Joachim Peiper's tactics

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Re: Joachim Peiper's tactics

#151

Post by Cult Icon » 19 Dec 2014, 16:34

Here are some of my notes on good tactical performance during the fall/winter of 1943. Source are from documents from Panzertruppen II covering this period. There are more examples from other panzer divisions and battalions , but they get repetitive.

Image

These cover panzer regiment or battalion only, and not the claims of the entire division:

24. Pz
The Abteilung now has nine days of heavy combat behind
it. During this period it knocked out 184 enemy tanks, 87
anti-tank guns, and 26 artillery pieces with only four of our
own lost as total write-offs. The enemy tanks were almost
exclusively T34 with a few heavy 15 cm assault guns.
14.Pz
During the period from 28 October to 1December 1943,
the mixed Panzer-Abte/lung destroyed 211 tanks, 176 antitank
guns, 54 artillery pieces, 41 motor vehicles, and 101
anti-tank rifles along with 1700 enemy killed.....
The losses as total
write-offs from 16 days in combat were 20 Pz.Kpfw.IV and
16 Sturmgeschuetze.
16.Pz-grenadier
The final report from Panzer-Abteilung 116 in the
16.Panzer-Grenadier-Division for the period from 1 July
1943 to 31 January 1944 reveals that a normal PanzerAbteilung
outfitted mainly with Pz.Kpfw.llls and a few
Pz.Kpfw.lVs handled by experienced crews was tactically
superior to the Russian tank brigades outfitted with T34 tanks....

During the period from 1 July 1943 to 31 January 1944,
the combat elements of Panzer-Abtei/ung 116 fought 76
battles along a stretch of3020 kilometers. They managed to
destroy 251 tanks, 245 guns,87 mortars, 164 anti-tank rifles
34 trucks, 4,680 enemy killed and 435 captured
very many uncounted pony carts, horses,
and infantry weapons
Their equipment write-offs: 37 tanks
Equipment: 37 Panzers (1 Pz.Kpfw.II, 26 Pz.Kpfw./II, 7
Pz.Kpfw./Y, 2 Pz.Bef. Wg., 1 Pz.Kpfw.//1 7.5 em kurz)
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Re: Joachim Peiper's tactics

#152

Post by Cult Icon » 19 Dec 2014, 16:48

Image

The fresh 1.SSLAH also possessed a stug battalion/brigade, making it the strongest division on the eastern front at that time in terms of equipment and manpower. A month later, almost the entire panzer regiment is no longer operational as it reaches a trough. Author sources his figures from BA-MA.

1. SS PR, Peiper:

Hitler's Warrior, Chapter 8
Later that month, when the
long-term regimental commander of the panzer regiment was killed by a stray Russian
shell, Peiper was designated to replace him. Yet Peiper had no experience leading tanks.
Almost immediately he sought to transform the panzer regiment into an armored version
of the heavy cavalry he loved. That winter, if Peiper could get fuel and ammunition, the
panzer group was off on another slashing adventure, even if his new style of
swashbuckling tank warfare was costly to man and machine.
For every mad tank–led dash there was another frozen hill or depression concealing
another thicket of Russian antitank guns—a Pakfront. More and more tanks were shot up.
In early battles Peiper had roared off on December 5 with sixty-six tanks, but four days
later there were just four Tigers and only sixteen other Mk IVs or Panthers. “If we don’t
get new tanks up to the front in a hurry,” Peiper worried over the radio, “the Russians are
going to light a fire under our ass.”23
Peiper’s earlier superior, Albert Frey, in charge of 1st SS Panzer-Grenadier-Regiment,
became critical of such foolhardy tank-led cavalry rides. The two faced off in a loud
quarrel over who was in charge when tanks fought with the grenadiers. Everyone heard it.
Peiper said he was in charge, but Frey said no, he outranked him. His grenadiers did not
have steel protection, and Peiper’s bold methods were too risky.24 “Peiper burns up his
men,” Frey concluded with intended irony.25 Yet Hans Siptrott, the hard-nosed NCO who
had been on the sharp end of Peiper’s hell-for-leather use of tanks, saw it differently. “I
didn’t realize he burned us down,” he said years later. “Peiper was a Draufgänger—a gogetter—
and led his regiment that way.”26
By the dark days of the solstice, Peiper had few tanks left to command
In the dark days of December 1943, Peiper’s regiment fought recklessly. Peiper led
crazy night actions by attacking the rear of enemy lines; he captured four division
headquarters. Still, his aggressiveness and lack of experience handling tanks caused some resentment.28 By now hardly any quarter was granted in the East: on December 5 and 6,
1943, his tank regiment reported killing 2,280 Russian “enemies” and took only three
prisoners.29 During that heavy fighting the village of Pekartschina, north of Zhitomir,
Peiper attacked “with all weapons and flame-throwers from his SPWs.” The village was
burned to the ground and “completely destroyed.” The next day it continued.

At dawn on December 6 Peiper found himself before Andrejew, but he was faced with a
bevy of antitank guns.30 Undeterred, he bolted east with a clutch of Tiger tanks, his
armored group smashing several artillery batteries, and by 10 a.m. he took the high ground
on both sides of Styrty. Peiper’s armored column moved so rapidly toward Kortschiwka
that it took the 121st Rifle Division totally by surprise, destroying its headquarters and
inheriting a “battlefield covered with many dead.”31 Tiger ace Michael Wittmann smashed
three more T-34s that rose to challenge Peiper’s approach, who then paused to take on
supplies.
.......................
Within twenty minutes his tanks and halftracks were on the move again, firing madly at
whatever came into view. The headquarters of the 322nd and 148th Rifle Divisions were
run down and the Russians thrown into a panic. At 2:30 p.m. Peiper seized Tortschin and
its nearby railway line. At nightfall Rudi Lehmann showed up to brief Peiper in the
village. Peiper’s forces were still clearing the enemy from houses now being put to the
torch, and the crackle of gunfire and flames was the sonic backdrop for their winter
discussion. Only at night in Kortschiwka, with the gas tanks dry, did Peiper finally stop—
after a thrust of thirty kilometers behind enemy lines. The recorded additional destruction
was tremendous: twenty-two artillery pieces, seventy-six antitank guns, forty vehicles,
seventy-one horse-drawn wagons, and a total of 1,450 killed. There was no mention of
prisoners.34

....The Schützenpanzerwagen—armored halftracks—were now replaced by
tanks......Within a month of rejoining the desperate battle in Russia, Jochen Peiper was as spent as
his tanks. On January 20, 1944, Peiper was ordered from the front to Hitler’s
Wolfsschanze headquarters in East Prussia. Four days later, Peiper paid a visit to
Himmler’s nearby Hochwald headquarters to catch up his former superior on events but
was shocked by his diminished appearance. Even so, on January 27, with Peiper looking
gaunt, pasty, and ailing, a smiling Hitler presented him with the Oak Leaves to the
Knight’s Cross at his headquarters.


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Re: Joachim Peiper's tactics

#153

Post by Cult Icon » 19 Dec 2014, 18:01

I searched axishistory and this locked argument from 2010 provides a lot of 'fuel' about the SSLAH armor numbers game.

http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic. ... &start=225

Some scattered and incomplete coverage of German counter-operations Nov-Dec 1943, right before the Soviet Zhitomir -B offensive:

-Glantz's self published material covering the Ukraine:

1985 Art of War Symposium, From the Dnepr to the Vistula: Soviet Offensive Operations, November 1943-August 1944: A Transcript of Proceedings.

-Leibstandarte III (last 100 pages)

-Minor accounts in 'Panzer Battles', 'Crucible of Combat', 'Scorched Earth', 'Panzer Operations' (Raus), 'Stalingrad to Berlin', 'Road to Berlin'.

It's a shame, as these operations deserve detailed treatment.

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Re: Joachim Peiper's tactics

#154

Post by Cult Icon » 19 Dec 2014, 19:54

^^

I read much of that thread above yesterday, and I found it both insightful and partisan. While it is proven that the SSLAH took abnormally high losses, what is not proven is the exact circumstances in which they took them, and what was accomplished in exchange for these high losses. The Red Army's perspective, particularly those of Rybalko's 3rd Tank Army and others, is absent as are the operational aspects for the warring sides.

From Armored Bears II (3.Pz) discussed the increased threat of anti-tank artillery due to the rapid expansion of the force structure in 1943.

Image

A bit later, during the Soviet Korsun offensive:
1. SS-Pz.Div. “Leibstandarte SS Adolf Hitler” LSSAH (“Leibstandarte SS Adolf Hitler”)

Operational Tanks During the Operation: 2 February:26 16 Pz IV, 29 Panther, 3 Tiger, 22 StuG

3 February:27 In assembly area: 13 Pz IV, 11 Panther, 3 Tiger, 18 StuG III, 1 StuH III; En route: 9 Pz IV, 18 Panther, 3 Tiger

6 February (early):28 22 Pz IV, 29 Panther, 6 Tiger, 27 StuG III, 3 StuH III

Zetterling, Niklas; Frankson, Anders (2011-03-19). Korsun Pocket: The Encirclement and Breakout of a German Army in the East, 1944 (p. 333). Casemate Publishers. Kindle Edition.
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Re: Joachim Peiper's tactics

#155

Post by Cult Icon » 19 Dec 2014, 21:14

Peiper's "tactics" and 'cavalry' charges. The SPW battalion and AA battalion in every unit history I have read is considered somewhat of cavalry unit. The description of 'bold raids' with halftracks was actually standard doctrine with german mobile forces. That was their function. The commander of the SPW battalion in the panzer divisions was usually the most decorated commander out of the 4 or 6 infantry battalions.
.
The most 'cavalry' like PzD I know of was the 24. Pz., which was in fact lead by Prussian cavalrymen. (converted 1. KD).

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Re: Joachim Peiper's tactics

#156

Post by dshaday » 20 Dec 2014, 12:13

Hi Sid
Sid Guttridge wrote:One wonders if Peiper would have any profile at all if it wasn't for the Malmedy massacre of US troops.
To truly build Peiper's profile one also need to factor in his being:

* A hightly decorated combat officer.
* Military and Political backround.
* Years of prominent combat at the front (particularly in the East) - with both good and bad results.
* Prominent role in the plan for the Ardenne offensive.
* Reputation and role of propaganda during and after the war.

Obviously, the Malmedy massacre alone does not define his career or profile. As the commanding officer he certainly bears responsibility, and this reflects on his profile. Let's not forget that after all he wasn't even there at the time of the massacre at the crossroads.
Sid Guttridge wrote: He seems to hold one unique distinction - his unit was accused of massacres on the Eastern, Mediterranean and Western Fronts.
Well someone will need to do a study of all Wehrmacht units to see if that is truly the case. Unproven comments along these lines are speculation.
Sid Guttridge wrote: Without some genuinely original military contribution of this sort, shouldn't his historical reputation primarily rest on the massacres?
Historical reputations do not rely on original military contributions. You are suggesting a straw man argument.
Logically, Peiper's historical reputation rests largely on his politics, his (total) wartime actions and his conduct in the post war trials. [/quote]

Regards

Dennis

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Re: Joachim Peiper's tactics

#157

Post by Sid Guttridge » 20 Dec 2014, 12:35

Hi Dennis,

Peiper has a high profile compared with almost all his equivalent contemporaries.

One has to ask why?

I would suggest that the high profile particularly rests on Malmedy, which has led to particular research being done on him, compared with equivalent contemporaries.

When I wrote, "He seems to hold one unique distinction - his unit was accused of massacres on the Eastern, Mediterranean and Western Fronts.", I deliberately qualified it with "He seems......". The only speculation is whether any other unit holds a similar unfortunate distinction. Until something else turns up, Peiper's unit stands alone. The only possible competitors would seem to be within the Waffen-SS, as I know of only one similar accusations against the Army in France and none in Italy. (Not that Army units weren't capable of it. The massacre of Italian prisoners on Corfu in late 1943 seems to have been easily the largest massacre in any theatre against the Western Allies).

As the massacre allegations against his unit seem to distinguish him from his contemporaries more than his military performance, it may not be unreasonable that these should particularly influence his reputation.

But here we are investigating "Joachim Peiper's tactics", and there seems little evidence so far that these were original or distinctive. Looking at Cult Icon's contributions here, he wasn't doing anything equivalent army formations weren't doing. Indeed, militarily this seems to hold true of the entire Waffen-SS.

Sid

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Re: Joachim Peiper's tactics

#158

Post by dshaday » 20 Dec 2014, 16:12

Hi Sid
Sid Guttridge wrote: As the massacre allegations against his unit seem to distinguish him from his contemporaries more than his military performance, it may not be unreasonable that these should particularly influence his reputation.
Obviously, war crime convictions would influence Peiper's overall reputation (mostly post war). What does this have to do with his tactics during the war?
Sid Guttridge wrote: But here we are investigating "Joachim Peiper's tactics", and there seems little evidence so far that these were original or distinctive.
Logically, Peiper's tactics do not have to be original. Again, this is a straw man argument, as pointed out to you in my last post.

Nor is there evidence, so far in this thread, that Peiper's tactics were not "distinctive".
Perhaps you have some new information you can share to illustrate Peiper's tactics? Otherwise your comment is akin to speculation.

If anything, the earlier reference in this thread to the book Jochen Peiper by Patrick Agte hints that Peiper's attacks were distinctive:
"This SPW Battalion had made a name for itself in the night fighting in Russia and in the divisional and corps area the Battalion was know as the Blow torch Battalion or Blow torch squadron. The SPW Battalion used to attack Russian villages like a cavalry unit from all sides at full speed firing everything we had. The thatch roofed houses always caught fire and added to the panic." My emphasis in bold.

The quote shows that Peiper's unit got a reputation for the night fighting and the blow torches. Sounds distinctive to me (unless you know of several Army units doing the same thing before Peiper?) .

It has also been pointed out earlier in this thread that "Peiper was a very skillful, very impressive SPW commander but as a Panzer leader he failed miserably." So not a mediocre commander of SPWs.

Regards

Dennis

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Re: Joachim Peiper's tactics

#159

Post by Harro » 20 Dec 2014, 17:53

I've often wondered: is there any evidence for this reputation, for this name the SPW battalion supposedly made for itself, or do we only have the HIAG-approved gospel of Agte that this was a "fact"?

Sure, we know the battalion used to attack villages from all sides like a cavalry unit (and killed hundreds of civilians and pow's in its wake) but what does it mean that it "made a name for itself"? Is that simply within the Leibstandarte or did other units/commanders also recognize Peipers battalion as something special and, if so, what written primary sources confirm this?

Same for the nickname " lötlampen-Bataillon", as far as I know this was a name they had within the division and probably some of Peiper's high-ranking SS and nazi friends knew about it, but that's far from being a well known nickname based on a well established reputation.

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Re: Joachim Peiper's tactics

#160

Post by Cult Icon » 20 Dec 2014, 19:32

The challenge I see here is separating the SS propaganda and post-war neo-nazi propaganda from the real combat performance. In fact, the performance of the entire 1SSLAH should be seen at this light as well as well along with other popular Waffen SS figures.

Peiper actually had little experience as an SPW commander, particularly compared to other SPW commanders of the Panzer divisions. 1.SSLAH came to the fray in Feb-March 1943, and fought relatively briefly. It was withdrawn, and then fought in Citadel. Then it was withdrawn again. 1.SSLAH returned to the eastern front in late Oct. and was deployed in heavy action in Nov. Peiper was 1.SSPR commander Nov. 20th after the CO's death.

Peiper's combat experience as SPW commander is more closely measured in weeks rather than months. "Hitler's Warrior" notes that as a soldier Peiper was frequently sick, due to his nervous system not being able to cope.

In comparison, an example of a real soldier in the 1943-1945 era: Colonel von Brese-Winiary, close combat clasp, was an infantryman since 1934, and was promoted in war since 1939. He was considered an expert in troop training and infantry leadership. He received some merit promotions, which landed him command of the first IR of 14.Pz (1 SPW, 1 motor). His command of this regiment was known for its boldness and tactical skill (according to unit history, 14. Pz). Then promotion to Colonel, and the assignment to command Fusilier Regiment GD. Both he and Otto Remer (SPW battalion, GD, close combat clasp) have the same accolades as the SS gave to Peiper. Otto Remer is also credited with performing many raids and 'coups' during his battles in 1943.

As far as names go, the commander of Fusilier Regiment GD before von Brese-Winiary, Colonel Niemack, renamed the SPW battalion of the Fusilier regiment the "Lion Battalion" in August 1944. This was due to a long string of successful offensive operations. Niemack himself was known to be a very good infantry commander of 24. Pz, his prior job. The 24.Pz and GD divisions fought together, successfully, in Rumania in April-May 1944.

Image

So with Peiper, details would be needed about his performance during these few weeks of combat, and what he accomplished. This should be measured with the resources he consumed (his own men, his equipment) and then compared with the combat records of other SPW battalion commanders. This is necessary to qualify the claim that he was an above-average SPW commander.

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Re: Joachim Peiper's tactics

#161

Post by rossmcpharter » 21 Dec 2014, 01:25

Great posts Cult Icon! I hadn't realised Peipers commands were so short. If you compare LAH its' combat career as mechanised infantry is indeed far shorter than Wehrmacht formations.

I've been reading 'Fire Brigades' a great book and indeed, by December 1943, 1PD has more AFV's left than LAH, but it's still lost a load, much as Jack Radey was saying in his designer notes for 'A Bold Stroke' 1943 Battle for Kiev game. The big units suffer big losses and the small units and burnt out panzer divisions suffer small losses.

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Re: Joachim Peiper's tactics

#162

Post by DargesFlyKiller » 21 Dec 2014, 13:18

I believe Peiper only had a couple of periods of illness and this was with the Panzer regiment not when commanding the III Battalion, "Hitler's Warrior" notes 37 pages 359-360:

'Ordered to take a rest on February 11 and 12, 1944, SS doctors at Dachau concentration camp's "Health and Fitness Center" examined Jochen Peiper. They pronounced him ailing from low blood pressure-the reason for recent fainting spells. He was also suffering nervous exhaustion-a Waffen SS euphemism for battle fatigue."

And also:

"Telegram from the SS hospital in Berlin describing Peiper's status on March 30, 1944, was sent to the Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler. BA-MA, RS/4/1241, "Extensive nerve dysfunction in hands and legs, so that further treatment is needed in a recuperation hospital is needed...Classified as unfit for duty."

I can't find anything about bouts of illness as commander of the SPW's in Agte's, Westemeier's ar Parker's bio's on Peiper. If anybody else has seen them let me know it'd be interesting to read although i know there is something in Danny Parker's 'Fatal Crossroads' but i can't find it at the minute. Peiper was also a close combat clasp in silver winner and also winner of the single handed tank destruction badge so i'd say he was a real soldier although a political soldier, A better comparison with Peiper would possibly be with Vinzenz Kaiser he was commander of 'Das Reich's' SPW Battlion during the same period as Peiper's command.

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Re: Joachim Peiper's tactics

#163

Post by Sid Guttridge » 21 Dec 2014, 16:30

Hi Dennis,

You are right, "Logically, Peiper's tactics do not have to be original." However, the presumption of this thread (and part of your reply) seems to be that they were. Hence the thread title and the following from the first post: ".....would like some insight into what he did with his mechanized forces that was so revolutionary."

The war crimes allegations against the Americans appear to be what gave Peiper his public profile and led to in depth biographical investigation not shared by many (any?) of his equivalents.

Without this, one has to wonder whether anyone would be asking about "Joachim Peiper's tactics" as if they were in some way distinctive.

Peiper was not, apparently, a unique or original tactician who later got known for war crimes allegations. He was an indicted war criminal whose military career has retrospectively received close inspection because of this.

You again use the irrational non-argument, "Nor is there evidence, so far in this thread, that Peiper's tactics were not "distinctive" ". There is also no evidence on this thread that the SPW tactics of Barney the Purple Dinosaur were not distinctive. In neither case does the absence of evidence do anything to advance the proposition that either Peiper or Barney were distinctive SPW tacticians.

Finally, your quote nowhere mentions "blow torches" as an original tactic. That seems to be your contribution to the myth. From your source, the "blow torch" reference seems to be a nickname given to Peiper's unit for the propensity of its fire to set thatch alight during assaults on villages.

If you want an example of the Army conducting night operations, I believe Cult Icon gave at least one such instance above.

It may have, "also been pointed out earlier in this thread that "Peiper was a very skillful, very impressive SPW commander but as a Panzer leader he failed miserably." but this is, in fact, an opinion. What is the evidence that he stood out from his contemporaries?

Cheers,

Sid

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Re: Joachim Peiper's tactics

#164

Post by Cult Icon » 21 Dec 2014, 16:39

DargesFlyKiller wrote: Peiper was also a close combat clasp in silver winner and also winner of the single handed tank destruction badge so i'd say he was a real soldier although a political soldier, A better comparison with Peiper would possibly be with Vinzenz Kaiser he was commander of 'Das Reich's' SPW Battlion during the same period as Peiper's command.
I haven't read the book (only read some). My 'sick' comment was referring to 'throughout the war' (from other sources, I recall). In Parker's book, there is also a letter from his wife about his health.

Pretty much, I suspect all his awards and claims of achievement due to his association with a highly political division, 1.SSLAH. He was also the patron of Heinrich Himmler, the man that helped his career and was head of the SS.... So I don't automatically believe this or that. Agte's book is called neonazi propaganda in that thread, and his other book about Wittmann certainly is. (I consider this book almost useless).

Peiper was probably an average soldier at best (as a company commander and battalion CO), that was given commands that were more appropriate for the highly trained and experienced. He was likely much more reckless with using up his unit than most, and was motivated by ambition, as a ruthless careerist.
rossmcpharter wrote:Great posts Cult Icon! I hadn't realised Peipers commands were so short. If you compare LAH its' combat career as mechanised infantry is indeed far shorter than Wehrmacht formations.

I've been reading 'Fire Brigades' a great book and indeed, by December 1943, 1PD has more AFV's left than LAH, but it's still lost a load, much as Jack Radey was saying in his designer notes for 'A Bold Stroke' 1943 Battle for Kiev game. The big units suffer big losses and the small units and burnt out panzer divisions suffer small losses.
Sadly, I don't have detailed information (don't have Glantz's manuscript yet..) about Balck's 48th Korps before the christmas offensive outside of how his 640 runners (400+ belonging to 1.SSLAH, 1.Pz. )dropped to around 200 runners by the end of Dec. But the idea of having their Panther battalions fall apart partially due to mechanical defects is suspected along with high combat losses. Balck's main force was in these two divisions.

1. Pz and 1.SS Pz were equipped with large Panther battalions with the early models. To give an example, II./PR-23, with 96 Panthers was also sent to the eastern front in Sept. 23rd , and suffered from teething troubles. It is down to 11 runners out of 68 after 17 days. (History of 23. Pz) after being attached to AGS reserve. It needs a shipment of 51 panthers in Jan and 59 Panthers in April 1944 to retain functionality while in service attached to other units. It is not returned to 23. Pz until June 1944.

As far as Peiper burning out the remaining portion of his PR, he did so in the first week of Dec. According to Generaloberst Raus' unreliable account (Panzer Operations) the Korps order was for 1. Pz to engage directly, and 1.SS to attack the rear.

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Re: Joachim Peiper's tactics

#165

Post by seaburn » 21 Dec 2014, 18:14

Cult Icon wrote: I haven't read the book (only read some). My 'sick' comment was referring to 'throughout the war' (from other sources, I recall).
I would have to agree with 'DFK' who has read and quoted from the three main Peiper biographers as opposed to un-named 'other sources'.

Cult Icon wrote:Pretty much, I suspect all his awards and claims of achievement due to his association with a highly political division, 1.SSLAH.

This is intriguing - does anyone else agree that all the LSSAH's awards of 'RK's' etc were tainted/undeserved ? While many have cited Peiper's awarding of the oakleaves as questionable, did he deserve his 'RK' ? Would it be fair to say that the criticism of his military successes are due as much to redressing his elevation by the pro-WSS factions as much as his political/war crimes associations ?

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