The_Enigma wrote:Cheers for that; does that mean they are missing from the first source that was provided?
I might as well post my entire write-up on the subject again. Unfortunately the table formatting will drop out, and I'm not going to reformat them all, so I hope you'll get the sense of them...
Welcome to the Nightmare that is German Armed Forces Casualties in World War II
The following are a selection of German casualty estimates for World War II as derived from our study “German and Soviet Replacement Systems in World War II” (HERO Report No. 48, July 1975) and other documents. Please note a very important distinction:
Wehrmacht (Armed Forces) refers to all German armed forces, including the Feldheer (Field Army), Ersatzheer (Replacement Army), Luftwaffe (Air Force), Kriegsmarine (Navy), Waffen SS, Freiwilliger Verbaende (Foreign Units), and Wehrmachtgefolge (non-combatants, including Organization Todt and other paramilitary organizations). And, typically, Heer and Feldheer casualty reports included losses of the Waffen SS and Luftwaffe ground troops (Flak, LW Feld-Divisionen and Fallschirmjaeger). Finally, in some cases it appears that Heer reports included losses in the Ersatzheer as well.
Table I. Heer Casualties 9 Sep 39 - 31 August 1944, Taetigskeitbericht, Chef d. Heerespersonellamt, c. August 1944, NARA T78, R39, F1497)
Losses in the Army and Waffen SS
KIA WIA MIA Total
Army Officers 60,302 101,853 21,001 183,156
Waffen SS Officers (to 31 Jul) 2,685 253 2,938
Army NCO & Enlisted 1,460,388 3,497,391 826,451 5,784,230
Waffen SS NCO & Enlisted 60,991 19,847 80,838
Total 1,584,366 3,599,244 867,192 6,050,802
This report was undated, but appears to have been completed soon after the post-20 July change of command in the Ersatzheer, and was at least in part an effort to clarify the manpower situation. It is unclear whether or not this count includes both Feldheer and Ersatzheer losses.
Table II. Heer Casualties 9 Sep 39 – 31 Jan 1945 (KTB d. OKW, Band IV, 1509-1511)
Losses in the Heer and Waffen SS
KIA WIA MIA Total
Ostheer 1,105,987 3,498,059 1,018,365 5,622,411
Geb.AOK 20 16,639 60,451 5,157 82,247
OB Süd-West 50,481 163,602 194,250 408,333
OB Süd-Ost 19,235 55,069 14,805 89,109
OB West 107,042 399,856 409,715 916,613
Ersatzheer 10,467 42,174 1,337 53,978
DOW 295,659 295,569
Heer Total 1,605,510 4,219,211 1,643,629 7,468,350
Other Total 17,051 2,687 19,738
Total 1,622,561 4,188,037 1,646,316 7,546,914
There are a number of interesting questions and discrepancies in this report. For example, it does not indicate whether or not the DOW figure was deducted from the WIA totals. There is also at least one typo in the original for the number of wounded, since there is a discrepancy of 31,174 between the “Heer total WIA” (as summed) and the “Total WIA” as given in the original. That may be a simple error in the original table, and it is possible that was the figure intended for the missing WIA column under “Other.” Alternately, it is possible the discrepancy accounts for losses in the Polish, Norwegian, French, and Balkan Campaigns (see below). The original also noted that the Waffen SS was included in the “Total.” Note that Geb.AOK 20 also included AOK Norwegen.
Table III. Heer Losses in the Polish, Norwegian, French, and Balkan Campaigns (Organizationsabteilung d. Gen,Stb. d. OKH. 6 Feb 45, NARA T78, R414, F3226-3227)
Losses in the Feldheer
KIA WIA MIA Total
Poland 8,082 27,278 5,029 40,389
Norway 1,166 1,548 1,091 3,805
France 27,650 115,299 13,607 156,556
Balkans 1,593 4,845 644 7,082
Total 38,491 148,970 20,371 207,832
This report apparently refers only to losses within the Feldheer, although it may include Waffen-SS losses as well. It appears that it does not include losses in Luftwaffe ground or airborne formations. For instance the losses quoted for the Balkans must certainly exclude 7. Flieger Division losses on Crete, which were probably 1,032 KIA, 1,632 WIA and 1,759 MIA.
Table IV. Feldheer Casualties 22 Jun 41-10 Jan 45 (Heeresartz i. OKH, Gen.Stb. d. Heer/Gen.Qu., NARA T78, R414, F3228-3229)
Losses in the Heer, Waffen SS, and Luftwaffe Ground Troops
KIA WIA MIA Total
Ostheer 888,262 3,458,986 1,107,339 5,454,587
Geb.AOK 20 16,299 60,329 6,845 83,473
AOK Norwegen 21 94 1 116
OB Süd-West 44,433 160,106 204,854 409,393
OB Süd-Ost 16,113 48,585 16,784 81,482
OB West 60,526 199,107 393,188 652,821
Total 1,025,654 3,927,207 1,729,011 6,681,872
These figures likely include Waffen-SS and Luftwaffe ground forces. Adding the figures from Poland, Norway, France, and the Balkans yields a grand total for 1 Sep 39-10 Jan 45 of: 1,064,145 KIA, 4,076,177 WIA, and 1,749,382 MIA.
Table V. Feldheer Casualties 1 Jun 44-10 Jan 45 (Heeresartz i. OKH, Gen.Stb. d. Heer/Gen.Qu., NARA T78, R414, F3228-3229)
Losses in the Heer, Waffen SS, and Luftwaffe Ground Troops
KIA WIA MIA Total
Ostheer 136,493 632,028 565,834 1,334,335
Geb.AOK 20 4,184 15,034 4,587 23,805
AOK Norwegen 27 71 16 114
OB Süd-West 19,066 66,066 59,889 145,021
OB Süd-Ost 8,241 27,259 11,095 46,595
OB West 59,145 196,134 392,994 648,273
Total 227,156 986,592 1,034,415 2,248,163
This is a subset of Table IV and is the “corrected report for 1 Jun 44- 10 Jan 45 (Berichtigte Meldung fuer die Ziet vom 1.6.1944 bis 10.1.1945).
Table V. Feldheer Casualties 1 Sep 39-20 Apr 45 (Organizationabteilung d. Gen.Stb. d. Heer, 26 Apr 45, NARA T78, R414, F3189)
Losses in the Heer, Waffen SS, and Luftwaffe Ground Troops
KIA WIA MIA Total
Ostheer 1,005,413 3,992,062 1,369,174 6,366,649
Geb.AOK 20 16,395 60,515 6,852 83,762
OB Süd-West 48,750 174,734 215,525 439,009
OB Süd-Ost 22,370 70,064 24,620 117,054
OB West 109,046 382,776 772,460 1,264,282
Other 9,248 28,826 6,120 44,194
Total 1,211,222 4,708,977 2,394,751 8,314,950
This table appears to be an amended and updated version of that published in the OKW diary (Table II, above). Note that this table does not include a total DOW, which appears in large part to be responsible for the discrepancy between the two. However, that does not explain the discrepancies in the KIA by theater, especially for the Ostheer. Unfortunately, the original documentary source for the table in the war diary remains to be found, and it appears possible that the cause of the discrepancies may also be simple typographical errors in that source.
Table VI. Feldheer Casualties 22 Jun 41-31 Mar 45 (OKW KTB, Band IV.2, p. 1515-1516)
Losses in the Heer, Waffen SS, and Luftwaffe Ground Troops
KIA WIA MIA Total
Ostheer 984,816 3,907,752 1,275,275 6,167,843
Geb.AOK 20 16,391 60,509 6,852 83,752
OB Süd-West 46,805 168,571 208,239 423,615
OB Süd-Ost 20,276 63,098 21,846 105,220
OB West 80,719 263,035 502,061 845,812
Total 1,149,007 4,462,965 2,104,273 7,716,245
Unlike the previous KTB entry this one did not include a column for “Other.” Note also that this table covers a different time frame than did the other, although this does not adequately explain the difference between the figures for OB West. There are also a number of typographical errors that may be found when comparing this with a similar table for losses 22 Jun 41-20 Mar 45 in NARA T78, R577, F0810-0811.
Table VII. Total Losses of the Wehrmacht (Gesamtausfaelle der Wehrmacht) by Year (1 Sep-31 Aug) as of 30 November 1944 (NARA T78, R414, F3184)
KIA DEAD UNK EXE MIA PW DIS DES
1939/1940
Heer 64,202 12,159 0 485 1,550 488 16,644 4
Marine 3,021 400 0 4 3 1,393 151 0
Luftwaffe 6,480 1,573 1 26 1,196 793 1,549 0
1940/1941
Heer 122,585 17,399 2 392 7,547 1,222 38,894 3
Marine 4,218 1,249 0 13 37 1,062 360 0
Luftwaffe 11,631 2,642 0 40 2,503 1,857 3,948 1
1941/1942
Heer 422,311 31,921 9 1,394 47,047 11,002 58,818 22
Marine 5,257 2,042 0 119 144 1,172 2,968 7
Luftwaffe 17,842 4,269 2 135 5,445 1,034 14,291 0
1942/1943
Heer 374,084 56,571 73 2,282 287,357 43,547 98,987 230
Marine 12,412 2,562 0 228 2,983 2,087 2,491 49
Luftwaffe 31,117 4,903 19 274 50,005 3,988 11,025 13
1943/1944
Heer 459,476 39,700 139 3,219 764,411 160,677 139,503 329
Marine 14,368 3,303 0 326 16,577 3,268 3,403 45
Luftwaffe 47,706 4,482 25 494 12,739 16,577 15,226 18
1944/1945
Heer 111,406 9,891 0 38 190,817 25,164 26,262 5
Marine 1,740 474 0 38 3,393 9 1,011 6
Luftwaffe 15,758 362 0 6 42,019 2,864 2,821 0
Total
Heer 1,554,066 298,369 223 7,810 1,298,729 242,100 379,108 593
Marine 38,016 10,030 0 728 23,217 8,988 10,384 107
Luftwaffe 130,534 18,231 47 975 113,907 27,113 48,860 32
Total 1,722,616 326,630 270 9,513 1,435,853 278,201 438,352 732
KEY:
KIA = killed through enemy action
Dead = dead through accident, sickness and suicide
UNK = dead to unknown causes
EXE = executed
MIA = missing in action and interned
PW = prisoner of war
DIS = discharged from the service
DES = deserter (still at large)
“Heer” probably includes Waffen SS and probably includes both Feld and Ersatzheer. Note that the approximately 1.5 million each of KIA and MIA & PW for the Heer is considerably higher than in any of the other reports. It appears likely that this may be the most comprehensive and accurate report of the collection.
Table VIII. Heer Losses 1 Sep 39-1 May 45 (Organizationsabteilung d. OKH, 10 May 1945, NARA T78, R398, F8326)
Reported for 1 Sep 39-31 Dec 44 (rounded to nearest thousand)
KIA 1,600,000
Dead 149,000
Other 8,000
Total 1,757,000
MIA 1,334,000
PW 276,000
Estimated for 1 Jan-1 May 45
Dead 250,000
MIA 1,000,000
Total 6,374,000
Losses include Waffen SS and Luftwaffe Ground Forces. The figures for 1 Sep 39-31 Dec 44 appear to be from the same source as the Table VII, although the number of “Dead” in this case is less than one-half that in the previous table.
Finally, “according to a Soviet study [in Voyenno Istoricheskiy Zhurnal, 1960] which cites a German document which has not been located, in June 1945 General Jodl reported that during World War II German losses amounted to 12,400,000 men. Of these 2,500,000 were killed, 3,400,000 were missing in action or known prisoners of war, and 6,500,000 were wounded, 10-15% of them too badly to return to duty. The Soviets rightly question the last figure, and point out that in 1953 there were about 2,000,000 disabled veterans in Western Germany alone, of whom three quarters had more than 25% disability. They cite statistics taken from various German documents that show a total of 8,899,000 casualties (KIA, WIA, MIA, POW) between 22 June 1941 and 28 February 1945, of whom 2,584,000 returned to service, and 6,315,000 were permanently removed from the Field Army” (HERO, p. 49).
The actual total reported for the Feldheer on 28 February 1945 was 1,098,041 KIA, 4,24,694 WIA and 1,860,816 MIA for a total of 7,201,551 (Heeresartz i. OKH, Gen.Stb. d. Heer/Gen.Qu., NARA T78, R414, F3217). Given that Marine and Luftwaffe KIA, MIA and PW totaled 341,775 as of 30 November 1944 (see Table VII), and assuming a 1-to-4 ratio of killed to wounded, then the approximately 1.7-million discrepancy may be accounted for. To that may be added a probable 60,000 plus casualties for the Ersatzheer.
So, what may we all conclude from this? For one thing, it is important to understand that casualties, killed in action, died, died of wounds, missing in action, prisoner of war, and all the other terminology of loss refer to specific things. In terms of the Wehrmacht in World War II, it appears that there is good reason to believe that at least 16 percent of the total identified wartime dead (not including MIA later declared dead or PW who later died) were not as a result of enemy action. Another thing to remember is that all casualty reports refer to a specific population. Thus, Wehrmacht, Heer, Feldheer, Ersatheer, Kriegsmarine, and Luftwaffe all refer to different groups, some of which are subsets of others. And, although we can probably say that Heer losses accounted for about 90 percent of the total Wehrmacht losses, we cannot say that the remaining 10 percent was irrelevant when that 10 percent could include close to 1 million casualties.
Now, how does all this apply to Overmans? Simply put, Overmans’ argument, in its fundamentals, is that previous estimates of German losses undercounted military deaths in the war by as much as 2.2-million. He arrives at that figure by a statistical analysis of a sample of the Allgemeine Kartei, which totals 15.2-million and which in theory represents those Wehrmacht personnel who did not die in combat (that number is documented in the approximately 3.1-million Totenkartei). Now, given that the evidence is that possibly 496,000 of those acknowledged “war” casualties were not combat related (the 16 percent figure above), is it surprising that 14.4 percent of the Allgemeine Kartei sample investigated by Overmans contained cases he classified as additional deaths? One could as easily say that Overmans’ sample was too small (7,619 of 15.2-million or 0.05 percent of the total) and that it is just as likely that 16 percent of the personnel represented in the Allgemeine Kartei, or 2.432-million is the correct number of “additional” deaths.
The crux of the matter is that Overmans assumes that the majority of these “additional” deaths were due to combat. Unfortunately, there does not appear to be much evidence for this theory. Furthermore, his conclusion that the German casualty reporting system prior to 1945 was highly inaccurate has been dealt with in Zetterling’s critique. Zetterling demonstrates that Overmans data, as found in his table of confidence intervals, closely matches the data provided for the Heersartz (on the Ostfront through 4 September the Heeresartz reported about 1,220,000 killed and wounded whereas Overmans calculates 1,240,000 for the same period).
Fundamentally, Overmans problem is that military casualty reporting systems are not really designed to answer the question he raised – “how many German servicemen lost their lives”? Rather, such systems are designed as manpower management tools and as means for tracking the combat effectiveness of a force.
As far as the accuracy of the reporting systems goes, we have evidence from the Germans themselves. On 1 October 1941 a statistical study group had been set up within the Office of Armed Forces Losses (Abteilung Wehrmachtverlustwesen) to resolve problems with the “Central Statistics of Manpower Losses in the War” (Zentralstatistik der Menschenverluste im Kriege). On 30 August 1944 the group issued a report on the “Development and State of the Work” (Entwicklung und Stand der Arbeit) (T77, R780, F2114~). The report gave the following examples of problems in the reporting of deaths (Toten) through enemy action within the existing systems of the Heer:
Polish Campaign: the Sanitats Inspektur (Medical Inspectors) reported 10,244 dead through enemy action, while the KTB of the various regiments reported a total of 14,188. The work of a committee to resolve the status of missing had to the date of the report determined the dead to be 15,450.
French Campaign: the monthly summary by the Wehrmacht Fuhrungsstab (Armed Forces Command Staff) reported 26,455 dead, the Sanitats Inspektur reported 30,267 dead and the MIA committee reported 46,059 dead.
Norway Campaign: the Sanitats Inspektur reported 274 dead, the IVb (Medical Officer) of Gruppe XXI reported 886 dead and the MIA committee reported 1,249 dead.
Eastern Campaign: these two sets of figures for Gefallen (KIA, note the distinction in this example from the others, which refer to Toten) were compiled respectively by the Heersartz to the Wehrmacht Fuhrungsstab and by the Wehrersatzdienstellen (the Armed Forces Replacement Office).
1941 Summer Campaign: 158,773/188,982
41/42 Winter Campaign: 86,287/133,446
1942 Summer Campaign: 131,230/179,456
42/43 Winter Campaign: 93,067/117,339
1943 Summer Campaign: 165,457/193,508
With the exception of the Norwegian Campaign these figures are very different from those laid out in Table III above. But the discrepancies again mostly appear to revolve around the resolution of the fate of the missing, a process that took months and years.
