Why the Waffen-SS

[Sid Guttridge]

Hi ljadw,

I am suprised you write, "I find it also questionable to talk about "Panzerwaffen elite " because this is giving the tank units an importance they never had". I would suggest that the skillful use of the tank to achieve breakthroughs and rapid, deep exploitation was at the forefront of all major German successes except Norway. If you know otherwise, please explain.

You write, "If "Panzerwaffen elite " means that only the PzD were elite, that means that till the winter of 1942/1943 the WSS was no elite, because only in this winter were the first WSS PzD committed;." No. It means that before they were armoured the W-SS divisions were only eligible to be amongst the elite of the motorized infantry divisions, not that they couldn't be elite at all. It is difficult to see how the performance of 1st W-SS Division, then motorized, in Yugoslavia and Greece could have been much improved on by any Army motorized divisions of the time. However, it should be recognized that its opportunity came after initial German Army breakthroughs, not its own.

You write, "If it means that all PzD were elite.....". No, it doesn't. It means that the Panzerwaffe was the decisive arm of the German ground war effort. As in the W-SS, there were better and worse divisions, as you rightly point out. On occasion, amongst the better were some of the senior Reichsdeutsch W-SS divisions.

You write, "No one is talking about infanterie/artilleriewaffen elite, thus why Panzerwaffenelite ? " Well, probably because (1) the armoured arm was the decisive one, (2) because there were no Reichsddeutsch line infantry or artillery divisions and (3) no W-SS divisions with any other specialization than motorized infantry or armour were ever good enough to be considered amongst that arm's elite. As I said before, there was no mystical quality of "Waffen-SS-edness" that could make a silk purse out of a sow's ear!

You write, "No one is talking about US/British/Soviet armoured /tank units elite , thus ,why Panzerwaffen elite ?" I would suggest that the title of the thread explains this. It is Germano-centric.

Cheers,

Sid.

[Sid Guttridge]

Hi ljadw,

You quote, " (about the LSS in the Dunkirk region in 1940 ) : once launched, the LSS progressed so slowly ,that Guderian was forced to commit 2 Pz to the battle ." Might it not be the case here that missing element was organic armour, which the Army panzer division had, but the W-SS then did not?

You quote, ".....the fighting performance of the WSS in France was on the whole acceptable,but not brilliant." Well this is rather an advance on your earlier blanket condemnation of the military qualities of the W-SS.

You quote, "Totenkopf lost in june/july 1941 during 16 days of fighting 10 % of its manpower, which drew criticism from Manstein who thought such losses excessive for the relatively modest gains from Totenkopf ." Given that the German Army used up all its five months of available trained reinforcements in the first two months of Barbarossa, it looks as though the problem of high losses without expected results went rather further than just the Totenkopf.

In each of these cases you wrote, "This is not indicating eliteness". True, but it is also not demonstrating the military incompetence you earlier alleged.

I would again suggest that on this thread you have damaged your own case by overstatement. You need a more nuanced view.

Cheers,

Sid.

[ljadw]

Hi ljadw,

I am suprised you write, "I find it also questionable to talk about "Panzerwaffen elite " because this is giving the tank units an importance they never had". I would suggest that the skillful use of the tank to achieve breakthroughs and rapid, deep exploitation was at the forefront of all major German successes except Norway. If you know otherwise, please explain.

You write, "If "Panzerwaffen elite " means that only the PzD were elite, that means that till the winter of 1942/1943 the WSS was no elite, because only in this winter were the first WSS PzD committed;." No. It means that before they were armoured the W-SS divisions were only eligible to be amongst the elite of the motorized infantry divisions, not that they couldn't be elite at all. It is difficult to see how the performance of 1st W-SS Division, then motorized, in Yugoslavia and Greece could have been much improved on by any Army motorized divisions of the time. However, it should be recognized that its opportunity came after initial German Army breakthroughs, not its own.

You write, "If it means that all PzD were elite.....". No, it doesn't. It means that the Panzerwaffe was the decisive arm of the German ground war effort. As in the W-SS, there were better and worse divisions, as you rightly point out. On occasion, amongst the better were some of the senior Reichsdeutsch W-SS divisions.

You write, "No one is talking about infanterie/artilleriewaffen elite, thus why Panzerwaffenelite ? " Well, probably because (1) the armoured arm was the decisive one, (2) because there were no Reichsddeutsch line infantry or artillery divisions and (3) no W-SS divisions with any other specialization than motorized infantry or armour were ever good enough to be considered amongst that arm's elite. As I said before, there was no mystical quality of "Waffen-SS-edness" that could make a silk purse out of a sow's ear!

You write, "No one is talking about US/British/Soviet armoured /tank units elite , thus ,why Panzerwaffen elite ?" I would suggest that the title of the thread explains this. It is Germano-centric.

Cheers,

Sid.

I disagree fundamentally with your claim that the armoured arm was the decisive one : the war was decided (as were all wars) by the infantry and artillery (aircraft not counted ) .Tanks are cavalry and cavalry is only exploiting the successes of the infantry and artillery .And when tanks are not protected by infantry/artillery, they fail, as in Poland 1939 and Dunkirk 1940 and in 1941/1942 in the Soviet Union .

[ljadw]

Hi ljadw,

You quote, " (about the LSS in the Dunkirk region in 1940 ) : once launched, the LSS progressed so slowly ,that Guderian was forced to commit 2 Pz to the battle ." Might it not be the case here that missing element was organic armour, which the Army panzer division had, but the W-SS then did not?

You quote, ".....the fighting performance of the WSS in France was on the whole acceptable,but not brilliant." Well this is rather an advance on your earlier blanket condemnation of the military qualities of the W-SS.

You quote, "Totenkopf lost in june/july 1941 during 16 days of fighting 10 % of its manpower, which drew criticism from Manstein who thought such losses excessive for the relatively modest gains from Totenkopf ." Given that the German Army used up all its five months of available trained reinforcements in the first two months of Barbarossa, it looks as though the problem of high losses without expected results went rather further than just the Totenkopf.

In each of these cases you wrote, "This is not indicating eliteness". True, but it is also not demonstrating the military incompetence you earlier alleged.

I would again suggest that on this thread you have damaged your own case by overstatement. You need a more nuanced view.

Cheers,

Sid.

About the LSS at Dunkirk :the PzD also failed,thus organic armour was not the missing element : it was the LSS as such that failed and the reasons why it failed are obvious .

About the fighting performance of the WSS in France : the quote is not my opinion ,but the opinion of the author of the book.

About the criticism of the Totenkopf : Manstein criticised the Totenkopf ,because his judgment was that the losses were much to high for the gains .

[Richard Anderson]

I disagree fundamentally with your claim that the armoured arm was the decisive one : the war was decided (as were all wars) by the infantry and artillery (aircraft not counted ) .Tanks are cavalry and cavalry is only exploiting the successes of the infantry and artillery .And when tanks are not protected by infantry/artillery, they fail, as in Poland 1939 and Dunkirk 1940 and in 1941/1942 in the Soviet Union .

Interesting. You are making the same fundamental error the French, British, Americans, and Soviets made in organization and doctrine, which resulted in the tremendous early German success.

Armor was NOT simply mechanized cavalry. Until you understand that you will continue to make the error.

[histan]

Richard is correct.

The reason for the German early successes was that they had a better understanding of Combined Arms Warfare (with some support from the Luftwaffe as long range artillery) and this blend of tanks, infantry and artillery making use of both manoeuvre and "fires" dominated the battlefield.

The reason that the Germans lost in Normandy was that the US had pretty well caught them up in Combined Arms Warfare but much more importantly the US and British had developed Joint Warfare which allowed them to project power from the sea onto the land and sustain it once ashore. Control of the air and of the sea allowed the US and British to "win" both the build up of troops and the logistics elements of the campaign as well as limiting the Germans ability to conduct operational level manoeuvre using a combination of psychological effects and physical effects (destruction of the transport infrastructure).

The Waffen SS had nothing to offer that would help to counter the US and British dominance of this "modern" way of waging war.

Regards

John

[ljadw]

I disagree about the words :"some support " :LW support was essential .

[ChristopherPerrien]

German successes through much of WWII depended on the "infiltration" and small unit tactics they developed in late WWI. Their tanks really did not have much to do with that.

Now on a higher level where the tactics of "Blitzkrieg" what would be approximated as "exploitation" on the allied side is where tanks and their mobility came into play.

Add in tactical air support ,you get to combined arms, in a way, but really true combined arms had to wait for better commo post-war.

[ljadw]

Richard is correct.

The reason for the German early successes was that they had a better understanding of Combined Arms Warfare (with some support from the Luftwaffe as long range artillery) and this blend of tanks, infantry and artillery making use of both manoeuvre and "fires" dominated the battlefield.

The reason that the Germans lost in Normandy was that the US had pretty well caught them up in Combined Arms Warfare but much more importantly the US and British had developed Joint Warfare which allowed them to project power from the sea onto the land and sustain it once ashore. Control of the air and of the sea allowed the US and British to "win" both the build up of troops and the logistics elements of the campaign as well as limiting the Germans ability to conduct operational level manoeuvre using a combination of psychological effects and physical effects (destruction of the transport infrastructure).

The Waffen SS had nothing to offer that would help to counter the US and British dominance of this "modern" way of waging war.

Regards

John

The Normandy campaign was essentially a war of attrittion where tanks had only a limited role .

And in a Combined Arms Warfare,tanks also had a limited role .CAW was warfare where manpower and firepower were more important than mobility : the more units were mobile, the less firepower and manpower they had and when tanks were faced by organized resistance /fortifications, they were blocked and had to wait on additional manpower (infantry) and firepower (artillery ) to help and protect them :Warsaw, Sedan Dunkirk, Stalingrad,etc are classical exemples .

As in WWI,artillery conquered terrain, infantry occupied terrain and cavalry (now mechanised and armoured) exploited the success, and the exploitation was mostly of short duration .

[ljadw]

Hi ljadw,

I am suprised you write, "I find it also questionable to talk about "Panzerwaffen elite " because this is giving the tank units an importance they never had". I would suggest that the skillful use of the tank to achieve breakthroughs and rapid, deep exploitation was at the forefront of all major German successes

You write, "No one is talking about US/British/Soviet armoured /tank units elite , thus ,why Panzerwaffen elite ?" I would suggest that the title of the thread explains this. It is Germano-centric.

Cheers,

Sid.

Tanks did not achieve breakthroughs, they exploited breakthroughs .


There were no elite British/Soviet/US tank units, thus why should there be elite German tank units .

[Richard Anderson]

The Normandy campaign was essentially a war of attrittion where tanks had only a limited role .

They had a considerable role, as evinced by their use and losses. Tanks are a weapon system that inflict attrition.

And in a Combined Arms Warfare,tanks also had a limited role .CAW was warfare where manpower and firepower were more important than mobility : the more units were mobile, the less firepower and manpower they had and when tanks were faced by organized resistance /fortifications, they were blocked and had to wait on additional manpower (infantry) and firepower (artillery ) to help and protect them :Warsaw, Sedan Dunkirk, Stalingrad,etc are classical exemples .

As in WWI,artillery conquered terrain, infantry occupied terrain and cavalry (now mechanised and armoured) exploited the success, and the exploitation was mostly of short duration .

You quite literally have no clue what you are talking about. In combined arms warfare the combined arms - infantry, armor, artillery, cavalry, and engineers, with support from air and sea - using fire and maneuver are more effective than any single arm or fire or maneuver individually.

You are confusing the idiotic and fictional dichotomy between the maneuverists and attritionists with combined arms. This still holds true today:

"We have gotten into the fashion of talking of cavalry tactics, artillery tactics, and infantry tactics. This distinction is nothing but mere abstraction. There is but one art, and that is the tactics of the combined arms. The tactics of a body of mounted troops composed of the three arms is subject to the same established principles as is that of a mixed force in which foot soldiers bulk largely. The only difference is one of mobility." - Major Gerald Gilbert, The Evolution of Tactics, (London: Hugh Rees, 1907).

[ljadw]

Without firepower and manpower, the mobility of tanks would not have any success . Mobility was no match for firepower and manpower .

WWI and WWII proved major Gilbert to be wrong .

Even the US divisions with more manpower and firepower than the Germans and the Soviets did not succeed into defeating the enemy by mobility only .

It is not so,as major Gilbert said,that the only difference was one of mobility, but that an advancing army could only advance at the speed of its slowest component : if the tanks were going faster than the infantry and artillery, they were doomed . Firepower and manpower were dominating,not mobility .

Combined arms in WWII meant that the slowest arms determined the speed of the advance And it is still so today : a dismounted infanterist was in war more save than an infanterist in a truck or a soldier in a tank .

Tanks had a limited mobility (for a few hours),but no manpower and only a small firepower

Artillery had almost no mobility and manpower,but enormous firepower .

Infantry had a lot of manpower, a limited firepower and a small mobility .

[Richard Anderson]

Without firepower and manpower, the mobility of tanks would not have any success . Mobility was no match for firepower and manpower .

WWI and WWII proved major Gilbert to be wrong .

Even the US divisions with more manpower and firepower than the Germans and the Soviets did not succeed into defeating the enemy by mobility only

(snip silliness)

I'm sorry, but I simply refuse to argue with mulish inability to reason cogently.

If "Mobility was no match for firepower and manpower" then why was it the "US divisions with more manpower and firepower than the Germans...did not succeed"?

[ljadw]

If "Mobility was no match for firepower and manpower" then why was it the "US divisions with more manpower and firepower than the Germans...did not succeed"?

Which was not what I said

I said that the US divisions who had more firepower and manpower than the Germans did not succeed to defeat the Germans by MOBILITY ONLY : in september 1944 the Allied advance was stopped from the Northsea to the Swiss border,because the allied divisions had advanced to fast, which had as result that they no longer possessed the needed manpower and firepower:tanks only were not enough ;what was needed for an advance to Berlin in the autumn of 1944 was not more mobility,but more infantry (and more motorised infantry ) and more artillery : every attack started with fire by field artillery,which was not automobile .

The lack of manpower and firepower where it should be was the principal reason why theInfantry and artillery could not keep pace with the tanks ; advance was stopped .

The tank lobby said after the war that it was the fault of the infantry and artillery which were to slow (Guderian also said the same ) ,but the truth is that the more units were mobile, the weaker they were,because the less firepower and manpower they had .

As in most cases firepower and manpower defeated mobility . Patton experienced this as were the airborne units during MG.

[Richard Anderson]

Which was not what I said

Actually that is precisely what you said...notice the quotes.

I said that the US divisions who had more firepower and manpower than the Germans did not succeed to defeat the Germans by MOBILITY ONLY :

The latter phrase makes no more sense than the former. The American infantry division was never intended to defeat anyone by "mobility only". That is your fictive. Nor was the American armored division intended to defeat anyone by "mobility only". That is also your fictive.

in september 1944 the Allied advance was stopped from the Northsea to the Swiss border,because the allied divisions had advanced to fast, which had as result that they no longer possessed the needed manpower and firepower:tanks only were not enough ;what was needed for an advance to Berlin in the autumn of 1944 was not more mobility,but more infantry (and more motorised infantry ) and more artillery : every attack started with fire by field artillery,which was not automobile .

Sorry, but no, the Allied advance was stopped by nothing of the sort. The advance was stopped primarily by sustainment issues, which limited the numbers of forces that could be brought to bear on the German border defenses. More "motorised infantry" or "more artillery" could not get there.

The lack of manpower and firepower where it should be was the principal reason why theInfantry and artillery could not keep pace with the tanks ; advance was stopped .

Sorry, but that is simply gibberish.

The tank lobby said after the war that it was the fault of the infantry and artillery which were to slow (Guderian also said the same ) ,but the truth is that the more units were mobile, the weaker they were,because the less firepower and manpower they had .

Which "tank lobby"? Who comprised it and what were their publications?

As in most cases firepower and manpower defeated mobility . Patton experienced this as were the airborne units during MG.

More gibberish. As usually, you are simply pulling random incidents out of your ass to give "exemples" of nothing at all.