Luftwaffe Bombing of Warsaw and Rotterdam

[4thskorpion]

I am sure that the legal experts can tell you which, if any, of these are in breach of the "laws of war"

Art. 17. War is not carried on by arms alone. It is lawful to starve the hostile belligerent, armed or unarmed, so that it leads to the speedier subjection of the enemy.

Art. 18. When a commander of a besieged place expels the noncombatants, in order to lessen the number of those who consume his stock of provisions, it is lawful, though an extreme measure, to drive them back, so as to hasten on the surrender.

Art. 19. Commanders, whenever admissible, inform the enemy of their intention to bombard a place, so that the noncombatants, and especially the women and children, may be removed before the bombardment commences. But it is no infraction of the common law of war to omit thus to inform the enemy. Surprise may be a necessity.

Art. 21. The citizen or native of a hostile country is thus an enemy, as one of the constituents of the hostile state or nation, and as such is subjected to the hardships of the war.
The Lieber Code

I believe the later Codes said something similar or weren't interested in this problem - but I'm not a legal expert.

Are these not US conventions governing armies of the US - General Orders No. 100 : The Lieber Code 1863? Were they adopted by governments outside of the US jurisdiction in the 20 Century?

[4thskorpion]

And 4thskorpion - how did Jewish daily newspapers in Warsaw respond to the events of the 13th?

I am not sure when Warsaw's most widely read Polish-Jewish daily the Nasz przegląd (Our Review) stopped publishing in 1939 but was definitely published up until 18 September 1939. Finding consecutive issues online is proving problematical!

[wm]

If the Hague Conventions couldn't provide an answer you were required to use principles established between civilized nations, and as the last resort the requirements of the public conscience.
The US was a civilized nation - one of the most developed then. The Liber Code and Oxford Manual were source and inspiration for others regulations. And both codified principles established between civilized nations.

[histan]

Hi GregSingh

I am very interested in the information you have on the results of the bombing on and around military and other targets in Warsaw.

Like you, I had assumed that the damage I had seen was the result of bombing errors - for example the bomb damage on the approaches to a bridge was because of across track navigation errors.

Regards

John

The stuff you have - pictures, leaflets, maps etc - never ceases to amaze me, you always seem to have something exactly relevant.

[GregSingh]

Italian Embassy building in Warsaw.
Although we can't see the extent of the damage to the back of the building, this one perhaps was caused by an artillery fire?

According to a daily newspaper rooms belonged to Italian Fascist Party were hit.
There seemed to be no damage to the surrounding buildings on aerial photos, so it had to be one of those "stuff happens" events...

Italian Embassy - Warsaw 1939

[4thskorpion]

A US diplomatic mission building on ul. Jasna 11 hit by German bombing and shelling:

Amerykanski Generalny, Jasna 11
Also housing:-
American Joint Distribution Committee (Amerykanski Zjedn. Komitet Kozdzielczy) Jasna 11
American Joint Reconstruction Foundation, Jasna 11

Noted American freelance war and foreign correspondent Paula LeCler's news caption on the reverse of this photo also mentions; "low-flying planes indiscriminately bombing civilians":

Paula_LeCler_Warsaw.jpg (113.88 KiB) Viewed 582 times

An extract form Paula LeCler's report form Warsaw 1 September 1939 originally published in Article first published in the British national newspaper the Daily Telegraph, Sept 11, 1939:-

Poland's fortitude as seen by a visitor in Warsaw
Public calm under stress of mobilisation and first air onslaughts.

Watching the raiders

When I reached my hotel, I found bulbs being changed, blinds drawn, public rooms screened from the street, and the beginning of that atmosphere of nocturnal blackness into which the city was to be plunged for an indefinite period.

At 6.15 next morning—the fateful Friday, Sept. 1—I was abruptly awakened by Warsaw’s first air raid alarm. With breakfast came the news that war had started—with the deliberate artillery and air bombardment of Katowice and other Polish towns soon after dawn.

At nine came the second Warsaw air alarm—followed closely by the staccato shots of anti-aircraft guns and the slower rumbling noise of distant bomb explosions. From the square in front of the hotel—among dozens assembled there and staring up curiously as if the sight were some spectacle quite remote from their actual lives—I watched two squadrons, each comprising nine big German bombing ‘planes in formation, appear in the clear sky above the heart of the city. There followed a pursuit by a smaller number of Polish ‘planes, and more shots, before the battle in the skies drifted out of our range of vision. This was Warsaw’s first real sight of the waging of war in the air.

Four or five additional alarms followed during this first day—each a prelude to an air raid with its ghastly toll of life, mostly in the outlying residential districts of the city and the suburbs. Next morning my room waiter told me that his house, with several others in his neighbourhood, had been shattered the previous night. Only by a miracle had he and his family escaped. Half a dozen of his friends and neighbours had been killed.

Full article text: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/history/worl ... arsaw.html

So far I have found Paula LeCler was one of 4 US photo-journalists in Warsaw in September 1939, the other three were Juilen Bryan, Harrison Forman and Frank Mutto.

[4thskorpion]

Two images of Warsaw's Praga district ablaze during the siege:

Below: Looking down one of the main highways into Warsaw, which is completely engulfed in burning smoke on the horizon

Below: Warsaw still smouldering on 1 October 1939

Caption on the reverse:

[4thskorpion]

Below: Warsaw burning - 25 September 1939.

Below: Captions on the reverse of the above.

Below: Night sky over Warsaw seen burning at 11 pm from 20kms away, at least I think that is what the caption below says?

[histan]

I have spent some time looking at British War Cabinet documents available for download for free from the UK national Archives.

The Chiefs of Staff produced a weekly summary of operations, one of which was posted earlier in this forum.

Of relevance to this topic is the one for the week after the one that was posted previously - which is given below.

This identifies a change in Luftwaffe policy from 13.09.1939 onwards and that orders were issued.

Certainly ties in with a meeting between Hitler and Göring on 12.09.1939 and the attack on Warsaw on 13.12.1939 that I have discussed above.

More circumstantial evidence.

Regards

John

[histan]

The War Cabinet also asked the Chiefs of Staff to examine the legality of German operations in the war to date.

The first response to this task was delivered on 12.09.1939.

On the basis of the evidence available to them, they concluded that air operations conducted up to 11.09.1939 could be considered to be legal.

Regards

John

[histan]

But immediately afterwards evidence appeared that caused them some possible problems with air operations after 11.09.1939 and they issued an update.

Date of the communique is not clear to me but it seems to me to be even more circumstantial evidence

More thinking to do!

Regards

John

[Hop]

The BC of course did not start bombing civilians in May 1940. In fact, it didn't fly any illegal attacks ('terror boombing') on German targets until Harris took over command. The single exception and first indiscriminate bombing by the BC was the attack on Mannheim in 12.1940. The first indiscriminate bombings by the GAF on British targets were the Baedecker-attacks in April and May 1942.

The Luftwaffe orders for the Coventry raid in November 1940 made housing a target. From The Blitz Then and Now, vol 2, p257, instructions for KG4:

In addition to destruction of industrial targets, it is important to hinder the carrying out of reconstruction works and the resumption of manufacturing by wiping out the most densely populated workers settlements.

[Reichskriegsgericht]

Hello John,

you wrote:
„I am a little surprised that the presence of a division at the outskirts of a city seems to mean that anything goes. Does that mean that the problem with Dresden is not the destruction of the city or the number of civilians killed but the fact that there was not a Russian division on its outskirts. Or that Harris should have waited until 21st Army Group reached the outskirts of Hamburg then he could have created firestorms until he got bored.“

Let me very briefly outline the legal frame here:
1. There is international law codified in conventions, protocols and similar treaties and there is the customary international law. This is undisputed among legal experts.

2. When the airplane emerged as a weapon, the legal experts, politicians and the military tried to incorporate it into the system of international law. During the Great War and in the years shortly before and after, there was an intense discussion whether Hague IV covers air warfare or not, and if yes, in what manner. The result of this discussion was that Hague IV covered the aerial warfare in the zone of operations of the ground forces, but not strategic attacks against targets outside this zone. This was also undisputed. Instead the doctrine of the 'military object' was developed.

3. When WW2 broke out, no codified treaty regarding the strategic aerial warfare had been signed. But the question remains if it was covered by customary international law and if yes, to which extent. Here lie the most difficult legal and practical problems, especially regarding the 8th & 15th AF of the USAAF, the Luftwaffe and the BC and their strategic attacks.

To answer your question, Harris didn't have to wait until Monty's troops had reached the outskirts of Hamburg to attack the city. He could attack military objects in Hamburg at any time and it would have been legal, provided he observed certain rules and precautions. These rules would be fewer or non-existent after the arrival of allied troops.

But the attacks on Warsaw were no strategic attacks as soon as the city came into the zone of operations of the German army (07. or 08.09.39) and therefore Hague IV fully applies. The applicable rules are Section II (Hostilities), Chapter I (Means of Injuring the Enemy, Sieges, and bombardments):

Art. 25 The attack or bombardment, by whatever means, of towns, villages, dwellings, or buildings which are undefended is prohibited.
Art. 26 The officer in command of an attacking force must, before commencing a bombardment, except in cases of assault, do all in his power to warn the authorities.
Art. 27 In sieges and bombardments all necessary steps must be taken to spare, as far as possible, buildings dedicated to religion, art, science, or charitable purposes, historic monuments, hospitals, and places where the sick and wounded are collected, provided they are not being used at the time for military purposes.
It is the duty of the besieged to indicate the presence of such buildings or places by distinctive and visible signs, which shall be notified to the enemy beforehand.

None of these rules was violated by the GAF during the attacks on Warsaw. Indiscriminate attacks in the zone of operations were allowed as long as the military advantage by destroying the target was not out of proportion to civil losses. This includes the use of incendiaries, bombing food storages, water, gas and electricity installations, even bombing whole blocks and city quarters to force the Poles to surrender as quickly as possible.

It would have been a war crime for example if the Germans had rejected a polish offer of surrender or only some companies of polish infantry had remained in a small part of the town, but the bombardement of the whole city had continued nevertheless, or if the GAF had deliberately targeted buildings with distinctive and visible signs as mentioned in Art 27.

When you, John, wrote „I do not believe that there was a requirement to take precautions to avoid civilian casualties but that there might have been a requirement to consider the proportionality between the value of the desired military outcome and the number of civilian casualties that might result.“, you described the legal situation regarding indiscriminate attacks in the zone of operations quite accurately (although some precautions are necessary and could be taken) .

And then you continue: „I have some concern at achieving military outcomes by deliberately targeting the civilian population. I have fewest problems with attacking the civilian infrastructure (electricity, gas, water, telecommunications) since after all I am of the John Warden generation! I am open to persuasion that deliberately destroying civilian property and killing civilians as a way to achieve the military outcome of the surrender of a city was justifiable.“

Between „no precautions necessary to avoid civilian casualties“ and „deliberately targeting civilians“ is a pretty thin line, right? The GAF didn't have to attack a 'military object' once Warsaw was in the zone of operations or even under siege. IMHO it would be legal to deliberately target civilians in a besieged town in an attempt to force the enemy to surrender as quickly as possible, depending of course on the importance of a quick surrender and the overall tactical and strategical situation. You might say the GAF didn't take any precautions to avoid civilian casualties on the 13.09.1939, but still they bombed for a military valid reason.

Plus, when you write it might be required „to consider the proportionality between the value of the desired military outcome and the number of civilian casualties that might result“, you will also have to show how commanding officers could properly consider that before the attack in face of the poor technical standards of navigation and targeting at that time, the weather, enemy resistance and other factors. The considerations could not be more than rather vague guidelines to the crews.

Back to the attack of the 13.09.1939:
Additionally to Speidel I have consulted „Luftwaffe Methods in the Selection of Offensive Weapons - Deichmann & Marquard“, „System of Target Selection Applied by the German Air Force in WW2 - Deichmann“ and „ Planning & Development of Bombs for the GAF 1925-45 - anon, translated by Heitman“.

I didn't find any mention of deliberate targeting civilians during the attacks on Warsaw. Speidel mentions two requests of von Richthofen to attack the jewish quarter of Warsaw (without giving a specific reason for the requests), but both were denied. All other targets in Warsaw during the days around the 13.09.39 were rail movements and facilities, roads to block the movement and retreat of polish forces through the city and polish artillery postions. Also mentioned are the unsatisfactory results of many of the bombings. The Vistula bridges were hardly hit and open until the last day. The accuracy of bombing was vastly overrated before the war. This was an experience the RAF and USAAF were yet to make.

My guess, based on this information, is the GAF tried to block the roads and the approaches to the bridges by targeting the adjacent housing blocks with HE-bombs and incendiaries because that was a promising way to stop troop movements across the bridges (except attacking trains and columns directly). Speidel also mentions the successful blocking of road approaches in Praga by the Fliegerführer zbV.

Last but not least, to the documents you posted. The most important point is Nr.9 of the third, undated document (war cabinet) stating 'the crux of the whole matter is to establish the truth'. In none of the documents any information is given regarding place, name, date, attacking planes or casualties. No evaluation is possible. The documents quote the Rules of the Hague Draft of 1923, but do not distinguish between the zone of operations and the rest of Poland. This would have been essential for a legal assessment. Also the conclusions drawn from the quoted german document are wrong.

The german communique which the third document refers to deals with resistance by polish civilians against entering german troops. Nowhere are attacks on undefended polish towns and villages mentioned. Hague IV clearly states in article 1:
„The laws, rights, and duties of war apply not only to armies, but also to militia and volunteer corps fulfilling the following conditions:
To be commanded by a person responsible for his subordinates;
To have a fixed distinctive emblem recognizable at a distance;
To carry arms openly; and
To conduct their operations in accordance with the laws and customs of war.
In countries where militia or volunteer corps constitute the army, or form part of it, they are included under the denomination "army."

As long as civilians starting to fight against approaching german troops (not after an occupation!) followed these rules, they were regarded as combatants and the normal rules of war apply, which means they could be targeted by the GAF or artillery. If they did not follow the rules, they were not protected by any international law of warfare.

Another point: To determine whether the GAF deliberately targeted civilians on the 13.09.1939 or later, one should first and foremost consult the attack orders of the participating units and/or their after action reports, not some british documents with no facts which only attest to the level of information available to the British in these days and to their process of decision making, but are no evidence for details of the military operations in Poland. Other valuable information could be found in polish damage reports (that probably don't exist giving the circumstances and confusion on polish side) or reports of german recon planes or german damage assessment teams after Warsaw had been occupied.

[histan]

I have also been thinking some more about the application of the legal principles.

I believe that proportionality applies to the planners of the attack and not to the pilots who would carry it out. For example, I think deploying a whole bomber group to bomb an area where there are known to be possibly thousands of civilians (with possible casualties of say 100) in order to clear a single sniper would fail a proportionality test.

Bombing Warsaw to kill the defending soldiers may require some form of area attack because individual targets can not be specifically identified. I consider that this could pass the proportionality test, given the likely ratio of military to civilian casualties. I consider that the use of heavy bombers in Normandy does pass this test and that any equivalent bombing of Warsaw in support of a ground forces attack would also pass this test.

I am happy with your point that civilians bearing arms may be treated as combatants.

I have also read accounts of 4 Panzer Division's attempt to enter Warsaw ("Blitzkrieg Unleashed: The German Invasion of Poland, 1939 by Richard Hargreaves) and can accept that the German Army could believe that the citizens of Warsaw were prepared to fight alongside their soldiers.

I also found this (Case White by William Russ) 10.09.1939 " in the afternoon an order from the Führer directed that the Luftwaffe would direct more attacks against the city of Warsaw itself. The Luftwaffe told the Army Group that most of these attacks would be directed at the bridges in Warsaw across the Vistula and in the suburbs of Praga to cut off any of the enemy forces from retreating into the city from the East. The Luftwaffe added that 4 Panzer Division and the SS Leibstandarte Regiment be withdrawn from the West edge of Warsaw so that these units would not be hit by stray bombs" No reference for this statement but Russ had access to all of the German Army records at NARA so I am happy to accept it.

We can now postulate a logical series of events that could explain the bombing on 13.09.1939.
The Luftwaffe attacks on the bridges undertaken on 11.09.1939 and 12.09.1939 do not achieve much, if any success. The Luftwaffe reviews its performance on 12.09.1939 (with or without consulting Hitler) and decides to try blocking the roads in Praga by setting fire to the place. Military target is retreating Polish soldiers and destroying Lines of Communication. Civilians in the area are perceived to have previously shown themselves as willing to fight the German ground troops.
A legal attack (nothing wrong with the ends, the ways, or the means). By all accounts achieves almost nothing and so not tried again.

Just as logical as:
Hitler is angry with the Poles for various perceived breaches of international law plus with the campaign almost over he can punish the Jewish population of Warsaw at the same time. Discusses this with Göring on 12.09.1939 who orders Luftwaffe attack with objective of setting fire to the Jewish quarter.

I am not sure that any orders issued by the Luftwaffe High Command, even if they could be found, would be explicit either way. I also don't think the individual attack orders would be that much different, whatever the objective - i think that the crews would be briefed about approach routes, aim points, etc not that they were deliberately attacking civilians - which of course they might not have been (see my point above)

From what I have read, apart from von Richthoven, no one in the Luftwaffe was particularly keen on carrying out illegal operations - not even Göring, who seemed more keen on peacemaking activities.

There is a logical answer to my question - "what were the military ends behind the attack on 13.09.1939?" - retreating Polish soldiers and Lines of Communication.

The British Chiefs of Staff were more concerned about attacks on "open" towns and villages - the town into which the UK ambassador had moved had been bombed! The first paper they produced had a list of reported incidents - all but one were dismissed immediately and all that related to Warsaw were assessed as being against military targets with civilian casualties resulting from bombing inaccuracies. I think we can be confident that they were attempting to be objective and that they were concerned by reports from Poland but could not say if they were true or not and that the truth needed to be established.

Regards

John

[4thskorpion]

Scroll of Agony: The Warsaw Diary of Chaim A. Kaplan
By Chaim Aron Kaplan, Abraham Isaac Katsh

Page 30: Scroll of Agony: The Warsaw Diary of Chaim A. Kaplan

Kaplan was certainly scathing of the Polish military leadership in Warsaw:

Page 37: Scroll of Agony: The Warsaw Diary of Chaim A. Kaplan