may be used
alone or in conjunction with maps or charts.

Other documents treat the matters in more detail. The standard method of developing firing solutions in the absence of map data was aerial photography. And it was something that developed in 1915, that is what all those artillery observation aircraft were flying around with cameras for... :roll:

Perhaps the reason is that almost all Finns in this forum are reservists and proud of the achievements of our fathers and grandfathers during the WW II and this may lead to "too confident" comments

As has been noted, that is a very good definition of hubris... :roll:

I agree. To me the results achieved are more important than the doctrines or the quality of equipment.

No kidding? So now you are going to give evidence of how the US Field Artillery did not acheive results? :roll:

[Harri]

... it may be "Hubris"

Absolutely not. Perhaps the reason is that almost all Finns in this forum are reservists and proud of the achievements of our fathers and grandfathers during the WW II and this may lead to "too confident" comments ...

You do realise, Harri, that what you wrote in reply is pretty much the definition of hubris?

Well, you really seem to have a big need to slander people. What would you call that?

I just wonder why you didn't quote the rest of my comment? I think you should finally stop posting these totally off-topic comments because they eventually tell more on yourself...

[Juha Tompuri]

Was it correct that Finnish artillery did not use timed fuzes during the Winter War?
and in such case how did finns do in deep snow ?

AFAIK neither side used time fuses (at least at large scale) during the War, of course exept at shrapnel rounds.
Deep snow was a problem for both sides and dud % was quite high. Sensitive fuzes were used to overcome the problem.
Some info about the issue:
http://www.winterwar.com/forces/FinArmy/FINartiller.htm

Regards, Juha

[Harri]

That is a good point.

Why is that a "good point"? It is a simple statement of fact, neither a "good" or "bad" point.

Read the whole text before commenting. There was also this:

The reason why the US Army updated its doctrine three (?) times during the war may be because that the damn organization is too large to do it by word of mouth!!

500 - 600 does not sound very good to me because there were divisional artillery, corps and army artillery.

Your response is a tautology - what else are they if they aren't divisional, corps, or army artillery? Why is having 500-600 battalions "bad" and 33-86 battalions "good"?

This 500 - 600 figure looked rather low to me, but perhaps I'm wrong. I just compared the numbers. I didn't say anything either for good or bad anywhere. That was your own interpretation.

At the beginning of the Winter War late in 1939 Finnish Army had 33 artillery battalions, in June 1941 77 (of which 20 heavy) and in June 1944 86 (of which 37 heavy and three super heavy). Additionally between 1941 - 1944 there were also fortress artillery battalions (about 10, some were later converted to field artillery). Coastal artillery didn't have battalion sized coastal artillery units but mostly batteries. In 1941 a few so called Field Battalions were fromed from separate field batteries.

So when the Finnish Army completed mobilization and re-equipment in the fifteen-month period March 1940-June 1941 following the Winter War it more than doubled (an increase of 233%) and then increased another 11.6% in the next 36 months. That is different just how from the US Army Field Artillery expanding from 263 battalions on 31 December 1941 to 414 battalions on 31 December 1942, 568 on 31 December 1943, 649 on 30 June 1944, and 657 on 30 April 1945? More than doubled in 24 months (216 percent). It is a difference in scale that would be expected, given the much larger US population and Army.

We had large enough army already in 1941. After that only quality and punch of the artillery pieces was gradually improved. BTW what was the portion of towed field guns and SP guns in USA and in Britain in 1941 and in 1944?

It is true that all higher officers and commanders knew eathothers and all training was very identical for all of them. During the Continuation War a special Artillery Shooting School was established in East Karelia at Suvi-Kumsa for improving firing techniques and training level of higher artillery officers. About 220 officers working in front units were graduated from 7 courses between April 1943 - June 1944. These courses lasted about one and a half months. School had its own training battalion and all activity could be practiced in real conditions.

And you think they didn't in the US Army? Or that the training wasn't "very identical"? Or that they didn't have an "Artillery Shooting School"? OOOOO! Seven one and a half month artillery course that graduated 220 officers. BTW, the US Field Artillery Advanced Course during the war was 12 weeks and postwar it was 37 weeks.

I didn't say anything on the US training. It was again your own interpretation (imagination).

You didn't quite understand what I told, did you? Finland had been in war for several years and these trained officers were among the most experienced in the Finnish field artillery. These men were mostly professionals although there were also reservists who had years training and experience. The main reason for these courses was that partisipants (current and forthcoming regiment and battalion commanders) were given the latest available information because the doctrine had changed in 1943. This enabled better use of FOs and guaranteed effective co-operation in the future. Many officers "practised" research of their own and the courses were also a good way to change ideas and opinions.

Of course there were methods for all possible situations (also captured Soviet maps were used) but as far as I know the fast artillery maps were the primary ones used. Finnish Blenheim IV bombers photographed large areas (at least the detected and known defense lines as well as road and railway lines) very quicly. The maps were usually ready for the planned direction of the attack. Of course we had good maps on the former Finnish areas.

You still don't get it, do you? FM 6-49 Field Artillery Manual Firing:

111. MAPS AND GRIDS (AR 100-15 and TM 2180-5).--If an accurate map or map substitute of suitable scale is available, it is used for the firing chart. If suitable maps are lacking, as will usually be the case, composites, mosaics, or provisional fire-control data sheets may be used to build up firing charts. Single vertical air photographs may be used
alone or in conjunction with maps or charts.

Other documents treat the matters in more detail. The standard method of developing firing solutions in the absence of map data was aerial photography. And it was something that developed in 1915, that is what all those artillery observation aircraft were flying around with cameras for...

Well, you too know very well that cameras (hand-held) and aircraft (slow and unsteady) of the WW I were nothing compared to those used during the WW II. Methods have perhaps been tested in 1915 for the first time but during the WW II the results and use were completely different. As for your note Gen. Nenonen had studied also in France in the 1920's.

Finns had Fairchild cameras bought from USA in 1940 but they were very poor compared to fixed Zeiss cameras (developed in co-operation with Gen. Nenonen). Nenonen had not invented the stereo mapping method but he improved it a lot by increasing the efficiency significantly. Finnish Army was able to map 5 - 10 times faster than the civilian authorities. Zeiss was selected because it was the best, not because it was German. Fairchilds were used only in secondary duties in Finland.

No kidding? So now you are going to give evidence of how the US Field Artillery did not acheive results?

So, did they? More and more I'm going to believe that it was the USAF that actually did the job and artillery was in the secondary role. I have heard anything special because you and JonS are more interested in analyzing my comments and creating your own interpretations.

I think the others would also like to hear more on what REALLY happened and less off-topic comments, right?

[Harri]

did the Finns suffer badly from counter battery fire?

Not so much as could be. Soviets used massive artillery concentrations but these were often inaccurate. I think some HQs with too dense radio traffic were more prone to Soviet artillery attacks. Finnish artillery had to be more worried about Soviet aircraft. But Finnish counter-battery units in co-operation with survey batteries and radio intelligence were a more serious threat to Soviets as well as Jabos of the Luftwaffe Gefechtsverband Kuhlmey (in the summer 1944).