Otto Skorzeny debunked

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WTW26
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Otto Skorzeny debunked

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Post by WTW26 » 21 Sep 2003, 17:30

Recently an interesting article about Otto Skorzeny was published in a Russian WWII forum. I’ve translated it, so that it could be discussed here.
My point of view: although the article has some minor errors in facts, and some statements are a bit far-fetched, it still makes sense in general. It’s up to you to decide whether to agree with it or not.
“The Super-Saboteur Otto Skorzeny”
They call him the “Nazi terrorist #1”, a “super-saboteur”, a “secret operation ace”. But why has Otto Skorzeny deserved such pompous titles?
In fact, this world-famous Austrian hasn’t done anything in his life, which could be included into the annals of secret operations, sabotage or terrorism. Or rather, he hasn’t done anything which could be considered a successful act of terror or sabotage.
Otto Skorzeny was born on June 12th, 1908. Entered the Technical University of Vienna in 1926. Student Skorzeny wasn’t interested in politics. Only once he took part in a demonstration calling to the unification of Germany and Austria, although such official demonstrations were held in his country annually since 1918.
In 1931 Skorzeny graduated from the Technical University and got fixed up in a job in a small construction firm. In summer 1932, like many Germans at that time, he entered the NSDAP. He didn’t become an activist – just visited party meetings and paid membership fees. In June 1933 NSDAP’s activities in Austria were forbidden, and this put an end to Skorzeny’s “political activity”.
Up to September 3rd, 1939 Skorzeny worked as an engineer in a construction firm. When the German-Polish war began, he was drafted and sent to a training unit for obtaining a pioneer speciality. So, with him being 31, began the military career of the future “super-saboteur”. A very strange career in the sense of its credibility.
In December 1939 Skorzeny – as he asserts in his memoirs - was enlisted as a pioneer into the reserve battalion of the division “Leibstandarte-SS Adolf Hitler”. That’s very strange, because Austrians were at that time enlisted into the SS regiment “Der Fuehrer”, which had been created specially for them; besides, Leibstandarte became a division only in 1941.
In May 1940, after finishing his pioneer training (for some reason already not in the Leibstandarte, but in “Germania” regiment), Skorzney received a driver speciality and was promoted to SS-Uschaf.
It’s quite explainable, that Skorzeny as a rookie didn’t take part in the war against Poland, because it had ended very quickly. But according to his memories, he didn’t take part in the French campaign also, which began just after he has finished his driver training. Although he has been with some rear transport units in France.
The Skorzeny writes that at the end of March 1941 his division, which he calls “Das Reich”, was transferred from France to the southwest of Romania, to the Yugoslavian border. At the same time, as he states, he was promoted to SS-Ustuf.
The SS division “Das Reich” took part only in the capture of Belgrade, and Skorzeny – if he really served in that division – had again acquired no battle experience, because the Yugoslavs had surrendered quickly and almost without fighting. Belgrade was captured by a German reconnaissance squad without a single shot on the 7th day of war, and the whole campaign lasted only 12 days (the Germans lost just 151 men, including non-battle casualties).
In the middle of July, Skorzney writes, his division was transferred to Poland – to the border with the USSR south of Brest-Litovsk. The Skorzeny states, that he, with his division, has taken part in the assault on Brest fortress!
In reality, Brest fortress wasn’t assaulted by “Das Reich”, but by th 45th infantry division of the Wehrmacht (btw, this division was made up of Austrians, because it had been part of the Austrian army before the Anschluss, but it had nothing to do with the SS). “Das Reich” division of the SS was part of the reserve of Guderian’s 2nd panzer group – the 46th motorised corps, located 50-80 km from the border. Its task was to move in the second echelon of the panzer group in the direction north of Brest.
In the next half-year Skorzeny (who, according to his words, now was serving in an artillery battalion) has described only one feat of his – how he, with a group of 5 soldiers and a roll of telephone cable, went to the rear of the division to re-establish intercommunication with it (why the regualr signalmen couldn’t do it, he doesn’t explain). In August 1941 Skorzeny was placed in a hospital with dysentery and got the Iron Cross 2nd class (apparently, for his cable roll feat).
In December 1941, just as the Moscow counteroffensive of the Red Army had begun, Skorzeny was in proper time attacked by a “brutal inflammation of the gall-bladder”. He was sent for treatment not jsu anywhere, but to his native Vienna. So his front career ended happily for him.
After treatment in Vienna up to spring 1942, Skorzeny didn’t go back to the front, but found himself in a reserve regiment in Berlin. After a half-year of easy (according to Skorzeny’s words, just dull) service in the Reich’s capital, he applied for panzer officer courses, as he asserts.
But after the courses he, for some reason, again didn’t go to the front. Instead, he was only in April 1943 called to the staff of the Waffen-SS, where they said to him, they needed an officer with an engineer education for creation of some special unit.
Skorzeny explains, that a year before the RSHA had founded a special training camp “Oranienburg”. This company-sized unit had to compete with the Abwehr-controlled special regiment “Brandenburg”, that is, to carry out sabotage tasks.
As Skorzeny states, the Waffen-SS command proposed him as a commander of an RSHA sabotage unit, because he “had battle experience and technical knowledge”. So there weren’t any better candidates for such an important post in all the Waffen-SS, than Skorzeny, who hadn’t shown his worth in any way. And the Waffen-SS counted at that time 300000 men, including 10000 officers.
Skorzney was promoted to SS-Hstuf d.R. and replaced as commander of the special camp “Oranienburg” a Dutch SS officer, who had been sent to the Eastern front.
At that time 20 SS men in this training camp were preparing for the operation “Franz” – organizing Iranian tribe rebellions, so that the tribes would attack military transport routes to the USSR, through which goods from the US and UK were transported.
The operation ended with a complete failure in summer 1943 – the Iranian tribe leaders first gladly accepted expensive gifts from the Germans, and then gave them (the Germans) up to the authorities, for a price.
But this failure didn’t affect the career of Skorzeny, who had been in charge of the operation. As he serenely remarks, “soon I had to manage even more interesting tasks”.
Skorzeny was ordered to prepare the operation “Ulm” – carrying out acts of sabotage at the industrial plants of Ural. On August 5th, 1943 the special camp “Oranienburg” was renamed to special unit “Friedental”, counting 3 companies. The aim of the operation “Ulm” was defined concretely – take out the blast-furnaces of the Magnitogorsk metallurgical works.
Skorzeny, according to his words, understood very soon that this mission was completely impossible. He was going to report it to his superiors. But the RSHA officers, having learned about Skorzeny’s intentions, just laughed at him. He was told, that in the RSHA you just had to show great enthusiasm at any order and regularly report about the successful preparations for the operation.
The “super-saboteur” Skorzeny took note of that friendly advice and successfully delayed the operation for 1.5 years - up to the end of 1944, when it was cancelled.
Skorzeny, according to his memoirs, had to feel pretty nervous already on July 26th, 1943, though, when he was suddenly called to the Fuehrer’s HQ. He was quite worried, because he thought that this call was connected with the operation “Ulm”. That is, with him having done nothing about it. This is one more contradiction in Skorzeny’s service record – as he describes it. On July 26th, 1943 he didn’t yet have to worry about “Ulm”.
Fearing punishment for his inactivity, Skorzeny, as he recalls, asked the pilots for cognac to relax while flying to Hitler’s HQ. But his fear was unfounded. Hitler had summoned him and five officers more (a Heer colonel and major, two air force lt.colonels and an SS-Sturmbannfuehrer) on quite a different occasion.
Hitler wanted to organize a rescue of the overthrown Mussolini.
This action didn’t have any military significanse.
Italy, where American and British troops had landed, decided to quit the ranks of Germany’s allies. Hitler apparently didn’t want to leave the overthrown Duce to the mercy of an inevitable trial: Mussolini’s execution or detention could affect the moral of the German people – or rather Hitler’s own authority – very badly.
So, Hitler decided to select the organizer of this transportation. His criteria were rather curious.
Hitler asked the six officers, if any of them had been to Italy. It turned out that Skorzeny had been there – once.
Hitler’s second question – “what do you know about Italy?” The officers started saying general phrases, like “it’s our ally”. But Skorzeny answered briefly, showing his incredible stupidity: “I’m an Austrian, my Fuehrer!” As he explains in his memoirs, he meant he didn’t like Italy for the annexation of German-populated South Tyrol.
The most amusing thing is that Hitler considered that Skorzeny’s stupid answer was the most satisfactory one. That a guy who didn’t like Italy was just right for saving its former ruler. As a result, Hitler chose Skorzeny to be the executor of this transport operation.
As you see, Hitler wasn’t interested in his professional qualities.
Skorzeny gives in his memoirs a detailed description of the briefing given to him and general Student (commander of a paratrooper army) by the Reichsfuehrer-SS Himmler. The briefing’s inanity is also incredible.
Himmler, for some strange reason, began telling Skorzeny and Student about the political situation in Italy, naming hundreds of people from the upper classes who would – or wouldn’t – remain loyal to Germany. At that, he allegedly demanded to learn all this by heart. Of course, all this “top secret” information couldn’t have been useful in an ordinary transport operation.
However, all this nonsense fades when compared to the further actions connected with that operation. A whole German paratrooper division was transferred to Italy just for that purpose! Then, already in the middle of August, Skorzeny demanded to additionally involve an SS brigade into the operation! And apart from it, a flotilla of torpedo boats and several mine-sweepers!
However ridiculous this could be, but Hitler personally handed all those forces to some Hauptsturmfuehrer (that is, just an infantry captain, a newly-made battalion commander, who hadn’t shown his worth in any way). Stupidity indeed has no borders!
Soon, however, Skorzeny personally found out that no ships for Duce’s transportation would be needed, because he was held not on the coast, as Skorzeny had thought, but on the contrary, in the mountains.
Then Skorzeny (a great specialst!) decided to arrange a troop landing in the mountains with the help of gliders! Vainly had real specialists from the air force tried to explain the ignoramus that it would only lead to great casualties – not battle, but traumatic ones.
Nevertheless, Skorzeny insisted upon 12 gliders, each carrying a pilot and nine soldiers, taking part in the operation. What’s even more incredible, Skorzeny ordered to equip the soldiers not with absolutley normal German MP-42’s, but with English STAN’s – an easy to produce, but a rather poor-quality weapon.
Naturally, such a stupid choice of landing means made by Skorzeny led to considerable casualties. The operation was carried out on September 12th, 1943 (that is, they had been preparing for 1.5 months, and in this period nothing had happened to Mussolini!). From the 12 gliders two crashed during takeoff, two more – during the landing. The remaining 8 gliders also couldn’t land smoothly on a rocky plateau.
As a result, 31 soldier perished, 16 were heavily injured. That is, casualties – at that, not battle ones – totalled 40%, solely because of Skorzeny’s amateurishness. As the German general Tippelskirch rightly wrote in his “History of the Second World War”, it was an “adventurous operation, which brought many victims”.
And the English submachine guns Skorzeny’s “eagles” hadn’t needed at all – the Italians in the mountain villa weren’t going to put up any resistance. More than that – would that operation have been led by a cleverer man, he would’ve just arranged it with the Italian guards, paid them a certain sum and got the Duce out without any casualties.
And for such a talentless operation Skorzeny was awarded the Knight’s Cross by Hitler and promoted to SS-Stubaf. Although he should’ve been rather degraded to a corporal and sent to a funeral team.
Skorzeny’s next mission was also a transport operation. In October 1943 Hitler began to suspect that Marshal Petaine, ruler of surrendered France, was going to flee to North Africa. Skorzeny was ordered to prepare Petaine’s transportation from Vichy (at that time “capital” of France) to Paris. Naturally, this operation didn’t have any military significanse, as well as Mussolini’s rescue.
Skorzeny didn’t even describe a general plan of this operation in his memoirs. He pointed out, however, that he had demanded and received two infantry battalions of the SS division “Hohenstaufen”, two police battalions and three infantry companies as reserve (?). At that Skorzeny admits that in case of the actual conducting of the operation all his forces would’ve been opposed only by a few hundred French National guardsmen, armed with light rifles.
Two months long Skorzeny hanged about in Vichy, which had been a resort before the war. On December 2nd, 1943 the operation was cancelled, after which Skorzeny got a vacation. He spent it with his wife and daughter at another resort, where he skied a bit.
In February 1944 Skorzeny got a new task. By Himmler’s order, a small group of soldiers from Skorzeny’s sabotage battalion had to render assistance in training the personnel of a new marine (?) sabotage diver-unit. And Skorzeny’s saboteurs hadn’t shown their worth in any way yet.
In summer 1944 a “brilliant” idea occurred to Skorzeny. He decided to turn an unmanned flying bomb V-1 into a manned one!
The primary idea of this weapon had been replacing and excelling long-range artillery. The advantages of a flying bomb before bomber aircraft are the possibility of mass production and no casualties. Its lack is lower accuracy.
Skorzeny’s “brilliant” idea (he himslef admitted, that he didn’t have aircraft-engineering education, he was an architect) consisted in throwing the advantages of the flying bombs away, but making them more accurate – the pilot would have to direct them himself at the end of the flight.
Turning V-1 into a manned aircraft naturally made its production more complicated and expensive, and flying it supposed if not death, than capture of a qualified pilot. As for the accuracy, only a handful of flying bombs, even manned ones, could reach the goal: they were very vulnerable for fighter aircraft and anti-aircraft guns; besides, many of them expolded during takeoff. And in a manned V-1 the pilot still wouldn’t have been able to evade the enemy fire, because the performance attributes of V-1 didn’t allow it.
This idea of Skorzeny can’t be called otherwise as sabotage of the flying bombs program. The “super-saboteur” himself has admitted he resorted to lies to push through his crazy idea.
Skorzeny came to Goering (actually GFM Milch – P.S.) and told him that his project had been allegedly approved of by the Fuehrer. Goering hesitated, seeing that Skorzeny was proposing total crap, but gave the go-ahead – against the name of Hitler even he couldn’t raise an objection.
Of course, the first test-flights resulted in crashes. But this didn’t stop Skorzeny (he wasn’t going to fly). Not only did he see to it, that 175 V-1’s were altered into his useless toys, but also that 60 men were made pilots of those things. As Skorzeny assured, 30 men from his sabotage battalion were included in this kamikaze team. That’s just beyond good and evil – to enroll people who’ve got nothing to do with aircraft in piloting.
This shame was stopped by the air force lt.colonel Baumbach, who had been in November 1944 appointed commander of the unit, where Skorzeny had been experimenting. Lt.colonel Baumbach just said it was sheer madness, ordered no to provide fuel for it, and Skorzeny preferred to retreat, because his phantasies weren’t sanctioned by his superiors.
One more “brilliant” idea of Skorzeny – taking out the oil pipe-lines in the Middle East. He suggested to do it in the following way: cut a hole in the pipe, place a mine there and “immediately close the opening”. Why it hadn’t occurred to him just to blow up the pipe – well, that must’ve seemed to him a too easy solution unworthy of his engineer education.
However, this phantasy of Skorzeny also wasn’t realised. As he says, he wasn’t provided with airplanes for the operation.
Skorzeny’s next task was to eliminate Tito’s HQ in Yugoslavia. According to the “super-saboteur”, he had got the task at the beginning of 1944 and collected all the needed information by summer.
The operation was carried out in Skorzeny’s traditional style – landidng of a paratropper battalion and a glider descent. As a result, the soldiers got Tito’s tunic, left in one of the houses of a deserted village.
In September 1944 a new order came. Skorzeny had to remove the Hungarian regent Horthy from Budapest, because Hitler suspected him of intending to surrender to Germany’s enemies. For Skorzeny such a mission – a transport operation – wasn’t new, and he quickly demanded and became three battalions and gliders (Skorzeny couldn’t do anything without gliders).
Skorzeny went to Budapest to prepare for the operation. There he he took his residence in a luxurious house with numerous servants and lived, as he subsequently with pleasure recalled, with unheard-of magnificence. And not a day or two, but a month. Skorzeny never hurried with carrying out his tasks, even if he got them from Hitler.
On October 16th, 1944 Skorzeny with his battalions and 8 “Panther” tanks attacked the building in Budapest, where he thought Horthy was. But it turned out that the Hungarian regent wasn’t there. The Germans had lost 4 men, 12 had been wounded. The Hungarians – 3 lost and 15 wounded.
And Horthy was meanwhile with a German general in another place, not thinking of escape or playing some other mean trick on the Germans. After a couple of days he flied to Bavaria on Hitler’s invitation.
It’s curious, that this time Skorzeny again wasn’t sent to a funeral team. On the contrary, Hitler for some reason awarded him with a Cross in Gold and promoted him to Ostubaf.
On October 21st, 1944 Skorzeny was ordered by Hitler to prepare a sabotage operation – capturing bridges in the coming Ardennes counteroffensive of the Germans. Hitler ordered to complete all the preparations to December 2nd. Skorzeny’s saboteurs were to act in enemy uniform.
Using Hitler’s carte blanche, Skorzeny decided to raise a panzer brigade counting 3300 men and including two panzer companies, two armoured car companies, three motorized infantry battalions and artillery, anti-tank and other units.
Skorzeny wanted to provide these units with captured (American) vehicles, outfit his soldiers with American uniforms and arm them with American weapons. As they were to operate in the rear of American troops, Skorzeny wanted to recruit as much English-speakers as possible.
Probably for the first time Skorzeny was planning something worth doing. But he failed again.
He got only two American tanks (one of which wasn’t functioning), ten armored cars, fifteen trucks and thirty jeeps. Lack of the trophy vehicles was filled up with “Panther” tanks, StuG’s and German trucks which were painted like American ones.
The brigade got only half of the needed trophy rifles. But, as Skorzeny writes, the ammunition exploded because of mishandling, and as a result only one company could be equipped with American SMG’s. It’s amazing, how bad luck always followed the “super-saboteur”.
There also arose problems with uniform. First, British uniforms came, then American greatcoats instead of tunics, then finally tunics, but with POW insignia.
With English the matters also stood poorly. There were only about ten soldiers in the brigade, who could speak English more or less well, they mostly came from the marine. 30-40 soldiers more (also mostly marines) could say something in English. The rest could only portray deaf and dumb Americans.
Skorzeny admitted in his memoirs, that even the company equipped with American weapons – he called it “commando” and it had to play the main role in the operation – had no professional saboteurs.
The Ardennes offensive began on December 16th, 1944. It was developing quite well, but Skorzeny immediately reported that his brigade’s operation should be postponed. On December 19th the command asked Skorzeny if he could capture Malmedy with his brigade. Skorzeny said he would try, but not earlier than on the 21st of December.
Meanwhile, Skorzeny had brought 9 sabotage groups (4 men each) across the front line. Two of them were taken prisoner at once, two more, according to Skorzeny, told fairy tales about their deeds after return, and 5 groups, in Skorzeny’s opinion, caused some damage to the American troops. This damage, as he proudly recalls, consisted in cutting two telephone cables, removing a few road pointers and exploding an ammunition depot.
On December 21st Skorzeny, true to his word, tried to capture Malmedy. An assault with tanks and infantry failed, and Skorzeny declared to the command that he needed supplementary artillery. Then the “super-saboteur” devoted himself to a more vital problem – search of a New Year tree and organizing a party for his staff.
On December 28th Skorzeny’s panzer brigade was sent to the rear for rest.
On Decemer 31st Skorzeny met Hitler in his HQ for the last time. According to Skorzeny, the Fuehrer didn’t react upon the idleness of Skorzeny ‘s brigade during the Ardennes offensive in any way. He just shared with him his grandiose plans for the counteroffensive in southeastern Europe.
On January 10th, 1945 Skorzeny’s brigade was disbanded. However, the SS battalion “Center”, SS paratrooper battalion and the “Nordwest” battalion (company-sized) remained under Skorzeny’s command.
On January 30th, 1945 Skorzeny was ordered by Himmler to set off with his three battalions for Schwedt-an-der-Oder. There three reserve infantry battalions, one pioneer, three artillery and two Volkssturm battalions were placed under the command of the “super-saboteur”.
Skorzeny now had to fight not as a saboteur (in which he never succeeded), but as a ground “warlord”. According to Skorzeny, his troops were named division “Schwedt”. In his memoirs Skorzeny asserts that in February 1945 his troops fought a violent battle with a Soviet guard panzer corps.
In fact, really serious battles, even the German counteroffensive, took place up to the end of the war far to the north of Schwedt. And Skorzeny had nothing to do with them.
Apart from that, Skorzeny, according to his words, was ordered to return to Berlin already on Febrauary 28th, 1945. Return alone, without his “celebrated saboteurs”. Skorzeny had been a “military commander” for four weeks.
In March 1945, according to Skorzeny, he was ordered to destroy a bridge over the Rhein near the town Remagen, which (the bridge) had been captured by the Americans. Skorzeny’s story about that operation arouses total perplexity.
Earlier he claimed that all his saboteurs had stayed at the front, in Schwedt. Now, so his story, his “frogmen” arrived from Vienna (?!) and at a “frosty night” at the end of March (?!) “dived into the icy waters of Rhein”.
How or in what those saboteurs were swimming, Skorzeny hasn’t explained. But he admitted that many of them were killed by American fire. And, not even having reached the bridge, the “frogs” found out that the Americans had built a few pontoon bridges over the Rhein. Skorzeny claims that the few surviving saboteurs had somehow mined some pontoons, after which they all were taken prisoner. But they had allegedly caused some damage to the bridges.
Something is definitely wrong with Skorzeny’s memory. For in the same book, written by him (not an aged man, but 41-year old) just 4 years after the described events (if they really have taken place), he suddenly writes again about his last meeting with Hitler, which now takes place not on December 31st, 1944, but allegedly at the end of March 1945. And of course, Hitler – as Skorzeny asserts – awarded him the Oak Leaves to the Knight’s Cross.
On March 31st, 1945 Skorzeny went (according to his words, by order) to the so-called “Alpine Fortress” in the mountains at the Bavarian-Austrian border, where he sticked around up to May 15th.
Skorzeny turned out to be as elusive as the famous Uncatchable Joe, whom no one ever tried to catch. So on May 15th Skorzeny himself asked the Americans to finally take him prisoner.
In July 1948 Skorzeny escaped easily. And was never caught, although he didn’t hide.
The Uncatchable Joe. Or, to be more exact, - the Uncatchable Otto. For the competent people knew perfectly that Skorzeny was no “Nazi terrorist #1” or “super-saboteur” or “secret operation ace”.
He was just a super-chatterbox, who was good at avoiding dangers – above all, those of the front. And an ace of deceit – of misleading his superiors with his “super-ideas”. And a liar #1 – in making his complete failures look like unheard-of successes. In a sense, a really outstanding character.

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