World War 2 at a Grand Strategic Level: Correcting Mistakes

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Alixanther
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Re: World War 2 at a Grand Strategic Level: Correcting Mista

#181

Post by Alixanther » 05 Feb 2013, 11:50

KDF33 wrote:Hello Alixanther,

Pretty much any kind of vigorous discussion takes the form of a "pissing contest", "articulate" polish or not. It doesn't mean that some arguments aren't better than others, even if at it's core everyone is more trying to win the argument than to find the truth (a judgement which would, IMO, be excessive cynicism if applied without caveats). People don't like losing, and will rarely admit being wrong, especially if there's absolutely no cost in not doing so, so "consensus through silence" is probably the best you can hope for. With that being said, I'll mention that LWD has close to 8,000 posts, so I'm pretty sure that a) You haven't read all of them, b) On some on them, he probably admits being wrong and / or lacking knowledge in a certain area, so accusing him of thinking he is always right sounds really specious to me.

Fundamentally, I think that the reason why everyone is kind of "piling up" on you in this thread is that the point your trying to make isn't clear. You previously claimed that it was simply that the U.S. was proportionally less mobilized for war than Germany, which is probably true (with some caveats), but you in fact went much further, arguing that such a difference in total mobilization meant that "under some conditions" one or the other belligerent could have defeated the other, i.e. that they were roughly comparable. You also argued, somewhat confusingly considering the previous argument, that Germany couldn't effectively mobilize for "total war" because Europe's population was "spoiled". Lastly, you seem to have claimed that the U.S. couldn't effectively mobilize like Germany because of political / "spoiling" considerations, while giving as evidence Roosevelt's considerations in the pre-war period when, obviously, political considerations still weighted heavily.

Regarding this comment,
Being able to quote from "serious" publications doesn't make you have an upper hand. Even if "these boards" assume a certain conduct, I don't think I've commited a crime by discussing things in a non-canon way.
You've obviously committed no crime, but if you argue a point without source material to back you up, it's kind of difficult to see what kind of discussion you are expecting. If you claim something and then someone disagrees with you, but have absolutely nothing to reply but "I restate my claim", the conversation will just go in a full circle. It's not bad faith on the part of LWD or the other forumers, it's just that your claims are unsupported.
The problem as I see it, is not the fact "I don't come up with source material". It's simple I come up with an idea, then there are 12 people out of the blue talking to me at the same time and I cannot keep track of all of them while they're engaging in copy-pasting huge excerpts from their preferred readings.
I don't mind being treated with a link (as a matter of fact I thank you all for giving me sources to read and ponder upon) but I'd like to see your personal insights, not copyrighted material.
It's easy to accuse someone's claims as unsupported, as long as you don't ever make any.

You, at least, make a step towards the right direction and I'll be happy to give a piece of my mind.
"arguing that such a difference in total mobilization meant that "under some conditions" one or the other belligerent could have defeated the other, i.e. that they were roughly comparable" - you say.
Well, should they NOT be comparable? Deutsches Reich and US were like apples and oranges? Are they on a different Kardashev spot? Wasn't Finland able to inflict serious damage on SU, at the point of getting almost a white peace? Why wouldn't either Germany or US, given the right conditions, being able to defeat one another? Why is this almost faith-filled belief that Britain and / or US cannot and will not ever be defeated? I know for some it's more of a patriotic duty but, come on, statistics and randomness and just facts of life. Everything could happen.
"that Germany couldn't effectively mobilize for "total war" because Europe's population was "spoiled". - you say
You misquoted me this time, because I included the occupied countries in the war effort - in order for the Deusches Reich economy to be more comparable to the US. So, while Germany standard of life decreased along the years (being lower and lower as the war raged on) it never dropped under certain conditions which would have led the people unrest and rebel. Nor did the standard of life in the occupied countries (noticeably lower than of Germany) did drop AS IN SOVIET RUSSIA, for the same reasons. So, Hitler was unable to wage a real "total war" (aka "all economy sliders set on the guns position and as far from the butter one") because the conditions were not met - he could not afford mass-rioting, nation-scale civil unrest in the West, where his industrial base was. What happened in the East, it's another story.
Finally, you say:
"U.S. couldn't effectively mobilize like Germany because of political / "spoiling" considerations, while giving as evidence Roosevelt's considerations in the pre-war period when, obviously, political considerations still weighted heavily."

I never mentioned anything "spoiled" about US so I don't see your point here. If you still consider 39-40 as a "pre-war period, then you're mistaken. At that time US was headed by Roosevelt into warring waters. That's why I brazenly rejected the "6 month period" which was given to me as a counterargument that US could mobilize "at the twist of a finger".
Sorry, I don't have sources other than common sense. I've read some, seen some. Trust whatever you wish.

KDF33
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Re: World War 2 at a Grand Strategic Level: Correcting Mista

#182

Post by KDF33 » 05 Feb 2013, 13:00

Hello Alixanther,

Thanks for replying! Here are my thoughts:
The problem as I see it, is not the fact "I don't come up with source material". It's simple I come up with an idea, then there are 12 people out of the blue talking to me at the same time and I cannot keep track of all of them while they're engaging in copy-pasting huge excerpts from their preferred readings.
I agree that this can be disconcerting. :)
"arguing that such a difference in total mobilization meant that "under some conditions" one or the other belligerent could have defeated the other, i.e. that they were roughly comparable" - you say.
Well, should they NOT be comparable? Deutsches Reich and US were like apples and oranges? Are they on a different Kardashev spot? Wasn't Finland able to inflict serious damage on SU, at the point of getting almost a white peace? Why wouldn't either Germany or US, given the right conditions, being able to defeat one another? Why is this almost faith-filled belief that Britain and / or US cannot and will not ever be defeated? I know for some it's more of a patriotic duty but, come on, statistics and randomness and just facts of life. Everything could happen.
Although obviously neither Germany nor the United States were Type I civilisations, there was a significant difference in industrial capacity between the U.S., on one side, and the European great powers (Britain, Germany, the USSR) on the other. Thus, here are the production stats, in millions of tons, for the main industrial resources (coal / iron ore / oil) in 1937:

Germany: 191 / 4 / 0.5
Soviet Union: 116 / 14 / 30
United Kingdom: 234 / 4 / 0

United States: 426 / 37 / 163

The case of iron ore is a bit tricky, since both Germany and Britain in 1937 operated way under capacity, their peak wartime averaging about 20 million tons for the UK and 30 million tons for Germany.In the U.S., wartime iron ore production shot up to about 100 million tons. In the case of oil and coal, the data is representative of the overall trends, with the caveat that the UK controlled the oil resources of the Middle East.

In 1942, when Germany controlled Europe and the USSR had been ravaged, the situation looked like this (data comes from various sources, I'll compile it if you want the list):

Germany (with European resources): 270 / 51 / 9
Soviet Union: 76 / 10 / 22
United Kingdom: 205 / 20 / 0 (11 for M-E)

United States: 529 / 108 / 184

As you can see, even with Europe under the boot, the Reich's supply of coal and iron ore was still only about half as much as that of the U.S., and it was absolutely dwarfed in terms of oil supply. This, rather than patriotism, is the reason why virtually nobody on this forum believes that Germany could defeat the U.S.
"that Germany couldn't effectively mobilize for "total war" because Europe's population was "spoiled". - you say
You misquoted me this time, because I included the occupied countries in the war effort - in order for the Deusches Reich economy to be more comparable to the US. So, while Germany standard of life decreased along the years (being lower and lower as the war raged on) it never dropped under certain conditions which would have led the people unrest and rebel. Nor did the standard of life in the occupied countries (noticeably lower than of Germany) did drop AS IN SOVIET RUSSIA, for the same reasons. So, Hitler was unable to wage a real "total war" (aka "all economy sliders set on the guns position and as far from the butter one") because the conditions were not met - he could not afford mass-rioting, nation-scale civil unrest in the West, where his industrial base was. What happened in the East, it's another story.
It is true that Germany's economy never reached the starvation-level mobilization of Stalin's USSR, but it was more mobilized in the later war years than either Britain or the U.S. As for the living standard of the occupied countries, it did drop to starvation level in some instances, i.e. the Netherlands in the winter of 1944-45, or Greece overall. The West, if by that you mean France and the Benelux, was also useless as an industrial base during the war because it was starved of energy (coal).
Finally, you say:
"U.S. couldn't effectively mobilize like Germany because of political / "spoiling" considerations, while giving as evidence Roosevelt's considerations in the pre-war period when, obviously, political considerations still weighted heavily."

I never mentioned anything "spoiled" about US so I don't see your point here. If you still consider 39-40 as a "pre-war period, then you're mistaken. At that time US was headed by Roosevelt into warring waters. That's why I brazenly rejected the "6 month period" which was given to me as a counterargument that US could mobilize "at the twist of a finger".
The U.S. obviously started mobilizing before the war started, but that doesn't mean that an all-out drive was possible before Pearl Harbor. That the U.S. administration was anticipating war is one thing; that the nation would accept wartime measures while still at peace is altogether different.

But I do agree with you that the U.S. couldn't mobilize "at the twist of the finger". But then no country could.

Regards,

KDF


Mika68*
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Re: World War 2 at a Grand Strategic Level: Correcting Mista

#183

Post by Mika68* » 05 Feb 2013, 13:15

Even that US production of weapons, airplanes, war ships was overwhelming, would it been very hard to won Germany without USSR support.
What if Molotov-Ribbentrop pact had never broken and USSR would joined to struggle against Great Britain and USA? Then I think China would ally with USSR. Japanese had taken troops from China.
Would Churchill continue the war or complied to peace with Hitler?
And nuclear bomb? As we know the developing atomic bomb was close to success in Germany when the war ended.
Germany had stand much more time without war against USSR.

ljadw
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Re: World War 2 at a Grand Strategic Level: Correcting Mista

#184

Post by ljadw » 05 Feb 2013, 13:24

As we know that the Germans were light-years away from the development of the A Bomb,we can discard the whole thing .

South
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Re: World War 2 at a Grand Strategic Level: Correcting Mista

#185

Post by South » 05 Feb 2013, 13:41

Good morning Alixanther,

I believe you wrote that the US - private sector - was the prevalent element of the US economy and was not susceptable to a political decree (such as a Presidential Executive Order) for war preparations leading to a mobilization.

Much of the private sector was obliged to accept adjustments for war preparations.

They did accept them and these was compliance.

The key elements of the US private sector such as banks, shipping companies, oil companies, agricultural and food producers, oiul companies, steel companies, railroads, were already loaded with WWI era requirements to be ready to comply with war preparations. FDR could rely on the Shipping Act of 1916 and the Merchant Marine Act of 1936, as one example.

On a different thread I posted something applicable here also. At the apex levels, the key US companies ARE present at the apex levels of the US Government - and vice versa.


Warm regards,

Bob

South
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Re: World War 2 at a Grand Strategic Level: Correcting Mista

#186

Post by South » 05 Feb 2013, 13:54

Good morning Mika 68,

Good thought-producing questions.......

I do think China was more likely to become a "France" - that is, an Occupied France, a Vichy France and a Free French (in exile). China would split into a Chiang faction and a Mao faction.


Warm regards,

Bob

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LWD
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Re: World War 2 at a Grand Strategic Level: Correcting Mista

#187

Post by LWD » 05 Feb 2013, 16:22

Alixanther wrote:Don't try to patronize me.
I wasn't trying to.
Being able to quote from "serious" publications doesn't make you have an upper hand.
But at least in respect to what is expected on these boards it does. The point of these boards from what I gather in the FAQ's and moderator comments is to be a good source of information on WWII. To that end they aren't just looking for opinions they want facts, sources, and logic.
Even if "these boards" assume a certain conduct, I don't think I've commited a crime by discussing things in a non-canon way.
Crime no. On the other hand depending on the board you may find your postings edited or find yourself getting reprimanded by the moderators.
You're much discussing a discussion here, instead of making a point.
Actually I was making a point. The point was that we have no way of knowing if your opinion is based on thin air or a very solid foundation of fact if you won't tell us what it is based on.
You're asking me for clarification, you're asking me for making a point, you're pointing a finger saying what I DO NOT, but you're not setting an example. Step up with a flawless posting technique and I'll be happy to oblige.
When you post an opinion by the standards of this board you are the proponent and you are suppose to furnish sources if questioned. Those questioning your stance are under no obligation to do so until they become the proponents of a position. Now I and other will often furnish sources as I have done here that indicate where our questions are coming from.
Most discussions over this respected board give me the impression of a piss contest (a very articulate one, on sources, but nevertheless a piss contest) which has a trivial meaning and scope.
One good way to learn is by reasoned debate. Certainly not what I would call a "piss contest" but I can see how some might. The alternative is people continuously restating their opinions without anything to back them up which I see as much worse.
Then you have the nerve to reproach me what you're doing on a daily basis (not you yourself, it's the generic "you" so don't take it personally).
Am I? How so?
If you (this time I include your person in the generic "you") really want this boards to improve in communicating ideas and answers we better establish a methodology of the "critique".
I think the boards currently do a pretty good job of that. I'd be interested to here about your suggested methodology though. Best by PM or on a board where it is on topic though.
It seems nobody is interested in establishing a true consensus THROUGH DISCUSSION.
But that's exactly what is desired.
... Have you ever admitted of being wrong on this forums?
More than a few times.
Were you always right?
Obviously not. Indeed a fair few of my posts have been essentially requests for information.
There, I thought so.
??? I have no real idea what you thought/think from the above.
However this is all off topic. If you wish to continue PLS do so either in the appropriate sub forum or by PM.

john becktel
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Re: World War 2 at a Grand Strategic Level: Correcting Mista

#188

Post by john becktel » 06 Feb 2013, 01:45

Alixanther wrote:LWD:

Please read this fragment:

Although President Roosevelt neither shared nor pandered to this viewpoint, he understood the strength of the isolationist position. With one eye on his upcoming reelection bid in 1940, he acted carefully. Some of his New Deal supporters, notably labor leaders, feared that a preparedness drive centered on a powerful War Resources Administration would undermine much recent social legislation. So, rather than begin a massive central rearmament effort, he launched a limited preparedness campaign at the start of 1939, with his emphasis on increasing the striking power of the Army Air Corps.

And this one:

Although full-scale mobilization remained politically impossible, the government started the financial transition from parsimony to abundance.

Note the "politically impossible" aspect. You cannot wage a war without a cassus belli in a country hostile to extra-continental wars.

And this one:

A calculated risk, lend-lease ultimately delayed mobilization by reducing, for example, the number of aircraft available to the U.S. Army Air Corps; the program slowed training. Later foreign munitions aid also became a problem to other Army elements.

And this one:

At first, increases in the force for the protective mobilization plan and the procurement of the equipment to meet this expansion were made piecemeal. But the desperate need for a coherent plan became plain as the Army went through eight separate expenditure programs between August 1940 and June 1942. (...)

And this:

Troop construction ultimately mushroomed into a $7.5 billion program, but the lack of industrial facilities constituted a greater barrier to mobilization during the defense period. The Depression had created much idle but largely obsolete industrial capacity. With demand low, there had been no incentives to modernize. The government had to encourage industrial expansion before its armed forces were engaged.

6 months, huh? I wouldn't say so.

Other things:
I didn't say "more stuff" period. I said "more stuff related to their resources".
US economy could not be shifted to war "at a push of a button" because of the political situation, your own sources said it. I never said US couldn't have done it if they would (and probably with a 3rd Reich-style government they would). And you're right about whether this is important or relevant, I said "it never required to do so" myself.
Your piecemeal arguing style is much more effective against "targets" who pretend they know everything. I don't.
do not take this as an attack on or quibble with your sources, but when such statements as above are given then who said/wrote them and when may be important in understanding how they may or may not contribute to the discussion.

all of the quotes you cite can be taken in different ways.

the first statement about roosevelt's ..." . . . viewpoint" brings a smile. i understand that no person ever left his office not deeply convinced that fdr understood and embraced the petitioner' position. and many of them spent much time thereafter wondering what went wrong when fdr didn't act. the man was a masterful american national politician. he never had one eye on any election he had all eyes fixed on every election. that's just the way he was.
and one must separate his new deal era from the war era. yes, he was proud of his social legislation but he had no problem busting(i.e., drafting) the philadelphia transit workers if they didn't return to work to get workers back to hog island navy yard by next monday.

full-scale mobilization was not impossible after dec 7, money poured out of the congress after the fall of france, . . .
not so easy after sept 3 1939.

A calculated risk . . . maybe not. the administration's (fdr's) objective was to get weapons into the hands of forces that would face germans as soon as possible.

plans changed several times in 1942 as the army and economists faced and resolved the so called 'feasibilty' problem.

the quotations you cite can be starting points for lengthy discussions. who and when is important.

AJFFM
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Re: World War 2 at a Grand Strategic Level: Correcting Mista

#189

Post by AJFFM » 04 Apr 2013, 21:33

Sorry to bring the original post back but I wanted to say some things about its original claims
Dark Age wrote: 1: THE GERMANS LOST THE WAR IN 1939

Incorrect. Such statements are claims that the German defeat was inevitable. They fail to recognize that Germany was winning the war until late 1941. France was smashed, Britain was too weak to invade Europe on its own, and the Soviet Union was in the process of being bled to death. Germany lost the war on Dec 11, 1941 when Hitler declared war on the United States while his armies were engaged in Russia. That single act decided the war because it forced Germany to fight another opponent with awesome industrial capacity, western technology and which contained a population of around 140,000,000 and furthermore was safe from fighting a war on its own soil thus its production could not be molested. The huge population of the USA meant it could , in time, mobilize armies of many millions which would tip the balance in the allies favor.
Germany certainly didn't lose in 39 but it sure lost the war in 1940. He went simply too far in the settlement with France, gained the permanent hostility of the US and let the British off the hook with a half hearted campaign in NA. He was just as aimless with the USSR first by reducing military output particularly that of the newer model tanks before deciding to resume production despite already making up his mind about attacking the USSR.
Dark Age wrote: 2: HITLER WOULD HAVE WON THE WAR IF HE LISTENED TO HIS GENERALS

Nope. So he should have listened to the same generals that told him not to occupy the Rhineland? The same generals that told him not to expand in 1938? The same generals that told him that Germany was not ready for war in 1939? The same generals who in 1939-40 came up with a rehash of the German 1914 invasion of France which would have likely cost Germany tremendous casualties for an indecisive result? Hitler had to , in fact, go outside his general staff to lower generals like Manstein to get a workable plan to deliver a knockout blow against France. Many of his generals were unimaginative and too fixated on convential warfare with the occupation of enemy cites rather than Hitler who prefered to attack an enemy's resources.

Having served in the army and studied history, I now can better understand Hitlers reluctance to listen to his generals. Many officers lack imagination and think too parochially. Napoleon was a brillant officer and great tactician but he failed to grasp things on a strategic level. He invaded Egypt and, by doing so ,wasted men and material which could have better been used in Europe where France faced more deadly threats. Wars in Europe are settled in Europe so seizing Egypt would have done nothing to bring the British Empire to its knees. Napoleon foolishly occupied Spain and then invaded Russia believing he could win against a country of that size in a convential battle. His tactial brillance meant nothing against Grand Strategy where a coalition of powers outnumbered him close to 3 to 1. Even if Napoleon would have won a Waterloo, he would have been defeated by sheer mass of numbers. Napoleon is the perfect example of a tactical officer failing because he refused to grasp strategy.

Officers during the Second World War and even today are generally no different. Hitler understood better what Napoleon didnt. Wars are about resources and population. And wars in Europe are settled in Europe, hence his reluctance to invade Britain and commit to Africa since such attacks would have done nothing to gain Germany living space to expand the its resources and population, two things which matter most in wars between technologically even powers.

Furthermore in the case with Russia, Hitler was for the most part correct in his military decisions. Russia was unlike central and western Europe were towns were in close proximity and thus a defensive position could be abandoned in favor of another defensive position close by. In Russia , defensible postions were far apart hence Hitlers reluctance to allow a retreat. Hitler decision to hold the line in Dec 1941 was to prove correct and logical.
He should have listened to his generals because corporals don't make good generals, they never did and never will. There is a reason why Generals told Hitler not to reoccupy the Rhineland, it was to do with the sabre rattling in France. Hitler called their bluff and the folded. If they didn't Germany would have been screwed. Same with Austria and the Czech republic.

Further close examination of the events of WWII prove that probably the only good strategic decision Hitler ever made was In Dec. 41/Jan 42 when he forced his troops to dig in and stand fast.


Dark Age wrote: 3: THE BATTLE OF BRITAIN WAS A BRITISH VICTORY

Nonsense. The term "Battle of Britain" was invented by Winston Churchill since he needed any victory he could get in July 1940. The Battle of Britain was simply an aerial battle were all that happened was the British defended their air space successfully. It was not a great British triumph but merely a triumph of survival. Overall, on the Strategic Level, the aerial battle was a stalemate. Although Germany could not win air supremacy over the British Isles, the Brtish were cornered and could not invade or gain aerial supremacy over German occupied Europe. Hence the Battle was not a British victory but a propoganda attempt to hide the fact that the British were in a hopeless situation.
It was a victory. It drained precious German resources, saved Britain from invasion and helped the USSR. When Germany invaded the USSR it had less planes than when it invaded France and on a bigger front. In the first phases of Barbarossa it was the Luftwaffe, not the panzer divisions, that was the hero.
Dark Age wrote: 4: HITLER SHOULD HAVE FINISHED OFF THE BRITISH FIRST

Not logical. Hitler attempted to finish off the British first.. it was called the Battle of Britain. All that happened was both sides lost a lot of planes and airmen. A German aerial assault on the British in 1941 or 42 or 43 would have yielded the same results. Attacking through the Mediterrean would also not have brought the British to their knees. Remember to settle a war in Europe you have to win the war in Europe. A large scale Mediterrean/African campaign would have been a waste just like Napoleons invasion of Egypt. The logical enemy to attack was the Soviet Union who had over 3 million troops amassed opposite of Germany's LAND BORDERS and whos territory could expand your population and increase your resources.

An attempt to finish off Britain would have cost too many German casualties ( troops Hitler needed for Russia), tie up too many German troops in occupation(whether in the British Isles or elsewhere) and simply would have taken too long... probably until 1945-46 and by then the USA and Soviet Union would be at war with Germany. Also Hitler knew that the British, just like in the Napoleonic Wars, could not invade Europe hence why Hitler left only 600,000 troops in Western Europe during Barbaroosa
No general disagreement here, I too think the USSR was the major strategic threat after France and Britain would only be able to invade on its own in 1943 at the most (When they were supposed to reach 1917 levels of native soldiers+ colonies especially the 2 million Indians).
Dark Age wrote: 5: HITLER'S INVASION OF THE SOVIET UNION WAS A GREAT MILITARY BLUNDER

Wrong. It was objectively the most sensible option for an imperialistic Germany bent on conquest. Its territory had the capacity to turn Germany into a GLOBAL SUPERPOWER. The Soviet Union, with its massive army, was the greatest threat to Hitler as it stood directly on Germany's Land Borders. The ideological differences between the two meant war was practically inevitable and, as I already explained, finishing off the British first would take too long and be too costly hence invading the Soviet Union was totally logical.

History was on the Germanys side too. Historically the Germans and their allies defeated the Russians in 1917-18 while fighting the Italians, French and British on other land fronts. In 1941, Hitler had no European land fronts to fight on. The Soviet failure to conquer Finland and Stalin's purges made 1941 seem like a great time to strike. Because of the Soviet Union's closed society, gaining accurate intel on the Red Army was all but impossible too regardless of when the invasion occured so such an inability could not logically deter the Germans if they intended to invade from day 1.

People with an elementary understanding of history simply compare Barbarossa to Napoleon. What they fail to realize is that the Germans were winning in Russia. The year 1941 on the Eastern Front produced a total of about 750,000 German casualties. The Soviet Union however, lost over 4 times as much. Examing the populations of each country gives us objective evidence that the Soviet Union could not sustain such casualties and would have eventually lost. The population of Germany was around 80 million while the Soviet Union was around 190,000,000 or a little less. Thus the Soviet Union had slightly over twice the population of Germany but was sustaining losses of over 4 to 1 making it mathematically impossible for Stalin to win on his own.

There is the general claim that the Russians were thrashed by the Germans but eventually recovered from the defeats and learned how to defeat the Germans. This is parochialism at its worse for it ignores the fact that the Germans learned from their mistakes as well. Hence the continued kill ratio favoring the Germans throughout the war.

So when someone mentions the harsh winter of 1941 in negative context to the Germans, they fail to realize that the Russians were suffering far far worse. The casualty ratio would continue to favor the Germans only perhaps with exception to Bagration in 1944. On a Grand Stretegic level the only reason the Russians won was because Germany had to divert resources to the West once the USA entered the conflict. Hence generally Barbarossa was logical and not a military blunder. Hitler may have not reached Moscow, but he didnt need to if he could bleed Stalin's armies to death.
Agree with you here. Hitler had to invade the USSR or else uncle Joe would have invaded him and the Red army of 1942 would have been a lot better than that of 1941. Uncle Joe was already taking revenge on all countries he though were responsible for the 1917 defeat and "reconquering" lost territory starting with Poland and ending with Romania. He was probably thinking of going after Turkey, which he did after the war, for Kars and its neighbourhood by the time the Germans invaded.
Dark Age wrote: 6: HITLER SHOULD HAVE ATTACKED MOSCOW INSTEAD OF THE UKRAINE IN 1941

This is more "Hitler should have listened to his generals nonsense" Hitler's decision to reinforce Army Group South and attack the Ukraine before moving on Moscow was logical. During the summer of 1941, Army Group Center captured Smolensk but Army Group South had failed to conquer Kiev. This meant that if Hitler allowed the advance on Moscow , Army Group Center, whether successful or not, would have been exposed in an enormous, vulnerable salient directly in the center of the front and be exposed to attacks on its flank. In a way, Hitler in 1941 was like General Eisenhower in 1944 in that he wanted to attack on a broad front. So those who say Hitler was wrong for choosing to attack on a broad front in 1941 also have to admit that General Eisenhower was wrong to want to attack on a Broad front in Western Europe in 1944-45 which is an absurb notion given the failure of Market Garden.

Also Hitler was more correctly fixated on resources than capital cities like his unimaginative generals. People also ignore the huge German victory in the South at Kiev which yielded over 500,000 Russian casualties. When that victory is coupled with the loss of large economic areas of the Ukrainie and when considering the consequences of allowing Army Group Center to attack Moscow without flank support, the benefits of attacking South outweigh even the most favorable result of attacking Moscow in August 1941. Hence it is false to believe continuing the drive on Moscow in July/August 1941 would have produced better results.
You should read about the battle of Smolensk before actually dismissing it. AGC was bled white as David Glantz said losing more men in the unnecessary 2 month stalemate than the other two AGs combined. He had a clean shot at Moscow around the middle of August when there were no major concentrations there yet decided to encircle Kiev for pure propaganda purposes. The Soviet Southwestern front was already in an extremely critical position and was in no shape ready to fight. Even its withdrawal was almost impossible due to Stalin's intransigence.
Dark Age wrote: 7: STALINGRAD WAS A GREAT/DECISIVE SOVIET VICTORY

Parochial nonsense. The Russian lost just as much, if not more, troops than the Germans in that battle. It was not a great victory but a Pyrrhic victory overhyped by Soviet propoganda. The Germans still had the ability to fight and counter-attack as seen in the 3rd Battle of Kharkov and Kursk so Stalingrad was objectively NOT DECISIVE.

If someone is concerned with technicality, then yes the Russians won the Battle but in reality, on a Grand Strategic Level, both sides had enormous casualties so it was not a victory at all. The Soviet Union could not sustain such casualties if they continued.

Why people fixate on the Battle of Stalingrad and Hitler's refusal to allow a retreat is beyond me. Regardless if the 6th Army is surrounded , its still preventing the Russians from advancing further West and killing a ton of them when the Russians assault their position.
When you through back your enemy 500km in roughly 2 months, destroy 5 field armies and successfully establish stable deep defensive lines that withstand a successful counter attack I guess you can call it a victory.

Unless you mean the battle in the city proper.
Dark Age wrote: 8: KURSK WAS A GREAT/DECISIVE SOVIET VICTORY

More parochial nonsense. The Russians lost more men and Tanks than the Germans. They once again only won on a technicality. No more than the British at the Battle of Breeds Hill , only on a much larger scale.
Of course it was a decisive victory. The Red army planners were planning for the gigantic counter offensives after the eventual and expected German attack fails. Even Hitler knew his attack was going no where. Within a month the Red army advanced well over 200 kms straightening the line for Hitler who refused to do so earlier.
Dark Age wrote: 9: LEND LEASE SAVED THE SOVIET UNION

I wanted to address this one because it is partly true. I see it on this forum often and people have already displayed numbers and sources of equipment provided to the Soviet Union. However as I said this is only parly true. Lend Lease was essential to equiping the Red Army. I will not deny that. However it alone would not have been enough to save Stalin. In addition to Lend Lease, the millions of American troops fighting in Europe are also needed to save the Russians for they divert German manpower and material away from the Russian Front. So the truth is Lend Lease alone wasnt enough to keep the Russians in the war, Lend Lease combined with American military attacks were. Stalin could have attempted to fight the war with Lend Lease but without American military intervention ,it would not have been enough. Having all the equipment in the world does not matter if all the people who will have to use the equipment are dead.
There is never one reason for why the USSR was never defeated. Each reason worked differently and at different times some reasons were indeed stronger than others.
Dark Age wrote: 10: THE INVASION OF NORMANDY OPENED UP THE SECOND FRONT IN EUROPE

No.I hear such foolishness often. Such an absurd notion is insulting to the Allied troops who fought in Italy, Sicily and North Africa and the airmen who fought in thr skies over Germany and Europe. The Second Front always existed since June 1941 and it had greater impact in 1942 once the United States was involved. The Germans gradually had to move more men and materal West to counter real or anticipated threats to German occupied Europe. Tunisa was just as costly to the Germans as Stalingrad and the Sicilian campaign forced the Germans to devote more divisions to occupy Italy. The bombing raids intensified in 1943 forcing the Luftwaffle to devote more fighters to aerial defense and remove them from the Eastern Front. The Second Front did not open on June 6th, 1944. I would argue that it was in late 1942 that the Second Front had noticable impact on weakening Germany's war effort with the Soviet Union.
Here I agree 100%. NA and Italy sapped German strength especially armoured strength. At one instance in time I read, maybe in Muller-Hillerbrand, that a full 20% of all armoured vehicles the Germans had were in North Africa. Not to mention the even more important sapping of Luftwaffe strength, and as I said before the Luftwaffe were the unsung heroes of Barbarossa and probably the eastern front. Germany if I am not mistaken had as much as 1 million men manning AA posts or engaged in occupation duty across the continent. One can only imagine what would they do in the east.

ljadw
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Re: World War 2 at a Grand Strategic Level: Correcting Mista

#190

Post by ljadw » 04 Apr 2013, 22:30

On point 2 : In a lot of cases,Hitler was right and his generals were wrong .
BTW :the generals did NOT oppose the reoccupation of the Rhine Land,the Anschluss,the Sudeten .
These are post war claims.

On point 5 :There is NO proof that Stalin would have attacked Germany,this is only the Suvurov blah blah.

On point 7 :Stalingrad was no decisive Soviet victory :there were no such things on the eastern front.

On point 8 :idem for Kursk

On point 10:the LW was not the unsung hero of the eastern front .

AJFFM
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Re: World War 2 at a Grand Strategic Level: Correcting Mista

#191

Post by AJFFM » 05 Apr 2013, 12:40

ljadw wrote:
On point 5 :There is NO proof that Stalin would have attacked Germany,this is only the Suvurov blah blah.
Just because Suvurov said it doesn't make it by default blah. I would say 80% of his claims are indeed blah but the rest have some grain of truth in them.

Stalin went on a rampage after Poland and German help for the Finns annoyed Stalin who sent Molotov with threatening language. His deliberate move against Romania was the last straw. It was calculated to draw German reaction and there was high tension if I am not mistaken because of it. Finally he was amassing the largest weapons arsenal in history, the new model planes and tanks that outmatched their German counterparts were entering service in their hundreds. He might have not drawn the definitive plans to invade but why should he, the entire Soviet doctrine was that of the offensive.
ljadw wrote:
On point 7 :Stalingrad was no decisive Soviet victory :there were no such things on the eastern front.
Stalingrad was the decisive battle in the east because it was the point of no return. Never were the Germans to reach the levels of Summer 42 again in the east and that was a full year before the Italian campaign began effective sapping of German resources.

ljadw wrote:
On point 10:the LW was not the unsung hero of the eastern front .
Here we disagree. Whenever Panzer divisions were decimated by combat it was the Luftwaffe that kept the lines. This was especially true in the Smolensk region during the Soviet counteroffensive in late August/early September.

South
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Re: World War 2 at a Grand Strategic Level: Correcting Mista

#192

Post by South » 05 Apr 2013, 14:02

Good morning AJFFM,

Do you have evidence that in 1939 Germany did not already gain the permanent hostility of the US?

Versailles obliged Weimar to pay reparations. These funds allowed the allies to repay war loans provided by the US. The Third Reich interfered with the revenue streams. I'd argue that this alone demonstrates a permanent hostility.

Add the fortifying political trigger mechanisms present: eg Lend-Lease, destroyers for bases, Panama Canal Atlantic approaches deemed semi war zone waters (The US was a neutral), and permanent hostility can be seen in 1939.


Warm regards,

Bob

steverodgers801
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Re: World War 2 at a Grand Strategic Level: Correcting Mista

#193

Post by steverodgers801 » 05 Apr 2013, 15:25

about the only time in the war did planes guard flanks was in the Normandy breakout. The LW helped defend lines, but it never held them

AJFFM
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Re: World War 2 at a Grand Strategic Level: Correcting Mista

#194

Post by AJFFM » 05 Apr 2013, 16:51

South wrote:Good morning AJFFM,

Do you have evidence that in 1939 Germany did not already gain the permanent hostility of the US?

Versailles obliged Weimar to pay reparations. These funds allowed the allies to repay war loans provided by the US. The Third Reich interfered with the revenue streams. I'd argue that this alone demonstrates a permanent hostility.

Add the fortifying political trigger mechanisms present: eg Lend-Lease, destroyers for bases, Panama Canal Atlantic approaches deemed semi war zone waters (The US was a neutral), and permanent hostility can be seen in 1939.


Warm regards,

Bob
Good evening (my time).

As a matter of fact I can, I have a two polls done by Time magazine, one in Dec. 39 and the other in Aug 41. The Dec. 39 poll shows only 2.5% favour joining the war with the allies and 14.7% favouring joining the war if Germany began to win. 0.2% favoured supporting Germany. 67.4% favoured strict neutrality. Of course we all know the 1940 election campaign was fought primarily on a neutrality platform in which Roosevelt did his best to distance himself from the war.

In Aug. 1941 only 53.7% favoured military action against Germany, while a majority it still not that great of a one.

You can find the polls here:

http://archive.org/details/AreOpinionPollsUseful (page 22-23).

War reparations didn't affect the US directly. For the US the loans were to the allies not the Germans and its their responsibility to give the money back regardless of how. The French let the Germans off the hook and for the Americans, if the French didn't object why the Americans should?

South
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Re: World War 2 at a Grand Strategic Level: Correcting Mista

#195

Post by South » 06 Apr 2013, 08:55

Good morning AJFFM,

Appreciate the clear reply. It was my post that was not clear. I used the expression "permanent hostility of the US" to mean the US political establishment and less so the US national population.

True, in the sense of logic, the war reparations did not - directly - affect the US. The US financial establishment ("Wall Street") knew sovereign loan repayments were a function of the (indirect) war reparations. The US - could - accept a German default on the reparations. The Wall Street component, however, could not accept this. The trend was clear enough. Start at the 1924 Dawes Plan rescheduling of reparations. Around this same time, France somewhat dillusionally worked up its national budgets depending on the German reparations. This set the stage. For researchers here, it was the Morgan syndicate that was not too keen on receiving less than agreed upon amounts. Fast forward to President Hoover's proposed 1 year moratorium on reparations and also Allied war debts. The international financial markets accepted this but French reluctance caused enough delays that it was too late. The later conditions for loans to the Reichsbank-and here I am explicitly thinging of the New York Federal Reserve Bank-commercial bank loans were prohibited. Germany's banking system collapsed.

There was a permanent US establishment hostility against 1939 Germany.

Later, will glance at the provided link. It's appreciated.


Warm regards,

Bob

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