Joachim Peiper's tactics

[jrutman53]

Eindoven,

I don't see what the problem is. I agree with you. I just don't like to type that much! LOL
J

[eindhoven]

Harro, your thread on Knittel is locked. I've sent you a private message regarding Knittel in 1937 as well as clarification on Knittels orders.

Danke sehr

[seaburn]

This is an except from the testimony of Eric Rumpf (co-accused with Peiper at the 'Malmedy' trial) and his view on Peiper's style of command. I thought it may add to the discussion here - this is just an excerpt. For the full testimony http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic.php?f=6&t=206251


"He was further known to also punish ruthlessly every one of his own soldiers who showed any weakness. Intellectually, he surpassed the other commanders and was personally known among the highest leaders of the state. I got to know him as a man who in action valued tactical success higher than anything else, who committed himself and others ruthlessly, who punished individual weakness hard and mercilessly, the same as he was hard and merciless towards the enemy. He was a man whom you could admire as a soldier because of his success, but whom you could fear imagining him as your enemy".

Source: RG-549, Box 32. Handwritten accounts written by Erich Rumpf of actions in Russia./supplied by Danny Parker, author of 'Hitler's Warrior'

[eindhoven]

Thank you Seaburn. Very interesting contrast to Agte's glowing descriptions of him as some sort of paternal commander.

[ridgback65]

Thank you Seaburn. Very interesting contrast to Agte's glowing descriptions of him as some sort of paternal commander.

I think we are all aware of Mr Agte's personal agenda with some of his comments.

[eindhoven]

Thank you Seaburn. Very interesting contrast to Agte's glowing descriptions of him as some sort of paternal commander.

I think we are all aware of Mr Agte's personal agenda with some of his comments.

That's assuming we are all enlightened to Agte's agenda yes? Maybe some need contrast who otherwise believe the Knödel. We are not all old hats here.

Rumpf's comment regarding Peiper's harshness, lack of tolerance towards any weakness in his own men in a fight was enlightening for a number of reasons especially the tactical but I'm not up for typing a soliloquy today. With Rumpf though you have to consider the timing of his statement and the context of his need to deflect responsibility to an unwavering senior officers intolerance making him do things he would never have done otherwise.

[ridgback65]

I know everyone here are not *old hats*. I have found this thread very interesting and have read the discussion with interest. I agree that the timing of Rumpf's comments could have been made out of the need to save himself at a time he found himself in trouble.

I will continue to enjoy this thread as I do enjoy healthy debate.

[seaburn]

Without going too much off-topic here, I'm not sure how detrimental to Peiper this particular testimony of Rumpfs was. But I don't personally see anything in this that flies in the face of the known facts about Peiper's style of command. There was another page that Rumpf wrote at the same time which contained a much more serious allegation against Kurt Meyer. That allegation against Meyer is corroborated by testimony from others, although Rumpf has thrown in a new suspect at the 11th hour by claiming Sepp Dietrich may have been in Jefremowka on the day of the atrocity. That part of his testimony has not been corroborated by any other evidence so far found. Rumpfs second page is posted here:

http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic. ... &start=135

I also have another testimony of his which covers multiple pages and goes into detail about the events in the Ardenne's. I was only interested in a small part of that one which covered events on the Eastern Front and therefore I haven't posted it in full on the Peiper thread as listed previously. I am not sure how much of these two testimonies were used at the Malmedy trial.

There appears to have been at least one more Rumpf testimony, one that was read out at the trial and contained a specific allegation against Peiper for the annihilation of a village in the East. Peiper referenced that testimony in a conversation with author James Weingartner in 1976 shortly before his death. I have a heavy suspicion that that testimony was flawed, the reasons are outlined in the Peiper thread. Unfortunately that document has eluded me so far, so therefore I cannot stand over my suspicion but I'm optimistic that it will surface some day and that all will be clarified. Rumpf was quite the chatterbox indeed.

[eindhoven]

As is often the case multiple sources from various time frames come into play to form the total picture.

Otto Dinse recalled the following about Peiper

"Every night we were on wild rides deep inside Russian lines. We didn't even know where the front line was...Peiper always took advantage of things. He always had a tank platoon with his battalion. He attacked one night and broke through, penetrating sixty kilometers north, that completely took the Russians by surprise. One cannot image; the enemy was standing on the dark street and we just marched right on through. I had the tank of the adjutant and we didn't even have communications with the division headquarters.....It goes like this in Russia: at 4 or 5 in the morning the sun rises and the the Russian artillery begins, and then at 8 a.m. in the morning the tank battle starts along with other fighting. But we took off at 12:01A.M. and drove around. We did this with tank attacks also. We did it time after time. We nicknamed the halftracks 'open coffins'...The Schützenpanzerwagen were only strong enough to stop rifle rounds; if an anti-tank gun fired on it, it was gone. Accordingly, Peiper always got tanks to go along and he attacked with tanks intermingled with SPWs. He would lead with an SPW out front with a tank behind a few more SPWs with another tank. That's how we rode all our attacks"

Source: interview with Otto Dinse, Pg 307 'Fatal Crossroads' by Danny S. Parker

[alan]

Might this have anything to do with why Peiper was given the Panzer Regiment?

[eindhoven]

Considering the seasoned leaders bypassed to promote Peiper to a command he was not properly trained to lead with results that speak for themselves what other logical military explanation is there other than strings from above? Imagine taking Michael Wittmann away from Panzers and putting him in command of towed artillery just because they had 88mm and he is therefore then familiar with employing artillery units. I don't get that logic.

Another acceptable possibility, one I've mentioned earlier, is sweeping in its explanation of their shortcomings as a fighting force, the Peter Principle, where the Waffen-SS consistently promoted individuals above their capacity leading to their ultimate failures.

Largely I'm among the many who believe his entire career was steered to the detriment of others up to and including an entire military operation in the Ardennes.

[Rob - wssob2]

Might this have anything to do with why Peiper was given the Panzer Regiment?

I believe so - he was seen as a guy who could "get the job done" so to speak. I suppose, however, that there is a thin line between aggressively effective and disasterously reckless.

[Rob - wssob2]

Reading between the lines of Dinse's comments:

"Every night we were on wild rides deep inside Russian lines. We didn't even know where the front line was...

Not knowing where the front lines are doesn't sound good.

Peiper always took advantage of things. He always had a tank platoon with his battalion. He attacked one night and broke through, penetrating sixty kilometers north, that completely took the Russians by surprise. One cannot image; the enemy was standing on the dark street and we just marched right on through.

Cavalry-style deep penetrations, using the element of surprise.

I had the tank of the adjutant and we didn't even have communications with the division headquarters.....

That definitely doesn't sound good, especially if you get into a spot of trouble.

We nicknamed the halftracks 'open coffins'...The Schützenpanzerwagen were only strong enough to stop rifle rounds; if an anti-tank gun fired on it, it was gone.

Clearly speed and surprise helped keep the panzergrenadiers alive, but against a prepared force with a lot of firepower those halftracks would earn their nickname rather quickly.

Accordingly, Peiper always got tanks to go along and he attacked with tanks intermingled with SPWs. He would lead with an SPW out front with a tank behind a few more SPWs with another tank. That's how we rode all our attacks"

Obviously, combined arms is a good thing, but Heaven help the Peiper unit tank that didn't have enought gas to penetrat 60km - or to get back.

[alan]

So we are saying that Peiper commanded tank platoons in joint actions with his SPW battalion for some time?
Successfully using cavalry tactics of speed and surprise to disrupt enemy communications and supplies and sowing confusion in the enemy's rear areas?

[eindhoven]

So we are saying that Peiper commanded tank platoons in joint actions with his SPW battalion for some time?
Successfully using cavalry tactics of speed and surprise to disrupt enemy communications and supplies and sowing confusion in the enemy's rear areas?

Not what Im saying at all.

Rob - wssob2 used the cavalry comparison. Not I.

Otto Dinse used the word success however unless you missed it he also mentioned running around not knowing where the front line was some 60km beyond friendly forces and being out of communications up to four and five hours before the Russian started trouble.

Werner Kindler who I've quoted was also in Peiper's SPW BN. Dinse's remarks contradict Kindler. See my earlier post where Kindler describes their unit composition and method of attack.

I find Dinse's remarks enlightening. You can sense his discomfort in going so rouge. Throwing in an obligatory word of success doesn't stop him from remembering how far out there on their own and cut off they were. Passing comment but examine what he is saying. Flying past the enemy isn't defeating your enemy. Its simply bypassing them. At speed. They are still there some four to five hours after you passed them.

With Peiper's method of going it alone and outrunning everyone how would Panzers keep up? Panzermen fill in that gap with words of being left behind. Given that Peiper had the only mounted Panzer-Grenadiers and that Panzer-Grenadiers are there to support panzer attacks as infantry support for the tanks perhaps that is what is meant by revolutionary when his veterans use this word. He revolutionized not supporting tanks and instead pressed the attack with his panzer-grenadiers alone going completely against their intended doctrinal use. Per Kindler, Peiper had two SPW dedicated to artillery support (mortars) and also augmented with flamethrower equipped SPW. Peiper in essence cherry picked his unit and employed them to his need. Not the greater need at that.

Since you are posing questions let me ask you, do you think he was a success as a tactician? If so, why?