Why German generals tactically superior than Allied Generals

[Oleg Grigoryev]

How a out this for a comparison. How many Axis troops saw combat in Russian by December 6, 1941 vs how many Russian troops saw combat during the same period?

I think comparing force levels that were intialy engaged and subsequently engaged (within 5 and a half months) would give a good indication of the relative successfulness and perfromance of both sides.

In other words, how many troops were at the front on December 6, 1941 (or there abouts) and how many casuaties had both sides sufferred up to that point?

well that would be hardly good indication considreing the fact that RKKA sufferd most of its casualties to prior to that date. Ultimately considreing the fact that Barbarossa achived only 1 goal out of 3 and that was done with much more casulties and material expediture than initially expected I'd say RKKA did it job.

[Sam H.]

Oleg - I fail to understand why comparing the forces ultimately engaged is not a good indicator of the relative likelyhood of success.

(Now - I am taking these numbers out of the air and only using them for discussion purposes - they are not accurate and are not meant to me accurate)

If Germany started with 3 million troops and Russian had only 2 million, but over the course of the next 6 months, Russia receives 8 million new troops while Germany only sends in another million - that would certainly show that Russian commanders had the freedom to - I'm hesitant to use the word because I know it will out rage you - but if the Russian commanders know they can squander their troops in bloody delaying actions, knowing full well that a new supply of troops is comming on the next train, while the German commander knows that he might get 1 solder for every 3 he losses, it certainly demonstrates the ability of the commanders on both sides. All Russian commanders have to do is stall for time and bleed the enemy white.

The Red Army did do its job, it defeated the Germany army and its allies. But the price was incredible. The war in the east was the bloodiest theater in the war.

Looking forward to your reply.

[Oleg Grigoryev]

Oleg - I fail to understand why comparing the forces ultimately engaged is not a good indicator of the relative likelyhood of success.

(Now - I am taking these numbers out of the air and only using them for discussion purposes - they are not accurate and are not meant to me accurate)

If Germany started with 3 million troops and Russian had only 2 million, but over the course of the next 6 months, Russia receives 8 million new troops while Germany only sends in another million - that would certainly show that Russian commanders had the freedom to - I'm hesitant to use the word because I know it will out rage you - but if the Russian commanders know they can squander their troops in bloody delaying actions, knowing full well that a new supply of troops is comming on the next train, while the German commander knows that he might get 1 solder for every 3 he losses, it certainly demonstrates the ability of the commanders on both sides. All Russian commanders have to do is stall for time and bleed the enemy white.

The Red Army did do its job, it defeated the Germany army and its allies. But the price was incredible. The war in the east was the bloodiest theater in the war.

Looking forward to your reply.

the problem is that was not the case. Even if USSR mobilized 50 million people but at any given moment it could field only fraction of it in actual theater - that would still live the Germans with numerical advantage. I'' dare you to find one successful German offensive in 1941 where they were not numerically superior to Soviet troops they were facing.

[Sam H.]

Even if it is true that Germany always managed to achieve local superiority in troops (and I am not conceding the point) - when the total number of troops available ultimately favors the Russians - isn't this testimont to the ability of the German commanders to effectively use the troops available to them?

If Russian will have 10 million troops available over the next six months while Germany has only 6 million available, yet the Germans are able to continually achieve numerical superiority where it is most needed, I'd say one side is doing one hell of an efficient job running the war!

[Oleg Grigoryev]

On February 12 of 1941 Soviet Government decided to reform its tank forces and ordered creation of 60 tanks division (TD) and 30 motorized division - these forces were supposed to be grouped into the so called 20 mechanized corps (MC) of the first wave (later on there was a decision to form 10 more MCs). Each MC was suppose to have 1031 tank : KV1 -126, T34 -420, BT-316, chemical – 152. others – 17. Armored cars – BA10 – 286, BA20-116,. Artillery -172 canons total: 76mm – 24, 45mm – 36, 122mm howitzers – 40, 152mm howitzers -36; mortars: 50mm -
138, 82mm -48. cars and trucks – 5161, bikes – 1679.

It seems to be reasonable to go Military district by military district to see how MC were doing. Lets’ start with Western Military District.


6MC - 4 tank division , 7 tank division , 29 motorized division, 4 motorcycle regiment (MR) ( MC belonged to 10the army)
had T-26 - 126, BT all models – 436, T-34 – 238, KV -113, others - 127
11MC 29 tank division , 33 tank division , 204 motorized division , 16 MR - belonged to the 3rd army; depndidng on the sourced number of tanks for this MC differs significantly – from 237 to 414, no matter what 6 mc was severely under strength. Most detailed breakdown by tank type I have is 162 of T-26, 48 BT all types, 28 T-34, 3 KV,
13MC 25tank division , 31tank division , 208 motorized division , 18MR - belonged to 10th army number of tanks depending on the source – form 282 to 294. Breakdown by type as follows : 263 of T-26, 15 BT of all types, other – 16.
14MC 22tank division, 30 tank division, 205 motorized division, 20 MR - belonged to 4th army; number of tanks differs form 518 to 520; breakdown by type as follows 504 of T-26 6 BT, others 10.
17MC 27 Tank division, 36 tank division , 209 motorized division , 22MR. Military District reserve. Number of tanks differs form 36 to 63.
20MC 26tank division, 38 tank division, 210 motorized division, 24 MR . Military district reserve Number of tanks differs form 93 to 94; breakdown by type : 80 T-26, Bt all models -13. To summarize it out of 6186 tanks that Military District was suppose to have it had 2201, out of 1608 armored cars -494.


As of June 15 1941 MC of Western military district were supplied with ammo: for 152 mm – 0%
For 76mm – 1% (live to consider how that number had to affect KVs and T-34 which were armed with 76mm canons)
45mm - 27%
37 AA - 14%

Artillery of MC, depending on specific formation was provided with means of transportation from 7-30%. 11th and 26th MC had only 8% and 26% of their transport in general – out this number 30% of auto park was in different state of repairs.
Because of simultaneous formation of so many MC district was suffering form cadre famine. Depending on specific MC there were only form 45% to 55% of tank offices and 19%-36% of NCOs. (more to follow)

[Qvist]

the problem is that was not the case. Even if USSR mobilized 50 million people but at any given moment it could field only fraction of it in actual theater - that would still live the Germans with numerical advantage. I'' dare you to find one successful German offensive in 1941 where they were not numerically superior to Soviet troops they were facing.

Considering that the two sides started out with close to numerical parity, and that the USSR mobilised 5 million men between 22 June and 1 July (according to Zhukov), it seems rather unlikely that the Germans retained an overall numerical edge throughout 1941.

cheers

[Qvist]

Since call-ups and raising of new units hardly proceeded at an even pace and large formations were sometimes lost within a brief time, it seems likely that RKKA strength must have fluctuated significantly during 1941. Have anybody seen any firm numbers for different periods of that year?

cheers

[Qvist]

Small points seem to be occurring to me in driblets, hence these multiple short posts. Sam, I believe Oleg is basically right in his comments about your proposed method of comparison - even if the Soviets were fielding a larger number of troops within a 6 month period, this does not neccessarily translate into a numerical superiority at any given time. It would be better IMO to compare forces at various points in time.

cheers

[Qvist]

Adding bits and pieces:

Of course, broader issues of quality are also relevant. Soviet lack of such things as APCs, reconnaissance vehicles and so on is a relevant factor.

But the armor quality issue is not one-sided. While T-34s and KVs are numerically marginal as a percentage of Soviet tank strength, the numbers are very substantial compared to the number of tanks the Axis fielded. And while the T-26 and BT-7 did not have very impressive characteristics, this is must also be seen against the fact that a very significant portion of German armor consisted of Pz Is, Pz IIs and Pz 35ts who did not possess armament sufficient to penetrate even thinly armoured tanks. Also, while the standard German 37mm AT gun was ineffective against several Soviet models, the Soviet 45mm counterpart was adequate against all German models. All in all, it would probably be fair to say that all other things being equal, the RKKA was not at a disadvantage on the basis of the basic combat characteristics of the opposing tanks and AT weapons.

cheers

[Sam H.]

Qivist

I still believe you also have to compare the total amount of troops available over the 6 month period.
If the Soviets fielded 12 million men but never had more than 3 million at the front at any one time - then their losses must have been astronomical. It shows the lack of respect for Cas. shown in a Western army and it also demonstrates the seemingly unending waves of fresh troops continually marshaled against the Germans.

Comparing numbers at a given time are great - but numbers available over a given period also hold some significance. They should not be ignored.

[General Patton]

FastFreddy wrote:

Rommel probably was the best general period. He is often commpared to Robert E Lee.

Lee was a leader and an idiot, ont an operational genius like Rommel. Also patton was a genius. Between Jan.-March 1945 he took over 3000 town and killed 99,000 men and captured 159,000.

[Oleg Grigoryev]

FastFreddy wrote:

Rommel probably was the best general period. He is often commpared to Robert E Lee.

Lee was a leader and an idiot, ont an operational genius like Rommel. Also patton was a genius. Between Jan.-March 1945 he took over 3000 town and killed 99,000 men and captured 159,000.

Single-handedly -by using his fvorite lasso and Smith$ Wesson 44 Russian:) (sorry could not resist)

[General Patton]

what are you suggesting, that patton was a bad general. Sure, amybe a little egocentric, but hey results are what ,matter

[b_c_ries]

Since Everybody seems to think Rommel was such a Great General compared to the Allied Generals, lets compare what the 'Desert Fox' accomplished as opposed to his English counterparts prior to Operation Torch. Rommel, 1) fought a back and forth battle between Libya and Egypt. eventually losing because of not sufficient supplies due to unsecure supply lines which is the natural result of not securing these supply lines by taking Malta. The British Middle East forces under various leaders, 1) defeated 250,000 invading Italian army with 30,000 man force taking 130,000 prisoners. 2) conquered Ethiopia. 3) conquered Eritrea. 4) conquered Somilialand. 5) Conquered Syria. 6) conquered Lebanon. 7) conquered Iraq. 8) lost battle for Crete but in the process convinced Hitler that Airborne operations were too costly to ever be attempted again. 9) fought back and forth battle between Libya and Egypt. Eventually winning because of more supplies, which is the natural result of taking action in 1940 and 1941 to secure these supply lines.

[General Patton]

Amy victories over italians were a joke. THeir army included brothels that go with em. THe british forces were led by the great general O connor, which led to theirr success. However, things went into a nosediveafter O connor was captured. THe most famous desert General, monty, was an idiot. EL Alamien was a blind rush against a tired out artyed out airforced out tanked and out equipped enemy, whichw was also outnumber. Yet monty still took many casualites and fought for twelve days when it should have been four. We was too caustious yet when he was daring,arnhem, his stupidity showed and caused many casualties. HIs plan for Market Garden shows that. Lets advance tanks up a single, outflanked road to link up withs paras that dropped on the 9th and 10th SS panzers, while doing it all un an idelaistic and unreal timetable. Idiot!

Regards, Patton