Joachim Peiper's tactics

[WEISWEILER]

It's interesting to note that you've finally decided to change your tune to "heavily delayed", given your initial claim that Peiper was "finished off" by the RAF instead of crushed by the 3rd US Armored, 30th US Inf and 82nd Airborne. As for my contacts with veterans, don't worry, they've enjoyed helping me with my research over the past 14 years and the few remaining veterans I know continue to help me to this very date, so I guess the fact that I never drove a tank and think Peiper was a bad tactician didn't put them off

Where did I say 'Peiper was finished off by the RAF'? The German raid, I said, the entire Ardennes offensive, ultimatly was won (for an important part) because weather cleared up and air force could jump in. And further you're not saying anything about the other facts I'm showing you on the issue, basically showing that Peiper had to row with the paddles he had and conduct by the orders given him.

And if you want to judge the tactical skills of Peiper, also read this first.

If you had to launch this offensive again, what measures would you execute differently, both in the higher planning and within your own regiment?

Peiper: It soon became apparent that the real aim of the Ardennes Offensive was not to reach Antwerp, but simply to disturb American preparations and delay the American winter offensive for two months. This should have been made clear by the higher command at the start of the counteroffensive. There are certain definite things that I would do differently:

Institute a speedier system of supplying gasoline.

Have no artillery preparation and keep the horse-drawn artillery from clogging the roads.

Attack with combat teams and tanks at the same time as the infantry. An unsupported infantry attack wastes too much time.

Reduce the length of each column, and instead of three columns use twenty; then upon finding the softest spot, all columns should concentrate on this point.

Use more infantry on tanks.

Take along a bridging unit with each armored point.

Make each combat team completely self-sufficient.

Put a general at each street corner to regulate traffic. [Obst. Peiper indicated that there were two good reasons for such a move, and one of them was not traffic control.]

[WEISWEILER]

It's interesting to note that you've finally decided to change your tune to "heavily delayed", given your initial claim that Peiper was "finished off" by the RAF instead of crushed by the 3rd US Armored, 30th US Inf and 82nd Airborne. As for my contacts with veterans, don't worry, they've enjoyed helping me with my research over the past 14 years and the few remaining veterans I know continue to help me to this very date, so I guess the fact that I never drove a tank and think Peiper was a bad tactician didn't put them off

Where did I say 'Peiper was finished off by the RAF'? The German raid, I said, the entire Ardennes offensive, ultimatly was won (for an important part) because weather cleared up and air force could jump in. And further you're not saying anything about the other facts I'm showing you on the issue, basically showing that Peiper had to row with the paddles he had and conduct by the orders he had to follow.

And if you want to judge the tactical skills of Peiper, also read this first.

If you had to launch this offensive again, what measures would you execute differently, both in the higher planning and within your own regiment?

Peiper: It soon became apparent that the real aim of the Ardennes Offensive was not to reach Antwerp, but simply to disturb American preparations and delay the American winter offensive for two months. This should have been made clear by the higher command at the start of the counteroffensive. There are certain definite things that I would do differently:

Institute a speedier system of supplying gasoline.

Have no artillery preparation and keep the horse-drawn artillery from clogging the roads.

Attack with combat teams and tanks at the same time as the infantry. An unsupported infantry attack wastes too much time.

Reduce the length of each column, and instead of three columns use twenty; then upon finding the softest spot, all columns should concentrate on this point.

Use more infantry on tanks.

Take along a bridging unit with each armored point.

Make each combat team completely self-sufficient.

Put a general at each street corner to regulate traffic. [Obst. Peiper indicated that there were two good reasons for such a move, and one of them was not traffic control.]

[Harro]

Where did I say 'Peiper was finished off by the RAF'?

This was your direct reply when I wrote that Kampfgruppe Peiper was crushed by American troops:

Crushed by American troops? You forget about the sudden impact of Allied airforce. As we all know the operation was called Herbstnebel because of the fact that the Germans wanted to break into the Ardennes as far as possible covered by foggy conditions. These conditions turned eventually (all German armies suffered delays on schedule). When weather got clear enough, Typhoons showed up and (of course together with ground pressure) just finished off the German raid.

The RAF operated Typhoons, the USAAF did not. P-47 Thunderbolts from 365th, 366th and 404th Fighter Group attacked Peiper on December 18 in a two-hour raid, it cost him twelve vehicles including two Panthers. After that the weather turned bad again and the USAAF was grounded while Peiper moved on to La Gleize and was ultimately crushed by the 3rd US Armored, 30th US Inf and 82nd Airborne between Stoumont and Stavelot without any involvement of the Allied airforce whatsoever. Now, you're offcourse free to claim that a single two-hour raid on the second day of a total of ten days of intense ground combat means that it was the airforce who finished Peiper off instead of the American groundtroops, and to you the difference between a Typhoon and a Thunderbolt is probably just as trivial as the difference between a tank and a Bren-Gun Carrier, but allow me to take such weird opinions with a big grain of salt.

[WEISWEILER]

Where did I say 'Peiper was finished off by the RAF'?

This was your direct reply when I wrote that Kampfgruppe Peiper was crushed by American troops:

Crushed by American troops? You forget about the sudden impact of Allied airforce. As we all know the operation was called Herbstnebel because of the fact that the Germans wanted to break into the Ardennes as far as possible covered by foggy conditions. These conditions turned eventually (all German armies suffered delays on schedule). When weather got clear enough, Typhoons showed up and (of course together with ground pressure) just finished off the German raid.

The RAF operated Typhoons, the USAAF did not. P-47 Thunderbolts from 365th, 366th and 404th Fighter Group attacked Peiper on December 18 in a two-hour raid, it cost him twelve vehicles including two Panthers. After that the weather turned bad again and the USAAF was grounded while Peiper moved on to La Gleize and was ultimately crushed by the 3rd US Armored, 30th US Inf and 82nd Airborne between Stoumont and Stavelot without any involvement of the Allied airforce whatsoever. Now, you're offcourse free to claim that a single two-hour raid on the second day of a total of ten days of intense ground combat means that it was the airforce who finished Peiper off instead of the American groundtroops, and to you the difference between a Typhoon and a Thunderbolt is probably just as trivial as the difference between a tank and a Bren-Gun Carrier, but allow me to take such weird opinions with a big grain of salt.

Indeed, I mistook the Typhoon. So what? The point was that:
1: Airplanes attacked Peiper and delayed his column heavily
2: Eventually the German offensive was stopped (for great part) because weather turned all right and air force could jump in massive.

Funny that you keep on bringing up an innoucent airplane type mistake to make your defence. That's about as far as you get. And don't get confused: gun carriers are tankettes, and in any case Kampfwagen. Just as Typhoons are fighter planes just like Thunderbolds.

And again you avoid all the other arguments I'm bringing up. They're substantial, however.

[Harro]

And again you avoid all the other arguments I'm bringing up. They're substantial, however.

You must be joking, we've discussed this over several of the previous pages of this thread and both Rob and I disputed all arguments you've brought in. Our replies go into great detail regarding your initial claim that Peiper was stopped by the airforce. It is no use trying to make us believe that you meant something else because your previous posts in this topic clearly show what your original approach was. 'Nuff said, over and out.

[Rob - wssob2]

Perhaps we can all agree that while KG Peiper did suffer some air attacks, the USAAF did not play a decisive part in stopping the combat group.

Certainly the spirited defense of several US Combat Engineer units plus the devastating American artillery played a greater role than air power in sealing the fate of Peiper's unit.

As for internal reasons for failure, a lack of gas, poor command and control on Peiper's part, plus an assignment that stood little chance of success also played a part.

[WEISWEILER]

Harro, I'll be more specific. Here you point out that Peiper was a bad commander, because he didn't care about his flanks.

the attack of Peiper was too dashing, Knittel had to follow and with nobody taking care of their flanks the American recaptured Stavelot behind their backs. Instead of heading for a Meuse River bridge the recce battalion was forced into repeated attacks on Stavelot to recapture the bridge and reopen the supply route for Peiper. Senseless attacks against a much stronger enemy but "no" was no option so they just tried and tried again until the increasing enemy pressure forced them back. But even then the recce battalion was sacrificed to save Peipers skin.

Now take a look at the instructions Peiper got:

What additional instructions or advice were you given at the division conference?
Peiper: They said that my combat team in the center was to have the decisive role in the offensive. I was not to bother about my flanks but was to drive rapidly to the Meuse River, making full use of the element of surprise.

And again I wonder what you think of the way Peiper himself evaluates the offensive

If you had to launch this offensive again, what measures would you execute differently, both in the higher planning and within your own regiment?

Peiper: It soon became apparent that the real aim of the Ardennes Offensive was not to reach Antwerp, but simply to disturb American preparations and delay the American winter offensive for two months. This should have been made clear by the higher command at the start of the counteroffensive. There are certain definite things that I would do differently:

Institute a speedier system of supplying gasoline.

Have no artillery preparation and keep the horse-drawn artillery from clogging the roads.

Attack with combat teams and tanks at the same time as the infantry. An unsupported infantry attack wastes too much time.

Reduce the length of each column, and instead of three columns use twenty; then upon finding the softest spot, all columns should concentrate on this point.

Use more infantry on tanks.

Take along a bridging unit with each armored point.

Make each combat team completely self-sufficient.

Put a general at each street corner to regulate traffic. [Obst. Peiper indicated that there were two good reasons for such a move, and one of them was not traffic control.

[Harro]

I don't think much about the way he tried to shift responsibility after the war without multiple sources for cross-checking his version of the events.

[Rob - wssob2]

Note that Peiper's 8-point assessment (I believe given to American interrogators) certainly presents his perspective, but we have to keep in mind that it's his perspective - not necessarily the full reality and is "what I would do differently" not "What I did wrong."

It is interesting that he actually doesn't critique his own performance but casts the blame elsewhere - a character trait documented in Peiper's own Army psychological profile (conducted as part of his application to the SS OCS school back in the 1930's). I'm also not sure the "instead of three columns use twenty" was a sound military option - sounds like it would have led to an even more rapid defeat.

Interestingly, Peiper didn't comment on the decisions he made regarding which march routes to use, nor comment on the fact that his subordinates were frequently out of contact with their troops. And, of course, he didn't comment on the illegal killings troops under his command committed.

[Sid Guttridge]

Hi Guys,

I am intrigued by this thread, which seems to be based on the presumption that "what he (Peiper) did with his mechanized forces..... was so revolutionary."

Is there any evidence for this?

I have asked for years for some original military contribution by the Waffen-SS, but without success. (And no, the W-SS did not invent camouflage clothing, or multi-coloured camouflage clothing, or live fire exercises, etc., etc.)

Could this be the be big breakthrough?

What did Peiper do that his contemporaries hadn't or didn't?

Tell us more.....

Cheers,

Sid.

[Jochen S.]

Well Sid,
I guess you will be disappointed. Peiper didn’t invent a new style of warfare but had his own style of attacking the sowjet forces during night-or early morning hours, to surprise and destroy the enemy(statements Erhard Gührs 14 January 2006/30 July 2009) . Which was very succesful but caused many casualties – both men and equipment.
This tactic he also used when commanding the Pz.Rgt. – like I wrote before – this cost the Regiment dearly. Even Peipers Panzerdriver Otto Becker deliberately put the tank out of action ‘cause he believed the following action to be too hazardous (statement Horst Schumann 11 November 2008) on serveral occasions.
His predecessor Schönberger was too cautious (acc. to veterans) calling him ‘Metermann’ and therefor preferred Peiper. Mind you, not all men of the Pz.Rgt. were glad to welcome Peiper as their new CO. Like the late dr. Arndt Fischer-Brandies. He asked for a transfer but Peiper denied and both became good friends later on(statement dr. Arndt Fischer Brandies 24 July 2006)
So, no breakthrough…….

[dshaday]

[Moved from "Jochen Peiper/Malmedy Incident Questions"]

Hi Rob

In your last post you said:

All Westemeier did was take the the facts and compile a more complete, and less hagiographic, portrait of Peiper. The facts stand that Peiper may have been a good SPW battalion commander, but he performed poorly as a Panzer commander.

So Peiper was a good SPW Battalion commander, but a poor Panzer Commander. In what ways was he a poor Panzer commander?
Is this based on the battle of the Bulge? Or also experiences in Russia?

All the best

Dennis

[Harro]

Peiper's command of the LSSAH Panzer-Regiment in the 1943/44 Ukrainian battles was a disaster. The other officers in the regiment feared that his gung-ho "SPW-style" methods would destroy the regiment and they were right. Peiper simply did not understand tank warfare. He burned down his panzers in a series of catastrophic attacks against dug-in Soviet AT guns, moved deep into enemy territory without any protection on the flanks, to such an extent that LSSAH commanders like Albert Frey refused to attach their men to Peiper's outfit in fear of losing them. Each and every attack, even when succesful, cost too many tanks and too many men. The fighting near Radomyschl on December 10, 1943, was especially disastrous. Peiper did not care about recconaissance or tactical manouvres, he send his troops forward and smashed his regiment head first into strong Russian defensive positions. The German tanks were helpless. Divisional commander Teddy Wisch witnessed the slaughter of his tanks and he ordered to abandon the attack to prevent further "turkey shooting" by Soviet AT guns. A few hours later Peiper insisted to try again and in similar fasion, and the result was the same. Again, a furious Wisch had to stop the attack and ordered Peiper back. It was only three weeks after he had taken command after Schönberger was killed and after those three weeks Peiper had only 12 tanks left. He was ordered back to the divisional staff to be replaced by Kuhlmann. Peiper was with the divisional staff and in Germany for rest and holiday while Kuhlmann led the remnants of the Panzer-Regiment through the Hube Pocket. In April the survivors of his unit were send to Belgium were Peiper joined them again. His Oak Leaves and promotion were a propaganda present for his godfather Himmler.

http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic. ... 0&t=106165

[Marcus]

A post about the Westmeier book was moved to the thread at http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic. ... 9&t=164221

/Marcus

[Rob - wssob2]

Hi Dennis.

Peiper had no experience commanding armor prior to his assuming command of the LSSAH Panzer Regiment. Having read a few biographies on the man, I'm still not entirely clear if Peiper had ANY training in armor other than the 2-day course he took at the Putlos Armor School in December 1942.

As for his SPW tactics, they seemed to be a motorized version of the cavalry-dash - a put-the-petal-to-the-metal straight on attack with all guns blazing.