Luftwaffe lost
-
- Member
- Posts: 14
- Joined: 03 Jul 2005, 23:23
- Location: USA
That statement really describes the entire German war machine during WWII.JonS wrote: * beating up on small and/or poorly equipped and/or isolated and/or unprepared air-forces
Hitler's vaunted military wiped the boards with the blood of those unfortunate enough to have to fight them at a disadvantage, like the French, the Poles, and the Dutch. But when facing an enemy force capable of meeting them strength to strength this same invicible NAZI war machine was crushed like an empty sardine can. Germany's WWII military was the proverbial bully of the beach, it fought for nothing that enobled mankind, instead it was created primarily as a weapon of enslavement and oppression.
Does that mean that everyone who served in this machine was an ignoble and inhuman fiend? Of course not, life is way too complex for such oversimplification. WWII was a tragedy that necessitated heroism on all sides, including Germany, and it's natural to give due credit to those who made the supreme sacrifice. Let's not for a moment forget though that the cause for which these hero's of Germany fought and died for was inherrently loathsome and vile.
That sadness seems unique to the populations of the Axis powers, Germany in Japan in particular, although the heroic sacrifices made by the Soviet Union basically for the benefit of Stalin's repressive regime must taste bittersweet too.
Meaningless - you need to construct the counterfactual of what production would have been without the bombing campaign to analyse its effectiveness. You are also ignoring the effect on fuel production and transport supply, both of which were affected quite seriously.Huck wrote:
This is the amazingly stimulating effect of Allied strategic bombing:
In Germany
Airplane production:
1943 24.807
1944 39.807
Submarines
1943 270
1944 387
Tanks
1943 5663
1944 7975
Overall armored vehicles (including tanks)
1943 24,840
1944 32,794
Artillery
1943 27.000
1944 41.000
Automatic weapons
1943 435.000
1944 787.000
Munitions (tons)
1943 2.558.000
1944 3.350.000
Basically every single weapon requested on the front had an increase in production in 1944.
Perhaps if the Allied bombing campaign had started earlier, Germany would have produced enough supplies to win the war
Increased maritime bombing - regarding diversion of KM personnel into refineries - AIUI the problem was not a lack of refined products, it was a lack of crude to refine. You also have not addressed how these He-177 would have been protected against shore-based fighters and how a plane with a range of 3,100 miles (and I have seen this referred to as ferry range, not combat range in some places) could have covered the Atlantic to such a degree that it would have stopped convoys, or even seriously threatened them. I stick to my judgement - pipedream.
All the best
Andreas
-
- Member
- Posts: 8251
- Joined: 07 May 2002, 20:40
- Location: Teesside
I would like to know a bit more about this invasion attempt. Where was it, why did it fail? Sources please that show that whatever it was was a full-scale attempt at invasion.Huck wrote:If it was so slack, why didn't the Allies tried an invasion in France earlier? Ah they tried, but ended in disaster.JonS wrote:do you know what a leap of logic is?
That production increased is a sign of how slack it had been till then, not of the ineffectiveness of the CBO.
All the best
Andreas
Does anyone else stand with Huck regarding the RAF meteor being a "Non operational aircraft" and a "Drama queen"?
http://www.redtwo.demon.co.uk/616/jets.htm
http://www.redtwo.demon.co.uk/616/jets.htm
Back to why the Luftwaffe lost:
Koenig wrote:
First, let's look at the Battle of Britain. What was the strategic purpose of that battle for the Germans? It was to achieve air supremacy against the RAF over the areas of Britain that had been selected as invasion sites. This should have been the sole focus of the Luftwaffe's efforts over southern England in 1940. But, what happened?
Grand Admiral Erich Raeder, "Grand Admiral," p.329 (emphasis added)
Thus, the Luftwaffe failed to establish air supremacy over the invasion areas, compelling the Germans to cancel Sea Lion. This had a profound effect on the progress of the war. Britain was still there, a determined foe.
We have already discussed the Luftwaffe's failure to support the U-Boat campaign, which was Germany's other way to take Britain out of the war. Admiral Dönitz believed that there was a real chance for success in this effort had he had greater air support, as well as not having his boats dispersed to places such as the MED. While his conclusions are certainly open to debate, the fact remains that the Luftwaffe failed in this vital strategic area.
These two failures occurred not as a result of superior Allied numbers, but as a result of strategic myopia on the part of the Luftwaffe and the German High Command as a whole. It was because of these failures that Britain was able to remain in the war and provide a base from which those superior numbers could, in the future, be launched.
Koenig wrote:
Not entirely. The notion that the Germans were simply beaten down by numbers is not correct. Numbers did, it is true, certainly play a role. But the Luftwaffe had failed on several strategic levels, which greatly affected the progress of the war, long before the Allies "filled the skies" with airplanes.A lot of the high emotions in this thread seem to stem from the various posts implying that the Luftwaffe's failure to succeed in World War 2 was based mainly on their own faults and mistakes. While there is no question that the Luftwaffe high-command was highly incompetent in many areas, wasn't the real reason the Luftwaffe failed in the end simply a game of numbers?
First, let's look at the Battle of Britain. What was the strategic purpose of that battle for the Germans? It was to achieve air supremacy against the RAF over the areas of Britain that had been selected as invasion sites. This should have been the sole focus of the Luftwaffe's efforts over southern England in 1940. But, what happened?
The Air Force had not achieved the air supremacy over the invasion area that the Navy considered a prerequisite for invasion. Instead of continuing to center his attention on preparation for the Channel crossing and landings, Göring was diverting his air forces more and more to an attack on London.
By the middle of September [1940] - the date presumably set for the invasion- the Naval War Staff recognized that the Air Force was making practically no effort against the units of the British Fleet that were operating in the Channel area, but was carrying on its own concept of total war quite apart from the plans for Sea Lion. Furthermore, Göring not only had failed in his task of making the Channel safe for landing operations, but, with the heavy losses he was taking in the Battle of London, would not have the strength thereafter to do any better. Unquestionably, in the Navy's view, any possibility of successfully crossing the Channel had vanished.
Grand Admiral Erich Raeder, "Grand Admiral," p.329 (emphasis added)
Thus, the Luftwaffe failed to establish air supremacy over the invasion areas, compelling the Germans to cancel Sea Lion. This had a profound effect on the progress of the war. Britain was still there, a determined foe.
We have already discussed the Luftwaffe's failure to support the U-Boat campaign, which was Germany's other way to take Britain out of the war. Admiral Dönitz believed that there was a real chance for success in this effort had he had greater air support, as well as not having his boats dispersed to places such as the MED. While his conclusions are certainly open to debate, the fact remains that the Luftwaffe failed in this vital strategic area.
These two failures occurred not as a result of superior Allied numbers, but as a result of strategic myopia on the part of the Luftwaffe and the German High Command as a whole. It was because of these failures that Britain was able to remain in the war and provide a base from which those superior numbers could, in the future, be launched.
WalterS, we both agree that the Luftwaffe was unsucessful strategically in the Battle of Britain. As I mentioned in my first post, the Luftwaffe's failure to win strategic battles came down to mostly two main reasons. One being the failure of high command, and the other being the lack of ability to out-produce the enemy that you are fighting against. There are many reasons for the outcome of the Battle of Britain, but aircraft production did even at this early stage play an important role in the British victory and the failure of the Luftwaffe.
As we can all see, Britain on its own more than doubled the Luftwaffe's fighter production in 1940 already.
Another factor to the failure of the Luftwaffe was also strictly based on numbers.
This is simply a result of the inherent advantage of defending your own country. Making shorter flights, being over friendly territory, etc. It is with this same disadvantage that the Allies had difficulty in gaining air superiority over the Luftwaffe in Europe until they greatly outnumbered the opposition.
As I said in my opening paragraph, I agree with you that the failure of Luftwaffe and the German High Command was certainly part of the reason for the Lutwaffe's failure not only in the Battle of Britain, but continually throughout the war. I do however propose that if one was to study the Orders of Battle, production figures, and sortie rates for many of the major Luftwaffe failures in the war that the story would be even much more pronounced that the situation in 1940.
Regards,
-Koenig-
Source: M. M. Postan, British War Production, 484-485. (The figure does not show any numbers past 1943)Single-Seat Fighter Production
Germany Great Britain
1939 1,541 1,324
1940 1,870 4,283
1941 2,852 7,064
1942 4,542 9,849
1943 9,626 10,727
As we can all see, Britain on its own more than doubled the Luftwaffe's fighter production in 1940 already.
Another factor to the failure of the Luftwaffe was also strictly based on numbers.
Source: Peter J. Dye, Air Force Journal of Logistics.A comparison of day-fighter sorties between the respective air forces indicates that [Fighter Command] was able to generate as many as four times the weekly sortie rate as the Luftwaffe (Figure 9). Even at the peak of the battle, Fighter Command's Spitfires and Hurricanes flew 1,000 more sorties per week than the Luftwaffe's Bf 109s. [48]
This is simply a result of the inherent advantage of defending your own country. Making shorter flights, being over friendly territory, etc. It is with this same disadvantage that the Allies had difficulty in gaining air superiority over the Luftwaffe in Europe until they greatly outnumbered the opposition.
As I said in my opening paragraph, I agree with you that the failure of Luftwaffe and the German High Command was certainly part of the reason for the Lutwaffe's failure not only in the Battle of Britain, but continually throughout the war. I do however propose that if one was to study the Orders of Battle, production figures, and sortie rates for many of the major Luftwaffe failures in the war that the story would be even much more pronounced that the situation in 1940.
Regards,
-Koenig-
I have removed several off topic posts from the last two pages of this thread.
I had already stated earlier that discussion regarding the specifics of the Bari raid and the poison gas should be discussed elsewhere via the links provided.
You wasted your time and mine by continuing that discussion here.
Andy H
I had already stated earlier that discussion regarding the specifics of the Bari raid and the poison gas should be discussed elsewhere via the links provided.
You wasted your time and mine by continuing that discussion here.
Andy H
Koenig,
the thing is, though, that the poor production figures, low serviceability, lack of pilots, etc that pinched first during the BoB* were all due to decisions made by the GAF before the war, and up to that point in the war. In some cases it was due to decisions made during the Battle itself. Making excuses for the GAFs poor performance is just that - making excuses. They still performed poorly when push came to shove.
Regards
JonS
* that wasn't really the first time, but overall victory over Poland and France had masked the shortcomings earlier.
the thing is, though, that the poor production figures, low serviceability, lack of pilots, etc that pinched first during the BoB* were all due to decisions made by the GAF before the war, and up to that point in the war. In some cases it was due to decisions made during the Battle itself. Making excuses for the GAFs poor performance is just that - making excuses. They still performed poorly when push came to shove.
Regards
JonS
* that wasn't really the first time, but overall victory over Poland and France had masked the shortcomings earlier.
JonS,JonS wrote: the thing is, though, that the poor production figures, low serviceability, lack of pilots, etc that pinched first during the BoB* were all due to decisions made by the GAF before the war, and up to that point in the war. In some cases it was due to decisions made during the Battle itself. Making excuses for the GAFs poor performance is just that - making excuses. They still performed poorly when push came to shove.
Yes the poor production numbers were to a large extent the result of decisions made in the High Command (which I acknowlegded in my original post). The reason the RAF was able to fly so many more sorties than the Luftwaffe was not due to servicability, but simply because their missions were over their own territory and were shorter in duration. They simply did not have to form up on bomber excort missions, and fly slowly with the bombers from France to Britain and then back again like the Luftwaffe did.
To just say the GAF performed poorly would invovle a completely different discussion looking at squadron performance, loss statistics, etc.
Certainly, the poor quality of their High Command, combined with my two previous points about aircraft production and sortie rates make up the largest reasons why the Luftwaffe consistently lost strategic battles throughout the war. These issues have almost nothing to do with the specific performance of each respective pilot, squadron, and aircraft. I definately see these two things as seperate discussions.
Regards,
-Koenig-
Quite. And the same can be said for every branch of every nation.-Koenig- wrote: [snips] These issues have almost nothing to do with the specific performance of each respective pilot, squadron, and aircraft. I definately see these two things as seperate discussions.
Regards,
-Koenig-
But the flip of that is that if the 37 Me356 'Verlassen Hoffnung' of JG-58a "Georings Own Air Hussars" manage to shoot down 12 out of 13 bombers that happen to fly over Irgendwoberg on the 31st Feb 1945, but completely fail to do anything about the other 10,000 sorties over Northern Germany that morning, then should the performance of Jg-58a be judged on their narrow success, or their overall failure?
Also, and unfortunately, some seem unable to seperate the theoretical specs of a few prototypes from the performance of the overall orgn.
Regards
JonS