Wittmann, Villers Bocage and his kill claims.

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Re: Wittmann, Villers Bocage and his kill claims.

#391

Post by Cult Icon » 30 Jul 2015, 03:52

Thanks. So in Jan the company was nowhere close to 27 and was basically Wittmann's crew and a few others on all the given days- a platoon.

The "destroyed by own crew" from Christmas day 1943 into Jan. mirrors the retreat of the 4.Panzer Army.

1.UKF's reported armor disabled is 1,420 in Jan. as compared to 1,835 (claims of 4.PzA/1.PzA).

In looking at my copy, I can see that the account in Tigers in combat is incomplete.

Fragments from Crucible of Combat- an operational text with no concern of individuals like wittmann:


1.SSLAH w/ 2.SS(KG), 68 ID, 208ID (KG) claim 100 tank kills in two days. ( 1-7 Jan 1944. )

12 Jan 1944: 12 kills plus

13 Jan 1944: 44 kills (Wittmann is involved and this gives him his 88th kill)

14 Jan 1944: 2 kills

Fragments from Agte:

Jan 5: Wittman's tally from 56 to 60: 4 kills.

Jan 9: 6 kills

Jan 12/13: 19 kills to Wittmann for his 88th.

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Re: Wittmann, Villers Bocage and his kill claims.

#392

Post by Michael Kenny » 30 Jul 2015, 07:39

pintere wrote:
While the Tigers in Combat series is not the best choice for the whole division, it certainly is helpful when seeing Wittmann's actions in light of the rest of his company. Here are a few sections from the book (all concerning the 13./SS-Panzer-Regiment 1).

Losses:

Date - Losses - On hand - Remarks

15 November 1943 - 2 - 25- Destroyed by friendly fire
8 December 1943 - 1 - 24 - Captured
19 December 1943 - 1 - 23 - Knocked out by an antitank gun
24 December 1943 - 7 - 16 - Destroyed by own crew
28 December 1943 - 1 - 15 - Knocked out by tanks
29 December 1943 - 2 - 13 - Destroyed by own crew
2 January 1944 - 5 - 8 - Destroyed by own crew
19-21 January 1944 - 2 - 6 - Evacuated for depot-level maintenance

Schneider is very free with his 'abandoned/destroyed by crew' claims.

The following is a listing of only those Tigers that are total losses. Agtes book has many other mentions of Tigers being knocked out in action.


15 November 1943 - 2 Tiger Destroyed by friendly fire Agte page 128

One Tiger falls into a tank trap and was pulled out by another Tiger which then tried to tow it back. Whilst this was in progress the Soviets attacked and the crews abandoned the 2 Tigers and fled. Other Tigers fired on them to make sure they were no use to the Soviets.
That is in no way a 'friendly fire ' incident. The first Tiger was clearly wrecked by a a trap built for that purpose. It was a victim of enemy action. The second was left behind when the crew fled. Again not a 'friendly fire' victim.


8 December 1943 - 1 Tiger Captured Agte page 135

The Tiger was hit and 'immobilized' (knocked out in any other army) and the wreck overun by advancing Soviets. This is not a 'capture'.
.

19 December 1943 - 1 Tiger Knocked out by an anti-tank gun

No mention in Agte.

24 December 1943 - 7 Tiger Destroyed by own crew. Agte page 155

The Germans retreated and it can be assumed these 7 Tigers were previously knocked out Tigers that were stuck in the workshops and (for whatever reasons) could not be repaired. They were not 'crew abandoned'.

I think these Tigers will have been like the 503 Tigers blown up in similar retreat.

http://www.tiif.de/thread.php?threadid=103&sid=

Srap iron in all but name and skewing the Units numbers because whilst it may show 25 Tigers on strength once the fighting starts the numbers fall off a cliff with hanger queens greatly outnumberng fit tanks. .

Knocked out Tigers that do not get repaired remain knocked out Tigers.

More to follow.


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Re: Wittmann, Villers Bocage and his kill claims.

#393

Post by Cult Icon » 30 Jul 2015, 16:28

Tanks are frequently knocked out more than once before they get written off. This company benefited from their participation in Kursk (a completely non-normal event with a fiasco of 5GTA at that). It claimed 151 kills in several days (by July 14th/end). This skews their record. I would remove it from any sort of comparison with other tiger units of possible "skill". From Nov 15- Dec 4, 1943 they claim 205 kills up to this point, which is ~55 kills. On Jan 17th they claim 343 kills. Final claim for the company is 400+.

It should be noted that there was tactical air-support and above-average Korps and divisional leadership present in 48.PzK that heavily effected outcomes. (most obviously Balck and Manteuffel, who liked to execute panzer raids) . Their track record/command style- with many tactical victories- focused on quick but loose encirclements and causing withdrawals, which lead to large scale abandonment of soviet equipment but without significant capture of enemy forces. Their ability to lead is how both eventually became Army Generals.

These overlaying structures helped create the existence of Wittmann as a tank ace.

pintere wrote: I've written elsewhere about the successes of the 13./SS-Panzer-Regiment 1. Even applying the most conservative kills reductions, the actions of the unit are quite remarkable. I've written more about this here.

http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic. ... 5#p1934635
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Re: Wittmann, Villers Bocage and his kill claims.

#394

Post by Cult Icon » 30 Jul 2015, 17:32

Some more contextual things:

48.PzK, according to Mellanthin was reduced to only 150-100 tanks in the last week of Dec. leading to a more target-rich environment for the tank crews for their mobile defense. 24.PzK's 8.Pz and 19.Pz were also battle worn as was 20.Pz (KG).

The Zhitomir-Berdichev offensive's main effort was deployed against the 4.PzA which included 48.PzK. Initial attack strength was 1,125 armor (not counting later reinforcements including forces from STAVKA reserve).
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Re: Wittmann, Villers Bocage and his kill claims.

#395

Post by Cult Icon » 30 Jul 2015, 17:59

Wittmann was credited with 56 tank kills during the battle of Kursk....that is over 1/3rd of the kills of three (line) tiger platoons. "Thunder at Prokhorovka (2014)"- which I have but personally haven't read yet- has a reconstruction of the actions which lead to these tallies. Of course that it is pretty abnormal..

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Re: Wittmann, Villers Bocage and his kill claims.

#396

Post by pintere » 30 Jul 2015, 18:03

Michael Kenny wrote:Schneider is very free with his 'abandoned/destroyed by crew' claims.
Where exactly is Schneider mistaken? It's all a matter of definitions.

The appendix I quoted only had the briefest of remarks to say what happened to the tank. In those appendixes, when Schneider says a Tiger is knocked out, he means destroyed beyond repair (a total loss). If a Tiger is hit but can be repaired, he does not consider it a total loss. Therefore if a Tiger is under repair, but must be destroyed during a retreat, the loss is not attributed to enemy action because it could still have been fixed and returned to battle under different circumstances.

Concerning the other tanks destroyed, every one of those more detailed accounts of what happened that you mention is also recorded in Schneider's book, and in the final tally they are attributed to enemy action. Once you keep in mind that Schneider is writing of total losses rather than merely damaged, all his summaries make sense.

When the two tanks were destroyed by friendly fire, he's not lying. When one tank was captured (but still repairable) by the Russians, he's not lying. When he says that tanks were destroyed by own crew during a retreat, he's not lying.

BTW Cult thanks for sharing those excerpts from Agte and Crucible. The action on the 13th is of particular interest to me, any information on that day is most welcome.

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Re: Wittmann, Villers Bocage and his kill claims.

#397

Post by pintere » 30 Jul 2015, 18:06

Cult Icon wrote:Wittmann was credited with 56 tank kills during the battle of Kursk....that is over 1/3rd of the kills of three (line) tiger platoons. "Thunder at Prokhorovka (2014)"- which I have but personally haven't read yet- has a reconstruction of the actions which lead to these tallies. Of course that it is pretty abnormal..
Coupled with his abnormal share in January and Villers-Bocage, it does seem to be a bit of a trend. It would be helpful to have more detailed breakdowns of the companies' actions during Kursk, I will have to try and get a hold of that book.

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Re: Wittmann, Villers Bocage and his kill claims.

#398

Post by Cult Icon » 30 Jul 2015, 18:14

With the nature of his kill score, Wittmann appears to be a spark rather than a steady performer that accumulates kills over a long period of time and survives many battles over the years. But then again, his unit fought in abnormally target rich circumstances in July/Jan. When he hits, he hits a home run on individual days, getting an amazingly disproportionate amount of the kills.

I have a digital of "thunder", I'll give it a look over later and see if the Wittmann segments are worth posting.

The propaganda theory which is linked to Kursk and 48.PzK: The kills included captured/overrun tanks, not just the ones disabled in firefights. Wittmann is the chosen 'star' of the unit. Any evidence of Himmler or his executives around this unit could add something to the situation.

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Re: Wittmann, Villers Bocage and his kill claims.

#399

Post by Michael Kenny » 30 Jul 2015, 19:07

pintere wrote:
Where exactly is Schneider mistaken? It's all a matter of definitions.

The appendix I quoted only had the briefest of remarks to say what happened to the tank. In those appendixes, when Schneider says a Tiger is knocked out, he means destroyed beyond repair (a total loss). If a Tiger is hit but can be repaired, he does not consider it a total loss. Therefore if a Tiger is under repair, but must be destroyed during a retreat, the loss is not attributed to enemy action because it could still have been fixed and returned to battle under different circumstances.
A knocked out tank in not a destroyed tank. A knocked out tank may also be a destroyed tank but a knocked out tank can (and often was) repaired and saw further service. The term 'total loss' means a tank no longer able to be used by the side that lost it. Total loss has no ambiguity about it.
Any tank knocked out that does not get repaired becomes a total loss. I have no time for those who invent a special class of tank casualty the appears in online German loss tables-the 'knocked out and so badly damaged tank that can not be repaired' that magically becomes a non-combat loss when the Unit flees in panic and leaves it behind. This special class of German uber-tank casualty is a fiction. A post war excuse dreamed up to gloss over the reality of defeat.

pintere wrote: Concerning the other tanks destroyed, every one of those more detailed accounts of what happened that you mention is also recorded in Schneider's book, and in the final tally they are attributed to enemy action. Once you keep in mind that Schneider is writing of total losses rather than merely damaged, all his summaries make sense.
After years of posting about this subject I never make the mistake of confusing knocked out with total loss. Schneider's books are long in the tooth and the product of an era when critcal examination of German accounts was not the done thing. Believe me anyone in the early 2000s daring to suggest these German accounts were anything but the most carefully checked and referenced claims in the history of warfare was subjected to a torrent of abuse and condemnation. Times change. The information available today has despelled many of the uber-panzer myths.

I was saying as much back in 2002.

http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic. ... 564#p48564


Schneider makes several mistakes in both TIC 1 and 2.( see the JJF site for 12 pages of corrections for TIC1 alone) Jentz as well has let mistakes creep into his works. I am not saying these books are bad sources but just reminding people that assuming everything written by an 'expert' is 100% correct is dangerous
.

pintere wrote:
When the two tanks were destroyed by friendly fire, he's not lying. When one tank was captured (but still repairable) by the Russians, he's not lying. When he says that tanks were destroyed by own crew during a retreat, he's not lying.
Nor is he telling the whole truth. The Tigers were abandoned when the crews ran away from advancing Soviets. One of the tanks at least had been knocked out. Quite why the other had stopped is not referenced. The tanks were in possesion of the Soviets. They were total losses. The fact other Tigers fired at them after they became total losses is of no significance.
Can you share the information that causes you to say the tanks were repairable? I can not see how anyone could know that.

I never cease to be amazed at the convoluted jiggery-pokery and voodoo mathematics introduced to try and validate the myth of the the low number of Tigers that were knocked out in a 'fair fight'. Can anyone give me a rational explanation for this peverse obsession?.

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Re: Wittmann, Villers Bocage and his kill claims.

#400

Post by Cult Icon » 30 Jul 2015, 21:54

I will probably post stuff from Zhitomir-Berdichev at the end of August. I am, of course, going to read it first.

I think it can be safe to make the assumption that platoon commander Wittmann was the among the most active of the tiger crews that the SSLAH used during Nov-Jan. I have read in unit histories like 23.Pz that when tank numbers collapse, the unit leaders are the ones with vehicles. The 'lessors' don't have a ride.

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Re: Wittmann, Villers Bocage and his kill claims.

#401

Post by pintere » 31 Jul 2015, 00:16

Michael Kenny wrote:I never cease to be amazed at the convoluted jiggery-pokery and voodoo mathematics introduced to try and validate the myth of the the low number of Tigers that were knocked out in a 'fair fight'. Can anyone give me a rational explanation for this peverse obsession?.
I've seen enough threads degenerate into chaos to see where this is going. I'm here for a reasoned discussion, not an insult match. I'll set the record straight on a few things here.

The start of my discussion was that Schneider's book can be useful to research Wittmann's actions in light of the rest of his company. I think that this has been demonstrated. You mention there are mistakes in Schneider's account. I never said his books are infallible, I'm well aware of many things he got wrong. But the simple fact is that no book is truly infallible, and despite the errors in his book, TIC 1 & 2 remain one of the most useful (and accessible) sets for researching the combat histories of Tiger tank battalions.

On to the cause of loss. A lot of the debate seems to boil down to simple definitions. Schneider's appendix where he charts the losses of the company are brief, they don't tell the whole truth, of course. But if they simply said that those tanks were captured by the Russians, that would also not be the whole story. Schneider is not obligated (indeed, it is not his intention to) give a full account of how every tank was lost in his appendix. He includes that in the main body of his book anyways. Seen this way, it can hardly be the case that he's trying to be deceptive.

Also, what gave you the idea I was trying to distort the numbers to validate a myth? I acknowledge that much has been said about the Tigers that has not been correct, but that doesn't change the fact that they were (especially with this company) very successful nonetheless.

To summarize my points, I am prepared to contend for the following three things.

1) That Schneider's book can be helpful for those trying to understand Wittmann's actions on the Eastern front in context.
2) That Schneider's book (for this company at least) correctly describes the fates of individual Tigers where possible.
3) That the 13./SS-Panzer-Regiment 1's Tiger company was a very successful combat unit.

If you dispute any of those statements, I'm happy to discuss it. There is no need to refute things I am not arguing for. More to the point, the main reason I use my time here is to find out additional information on this particular Tiger company. In this sense I'm grateful to Cult for sharing the information on the company he's been able to find. :milwink:

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Re: Wittmann, Villers Bocage and his kill claims.

#402

Post by Michael Kenny » 31 Jul 2015, 01:01

I would like to know why German tank losses are broken down into so many different causes. I have lots of experience both with Allien Unit documents and internet posting where tank losses are discussed. I have never ever seen anyone allocate an Allied tank casualty other than as as one of 3 classes

1 Fit and ready for action.
2 Damaged and repairable.
3 Destroyed/struck off.

I see German losses being subdivided into these classes.

1 Fit
2 Damaged and repairable.
3 Destroyed in combat
4 Destroyed by crew.
5 Broke down and abandoned by crew.

Of the above 5 numbers 3,4 and 5 all mean the same thing and in the Allied record would simply be classed as struck off/destroyed.

I genuinely would like to know why is it so important to sort German losses in sub-sets where what caused the loss is considered important.
Note that none of theses extra classes make any difference to the Unit. To them a lost tank is a lost tank.

I can give you an example where the fact that most of an Allied Units losses were by abandonment is not used to downgrade the German victory. At Villers Bocage of the 25 British tanks lost only 12 were penetrated. The rest were simply abandoned by the crews. Further of the 12 penetrated 2 were Artillery Observation tanks and 2 were Stuart light tanks. Nowhere have I seen anyone try and break the British losses down and claim the abandoned tanks are not combat losses. The British just recognised 'lost' tanks and not 'lost to non combat' reaons.
In this sense I'm grateful to Cult for sharing the information on the company he's been able to find
I re-read Agte for these replies. I just needed my memory refreshing and after a while I got tired of reading about a few Tigers charging forward on ther own and wiping out whole Infantry battalions(Nov 16 1943. 1 company wiped out by Kalinowsky with 3 Tigers, 1 battallion wiped out by Brandt with 3 Tigers and 1 Battalion wiped out by Kling with 5 Tigers. Nov 20. 1 Battalion wiped out by Brandt with 1 Tiger) or in one case a Tiger capturing a village with nothing more than its MG. (Nov 28, Kling with 1 Tiger)that I gave up. The language and the deeds being described just did not ring true and I thought it pointless to keep reading these obviously stock descriptions of wiped out Soviets.
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Re: Wittmann, Villers Bocage and his kill claims.

#403

Post by Sheldrake » 31 Jul 2015, 01:59

Michael Kenny wrote:I would like to know why German tank losses are broken down into so many different causes. I have lots of experience both with Allien Unit documents and internet posting where tank losses are discussed. I have never ever seen anyone allocate an Allied tank casualty other than as as one of 3 classes

1 Fit and ready for action.
2 Damaged and repairable.
3 Destroyed/struck off.

I see German losses being subdivided into these classes.

1 Fit
2 Damaged and repairable.
3 Destroyed in combat
4 Destroyed by crew.
5 Broke down and abandoned by crew.

Of the above 5 numbers 3,4 and 5 all mean the same thing and in the Allied record would simply be classed as struck off/destroyed.

I genuinely would like to know why is it so important to sort German losses in sub-sets where what caused the loss is considered important.
One reason for the differences in allocating casualties is because two different criteria are used.

Armies reporting their own losses use the three categories. A lost tank is simply lost. Understanding the cause of loss cannot always be determined and is mainly of academic interest.

The division of German losses into three looks like the categories used in Allied reports from their Operations research teams. The only way to determine whether an AFV has been destroyed in combat, by its own crew or abandoned is to inspecting hulks on the battlefield. This was an activity mainly undertaken by Allied OR teams.

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Re: Wittmann, Villers Bocage and his kill claims.

#404

Post by Cult Icon » 31 Jul 2015, 03:07

pg. 53 ZB II:

Jan 10, 1944: 1.SSLAH: 6 Pz IV, 7 Panther, 5 Tiger, 10 Stug, 6 SP Guns initiating for OP Winterreise

combat action, tanks claimed

Jan 13, 1944:

A 'soviet tank unit of 50 tanks assault guns' broke though SS-panzergrenadier regiment 1.

KG Peiper attacks the breakthrough and claims 37 tanks and 8 assault guns. Wittmann gets credited with 20 of these kills and this is his 88th.

48.PzK Tagesmeldung and Die Wehrmachtberichete 1939-1945 Band 3, pg 10.
=================================

Operation "Waltraut"/Watutin- over 300 tanks are involved.

1.SSLAH allocated from 48.PzK to 46.PzK to lead the next assault.

Jan 22: 24 Pz IV, 28 Panther, 1 Tiger, 23 Stugs
Jan 27: 2 Pz III (L), 17 Pz IV,13 Panther, 2 Tigers, 16 Stugs
Jan 28: 16 Pz IV, 9 Panther, 4 Tigers, 16 Stugs
Jan 30: 13 Pz IV, 6 Panther, 4 Tigers, 15 Stugs

In the operation, 46.PzK credited with 520 tank kills. 3. PzK gets 181 kills.

Heavy PR-Bake of 46.PzK gets 267 kills. The rest of 46.PzK: 253 kills between 1.SSLAH, 1 Artillery division, and 3 infantry divisions.

Wittmann gets his 112th on Jan 29, 1944. That's it for now.

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Re: Wittmann, Villers Bocage and his kill claims.

#405

Post by Cult Icon » 31 Jul 2015, 04:46

This reminds me of one of SLA Marshal's theories from Men Against Fire, which is identical to the bolded. Whether or not it is believed, it claims that the minority of fighters (in this case Tigers) lead the majority in attack operations and do a disproportionate amount of the work. By training the Tigers of GD/SS were the forward detachment:

Balck about his 48.PzK after Z-B:Reflective of Wittmann???
In professional military literature the question has been raised time and again as to
which is the strongest form of combat, the attack or the defense? In World War I it was the
defense, because barbed wire and machine guns were invincible. But in the age of the
Panzer it is the attack. The effect of a dozen soldiers acting with forceful initiative can
transmit a psychologically decisive energy to the attack of an entire division. The mass
just has to follow through.
In the defense, with its extended front lines during World War
II, everybody had to perform at full capacity. Sitting in your foxhole by yourself—not a
fellow soldier in sight, but everything moving toward you—is a situation that not
everyone has the nerves for. As a result, almost all linear and stubbornly defended This was our operational approach in the following weeks. Our weak and overstretched
divisions holding frontline sectors up to forty kilometers long were penetrated at
numerous points by strong Russian tank forces. I pulled the corps back into a shorter
straight-line position, and in the course of the move we destroyed every Russian tank that
stood between and behind our battle groups. Most importantly, my three stalwart divisions
took up their new positions confident of victory.
At one point we launched a surprise counterattack along the whole front line after we
had evaded the enemy purposely for two days. At another point we concentrated strong
Panzer formations and then rolled up the entire Russian advance position parallel to the
corps’ front. The most important thing was never to repeat our tactics and only to do what
would catch the enemy by total surprise. However, my three first-rate divisions were the
main pillars of success, and after months of fighting together they had been welded into an
effective weapon. Without a lot of back and forth discussion, they executed quickly what
was ordered of them, even though at the time they might not fully understand the intent of
the corps headquarters. The element of trust we had built slowly was now bearing rich
fruit.

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