Eagles Of The Reich

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AirborneAllTheWay
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Eagles Of The Reich

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Post by AirborneAllTheWay » 10 Aug 2002, 17:41

Here is something for you to read...


Eagles of the Reich by Piers Brand.



Introduction

During 1928 Brigadier General William Mitchell ordered an exercise which involved six soldiers parachuting from an United States bomber and setting up a machine gun on landing. The exercise was a success and demonstrated that the idea of airborne assault was a viable military tactic. This was not the first deployment of airborne troops during the 1920’s. Germany had for many years been watching with interest the airborne developments in Russia and Italy. The Italians had developed the first effective static-line parachute and during the 1930’s the Russians demonstrated their ability to drop large numbers of troops onto a precise objective. Six thousand Russian troops “successfully put down at designated drop zones” . Amongst the German observers who watched with interest the Russian manoeuvres in 1935 and ’36, was General Hermann Goring. Impressed by the airborne forces, Goring re-built his Landespolizeigruppe (Provincial Police Group) ‘General Goring’, as the first fledgling German airborne regiment. This unit was incorporated into the Luftwaffe on 1st October 1935 and training commenced in earnest with sufficient volunteers to allow a Jager battalion to be set up in January the following year. As Britain and America failed to explore the airborne role, Germany although a late starter, recognised the potential of this new weapon.
The idea of an airborne assault was not new in the world of military theory in the thirties. William Mitchell had proposed the idea of an airborne assault during the First World War to end the stalemate on the Western Front. Mitchell had suggested parachuting the entire U.S. 1st Division behind the German lines into the Menin-Roselare region. His belief was that the surprise and confusion would lead to the dissolving of the entire German front. His idea came to nothing, the logistics were unavailable at the time and the war came to an end before the proposed operation date of February 1919. Mitchell’s idea was also met with widespread contempt from fellow military leaders. Even after his exercise in 1928, his idea did not meet with any acceptance till after the first German operations in 1940.
The roots of airborne troops however, lie much further back than with William Mitchell. In April 1889 the American Charles Leroux parachuted before an audience of German officers. One of these, General Alfred Von Schifflen, stated that “parachute deployment offered new dimensions of tactical surprise, especially as a method of shock, vertical invasion against otherwise inaccessible enemy headquarters”. Von Schifflen did however note that the technology of the time did not offer the directional control required for military operations. This drawback was not remedied till the invention of the backpack parachute, by the Italians in 1911. The lack of technology meant that the aircraft needed for airborne work did not emerge till the First World War, and in fact the first formal airborne units did not come into being until after the war. In 1918 the Red Army had a small unit of parachute troops, which by 1930 was large enough and professional enough to take part in military exercises. The Italian army had set-up an experimental unit by 1927 and by 1938 they had a formalised parachute company.
Russia’s first test operation, witnessed as previously mentioned by Hermann Goring, was a small-scale attack on an ‘enemy’ headquarters, as recommended by Von Schifflen. This exercise involved 1000 parachute troops and 5000 air-landed troops. These demonstrations showed the new tactical horizons of airborne assault and also proved in practice what many had only considered in theory. Red Air Force Marshal Mihal Schtscerbakov, remarked during a tour of the Maginot Line, that “Fortress’ like this may well be superfluous in the future if your potential adversary… parachutes over them!”
By 1933 Germany had a small body of parachute troops, foreign developments proved to be a catalyst for further development, as did the changing face of military doctrine after the legacy of trench warfare. Opinions were changing to favour the mobility of air and armoured power. In this context, parachute troops used in an airborne assault offered the ultimate mobility for Germany’s land-based troops and could completely alter battlefield dimensions and dynamics.
Airborne operations are often termed vertical envelopment and this is probably the best description of their value. The essence of envelopment is to pin the enemy in place so that his forces can be destroyed. A strong force in an enemies rear disrupts not only supplies and communications, but also makes an enemy more vulnerable to a frontal attack. An airborne attack can also have a major psychological impact on the enemy as the confidence that everything to the rear is friendly, is no longer a certainty. Troops under threat from airborne assault can no longer assume that those coming from their rear are friendly reinforcements. This causes acute strain on defending troops as the line between friend and foe is blurred, and confusion spreads rapidly in this situation. Airborne operations also change how a defending force can deploy. It forces an opponent to protect possible drop areas and if surprised will force them to weaken their main line in order to reduce airborne pockets. In some respects airborne assaults are impossible to defend against. It is only when luck intervenes, that airborne forces can be destroyed while dropping, before being able to form defensive positions. To an aggressor the value of airborne troops far outweighs their numerical strength, when used correctly. The combination of these factors would prove decisive in the coming war.
The Fallschirmjager would lead the Nazi assault on Europe, and all the advantages and disadvantages of airborne forces can be seen in their operations of the Second World War. The aim of this dissertation is to examine the use of the Fallschirmjager in an airborne role. To look at the individual operations that had consequences for the development of the Fallschirmjager and the strategic outcome of those operations. Then the outcome will be examined to see how it effected the German strategic war effort. The conclusion will aim to answer the question how greatly did the Fallschirmjager contribute to the German war effort?











Chapter One- Development

During the years leading to the outbreak of war in 1939 the Fallschirmjager were trained and developed as a leading formation of the new German military. Hitler wrote, of the Fallschirmjager, that “you are the chosen men of the Wehrmacht. You will seek combat and train yourselves to endure all hardships”. This gave them the ‘esprit du corps’ that stayed with the Fallschirmjager units throughout the war and allowed them to truly consider themselves an elite fighting force. The effort and work during the embryonic stages of the Fallschirmjager’s development laid the foundations for one of the most valuable forces in the German military.
In Nazi Germany the strategic possibilities of airborne forces were quickly appreciated. In January 1936 a Luftwaffe paratroop training school was set up at the Stendal-Bostel airfield. This became home to the ‘General Goring’ regiment under their new commander Bruno Brauer. Within six months the first graduates of the Stendal School made their first jumps, not from the wing of an aircraft as Russian paratroopers did, but through the side doors of a transport aircraft. This method of exit would become standard, not just for Germany, but for the airborne units of most nations.
During the spring of 1937 the German army finally gained the authority to establish a paratroop company of their own, but due to the lack of army training facilities the soldiers were sent to the Stendal school as well. The fact that two different formations, intended for the same purpose, should train independently of each other at the same place, is indicative of the petty rivalries which typify the chaotic nature of the Nazi State. Alongside the lack of experience, there was confusion as to the actual role of the paratroop force during war.
The German army saw the employment of airborne forces during war in much the same manner as William Mitchell. He proposed the landing of large bodies of troops behind enemy lines, would enable conventional infantry attacks to be carried out in the enemies rear. For that reason the German high command selected the 22nd Infantry Division to be trained up and employed for air-landing operations. The Luftwaffe’s idea for the employment of airborne troops was to form small commando style units, which would be used to attack and destroy key enemy targets. To facilitate this the Luftwaffe training plans reflected a stress on military engineering skills. In particular the techniques for demolition. The two parachute arms of service eventually amalgamated and each submitted its evaluation of airborne strategies to the German Armed Forces High Command (OKW). In 1938 the OKW issued a directive, contained within it were two paragraphs, which detailed the two types of airborne operations. The first was classed as a “strategic air-landing mission carried out in conjunction with the Army”. The OKW summarised this as follows: “the scope and execution of an air-landing operation depends upon both the military situation and the intention behind the operation. In addition to the air-landed troops other Luftwaffe units, fighters and fighter-bombers are to be employed. This type of mission must be closely linked to army operations. The Luftwaffe will be responsible for the preparation and execution of the battle plan as well as for air supply drops. The army will only assume command of the air-landed formations once contact has been established between those men and our own ground forces”. The second type of mission was termed an “Air-landing operation within the framework of a Luftwaffe mission”. This was described as follows: “In this connection what is implied are sabotage or demolition units landed on to objectives which have been nominated by the Luftwaffe because it had not been possible totally to destroy or severely damage them by aerial bombardment”. These two out-lines neatly fit with the operation for Crete, and the demolition of Eben Emael. In the end “exponents of both viewpoints were to see their ideas tested, and it is to the credit of the Fallschirmjager and their instructors that they were able to fulfil both expectations”.
There were tactical differences between the two concepts of the Army and the Luftwaffe on the use of airborne troops. The Army believed that a point of maximum effort (the Schwerpunkt) should be quickly established by means of a mass airdrop too large for the enemy to counter. The opposite Luftwaffe concept was known as the ‘drops of oil’ technique. This would involve a number of simultaneous parachute drops, each would be of a relatively small number of men, which would group together to form perimeters and cause a threat to the enemies line at numerous places. It was at these formed perimeters that troops were reinforced and extended until these perimeters became the Schwerpunkt.
While arguments raged over the conceptual nature of Germanys parachute troops, the airborne forces continued to increase, and over time it became clear that it was necessary to amalgamate the differing groups into one major formation under a single command. On the 1st July 1938 the Luftwaffe High Command (OKL), issued an order stating that the parachute, glider and air transport units under their command would be formed into the 7th Flieger Division, based at Berlin Tempelhof aerodrome. This newly created formation was to be commanded by Major-General Kurt Student whose tireless work and ideas on the deployment of his new troops, would mould the fledgling Fallschirmjager. He was to be a revolutionary leader who would be hailed as the ‘Guderian’ of the Fallschirmjager.
Student infused the 7th Flieger Division with his own passion and pride and greatly reinforced the paratroopers already existing ‘esprit du corps’. But perhaps more importantly, Student saw the role of airborne troops with the same tactical interpretation as the army did. He argued that the small-scale attacks were merely suicidal, as the ability to retrieve the troops after deployment was very unlikely. He felt that the use of large-scale parachute drops would create an “incredible shock to the enemy” . His thoughts and ideas paid attention to the effects that certain tactical choices would have on morale. The decision to put a Luftwaffe Officer in charge that held the same ideas as the army, helped to ease the differing groups. However even with the drive of Student the raising of the 7th Flieger Division had not been completed, nor had the 22nd Air-landing Division completed their training by the outbreak of war.








Chapter Two- Training

A volunteer for the Fallschirmjager spent eight weeks in training, equally divided between basic training and parachute training. The basic training was composed of an intensified format of standerd infantry training. The soldiers learnt combat skills and the use of weaponry, demolitions and tactical deployment as well as parade ground and marching skill. This side of the training was very severe physically and mentally, hardening the new recruits. The emphasis placed on the innate strength of character, was the driving force behind paratrooper recruits and discipline was not as severe as other military units.
If the candidate made it successfully through the first four weeks of training, he would proceeded to the second stage of training, this was the distinguishing factor of the airborne units. German parachute training lasted a further four weeks, with recruits learning basic techniques in the gymnasium and becoming familiar with their parachutes and equipment. The next stage of training was jumps from a dummy fuselage to learn the correct jump position, vital due to the nature of the German parachute design.
The training was aimed at creating a “high quality fighting man, capable of independent action and from the outset was based upon the concept of engaging a superior opponent under adverse conditions”. For example, the paratrooper had to be capable of taking out a machine-gun nest or enemy emplacement, on his own. If only armed with the pistol and grenades with which he jumped, should he be unable to retrieve his weapons from the drop canisters. As a result of this intensive personal training the comradeship and esprit du corps was unsurpassed.
By the time he came to make his first air drop, the Fallschirmjager had mastered the skills of packing his parachute and jumping from an aircraft. Six training jumps were made over the training period, the final jump being followed by a tactical exercise. On the successful completion of his training the soldier gained the coveted Fallschirmschutzenabzeichen (Paratrooper’s Badge). Throughout the training period all the training and exercise of the Fallschirmjager was designed to weed out those who were weak of character and molded the rest with a bond of loyalty to one another and to their officers. Generalleutnant Richard Heidrich spoke of the Fallschirmjager spirit “even if we undergo temporary separation, we remain a single entity”. The German parachute regiments held a very inward looking sense of pride, common to ‘elite’ regiments. They derived satisfaction from their regiments standerds and discipline, rather than gaining satisfaction from the military context in which they performed.
Student had his own peculiar vision of what he wanted to create in the Fallschirmjager. He wished to instill a definite commitment of the individual to the regiment. They would commit to the name, ethos and reputation of the new parachute arm. He wished to make his troops proud to serve in their units, this stemmed from a comradeship, which was deeper than that of any other German regiment. Student stated that “training must be based not on formal discipline based on fear and blind obedience but on the principle of mutual confidence”. Student gained the regimental spirit that he desired and the force became one of exceptional integration, which needed little external pressure to force discipline and mutual support. The unification of the force was to be most expressed in combat, where it showed its phenomenal level of devotion in fulfilling its missions. A German paratroop officer said of his men “the spirit of the parachute soldier is unquenchable” this devotion to duty was to be tested to its limits during the coming war.















Chapter Three- Denmark & Norway


Student reported to Hitler that the Paratroops were disappointed that they had not been used in the invasion of Poland in 1939. Hitler declared that “I don’t want to betray the secret of my new weapon prematurely”. However 1940 was the year that military leaders were given the first examples of what a well-trained highly motivated airborne force could achieve. In April 1940 the Fallschirmjager were to conduct their first major airborne operation. This first operation was based on the first OKW plan for strategic operations. It was to be a large landing, not of the Luftwaffe favoured commando-style raid. It was to be an airborne assault that would be supported by both the Army and Navy. The airborne operation in Norway and Denmark was to be a shock assault force, used for the rapid capture of key bridges and airfields ahead of the main German advance. The seizure of the bridges was of critical importance, as it would allow the German armour to speed on their advance through Denmark. The reason for taking the airfields throughout southern Norway was to give the operational radius required by the Luftwaffe for further campaigns, also allowing the successful deployment of the air-landing units and supplies. The “crux of the plan lay in having air support throughout, for this the airfields had to be captured from the outset”. The attacks on Norway and Denmark were carried out by 1st Battalion Fallschirmjagerregiment Nr 1 (FJR 1) and they encountered a great deal more resistance in Norway, than in Denmark. The first obstacle to overcome was the poor weather and only at the last moment did the skies clear sufficiently to allow the operation to commence. They encountered resistance upon landing which stopped many paratroopers from retrieving weapons from drop canisters. At Sola many canisters fell out of reach, “until he (the Paratrooper) could find a canister he was virtually helpless”. This operation first highlighted the deficiency of dropping weapons canisters. The Stravenger airfield was taken only after reinforcements were dropped, and the Oslo airfield was only secured after help from the 163rd Infantry Division. The Fallschirmjager also suffered its first taste of defeat in Norway. In an attempt to relieve pressure on General Dietl’s force occupying Narvik, the 1st Company of 1st Battalion of FJR 1, parachuted into the Gudbrandsel Valley. The drop took place in bad weather and many men were killed when they were forced to jump too low and many were dropped off course. From the moment they landed they faced intense pressure from the Norwegian forces, managed to continue fighting for four days until lack of supplies, casualties and fatigue took their toll and forced them to surrender. Although the first surrender by parachute troops, it showed their tenacity and willingness to continue resisting against all the odds. The operation in Norway vindicated the use of Airborne troops against an unprepared opposition with the element of surprise. The attack on the airfields in Denmark and Norway was the key element in the Scandinavian campaign. The airfields were required to give air superiority to the Germans and conduct operations against the north of Norway. This campaign secured the iron-ore railway at Narvik and assured Germany of iron-ore supplies. The operation also showed that one battalion could capture four strategic objectives, widely scattered, and within a single day.
This operation did however highlight some deficiencies in the German parachute arm. The German parachute was of a poor design when compared to contemporary Allied examples. The main disadvantage of the German RZ parachute series “was in the harness attachment, and is inexplicable, considering the generally excellent standerd of all German military equipment”. The harness was fairly conventional based upon the Irvin design with the crossways waist, chest and thigh straps. This was united with vertical webs up each side of the chest and crossing behind the back. But the Allied parachutes had vertical ‘lift webs’ rising in front of and behind the shoulders to unite the shroud lines. The RZ followed the Italian Salvatore design and had the shrouds uniting at a single point above and behind the paratrooper’s shoulders. The canopy attached to the harness at a single point behind the hips on the waist belt.
The faults in this design of parachute had several consequences, all of them costly. Firstly the headlong dive from the aircraft fuselage was a necessary precaution, as the paratrooper had to be horizontal when the parachute opened. The shock from opening would have doubled up the paratrooper and jerked head and foot towards each other. If the paratrooper had jumped normally the shock of opening would hit so low down on the body that he would be flipped upside down with a good chance of becoming tangled in his shroud lines as they played out above him. This could result in an accident, which invariably was fatal as German paratroopers carried no reserve parachute as the low altitude drops prevented their use
Secondly, during a paratrooper’s descent, he was unable to gain hold of the shroud lines and alter his direction. The German paratrooper was unable to steer himself towards the target as Allied soldiers were able to do. This led to the widely dispersed drops and caused casualties as troops were unable to avoid dangerous terrain. The German paratrooper was thus “a plaything of the wind, unable to control where he fell or in what direction”. This lack of control became of most importance at the point of landing. Due to the low attachment of the parachute the soldier was forced into a ‘leaning forwards’ posture. This meant that the soldier inevitably faced a forward roll on landing to get down safely. This shows the reason for Germany being the only parachute arm to place so much importance on padded protection for the knees, ankles and wrists. A forward roll landing in full battle equipment, falling at a rate of 12 to 19 feet a second, even under perfect weather conditions was highly dangerous and fractures were common on training drops. Thus dropping in windy conditions with the RZ parachute, onto unknown terrain without control of your descent, was full of risk. All Airborne arms suffer from landing injuries and troop dispersal, but due to the German Parachute design they suffered far worse than compared with Allied paratroop units.
Finally if the paratrooper did get down in one piece, he was faced with the final obstacle of the RZ parachutes. The parachute harness had four buckles to undo, rather than a quick-release box, as on Allied parachutes. The German paratrooper therefore could not get free from his harness very quickly and as the soldier was unable to get to the shroud lines easily, due to the rear attachment of the parachute. This meant that high or gusting winds would drag the soldier across the drop zone if still in his harness. This had serious consequences in Norway were men were killed and seriously injured when strong winds dragged many across rough terrain and some were even dragged into water. The inability to control the shroud lines meant that the paratrooper could not collapse the canopy lip and reduce the danger of him being dragged.
These dangers were all known before the war but the drops in Norway showed how many men were being lost in airborne operations due to the design of the RZ series. This design of parachute remained in service with some slight modifications throughout the war. What is slightly more difficult to understand is why Luftwaffe pilots and crews were issued with conventional style shoulder harness rather than the waist style issued to the Fallschirmjager. The reason for the use of the RZ series was that it allowed for very low altitude drops, “a valuable consideration for a man who may be a sitting duck for ground fire”. Fallschirmjager dropped as low as 250 feet during the invasion of Norway.
A further disadvantage, highlighted in Norway, was the dropping of weapons in canisters. Rather than dropping the weapons with the individual paratrooper, as did the Allies, their personal weapons were dropped in canisters along with ammunition and supplies. This led to difficulties in retrieval, especially when under enemy fire. At the Sola airfield the German paratroopers were kept pinned down for several hours until they could recover their drop canisters. Finding and recovering these canisters was a vital condition to the rapid attainment of combat readiness. This problem was not solved after the Scandinavian campaign and was never satisfactorily solved, except by the use of glider-borne troops. The need for the canisters was again due to the RZ series parachute which did not allow the Fallschirmjager to drop with the heavy equipment bundles that Allied paratroopers could.
A final disadvantage that began to show itself during the Norwegian campaign was the problems with the aircraft used to drop paratroopers. The standerd aircraft used for troop delivery was the Junkers 52, a strong and reliable aircraft that had been in-service since 1930. This was a “very safe aircraft, which due to its construction, was capable of withstanding heavy damage, and still keep flying”. It did however have certain disadvantages, which plagued its use throughout all the Fallschirmjager operations. The Junkers 52 had a very low speed, around 125-mph, and appeared somewhat sluggish in the air. Its main disadvantage was the lack of armoured fuel tanks and although relatively few were lost in this first operation it was clear that against heavy flak and an enemy prepared for an airborne attack, losses in transport aircraft would be high. Also the Germans possessed limited numbers of suitable transport aircraft and this deficiency hampered many operations during the war. After this first campaign other aircraft were tested for parachute drops, but none were as suitable as the veteran Junkers 52 was. It was also the only aircraft suitable for use by the air-landing units as it was capable of landing on roads or even fields, should the need arise. In the “hands of a skilled pilot the Junkers 52 was an excellent if somewhat under powered airplane”. The need for air superiority was a requirement due to the slow nature of these aircraft.
The Scandinavian campaign showed that the armies’ theory for operations in support of the ground forces to create pockets of heavy resistance, was practical in its use. Although the campaign was not as easy as had been expected the Fallschirmjager had distinguished themselves in their first combat operation and had shown the benefits of the vertical envelopment. The use of the Fallschirmjager fr the first time had “proved very valuable”, it was not the most important factor in the campaign. The most decisive factor in the operation was the Luftwaffe deployment, with over 800 operational aircraft deployed as well as 250 transport aircraft. The size of this force overawed the Norwegian forces and paralysed any Allied countermoves against the Germans. But it should be remembered that these aircraft played a very significant part when they operated from airfields captured by the Fallschirmjager. So even in their first campaign the Fallschirmjager provided a “definite strategic advantage to Germany and helped with the eventual conclusion of a rather drawn out campaign”. That did not end until 7th June, when France was on the verge of collapse.



















Chapter Four- Belgium & Holland

Even before the invasion of Poland, Adolf Hitler had conceived of some defining actions for the fledgling Airborne formations. In particular, he envisaged two operations that would be “pivotal to the success of the invasions of Belgium and Holland”. In Belgium, the airborne forces would be allotted the task of destroying the forts of the Reduit National region, in particular the modern, powerful fort called Eben Emael. In Holland the objectives would be the capture or destruction of the nation’s high command, located at The Hague. Alongside these objectives would be the seizure of several bridges vital to the German advance into these territories. The two operations are based on the two strategies adopted by OKW for the use of Airborne troops. The operation in Belgium was a commando-style raid as prescribed by the Luftwaffe against a target, which could not be destroyed from the air and would cause a lengthy delay to a ground assault. The operations in Holland followed the armies’ concept of airborne warfare and involved operations, which would act in concert with the ground forces advance.
Perhaps the most dangerous of these operations was the neutralisation of the Eben Emael fortress which was claimed to be the “most formidable fortification in the world at this time”. Eben Emael was built 150 feet up on the west bank of the Albert canal which ran at a parallel to the river Maas. It was defended by a garrison of 2000 men and a mass of anti-tank ditches, pillboxes, multiple anti-aircraft machine-guns and large cupolas containing retractable heavy artillery. The northeastern side of the fort dropped 130 feet directly into the canal and the ground to the northwest was able to be flooded to provide another obstacle to advancing troops.
For the capture of Eben Emael and the three key bridges in its vicinity, a special unit was formed under Hauptmann Walter Koch. It consisted of personnel from No. 1 company 1st Battalion FJR 1, and the pioneer company from 2nd Battalion FJR 1 and the glider group. This was to be the first operation in which the Germans were to employ the use of gliders. The group was named Sturmabteilung Koch (Assault Group Koch) after its leader and numbered around 500 men. It was assembled in November 1939 and began training in the Adler mountains on Czechoslovakian fortifications of a similar construction shortly after. The troops underwent intense training involving the use of new explosives specially designed to destroy fortifications. The glider pilots too trained hard for their role at Eben Emael and soon were able to land ten gliders in an “area little larger that of a tennis court”.
For the operation in Belgium the force was split into four sections, each with its own defined objectives and codename. ‘Concrete’ under Leutnant Schacht was to seize the Vroenhoven bridge, Leutnant Altmann was to lead ‘Steel’ in an attempt to take the Veldvezelt bridge and ‘Iron’ commanded by Leutnant Schachter was to capture the Canne bridge. ‘Granite’ force was to be led by Leutnant Witzig and had the responsibility for the capture of the primary objective- Eben Emael. Confidence in the abilities of the assault troops was high, as only 83 men and two officers were to destroy the concrete monster.
The key element for the success of this operation, was the element of surprise. To facilitate this, gliders were to be used to bring in the troops. This would allow for complete silence, no engine noise, and would also land all the troops together. There would be no scattering of troops in Belgium. The greater directional control of the glider was a vital factor in the Germans success, as at Eben Emael, the gliders were to land on the fortress roof.
All the attacks took place simultaneously and two of the bridges were taken intact. The Vroenhoven bridge was destroyed by the Belgian defenders as the gliders landed, as the defenders had spotted German army troops advancing towards them. Had the German troops not advance further than was ordered, it seems likely that the third bridge would have been captured intact. The troops of ‘Iron’ designated to take the destroyed bridge carried on with their attack in the face of intense enemy fire and succeeded in capturing their designated targets. All the attacks succeeded in part due to “the surprise glider landings, thus allowing the troops to land at full combat readiness”. The German commanders were able to launch attacks from the moment of landing, making full use of the element of surprise with violent, well planned assaults.
The small, but highly trained group that landed on Eben Emael, had not only the advantage of surprise, but new hollow-charge explosives. This would not only be the first use of gliders in war, but also the first use of hollow-charge explosives. These explosives provided an ideal method for punching through the thick concrete structures and for destroying the gun barrels of the heavy artillery pieces. The forts guns had to be destroyed to allow the advancing German force to move forward unhindered by enemy fire. If the fort was not suppressed, “German forces would face a lengthy siege, which could delay the advance fatally”.
From the first moment of attack, the high level of training and courage of the Fallschirmjager was immediately in evidence. Even though two gliders did not make it through, one of which contained Witzig the commanding officer, the destruction of the fort was as efficient as it was ferocious. For the loss of only six men, they destroyed all of their targets and demolished supposedly impregnable gun positions. The operations in Belgium had proved the “value of elite skills when used in rapid commando-style raids and incisive attacks”. From every viewpoint the attack on Eben Emael was a tremendous German victory. It was a wonderful propaganda piece and increased German morale greatly, it also had the opposite effect on Germany’s enemies. It also showed the Fallschirmjager at their operational best, Kurt Student called the action at Eben Emael “a deed of exemplary daring and decisive significance”.
The operations in Belgium show the true capability of the Fallschirmjager. They were able to defeat vastly superior forces, completely. They showed their toughness and courage and their tenacity to successfully complete their objectives. It also shows the flexibility and initiative of the Fallschirmjager. It is worth noting that the attack on Eben Emael succeeded with 20 per cent of its force missing, making the feat even more remarkable. Witzig did arrive at Eben Emael, after commandering another tow for his glider, and his arrival was a further factor in the success. Witzig’s glider landed some three hours after the attack had commenced and his lucky arrival spurred on the Fallschirmjager to even greater efforts. This shows the effect that the arrival of reinforcements can have on a force, but it also shows the comradeship of the Fallschirmjager. Witzig wanted to be with his men and his arrival increased German morale greatly.
The operation also showed the value of gliders in an airborne assault. With gliders an entire squad could be landed together from the air into a small area and once on the ground was immediately ready for action with its weapons, not having to collect their equipment from drop canisters. With troops dropped by parachute they would be scattered over an area 150-200 metres long and then they required a period of time to recover their weapons and assemble. Also as the towing aircraft released the gliders up to eight miles from their targets, they would be able to approach silently and land noiselessly directly on the target. Command of airspace was the “one requirement for the use of gliders, for the weakly armed transport aircraft and the unarmed gliders would be easy prey for enemy fighters”. Loss of a glider led inevitably to the loss of an entire squad, the one main drawback of their use. The advantages of the glider are easy to see. The ability to land ready for combat, with all your troops in one place, usually on your target, is a tremendous tactical advantage. The Allies saw the benefit of gliders and used them extensively during the war.
As well as gliders a further technical innovation was the use of hollow-charge explosives. These new explosives were ideal for an airborne operation, as they “were extremely powerful, with fifteen times the explosive power of conventional explosives in a directional force”. They also kept weight to a minimum, due to their hollow construction, which is an important factor in airborne operations. The principle of the hollow-charge explosive is that the explosive force is concentrated into a thin stream of power, which would literally burn its way through steel or concrete. The resultant effect of a successful penetration was frightening. The jet of molten metal would burn its way through everything in its path and concussed or killed others with fragments of concrete or steel.
The capture of Eben Emael and the surronding bridges showed that the Germans “were tactically and technically the superior antagonist at this point of the war”. This operation brought together two new concepts of war for the first time, the use of gliders and hollow-charge explosives. Student himself wrote, “the surprise attack on Eben Emael was based on the use of this new weapon (hollow-charges), which was silently transported to the objective by another new weapon- a freight carrying glider”. There is very little in military history to compare with this first daring airborne assault and the force deployed can be seen as clear ancestors of the modern special forces. This operation vindicated the Luftwaffe ‘drops of oil’ strategy, with less than 500 men the advance of the German Sixth Army was assured. Indeed the commander of Sixth Army, General Von Reichenau, thought the operation was “an adventure in which we had no faith”. The success of this operation allowed the German forces to breakthrough the Belgian defences and push the Belgian Army to retreat, just as the British and French were heading to support them. Although the invasion of Belgium was not the most decisive factor in the invasion of the West it did have a vital effect on the coming campaign. It drew the Allies attention in the wrong direction and sucked in the most mobile Allied divisions into battle so that “they could not be pulled back to meet the true threat of the invasion force that struck on May 13th at the weakest part of the French line”.
The operations in Holland were based upon the German Army’s concept of airborne warfare. The general plan was to use the rest of the Fallschirmjager to seize important river crossings and airfields. This was to be combined with a major street-fighting attack launched by the 22nd Air-Landing Division in an attempt to capture the Dutch High Command at the Hague. The Fallschirmjager would have to capture two bridges and two airfields. Both airfields and the two bridges were captured but the attack on the Hague had to be abandoned due to increasing Belgian resistance. The German forces were much smaller than those opposing them and the chance for success rested with the Airborne operation. Student felt that “we dared not fail, for if we did the whole invasion would have failed”.
Some of the problems encountered in Holland were the same as those already seen in Norway. The dispersal of troops was far less as weather conditions were more favourable to the dropping of paratroopers. However it was noted that the white parachutes were far too conspicuous when lying on the ground. This had not been a problem in Norway were most of the ground was covered in snow. In Holland the parachutes could be seen from some distance by enemy troops, both when dropping and when on the ground. This gave away the Fallschirmjager positions to enemy observers. As a result of this the first camouflage colours for parachutes were introduced. These first camouflaged parachutes would be used in the invasion of Crete. Some troops were however dropped in the wrong areas and into terrain, which was heavily defended. This was due to the Junkers 52 pilots failing to identify the correct drop-zones. Drop canisters again proved to be difficult to recover in the face of enemy fire.
Holland did highlight the Fallschirmjagers poor organic artillery. After this operation research began into lighter guns that could be air dropped to provide direct support to the Fallschirmjager during their operations. The artillery which, was being used was unsuitable for their operations. The GebirgsKanone 15, had to be transported inside the Junkers 52 and required a landing site that was secured. Also the weight of the guns gave problems when it came to transportation. Attempts at using Haflinger horses were a disaster, and a new weapon was required. To meet the requirements of the Fallschirmjager there was an entirely new weapon designated for use as artillery by the parachute troops known as the Leichtegeshutze (Light Guns). These were in fact the first recoilless guns. They were designed to allow part of the powder gases to be directed through a large rear orifice. The rearward momentum of the gases equalled the forward momentum imparted to the shell, eliminating any recoil and allowing the barrel to remain stationary. Consequently, there was no requirement for any recoil buffer. A typical feature of this weapon was a large cone-shaped orifice at the rear end of the barrel. Weight was minimised through considerable use of light metal. The light gun was therefore true to its name. It was very light in weight and was a completely new form of gun design. On average its weight “was a third of conventional guns of the same calibre”.
The weapon, was developed by Krupp and its weight allowed it to be dropped in four components by parachute. The weapon was placed in service in late 1940 and would be first used in the invasion of Crete. It could be moved easily by men and could be pulled by a motor-cycle combination.
After the success of the Operations in Belgium and Holland the division was enlarged by the creation of a third regiment, FJR 3. Koch’s Assault Group was expanded into Fallschirmjager-Sturmregiment (Assault Regiment) and possessed four battalions. The operations vindicated the Fallschirmjager and their tactics completely. The value of the airborne troops “when used properly by the Germans, far outweighed their numerical strength”. Although it would be false to state that the invasion of France and the Low Countries by Germany in 1940 could not have succeeded without the Fallschirmjager and the gliders, but would have been made far more difficult without them.


Chapter Five- Crete

On the 20th May 1941, the Fallschirmjager launched the largest airborne operation of the war up until that time. Although they did not realise it at the time, it would also be the last major German airborne operation. The island of Crete was a vital objective to Germany’s overall war strategy in the southern theatre. This island allowed the Allies to retain valuable airfields from which they could conduct attacks against German military formations and the vital Ploesti oilfields. If the Allies did establish long-range bomber formations on the island they could “conduct air attacks against German military operations and its economy”. Student had envisaged using the Fallschirmjager to take islands in the Mediterranean and Adriatic and the hastily put together plan for the invasion of Crete was given the code-name Merkur (Mercury). Student felt that the taking of Crete was a necessary supplement to the campaign in the Balkans. He proposed his ideas to the OKL on the 20th April 1941 and Goring agreed to the operation. Finally Student gained Hitler’s approval for the operation to commence.
The forces, which were to be deployed in Crete, had changed since the operations in Belgium and Holland. Fallschirmjagerregiment Nr 3 (FJR 3) was fully operational and the three Fallschirmjager Regiments came under the command of General-leutnant (Lieutenant-general) Sussmann, the new commander of 7th Flieger-Division. The Fallschirmjager-Sturmregiment (Assault regiment) was renamed Luftlande-Sturm-Regiment (air-landed assault regiment) and the 22nd Luftlande-Division (air-landing division) had been diverted to guard the Ploesti oilfields. They were replaced by the 5th Gebirgs-Division (mountain division) under Generalmajor (Major-General) Ringel. In addition to these forces were the divisional troops of 7th Flieger-Division and a light flak battalion. These forces would be dropped in two phases on four main objectives, three of which were airfields. The first objective was the airfield at Maleme and the capture of various roads, bridges and anti-aircraft positions. The taking of these objectives was the to be the first wave of the airborne assault. This was made up of the Luftlande-Sturm-Regiment under Generalmajor Meindl and was to receive support from Oberst Heidrich’s FJR 3. The second wave was to be Oberst Sturm’s FJR 2 which was to capture the airfield and town of Rethymnon (Retimo) and FJR 1 under Oberst Brauer was to take the town and airfield of Heraklion. These objectives were located some miles down the coast and left this force, in a particuarly exposed position. The 5th Gebirgs-Division was to land in support once the airfields were secured.
The “basic attack plan was sound, aiming as it did at the two operational airfields of Maleme and Heraklion, the limited landing ground at Rethymnon, and the supposed Allied headquarters and main garrison at Canea”. However, not only was German intelligence faulty, they believed that the 50,000-plus troops evacuated from Greece had all gone back to Egypt. Some however had landed at Crete to strengthen the garrison and the Germans were unaware of the true size of the defending Allied force. The Germans did not know that the British garrison had time to prepare the island for defence. The actual fact was that the British were alerted to the fact that the main assault was to be by airborne forces. The British had cracked the German ‘Enigma’ code and Ultra signals sent to the commander on Crete, General Freyburg, warned of the date and substance of the attack. Freyburg spent much time in the organising of defence for possible landing areas and they were prepared with ‘booby traps’ for both paratroopers and gliders. The Germans also expected the defenders to be demoralised by the defeat on the mainland of Greece. This however was not true and the defenders morale was very high, and most expected to crush the German invasion.
The operation to take Crete did eventually succeed, but it was a very costly operation. The total German force employed was 22,000 men and they lost “3,986 killed and missing and 2,594 wounded… Paratroopers killed on the first day made up half of this total”. This was due to the Fallschirmjager commiting to action against a well-prepared enemy and without the key element of success- Surprise. Without the element of surprise an airborne operation is very unlikely to succeed, as troops will be destroyed before they are able to land and organise themselves into an effective fighting force. This was the cause of so many casualties on the first day as the troops dropped onto prepared enemy positions and transport planes were scattered by enemy flak and the troops were widely dropped. The use of drop canisters again hampered troop effectiveness, as many canisters were irretrievable in the face of heavy enemy resistence. Many planes were lost hampering further drops and the procedures in situ for the re-fueling of the first wave planes were poorly organised. The returning planes had to be re-fueled before they could transport the second wave. Due to the fact that the planes had to be re-fueled by hand and the huge clouds of dust generated by the planes caused the second wave to be dropped not en-masse but in small groups which further exasperated the problems on the ground. In contrast to previous operations the Fallschirmjager failed to capture a single primary objective on the first day.
The consequences of this operation were many. Firstly, the costly nature of the operation and the lack of surprise convinced Hitler that the usefulness of the airborne assault was at an end. Secondly, the Germans lost considerable numbers of much needed aircraft, and this was to have decisive consequences later in the war. The attack on Crete showed that an airborne operation would be difficult against a prepared adversary without the element of surprise.
This attack on Crete was “one of the most astonishing and audacious feats of the war”. It was also the most striking example of an airborne operation to date. Even though the Allies had seen the effect of previous operation and expected an airborne attack on Crete, the British commander General Freyberg, “did not regard the threat as seriously as it should have been”. Most Allied concern was directed towards a possible sea-borne invasion and this was actually eliminated by the Royal Navy without having any effect on the battle for Crete. A further reason for the eventual defeat of Allied forces on the island was the lack of air support for the garrison. Without aircraft there was no aerial defence against the German dive bombers and transport aircraft. Throughout the campaign the close support of the Luftwaffe was the saviour of the Fallschirmjager. The close support delivered by Junkers 87 ‘Stukas’ destroyed enemy positions and defences. The main Allied advantage was the interception of ‘enigma’ messages which detailed the forces in the invasion and the date.
It has been suggested that Hitler was shocked at the losses on Crete and ordered the Fallschirmjager to be employed in a conventional ground role. Hitler declared that “Crete has shown that the days of the parachute troops are over, the parachute troops are purely a weapon of surprise, the element of surprise has now been used up”. This however seems invalid as new divisions were to be raised, and further airborne operations were planned. In addition there were several smaller operations launched during the war, which would seem to refute the idea that Hitler only wanted them to perform in a ground role. By the end of the war the German parachute force had grown to army size with two parachute corps containing ten divisions. The reason for the few operations executed after Crete was perhaps due to Hitler’s realisation that the element of surprise had been lost after the campaign. Also the now growing shortage of suitable transport aircraft was to limit the operations that could be carried out by the Fallschirmjager. The loss of 151 Junkers transport aircraft during the Crete operation, nearly a third of the total available to Student was “even more serious for the German war effort”. If Crete had an effect on Germany’s war effort, it was that the production of transport aircraft never caught up with the numbers required. This was to have disasterous consequences for the invasion of Russia, as the Stalingrad air-lift did not have the needed planes to succeed. The operation in Crete and Greece did not delay the launching of Barbarossa, and this notion should be disregarded as “wishful consolation”. After the battle of Crete the Fallschirmjager were employed “almost exclusively as ground troops- in Russia, in Italy, in Western Europe and even in Africa- the Fallschirmjager proved themselves an elite everywhere they served”. In contrast the Allies, once achieving air superiority the prime requisite for airborne operations, used airborne troops in growing numbers. Ultimately carrying out the largest operation of all time when, in the spring of 1945, 40,000 men descended on the Lower Rhine by parachute and glider.
Crete shows the advantages and disadvantages of airborne operations and of the Fallschirmjager themselves. Recoilless guns were used for the first time during the battle for Crete. Four of these guns were dropped by parachute to give the Fallschirmjager some artillery support. The ability to drop guns of this calibre was a distinct advantage for the German forces. They were able to provide adequate fire support and could even be deployed in an anti-tank role. They did however have some disadvantages. The stream of powder gas, which exited the rear of the gun, gave “a conspicuous cloud of smoke and a large flame from the exit nozzle”. This stirred up clouds of dust and dirt when the gun fired thus revealing the position. This made concealment difficult for the crews of recoilless guns. Although the first recoilless guns, production was halted in 1944 due to the large amounts of powder needed in the special cartridges. This was considered to be too high in terms of powder consumption, at a time of the war when resources were becoming scarce for the Germans. Also the subsequent lack of airborne operations, meant that the role designated for the guns was not being used, thus negating the need for specialist airborne artillery.
Used for the first time at Crete was the addition of a single quick release buckle to the RZ parachute harness. This buckle used in limited numbers during the Crete operation dramatically reduced the time the Fallschirmjager took to release himself from the harness and free him from the parachute. The operation also saw the first use of camouflaged canopies and these worked well, the enemy, were unable to spot them from a distance. These again were only used in limited numbers. After Crete developments of camoflaged parachutes was halted. This was due to the Fallschirmjagers unfounded fears that the chemicals used to dye the silk had “an adverse effect upon the swift and smooth unfolding of the canopy”. Parachutes therefore remained white, even though equipment was dropped with camoflaged canopies.
Following the battle of Crete new developments were made in the area of drop canisters. During the battle many canisters were unretrivable in the face of enemy fire and many groups were unable to equip themselves with personal weapons. Due to this larger containers were developed that could hold twice the required number of rifles, sub-machine guns and light machine guns. This was to compensate for the loss of canisters due to damage or ones that could not be recovered due to enemy action. Had these been available earlier in the war it is likely that combat effectiveness would have been easier to attain. Crete also saw the first drops of the German 37mm anti-tank gun. These were dropped by quintuplet parachutes. Of the handful dropped, many were damaged on landing. Those which were used, performed poorly in an anti-tank role, unable to penetrate the British tanks. The Fallschirmjager lacked an effective anti-tank weapon until the development of the Panzerfaust and Panzerschrek. These light, portable weapons could be dropped by canister giving the Fallschirmjager an excellent anti-tank capability. These however, were developed too late, to be used on any large drop, but some were dropped during the last airborne operation launched during the Ardennes campaign. Crete was also the first time that some Fallschirmjager jumped carrying their personal weapons. The only weapon that could be carried was the German sub-machine gun, the MP40. To jump with a weapon was “highly hazardous given the nature of the German parachute”. The weapon was potentially very dangerous on landing, given the forward role technique. There was no official method of jumping with a weapon, but many troops felt that “the dangers of landing with a weapon was far less than the dangers of landing with only a pistol, perhaps far from the drop canisters”. At Crete this belief was obviously widespread as one man in four jumped carrying a MP40. It is worth noting that photographs from the Stendal School show Fallschirmjager jumping with rifles held in their hands. How this was accomplished, and whether it was ever done on an operational drop, remains a mystery.
Further disadvantages of the Fallschirmjager, which were revealed in Crete, were their deficency in communications equipment. The German industry had failed to develop capable lightweight radio sets. The ‘Dora’ and ‘Friedrich’ sets used by the parachute troops were too large and heavy, and their performance in Crete was highly unsatisfactory. Communications were badly disrupted by the terrain, contact between units was difficult. Communication with the German forces on the mainland was almost non-existent early on in the operation and this led to troops being dropped over areas held by enemy troops which had already caused heavy casualties on the dropping paratroopers. This is worth comparing to the experiences of the British 1st Airborne Division at Arnhem. They too suffered from poor radio communications. The Germans never produced an adequate lightweight radio, which could be used by airborne formations.
The use of drug stimulants during the battle of Crete added further problems to the troops fighting on Crete. Troops were issued with Dextro-energen tablets and Pervitin, “a Benzedrine preparation designed to maintain alertness”. These had been used in other operations but the climate on Crete exasperated the side effects of taking these drugs. The main side effect was to “produce an intense thirst” and the heat on Crete and the lack of water available to the invading troops, was a further hinderence to combat performance.
The use of gliders was again successful, although many gliders were destroyed or damaged when landing on the rocky terrain of Crete. Those units that did land in gliders suffered less, as they landed at full combat readiness, but the disadvantage of using gliders was also evident. As stated before the loss of a glider inevitably led to the loss of the troops inside. At Crete the commander of 7th Flieger Division, Sussmann, died when his glider crashed into the sea before reaching Crete. The amount of gliders lost, along with the numbers of transport aircraft lost, was a factor in curtailing the aerial operations of the Fallschirmjager. It is worth noting that the use of gliders did continue and perhaps their most famous employment, after Eben Emael, was their use in the rescue of Mussolini from the Gran Sasso. This operation again vindicated the use of small highly trained commando-style units, in the manner recommended by the Luftwaffe. With the element of surprise the silent approach of gliders was almost impossible to counter. At Crete the role played by glider-borne troops was fundamental in the eventual success of the operation.
Perhaps the most important factor in Crete, was the toughness and resilience of the Fallschirmjager. In their biggest operation they “were tested far harder than ever before”. Even though suffering horrendous losses, in both men and particularly officers, they continued to fight without ever entertaining thoughts of defeat. This confidence in their abilities was due to the intense comradeship and esprit du corps of the unit, and “their devotion to the operation and their pride in their ability to succeed in the face of immense odds”. Although Crete could be considered lost by the British, due to several tactical errors, without the skill of the Fallschirmjager the success of the operation would have been very doubtful. If Crete showed nothing else, it showed the tenacity and toughness of the Fallschirmjager in battle.
The Fallschirmjager fought the battle of Crete without the heavy weapons, which were supposed to reach the island by sea, and against an enemy three times larger than that which they expected to face. The troops suffered losses from bad landings, due to the lack of suitable landing areas on the island. The pilot’s fear of dropping the troops into the sea meant that many pilots dropped them too far inland and onto enemy positions. They were also surprised to find themselves facing enemy tanks and were also at the stiff resistence put up by the defenders. The taking of Crete secured the Eastern Mediterranean Sea to the Germans and for the moment kept the vital Ploesti oilfields from harm. After this pyrrhic victory, Germany would never again launch a large-scale strategic operation. Crete had shown the “vulnerabilities of airborne deployment in the face of a prepared opponent”. Gliders proved slow and easy targets for anti-aircraft fire and their landing was also dangerous. This reduced the numbers of troops even before combat had begun. Parachute deployment meant that men had to spend “exposed seconds hanging in the air in full sight of the enemy, and even more dangerous minutes retrieving weapons canisters and releasing themselves from their harness”. But for all these reasons, the paratroopers would rarely take to the air again simply because the war was eroding Germany’s resources and the “planes and infrastructure were no longer there to facilitate such major parachute drops”. The wings of the Fallschirmjager were clipped and they were now to be deployed in a ground role. The Fallschirmjager fought the rest of the war as elite infantry deployed in the conventional operations of the German military. The first years of the war, where they had performed as a purely airborne force, were over. Crete was to be the last major airborne drop as never again did “the Wehrmacht face the tactical situation to justify such an effort”.


Chapter Six- Conclusion


The Fallschirmjager contributed significantly to the German war effort during the period that they operated in a strategic airborne role. After Crete the troops fought mainly in a ground role with only limited tactical airborne operations. This was in part due to the lack of suitable aircraft, needed for large strategic missions and the lack of a tactical situation, which required a large drop. Airborne troops are only of strategic value to an aggressor, as they are of limited airborne use in defence. This was to be proved by the Allies in the invasion of Northwest Europe. The use of the Fallschirmjager in a totally ground role was a wasteful squandering of highly trained troops.
The excellent training programme helped to develop an intense unit pride and comradeship, which built an ‘elite’ fighting force. This body of troops would prove the key element in the ‘Blitzkrieg’ campaigns of 1940-41. The attacks on Denmark and Holland vindicated the German use of airborne forces and directly helped the war effort. The capture of Denmark and Norway extended both aircraft and U-Boat range and would help in stopping a British blockade of Germany. The capture of Norway also secured shipments of iron ore from Sweden to Germany. This supply was vital to the ever increasing needs of the German war machine.
The attacks on Belgium and Holland gave a major bonus to the war effort. The attacks convinced the Allies that the main German attack was coming through the North and the Allies most mobile units were sent to counter the threat. This split became more evident when the real attack came through the Ardennes, and eventually lead to the British evacuation at Dunkirk. It is certain that had the Fallschirmjager not been used then the attack on the West would have been far more difficult and may not have even succeeded. The main factors in both these operations were air superiority and the element of surprise. These operations showed the two necessary requirements for an airborne mission.
Crete did have strategic merits and the only reason for the costly nature of the operation was the fact that the Allies expected the attack. Had the Germans had the element of surprise then the attack would probably have succeeded.

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AirborneAllTheWay
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#2

Post by AirborneAllTheWay » 10 Aug 2002, 22:52

This article was to discuss the effectiveness of german airborne troops in 1940-41. If anyone has any more info, or ideas or critiscm please post it up.

Thanks.


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Re: Eagles Of The Reich

#3

Post by Cantankerous » 26 May 2020, 17:22

How did Nazi Germany's techniques for dropping paratroopers compare and contrast with that of the Red Army, since the USSR created the world's first paratrooper force in 1930?

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Re: Eagles Of The Reich

#4

Post by ROLAND1369 » 27 May 2020, 00:19

The first major difference was that the Russians jumped with a reserve(emergency) parachute, the Germans did not. The Germans jumped from a lower altitude 300 to 250 feet so a reserve was useless. All photos I have seen show the Russians jumping from higher altitudes 800 feet or higher. The Russian Parachute had 4 risers which make it marginally steerable while the German had only on central riser and was no steerable. The German had a more rapid rate of descent than the . At least prior to the war the Russians jumped from bomber type aircraft climbing out and sliding from the wings and body. The Russian parachute utilized a ripcord release to deploy their parachute while the Germans used a static line deployment system and a dedicated transport aircraft from which they jumped from the aircraft door. These are some of the basic differences of which I am aware. I am unaware of the changes which may have occurred during the war with the arrival of lend lease C 47 and its licence built clone.

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Re: Eagles Of The Reich

#5

Post by ROLAND1369 » 27 May 2020, 15:21

During their employment in 1942 they jumped from 800 to 1000 meters which is quite high for a combat jump and were plagued by a shortage of drop aircraft. as a result of this an poor planning their efforts were not successful. They spent most of the war employed as elite ground infantry. At the end of the war they made several successful airborne operations in the far east against the Japanese. See COMBAT STUDIES INSTITUTE, RESEARCH SURVEY NO 4 " THE SOVIET AIRBORNE EXPERIENCE" NOV 1984.

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