Influence of the Spanish Civil War on the Munich Pact

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JD
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Influence of the Spanish Civil War on the Munich Pact

#1

Post by JD » 03 Feb 2013, 13:32

Hi guys, just formulating a little idea here...

It seems to me that very few people ever discuss the origins of WWII in the context of the political situation in Europe in the 1930s. Certainly, alliances came and went - some lasting about as long as a wine gum - but it seems to me that WWII didn't just start as a war against Nazi aggression.

The situation is Spain gets a bit of coverage but only from limited points of view. The Germans used Spain as a training ground (Legion Condor) and it was there that they developed fighter tactics which they used in WWII. It was also the first time that Germany and Italy teamed up so openly. There was also the use of tanks and bombing of civilians.

I look at it a bit differently. Contrary to popular point of view - not necessarily representative of this forum - I don't believe that the origins of WWII can be discussed in isolation. German military build up was one thing but diplomacy was another.

The point is that all Western European states tacitly or openly supported Franco. The only exception was France which - from memory - developed something of a "leaky border" under Leon Blum (who was forced to adopt an official policy of neutrality).

The big fear at the time was not Hitler but Stalin.

Some governments believed they could deal with Hitler but nobody wanted to deal with Uncle Joe. And don't forget; this fear existed beyond the end of the civil war in 1939, only five months before the outbreak of what became WWII.

So to what extent did this shape international policy in 1938? How did it affect planning for people like Neville Chamberlain or Edouard Daladier? Were some of their ministerial planners blinded to the threat because of a deep-seated fear of communism?

Most importantly of all, how did it affect the shape of the Munich Pact in 1938?

I raise this because I have never read anything which discusses the Pact with any reference to the fact that, at the time, Germany was fighting in Spain and Britain was nominally neutral. For all practical purposes, Britain was tacitly supporting Franco, putting them, in effect, on the same side as Germany... It seems to have always been refracted through the notion that these events occurred in isolation.

For all practical purposes, this would have been impossible.

Now, I realise I've made some assumptions here but I don't believe they are any worse than some of the assumptions of omission in so many previous works. I may also have made some fundamental errors or missed something vital. If anyone has any information on this, I'm open to it whatever it's conclusion.

Globalization41
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Re: Influence of the Spanish Civil War on the Munich Pact

#2

Post by Globalization41 » 12 May 2013, 18:38

The Spanish Civil War: An Overview

Excerpt:

To resist, to hold on, was in part to buy enough time for the world to confront reality. Unfortunately, the British commitment to an appeasement policy was already in place. The Republic now had enough arms for one last great campaign, training and planning for which began immediately. It was to be a crossing of the Ebro in July of 1938, into territory lost in March and April. Initially successful, the Republic's forces were gradually pressed back by the rebel counter-offensive. Even in August or September, arms might have made a difference, but the watershed event of the fall of 1938 was not to be the resupply of Spain's democracy. It was to be Munich.

At the end of September, British and French representatives met with Hitler and Mussolini and granted Hitler Czechoslovakia. Shamefully, Czech representatives were not invited. Meanwhile, with that agreement another unrepresented nation's fate was effectively sealed, for with the signing of the Munich Accord it was clear that the democracies would not stand against fascism in Spain. The Internationals were withdrawn, and Spain fought on alone for several more months. In late November Hitler resupplied the Nationalists with arms. Franco started his final offensive, taking Barcelona in January. At the end of March, Madrid fell. On April 1, 1939, the Spanish Civil War officially came to an end.

For many, however, the suffering was not over. It was not to be a civil war ending in reconciliation, for Franco began a reign of terror aimed at the physical liquidation of all his potential enemies. Concentration camps were set up. Tens of thousands were shot. Mass executions would continue until 1944. Meanwhile, World War II was under way, and many of the volunteers took up arms against fascism again.

Roosevelt Appeals to Hitler, Benes, Monday, September 26, 1938

France, Britain Cede Sudeten to Germany, but Hitler Wants More, Tuesday, September 27, 1938

Berlin Gives Czechs Until Saturday to Agree, Wednesday, September 28, 1938

Hitler Halts War Moves for Munich Conference, Thursday, September 29, 1938

Agreement at Munich, Germans to Occupy Sudetenland, Friday, September 30, 1938

Peace in Our Time, Saturday, October 1, 1938

Stalin Charges Britain and France Bribed Germany to Launch War with U.S.S.R. by Ceding Sudetenland to Hitler, Saturday, March 11, 1939

Germany Seizes Prague, Thursday, March 16, 1939

Spanish Civil War Ends as Nationalists Enter Madrid, 18,000 Political Prisoners Released, Thursday, March 29, 1939

Francisco Franco Bahamonde, or Generalísimo Francisco Franco

FDR Letter to Spain

Letter to Spain, March 1945:

"Having been helped to power by Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany, having patterned itself against totalitarian lines, the present regime in Spain is naturally subject to distrust by a great many American citizens, who find it difficult to see justification for this country to continue to maintain relations with such a regime.

"Most certainly we do not forget Spain's official position with, and assistance to, our Axis enemies at a time when the fortunes of war were less favourable to us, nor can we disregard activities, aims, organisations, and public utterances of the Falange, both past and present.

"These actions cannot be wiped out by actions more favourable to us now that we are about to achieve our goal of complete victory over those enemies of ours with whom the present Spanish regime identified itself in the past, spiritually and by its public expressions and acts.

"The fact that our Government maintains formal diplomatic relations with the present regime should not be interpreted by anyone to imply approval of that regime and its sole party, the Falange which has been openly hostile to the United States and which has tried to spread its Fascist party ideas to the western atmosphere.

"Our victory over Germany will carry with it the extermination of Nazi and similar ideologies."

President Roosevelt pointed out that it was United States practice not to interfere in the internal affairs of other countries unless a threat to international peace existed, but added:

"I should be lacking in candour, however, if I did not tell you I can see no place in the community of nations for Governments founded on Fascist principles. We all have the most friendly feelings for the Spanish people and we are anxious to see the developments of cordial relations with them. There are many things which we could and normally would be glad to do in economic and other fields to demonstrate that friendship.

"The initiation of such measures is out of the question at this time, however, when American sentiment is so profoundly opposed to the present regime in power in Spain. Therefore we earnestly hope the time may soon come when Spain may assume the role and responsibility which we feel it should assume in the field of international co-operation and understanding."

Globalization41.


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phylo_roadking
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Re: Influence of the Spanish Civil War on the Munich Pact

#3

Post by phylo_roadking » 13 May 2013, 02:40

Just a few minor points...
There was also the use of tanks and bombing of civilians.
The use of tanks was more widespread...and certainly more crucial in various battles...in 1918 than in the SCW.

Also - there was nothing new about bombing civilians. The Italians had done in from balloons on tirbal camps in Libya in 1911...the Germans had bombed London (and many other British cities) both by zeppelins AND by Gotha bombers in 1917/18...and in fact, one of the very few successful legal cases against the terror bombing of civilians was brought against the Germans by the Greeks for the German aerial bombing of Salonika in WWI!
The big fear at the time was not Hitler but Stalin.
Dpends exactly who you were taking to! If someone from the RAF....they were CLEARLY oriented against germany from march 1933 onwards...while the British government and Admiralty were actually more concerned at various times about the Italians! THEY were the major restless colonial power in North and East Africa, after all, threatening British possessions...and of course the route through the Med via the Suez Canal to the Far East.
Twenty years ago we had Johnny Cash, Bob Hope and Steve Jobs. Now we have no Cash, no Hope and no Jobs....
Lord, please keep Kevin Bacon alive...

Globalization41
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Re: Influence of the Spanish Civil War on the Munich Pact

#4

Post by Globalization41 » 14 May 2013, 05:37

Stalin and the Spanish Civil War

Excerpts from above link:

...Bolloten, among others, has pointed out that it is impossible to understand Britain and France’s attitude without realising the deep fear of Russia and communism among the elites of these countries.

Others have pointed out that the majority of the British establishment supported Franco in 1936. Even if strategically it had made sense to challenge Italy and Germany in the Western Mediterranean, “class sentiment and property sense would have seemed to blind their strategic sense”, as government advisor Basil Liddell Hart expressed his disappointment in the British elite’s attitude.

The NKVD went to great lengths to destroy all left-wing opponents of Stalin in Spain.

Globalization41.

JD
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Re: Influence of the Spanish Civil War on the Munich Pact

#5

Post by JD » 22 Jan 2014, 14:49

Sorry it took so long to get back on these points.

I didn't realise anyone had actually posted anything.

Thanks for your interest gents. Most of it circles around without quite getting to what I was on about. I only mentioned tanks and bombing of civilians as an example of the way the Spanish Civil War is usually framed in historical terms. I don't intend to discuss it in this topic because it is a distraction. The last post by Globalization41 hit it fairly well. The establishments of both Britain and France - and the rest of Europe for that matter - had lived in some fear of communism and communist revolution for some time, pretty much since 1919 and the beginning of the Red Terror. They had actively worked for the Whites even before then.

The NKVD's activities in the Spanish Civil War, while helping to define the problem, didn't really change anyone's position. Stalin's style was pretty well known and that's why none of the European leadership had any desire to deal with him. This only magnifies the point even further because it shows that for 15 years, the rest of Europe had virtually lived under a policy of regarding the Soviet Union as the pariah. Add to that a bit of "my enemy's enemy is my friend" and you end up with some strange bedfellows and a fair amount of delusion.

But this is exactly what happened in Spain.

Britain, while not actively supporting Franco, could easily have blockaded the runs he made from North Africa but they didn't. I assume this was so that they would not have to surrender Gibraltar if Franco won. That they were prepared to gamble on Franco gives some insight into the level of tacit support within the rest of Europe.

Even the US was not out of the picture. While the government did nothing to help Franco, US industry provided him with 10,000 trucks 40,000 bombs and millions of litres of fuel. These shipments could easily have been stopped.

Yet we always hear about how anti-Hitler everyone except Chamberlain and Daladier were and it is my assessment that few really cared. For me it all points to a deep-seated and continuing fear of Stalin, leaving the door wide open for Hitler to make a home run into Poland. IMHO, this blind-siding was enough to make him believe that, whatever had been decided at Munich (and by September 1939 appeasement had been officially dropped anyway), he would not be challenged.

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Re: Influence of the Spanish Civil War on the Munich Pact

#6

Post by Literalman » 06 Aug 2014, 19:33

In the excerpt from "The Spanish Civil War: An Overview" (quoted above): "the democracies would not stand against fascism in Spain." While that's true, it kind of implies that later the democracies did stand against fascism. I don't think that in going to war against Germany they were standing fascism per se but against German expansionism and aggression.

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