Suppling Demyansk

[Richard Murphy]

Morning all,

Working on updating my files on Brockdorff-Ahlefeldt, I was doing some digging around looking for specifics on the air bridge and found that, whilst Sydnor (Soldiers of Destruction, The SS Deaths Head Division, 1933-1945 p215 n7) states that;

For the first two weeks of the air supply operation the Luftwaffe managed to deliver more than the daily minimum tonnage calculated by Busch, achieving peak deliveries of 182 tons in 110 flights on February 22, and 286 tons in 159 flights into the pocket on February 23. [b]Thereafter, the weather, Soviet fighters, flight crew exhaustion and a shortage of aircraft caused the deliveries to drop off to a daily average of less than half the minimum requirements for the trapped German forces

citing NA/T-312/556/8167219-7261 (Containing the daily tonnage summaries of the supplies air-delivered by the Luftwaffe to the Demyansk field during February)

Yet, Hooton (Eagle in Flames, The Fall of the Luftwaffe (p173) says that;

By then [The time the pocket was evacuated in January 1943-RFM] Morzik's Gruppe had flown 33,086 sorties, bringing in 64,844 tonnes of supplies and 30,500 men (24,303 tonnes and 15,446 men by 18th May [when a land-link was re-established-RFM.].).

By my calculations, this means that an average of 315 tonnes (310 tons) were delivered every day of the 77 days that II Korps was supplied purely by air, which is actually higher than Sydnor's figures, not "less than half"!

Does anyone have first hand sources that can confirm which is correct?

Also, are there any figures available for losses amongst the Luftwaffe supply formations (Which I presume were bombers as well as JU-52's).

Regards from the Park,

Rich

[brustcan]

Hello! In February 1942 the Russians surrounded two German Army Corps(six divisions - 100,000 men) at Demyansk. The forward airfields were a short distance from the pocket, and tied directly to airfields in the Baltic
Countries. From Germany to the Baltic to the forward airfields was relatively easy to move planes and supplies. The pocket was relieved in May 1942. During that time, the airlift flew 14,455 missions, moved 24,303 tons of weapons and supplies, and 22,093 wounded out. The performance averaged between 100 - 150 missions and 265 tons daily.
The Luftwaffe lost 265 transport aircraft during the Airlift. source: "Strategy for Defeat" Robert Mathis, based on the German Military Archives in Freiburg Germany. Cheers brustcan

[tigre]

Hello to all ; just a little complement for this old thread

Supplying the Demyansk Pocket.

On February 9, contact with overland supply lines was severed by the Soviets and the Demyansk Cauldron was born. Inside the Cauldron were the remnants of several German divisions from the II and X Army Corps and from neighboring Army corps that had been caught up in the Soviet net. Hansen had moved his headquarters to Staraya Russa, some 20 miles northwest of the Cauldron’s western perimeter. Von Brockdorff’s headquarters remained in Demyansk and was given overall command of the encircled German forces. He had approximately 95,000 men to hold the Russians at bay.

The Germans had to carry at least 300 tons per day of general supply (calculated on the basis of 2/3 of the ration for men and 1/4 for the cattle) in order to meet the demands of the personnel and the cattle. For this, and considering that each Ju-52 could carry 2 tons per flight, it would be necessary around 150 aircraft / flights daily ; more considering the casualties, technical failures and climatic factors it was estimated that only 30% of aircrafts would be serviceable at the same time, therefore some 500 aircrafts were needed to achieve the daily quota according to calculations by the Luft-Transport-Führer (Head of Air Transport).

Sources: http://www.wwiihistorymagazine.com/2005 ... ldron.html
http://otvaga2004.narod.ru/publ_w2/demyansk.htm
Vor 30 Jahren – Harte kämpfe am Ilmensee von Max Sachsenheimer, Generalmajor a.D.

Cheers. Raúl M .

[tigre]

Hello to all ; more folllows.......................

Supplying the Demyansk Pocket.

On February 18, 1942 Generalmajor Fritz Morzik, who served as the Chief of Air Transport in the Quartermaster General Section of the Luftwaffe and Commander of the Blind Flight Schools (by instrument), was ordered to transfer his forces to the 1 st Air Fleet. Morzik established his headquarters in Pskov-Sud (an airport with all facilities and operating all time), at that time his staff consisted of himself, 5 officers and 3 soldiers. The officers were: Hptm. Metscher (Operations and Intelligence Officer), Hptm Trautwein (Technical Officer), Oblt Langer (Personnel Officer), Oblt Oberländer (Communications Officer) and Lt Bernt.

On February 19, 1942 five transport groups were subordinated to Luftflotte 1, in order to take part in the first major air supply mission to Demiansk. These groups were:

IV./ KGzbV 1 based at Ostrov.
KGrzbV 600 moved from Orsha to Korov’ye-Selo.
KGrzbV 700 moved from Orsha to Pleskau-West.
KGrzbV 800 moved from Vitebsk to Korov’ye-Selo.
KGrzbV 900 moved from Vitebsk to Pleskau-West.

http://www.wwiihistorymagazine.com/2005/may/fea-cauldron.html
http://otvaga2004.narod.ru/publ_w2/demyansk.htm
Vor 30 Jahren – Harte kämpfe am Ilmensee von Max Sachsenheimer, Generalmajor a.D.

Cheers. Raúl M .

[tigre]

Hello to all ; more folllows.......................

Supplying the Demyansk Pocket.

On February 20, 1942 the first Ju-52 began to land on the snowy airfield at Demjansk which measured 800 x 45 meters. Such were the conditions that the gunners of the planes stayed at their posts while their aircraft were unloaded – there was always the chance that they would be attacked by low-flying Soviet ground attack aircraft. The planes were allowed 90 minutes for unloading, after which took off immediately. Initially the aerodrome did not have the support services to the most basic navigation requirements.

Mortsik required the construction of a second airfield inside the cauldron (Peski) to supply the 100,000 men trapped, since a single airfield was very vulnerable and could be easily blocked by enemy forces threatening the entire operation in that case. In the month of March it was built this airfield in Peski, some 15 kilometers east of Demjansk, but this track was about 30 meters wide, so only the most experienced pilots could use it. The capacity to operate there was reduced to 1.5 tons because of the snow was not compact enough. Both airfields could be used only during the day.

Sources: http://www.wwiihistorymagazine.com/2005/may/fea-cauldron.html
http://otvaga2004.narod.ru/publ_w2/demyansk.htm
Vor 30 Jahren – Harte kämpfe am Ilmensee von Max Sachsenheimer, Generalmajor a.D.

Cheers. Raúl M .

[tigre]

Hello to all ; more folllows.......................

Supplying the Demyansk Pocket.

In the second half of February it was necessary to get four transport groups to supply the "cauldron" and these groups were brought from the center and south of the eastern front, Germany and even the Mediterranean (KG zbV 500 commanded by Maj. Beckmann ) which went from the hot desert to - 30 º C of the Russian winter. After few weeks the crews should undertake their own maintenance due to the lack of technicians and due to weather conditions the operational aircraft fell to 25%.

Finally in early March came other five groups of transport, the maintenance personnel and pilots were recruited from anywhere, even the instructors and students of schools. One group consisted of bombers He-111 and the other were equipped with Ju-52. Two groups were dissolved and their airplanes reinforced the other groups (see table below)

Table 1

GROUPS OF TRANSPORT AIRCRAFT, OPERATING IN DEMYANSK

GROUP --- COMMANDER --- AIRFIELD

AT THE BEGINNING OF OPERATIONS

KG zbV 9 --- Major Hammer, later Hptm. Zahr --- Riga / Pskov-Sur
KG zbV 172 --- Oberstlt. Janzen, later Oberstlt. Jackel --- Pskov-Sur

01 TO 19 FEBRUARY, 1942

IV. / KG zbV 1 --- Oberstlt. Beckmann --- Pskov-Sur
KG zbV 600 --- Hptm. Zeidler --- Korov’ye-Selo
KG zbV 700 --- Mayor Mugemthallen --- Pskov-Oeste
KG zbV 800 --- Mayor Kalepky --- Korov’ye-Selo
KG zbV 900 --- Hptm. Stipschitz --- Pskov-Oeste

LATE FEBRUARY 1942

II. / KG zbV 1 --- Oberstlt. Neundlinger --- Ostrow
KG zbV 500 --- Mayor Beckmann --- Pskov-Sur
KG zbV Posen --- ? --- Ostrow
Kg zbV Oels --- Oberstlt. Schweitzer --- Pskov-Sur
KG zbV 105 --- Oberstlt. Deffner --- Pskov-Sur

BEGINNING MARCH 1942

KG zbV 4 --- Mayor Krause --- Riga
KG zbV 5 --- Hptm. Zahn --- Dvinsk / Riga
KG zbV 6 --- ? --- ?

DISSOLVED TO REINFORCE OTHER GROUPS

KG zbV 7 --- ? --- ?
KG zbV 8 --- Oberstlt. Damm --- Dvinsk

Notes: Oberstlt. - Lieutenant Colonel; Hptm. - Captain

Sources: http://www.wwiihistorymagazine.com/2005 ... ldron.html
http://otvaga2004.narod.ru/publ_w2/demyansk.htm
Vor 30 Jahren – Harte kämpfe am Ilmensee von Max Sachsenheimer, Generalmajor a.D.

Cheers. Raúl M .

[tigre]

Hello to all ; more folllows.......................

Supplying the Demyansk Pocket.

At first the transport aircrafts flew alone or in small groups at low altitude but this increased losses because the Soviets could concentrate fire on a single machine on the ground and on the other hand one Ju-52 had little chance of surviving an encounter with an enemy fighter.

Soon the tactics were changed and the airplanes began flying in large formations up to 30 aircrafts and at high altitude (2500 meters), so the German subtracted their aircrafts from the Soviet flak and small arms fire and the concentrate airborne weapons could repel with more effectiveness an attack of hostile fighters.

Occasionally an fighter escort was organized for the airlift and even was envisaged a permanent escort by means of aircrafts Bf-110 but the lack of airplanes not allowed to fulfill the plan.

Sources: http://www.wwiihistorymagazine.com/2005 ... ldron.html
http://otvaga2004.narod.ru/publ_w2/demyansk.htm
Vor 30 Jahren – Harte kämpfe am Ilmensee von Max Sachsenheimer, Generalmajor a.D.

Cheers. Raúl M .

[tigre]

Hello to all ; more folllows.......................

Supplying the Demyansk Pocket.

The low capacity of the pocket imposed heavy demands to the air traffic in Demiansk having strict take-off times. Insufficient fueling created great difficulties and many planes had to be redirected back to the airfield which had received fuel. During the operation it became clear that not all flight equipment was able to withstand the low temperatures existing, so for example the BMW-132 engine that was to be maintained after 200 hours of use, suffered problems already with 40 hours. Thus emerged the urgent need for weatherization of all systems and equipment on board of the Ju-52.

During the period of existence of Demyansk springboard (from 20 February 1942 to January 1943), the German airlift carried out ​​32,427 flights, carried 64.844 tons of cargo and 30,500 men. In return flights brought 35,400 men, most of them sick and wounded. In the most intense period of February 19 to May 18, 1942, when terrestrial communications were cut, the Luftwaffe fulfilled ​​24,303 flights, delivering 15,446 tons (an average of 273 tons per day) and recovered 22,903 wounded.

Sources: http://www.wwiihistorymagazine.com/2005 ... ldron.html
http://otvaga2004.narod.ru/publ_w2/demyansk.htm
Vor 30 Jahren – Harte kämpfe am Ilmensee von Max Sachsenheimer, Generalmajor a.D.

Cheers. Raúl M .

[tigre]

Hello to all ; last part.......................

Supplying the Demyansk Pocket.

German aircraft losses during transport operations at the siege of Demyansk in the period January 1 to May 20, 1942 - Source Bundesarchiv.

Period --- Enemy fighter --- Enemy AA Defence --- Hostil Ground Fire --- Other causes --- Unknown --- Flying --- in total

01.02-10.02 --- --- --1 --- --- --- --1
11.02-20.02 --- --- --- --1 --3 --1 --5
21.02-28.02 --2 --2 --1 --6 --7 --3 -21
01.03-10.03 --2 --5 --- --3 --9 --7 -26
11.03-20.03 --1 --5 --- --4 --6 --4 -20
21.03-31.03 --5 --- --- --2 -10 --3 -20
01.04-10.04 --5 --- --- --2 --4 --- -10
11.04-20.04 --- --1 --- --1 --1 --- --3
21.04-30.04 --- --2 --1 --1 --- --- --4
01.05-10.05 --1 --- --2 --- --2 --1 --6
11.05-20.05 --- --- --- --- --- --- ---
Total --- 16 -- 15 -- 5 -- 20 -- 42 -- 19 -- 116

104 Ju-52, 10 He-111 and 2 Ju-86.

Sources: http://www.wwiihistorymagazine.com/2005 ... ldron.html
http://otvaga2004.narod.ru/publ_w2/demyansk.htm
Vor 30 Jahren – Harte kämpfe am Ilmensee von Max Sachsenheimer, Generalmajor a.D.
Die Ju-52 im Zweiten Weltkrieg. Janusz Piekalkiewicz.

It's all folks. Cheers. Raúl M .

[tigre]

Hello to all ; some pictures regarding the topic.......................

Supplying the Demyansk Pocket.

Source: Die Ju-52 im Zweiten Weltkrieg. Janusz Piekalkiewicz.

Cheers. Raúl M .

[naxos]

Luftwaffe casualty card:
Feldwebel Helmut Goldbecker of 4. Staffel, Kampf-Gruppe z.b.V. 900 flew on March 15, 1942 his Ju52 into the Demjansk pocket. He was shot down inside the pocket. His Ju52 crashed 4 kilometres south-west of Anino/Demjansk. Suffering from a fractured scull, fractured left arm, frostbite, contusion and bruising of his left thigh and hypothermia, he was taken to the field hospital of the 123. Infanterie-Division. Goldbecker recovered from his wounds at Demjansk. Outside the Demjansk pocket the Luftwaffe assumed that he was killed in the crash - only in Mai 1943 was his file corrected to: "severely wounded".

Feldwebel Goldbecker was born on September 4th 1913 in Gütersloh. His dog tag was: 62840/31

[Larry D.]

Hi Naxos -

The interesting thing about the above is the image of the casualty card. Where in the world did you get this? These cards are closely held at the Krankenbuchlager in Berlin and WASt Berlin is the only authority given access to them, and then only for the information they contain. This has been the case since 1988 when the German privacy laws were enacted. I have been a researcher, historian and author of the Luftwaffe for nearly 50 years now and have spent many days in the Bundesarchiv-Militärarchiv at Freiburg-Merzhausen. I have never encountered one of this cards before.

?????????? Larry

[naxos]

Hi Larry;
I wish these casualty cards would all be kept at the WASt, sadly they have been discarded and dozens of them were sold on eBay. Another source for research lost to historians.

[Larry D.]

Amazing, Naxos, truly amazing! I am hoping the ones sold were duplicates or something, but that seems unlikely. It must be that someone thoughtlessly ordered them trashed after the data was computerized or the cards were shot with a digital camera. Anyway, it's a shame, as you said, because so few original Luftwaffe documents survived the war, too few to be throwing anything away.

Casualty reports called NVMs (Namentliche Verlustmeldungen) are at WASt in Berlin and I haven't heard of any of these being discarded. Maybe they thought they didn't need to have both the NVMs and the cards.

Larry

[tigre]

Hello to all ; thanks for sharing it here naxos . Cheers. Raúl M .