Hi Hop,
JESUS, where do you get your information?
From a lot of studying of the BoB. I am confused by your source of information, as the only two sources that come close are
1. The German figures released to the press at the time of the BoB, which added up to 896 according to Wood and Dempster in The Narrow Margin. Unlike the British, the Germans did not admit to their true losses for propaganda purposes.
2. Doug Tidy. However, whilst he gives German losses as 951, he gives RAF losses as 715, so it cannot be from him.
sorry don't mean to get personal, but I would strongly recommend to you to buy some extra literature (preferably non ......)
I'll give you some of my sources with the figures below, perhaps you could enlighten us with the sources that contain the figures you used?
The true figures about aircraft losses regarding the BoB are also known to everybody, I really don't know where you got yours from.
Source, and the dates they include losses from:
Wood and Dempster, The Narrow Margin (10th July - 31st October):
RAF 915
Luftwaffe 1,733
Eagle in Flames, ER Hooton (1st July - 6th October)
RAF 866
Luftwaffe 1438
Stephen Bungay, The Most Dangerous Enemy (10th July - 31st October)
RAF 1023
Luftwaffe 1,887
Williamson Murray, Strategy For Defeat (July - September)
RAF -
Luftwaffe 1,455 on operations, 181 not on operations
John Terraine, The Right of the Line, lists the various widely published figures:
Denis Richards, The Royal Air Force 1939 - 1945
RAF 915
Luftwaffe 1,733 (these are by far the most widely quoted figures)
Winston Ramsey, The
Battle of
Britain Then and Now
RAF 1,017
Luftwaffe 1,882
It's notable that the later research, with better access to Luftwaffe records, has pushed the Luftwaffe loss figure close to 1900.
I mean everybody knows (even the movie BoB is correct on this issue) that the initial Lw raids on Englands airfields where so sucessfull that the RAF was almost down to nill.
Do they?
Williamson Murray, Strategy for Defeat:
What has not been so clear is that these air battles placed a comparable, if not
greater, strain on the Luftwaffe's resources . For the week beginning with "Eagle
Day" on August 13 and ending on August 19, the Germans wrote off approximately
284 aircraft, or 7 percent of their total force structure, or approximately 10 percent
of all aircraft deployed in the three air fleets facing Britain as of July 20.9' For
August, aircraft losses were 774 from all causes, or 18 .5 percent of all combat
aircraft available at the beginning of the month.
Such a high attrition rate had an obvious impact on crew strength and morale. As
Table VII 99 indicates, pilot losses for August were disproportionately high
compared to aircraft losses, undoubtedly reflecting the fact that most of the air
fighting occurred over the Channel or British territory .
The figures in Tables VII and VIII only hint at the problem. Not only had the
Germans lost many of their most experienced combat crews but by September
1940, the percentage of operational ready crews against authorized aircraft had
dropped to an unacceptable level. On September 14, Luftwaffe Bf 109 squadrons
possessed only 67 percent operational ready crews against authorized aircraft. For
Bf 110 squadrons, the figure was 46 percent ; and for bombers, it was 59 percent .
One week later, the figures were 64 percent, 52 percent, and 52 percent,
respectively.
Conversely, aircraft losses for July through September give the impression that
the Germans were running out of aircraft as well as aircrews! (See Table IX .'°z)
Table X'° 3 indicates the cumulative effect of losses from May through September .
These losses indicate the Luftwaffe's heavy commitment for the period .
The impact of losses over southern England combined with inclinations already
present in Luftwaffe doctrine to induce a change in German air strategy early in
September. Attacks on Britain's air defense system through September 6 had given
no indication that Fighter Command was weakening . As a result, Goring-at
Kesselring's urging and with Hitler's support-turned to a massive assault on the
British capital. This all-out effort, directed at London's East End and the Thames
docks, accorded well with Douhet's theories and the German's own belief that
ruthlessness could pay extra dividends .
From The Most Dangerous Enemy by Bungay:
Knowing that their enemy was preparing to 'go down hill' would have been cold comfort to the Luftwaffe. They assumed the enemy had been doing that for some time. In fact they believed he ought to be at his last gasp. General Stapf had reported to Haider on 30 August that the British had lost 800 Hurricanes and Spitfires since 8 August out of a front-line strength of 915. Given Schmid's estimate of their production capacity of 200-300 a month, the British could therefore only have 3-400 left at the outside. After another week of pounding in September, they must indeed be down to their last 200 machines.
In fact, on the evening of 6 September, Fighter Command had over 750 serviceable fighters and 1,381 pilots available to it, about 950 of whom flew Spitfires or Hurricanes. It needed 1,588 pilots to be at full establishment, which is of course what Dowding wanted, so from his point of view he was 200 short.20 From the Luftwaffe's point of view, he had almost 200 more pilots and 150 more planes than he had had at the beginning of July when they set out to destroy him.
Read that last sentence again. On the 6th of September, the day before the Luftwaffe switched to attacking London,
Fighter Command had 200 more pilots and 150 more planes than they'd had at the start of the
battle.
In contrast, Luftwaffe single engined pilot figures (fit for duty):
1 June 906
1 August 869
1 September 735
1 November 673
Here is a graph from Logistics in the
Battle of
Britain by Air Commodore Peter Dye:
This overstates the FC case somewhat, because it includes squadron reserves (although not strategic reserves), and it includes fighters posted away from the
battle area, in the north and west of
Britain. However, the trend is very clear. RAF
strength went up month by month, Luftwaffe
strength went down.
Fighter Command aircraft serviceable:
17 July
* Blenheim - 67
* Spitfire - 237
* Hurricane - 331
* Defiant - 20
* Total - 659
7 August
* Blenheim - 66
* Spitfire - 256
* Hurricane - 368
* Defiant - 24
* Total - 714
4 September
* Blenheim - 50
* Spitfire - 218
* Hurricane - 407
* Defiant - 21
* Gladiator - 8
* Total - 704
The reasons why suddenly the Lw attacks were diverted to bomb cities are also known, definately not because the initial strategy didn't work out.
Definitely because it did. Williamson Murray:
The impact of losses over southern England combined with inclinations already
present in Luftwaffe doctrine to induce a change in German air strategy early in
September. Attacks on Britain's air defense system through September 6 had given
no indication that Fighter Command was weakening . As a result, Goring-at
Kesselring's urging and with Hitler's support-turned to a massive assault on the
British capital.
Bungay:
There was by now a strong groundswell of opinion within the German military hierarchy that this step was overdue. It had been Hitler's sacred cow for too long. Jodl had always been in favour of trying it. At a meeting with Hitler which took place on Eagle Day itself, he had strongly recommended a ruthless air attack on London the day before the invasion. A mass exodus of the population would result in a stream of refugees comparable to that which had clogged the roads of France a few weeks earlier and made movement impossible for the Allied armies.22
In any case, it did not really matter too much if the Luftwaffe could not knock out the RAF and Sealion had to be postponed. There was more than one way to defeat England. An attack on London could be the beginning of extended economic warfare and a U-boat siege. Then Gibraltar and Egypt could be taken from her. As the cost of prosecuting the war grew, England would come round. The key thing was to break her will to resist by the Spring of 1941, when it would be Russia's turn. Invasion was not the only, nor even the best, way.
Hitler had reiterated on 22 August that Sealion would only be carried out if the conditions were particularly favourable. In the meantime, Franco was approached about co-operating on Gibraltar.24 There were plenty of options. So the Luftwaffe might as well have its last try at creating particularly favourable conditions for Sealion.
John Ray, The
Battle of
Britain:
Consequently, according to Deichmann, several days before the opening of the daylight and night raids on the British capital, 'Feldmarschall Kesselring asked me if the RAF fighter forces were by now sufficiently weakened for us to mass-attack the most important targets in London without too great a risk to our bomber-formations.' In this way, Kesselring and his commander-in-chief hoped to attract the bulk of the RAF's remaining fighter force to the defence of the city. There, German aircraft would have the best chance of destroying them and achieving final victory. After that would come the overwhelming of other units of the RAF, preparing the way for a seaborne invasion. In Goering's opinion, if total success were achieved by the Luftwaffe, there well might be no need for landings, as the British Government would be compelled to seek peace.
Basic faults in Luftwaffe strategy and tactics thus far had led to failure to win the daylight battle. Fighter Command, not needing to win the battle, only not to lose it, had held on. In spite of the determination of German bomber crews in launching raids against airfields or aircraft factories, or in being used as bait to attract British fighters into contest with Bf 109s, the outcome had not been resolved by the early days of September. The RAF, fighting with equal determination and great courage within a carefully planned defensive system, had proved to be the biggest and most efficient air force ever engaged by the Luftwaffe. There would be no more easy successes comparable with those gained in Poland, Norway, the Low Countries and France.
These factors were exacerbated by poor German Intelligence. A survey of British fighter strength on 17 August estimated that only 300 fighters were left at Dowding's disposal, a number reckoned to have been severely reduced over the following three weeks of unrelenting assault. This handful of machines was the force which the Luftwaffe was about to demolish. It is small wonder that Goering invested such faith in the great afternoon raid on 7 September, followed by the opening of the Night Blitz. Here was to be the final crushing of Dowding's forces, which explains why Deichmann claimed that the change of strategy was 'necessary for military reasons if a decisive victory was to be won'. He stated that // Fliegcrkorps and Luftflotte II wanted mass attacks 'even if air superiority had not been achieved', because of'the general situation of the war in the air'.
There was, however, a more pressing need for the Germans to change the bulk of their campaign from day to night raids. This was the extent of their bomber losses from mid-July to the end of August. According to the Quarter-Master General's Department of the German Air Ministry, by 30 September Luftwaffe bombers had suffered a 69 per cent casualty rate during daylight raids. This total comprised 621 aircraft destroyed and 334 damaged; when this number is added to the 724 bombers destroyed or damaged during May and June, the rate of attrition suffered by aircrews is obvious. 'The losses suffered by our bomber units must be terrible,' wrote a German pilot stationed in Denmark on 25 August, a comment supported by several factors. The first was the peril of the double crossing of the Channel, especially the return flight. The second was that men shot down over Britain, if escaping with their lives, inevitably became prisoners-of-war, with no chance of return. The third was the weak defensive armament ofbombers confronted by eight-gun Hurricanes and Spitfires. Interviewed in 1945, WernerJunck, who commanded Luftflotte IIFs fighters during the battle, claimed to have advocated 'at an early date in the Battle of Britain that night attack be substituted for day attacks. This was finally done because of the severe losses in daylight raids.' He called the battle 'a sort of air-Verdun, in which the Germans were at a disadvantage'.
By the start of September, German hopes that the Luftwaffe alone would defeat Britain by a daylight offensive were looking forlorn. The only realistic assault, by means of a seaborne landing followed by a series of land battles, all protected by the Luftwaffe's air umbrella, became increasingly unlikely. Suitable tidal conditions for an invasion to be launched by the middle of the month were narrowing in number. A mutual distrust of commitment between the German Army and Navy brought delay which left the burden of war in the hands of Goering's aircrews. Yet, on the British side, the suspicion that the raids on London were the forerunners of seaborne landings occupied the minds of military leaders, politicians and the nation generally. One result of the bombingon 7 September was the issuing of the invasion code-name 'Cromwell' at 8.07 p.m. as landings were believed to be imminent.24
A change from day to night attack would provide bomber crews with a cloak of darkness in crossing the Channel and reaching targets. The strain and fear of fighter attacks would be removed. In the opinion of Noble Frankland, 'the only opportunity for a sustained air offensive was therefore under conditions in which Messerschmitts and Spitfires could not operate effectively; that is, under the cover of darkness'.25 The pressure on the morale of German fighter pilots by September was considerable, a point made by Steinhoff, who led an escort group of Bf 109s. Bomber crews were affected at least as greatly, as they had less chance of protecting themselves in combat. Weariness from continuous operations, together with heavy casualties, caused a small number of aircrew to be affected by Kanalkrank, the German equivalent of'lack of moral fibre' (LMF).
He goes on:
To summarise, the Germans had a variety of motives for turning to attacks on London and opening the main Night Blitz against Bntain. They were thereby able to take pressure off the Luftwaffe, especially bomber crews, by changing the main assault from the RAF to economic and civilian targets. Also, they made much of the claim that they were doing no more than retaliating for RAF raids on German civilians. Whatever the truth or exaggeration of that, German leaders were not slow to use it as a justification for the Night Blitz
And last; the packing of Bombers was exactly what the British were waiting for, this was the only way to takle the Lw in full strength. Which was disasterus for the Lw since the (according to my oppinion - For the BoB useless H-111 and DO's) could be brought down like sitting ducks and an average of 10 min combat time for the accompaning 109's was simply not enough to protect the bombers.
The loss records show the opposite is true. From Eagle in Flames by Hooton, Luftwaffe daylight
fighter and bomber sorties and loss rates for the 3 phases of the
battle: (not in quotes because they are compiled from tables, rather than quoted)
Channel phase, 1st July to 4th August
Bombers
Sorties 1150
Losses 100
Loss rate 8.7%
fighters
sorties 3350
losses 56
loss rate 1.7%
Fighter sorties per bomber sortie 2.9
Main phase, 5th August - 1st Sept
Bombers
Sorties 3850
Losses 303
Loss rate 7.9%
Fighters
sorties 12,450
losses 359
loss rate 2.9%
Fighter sorties per bomber sortie 3.2
Attack on London, 2nd Sept - 29th Sept
Sorties 4125
Losses 192
Loss rate 4.7%
Fighters
sorties 8450
losses 280
loss rate 3.3%
Fighter sorties per bomber sortie 2
The dates don't coincide with the phases exactly, because they are weekly totals, but it's a good indication of the loss rates per phase.
Note how the bomber loss rates are astronomical in July and August, and only drop close to acceptable levels in September, with the attacks on London. That's despite actually flying more bomber sorties than at any other period of the
battle.
by Taigong on 03 Feb 2007 12:06 
.....it would still be Taipong's mission to support his allegations. But it could be done by others than numbers...... 
