Axis nations involvement in the early stages of "Barbarossa"

[Art]

Those counter-actions by the II Army corps were not really "combat operations" as such.

I don't understand what you mean by counter-actions frankly. I'm not versed in all details but from the losses record of the 2 Division it appears to be quite a serious engagement, not less serious than this division's participation in the following general Finnish offensive:
http://digi.narc.fi/digi/view.ka?kuid=3507977
Then from the page linked above the II Corps lost more men than Finnish forces taking part in Silberfuchs which was of course a real combat operations. So as far as intensity of combat is concerned we have no reasons to ignore this episode. That it didn't lead in any major results for both sides other than losses is another matter.

[John Hilly]

IIRC II AK requested permission to attack earlier than Karjalan Armeija to occupy important Hiitola crossroads by surprise, though disable Soviets from moving troops around south-west Ladoga tip and to reach better start up areas for further attacks.

[CNE503]

If I understand well, it was a preliminary attack to obtain better results from the main offensive launched later, right?

Mikko's statement ("The initial orders of Lieutenant-General Karl Lennart Oesch's IV Army Corps were given on 18 August. It had to wait that long because the II Army Corps north of it was first to reach the River Vuoksi north of Oesch's corps. The general aim was to encircle and destroy the enemy forces in Viipuri and western Isthmus.") remains still a little bit unclear to me: the IV Armeijakunta stayed more than a month without moving because the II Armeijakunta had first to reach the Vuoksi River, is that right? But why, to make possible a larger encirclement in Viipuri?

Thanks for your help,
Regards,

CNE503

[Orlov]

The Finnish Parliament declared the state of war on 25 June 1941

The best information about preparation and early stages of Continuation War you find in marvelous book of Mark Sołonin "25th June - stupidity or aggression?" (unfortunately only in Russian). He developed the thesis of Suworow, but based on the few available archival sorces. Of course, some will be reminded of mined Finland Bay by German minelayers stationed in Finnish ports and German Ju-88's mined Kronsztadt (took off from East Prussia, landed in Finland for refueling and flying back) - Soviet NKGB and GRU didn't observe those movements and "saw" hundreads German planes in Finland - but it is not disputed bumbling Soviet attack on June 25 at the Finnish airports, because Soviet preparing next war against Finland.
Bestreg Orlov

[Seppo Koivisto]

Parts of Mark Solonin's book seems to be readable in English on his web page:
http://www.solonin.org/en/book_june25

“25th of June: foolishness or aggression?” The idea separating "the two wars" led to an examination of the 2nd Soviet-Finnish war (25th of June 1941 - 5th of September 1944), followed by a book "25th of June: foolishness or aggression", which has been published at the end of 2007. By including state archive information and some of the documents which have been made public only recently, the book pours light on endless, though fruitless attempts Stalin made to conquer Finland. The climax of this reckless and aggressive policy was brought about by the June 25th mass air strike against military and civilian targets in Finland. It led to a new chain of unjustified losses and casualties.

June 25: Foolishness or Aggression
A real story of the Soviet-Finnish military conflict is much more astonishing than any other incredible invention. In 1945 an invincible, multi-million army of Stalin’s empire controlled the enormous territory, stretching between Yellow Sea (Northeast China) to the Adriatic, from Tehran to polar Kirkenes (Norway); Soviet tanks went through the squares in the Prague, Wien, assaulted Danzig (Gdansk), Budapest and Berlin – but couldn’t break the Finnish resistance, a country whose population (including babies to old men) was much smaller than the size of Red Army. Only three European capitals – participants of WWII, weren’t captured by enemy’s forces: Moscow, London and … Helsinki.

[John Hilly]

If I understand well, it was a preliminary attack to obtain better results from the main offensive launched later, right?

Yes.
I remembered wrong though. The aim of 2. D /II AK was'nt Hiitola at that point, but reach a line between Lake of Simpele (Simpeleenjärvi) and Pyhäjärvi from which further advance was easier to achieve.

Mikko's statement ("The initial orders of Lieutenant-General Karl Lennart Oesch's IV Army Corps were given on 18 August. It had to wait that long because the II Army Corps north of it was first to reach the River Vuoksi north of Oesch's corps. The general aim was to encircle and destroy the enemy forces in Viipuri and western Isthmus.") remains still a little bit unclear to me: the IV Armeijakunta stayed more than a month without moving because the II Armeijakunta had first to reach the Vuoksi River, is that right? But why, to make possible a larger encirclement in Viipuri?

Reaching Vuoksi wasn't enough. II AK had to cross Vuoksi and secure beacheads, so eliminating Soviet counter-attacks from east against IV AK.
Encircling Viipuri wasn't an aim yet, but to move fast to reach 1939 border. Viipuri encirciling became possible only after surprise crossing of the Bay of Viipuri by 8.Division.

Hope you can understand my messy text!?

With best,
J-P

[CNE503]

It's clearer now. Thanks John.

All the best,

CNE503

[Karelia]

I don't understand: if it wasn't combat operations, why the 2 Divisioona was "heavily involved"?

I understood that the Finns began the war on June, 26th 1941 (state of war acknowledged on June, 25th), and that their military operations began on June, 29th 1941 in the Carelian isthmus (II Armeijakunta) ; July, 1st 1941 for Northern Finland alongside with the Germans (3 and 6 Divisioonaa) ; July, 4th for the Central Finland (14 Divisioona) ; and July, 10th for the Karjalan Armeija.
Is that wrong?

Cheers,

CNE503

Let me rephrase, since I was in a bit of a hurry earlier.

That operation of the 2nd division was not really any major operation, but a local one with limited targets. However this limited operation turned out to be quite bloody nevertheless.

[Karelia]

Those counter-actions by the II Army corps were not really "combat operations" as such.

I don't understand what you mean by counter-actions frankly. I'm not versed in all details but from the losses record of the 2 Division it appears to be quite a serious engagement, not less serious than this division's participation in the following general Finnish offensive:
http://digi.narc.fi/digi/view.ka?kuid=3507977
Then from the page linked above the II Corps lost more men than Finnish forces taking part in Silberfuchs which was of course a real combat operations. So as far as intensity of combat is concerned we have no reasons to ignore this episode. That it didn't lead in any major results for both sides other than losses is another matter.

"Counter"-actions to soviet attacks against Finland from 22nd June onward - also by the Eastern border. With broader perspective also "counter"-actions to the soviet invasion in the Winter War, which lead to the Continuation War.

See my post above. Indeed there's no reason to ignore anything, this episode included. That limited operation of the II Corps was supposed to be a limited, local operation, not the main thing. However it turned out different.

[CNE503]

Concerning Romanian contribution, I found three contradictory orders of battle for late June or early July 1941:

1) from a Romanian source (Armata Romana 1941-1945, by Cornel Scafes, Horia Serbanescu, Ioan Scafes, Cornel Andonie, Ioan Danila and Romeo Avram):
(from North to South)
3rd Army:
- 8th Cavalry Brigade;
- 1st Mountain Brigade;
- 2nd Mountain Brigade;
- 4th Mountain Brigade;
- 7th Infantry Division.
German 11. Armee:
- Cavalry Corps with 1st Armored Division, 5th and 6th Cavalry Brigades, 6th Infantry Division;
- under German LIV. Armeekorps: 5th, 8th, 13th and 14th Infantry Divisions.
4th Army:
- 3rd Army Corps: 11th and 15th Infantry Divisions, 35th Reserve Infantry Division;
- 5th Army Corps: Guards and 21st Infantry Divisions, Borderguards Division;
- 11th Army Corps: 1st and 2nd Fortress Brigades.
Independant 2nd Army Corps with 9th and 10th Infantry Divisions.

2) from Dr. Niehorster's website (on June, 22nd 1941):
3rd Army with the Cavalry Corps (5th and 8th Cavalry Brigades), Mountain Corps (1st, 2nd and 4th Mountain Brigades) and 4th Army Corps (6th and 7th Infantry Divisions);
Under German 11. Armee command: 1st Armored Division and 6th Cavalry Brigade with the German XI. Armeekorps, 8th, 13th and 14th Infantry Divisions with the German XXX. Armeekorps, 5th Infantry Division with the LIV. Armeekorps;
4th Army with 3rd Army Corps (Guards and 15th Infantry Divisions, 35th Reserve Infantry Division), 5th Army Corps (Borderguards Division, 21st Infantry Division) and 11th Army Corps (1st and 2nd Fortress Brigades);
2nd Army Corps (9th and 10th Infantry Divisions) and 11th Infantry Division were under direct army group command.

3) from worldwar2.ro (on July, 2nd 1941):
The 3rd Army was on the left (north) wing to reconquer Northern Bukovina. To do so, it had the reinforced Mountain Corps (1st, 2nd and 4th Mountain Brigades) but also the 8th Cavalry Brigade and the 7th Infantry Division;
The main thrust was in the central sector, under German 11. Armee direction. There were three main axis of attack: towards Moghilev (on the Dniestr river) with the XI. Armeekorps (76. and 239. Infanterie Divisionen, 1st Armored Division and 6th Infantry Division), with the Romanian Cavalry Corps (5th and 6th Cavalry Brigades) as a flankguard on the left ; towards Balti first, then Soroca with the XXX. Armeekorps (198. Infanterie Division, 8th, 13th and 14th Infantry Divisions) ; towards Dubosari with the LIV. Armeekorps (50. and 170. Infanterie Divisionen, 5th Infantry Division);
On the right (south) wing, the 4th Army had to clear up the area between the Pruth and the Dniestr rivers, with a double attack: the 3rd Army Corps (11th and 15th Infantry Divisions, 35th Reserve Infantry Division) towards Chisinau, the 5th Army Corps (Guards and 21st Infantry Divisions, Borderguards Division) towards Odessa. At the same time, the 11th Army Corps (with the two fortress brigades) had to establish a defensive line along the Siret river.
At the extreme right wing, the 2nd Army Corps (9th and 10th Infantry Divisions) had to break the Danube line and to clear up the coast to the Dniestr estuary.

The latter order of battle seems to be more related to the reality of operations, with a very understable and clear map to help to understand the Axis deployment. It is in accordance to the facts precisely related on the website concerning operation "München", so I tend to believe it is the most accurate of the three.

What do you think about this?

Cheers,

CNE503

[Jeff Leach]

Are you looking for the Rumanian troops committed to active operation during the period 22 June 1941 - middle of July 1941 or are you looking for the order of battle of the troops committed? There are order of battles for the 20th, 25th, 28th and 30th June and 5th, 10th and 18th of July and they are all different. There are also a number of order of battles for "Operation Müchen".

[CNE503]

Actually, an order of battle has much more sense if it is linked to a particular day or event. The problem with the Romanian army in 1941 is that it is hard to determine when this particular event came: on June 22nd, 1941, when Romania entered the war against USSR but only with minor combats and skirmishes to gain bridgeheads on the Pruth river, or on July 2nd, 1941 when started operation "München" and the reconquest of Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina?

The best, I guess, is to have a perfectly clear OoB for June 22nd, 1941 and another one for July 2nd, 1941.

CNE503