Joachim Peiper's tactics

[Sid Guttridge]

Hi Guys,

One of the problems with Peiper is the in-depth investigation he has undergone compared with other German officers in similar appointments.

This in-depth investigation is entirely triggered by the war crimes committed by his unit in at least two western theatres of war, which raised his profile in the post-war West. Had these war crimes not occurred, I suggest that we would not be having this discussion about Peiper possessing some sort of supposed military exceptionalism.

There were probably hundreds of German officers, mostly in the Army, who held similar appointments to Peiper at various times during the war. We have no information on them comparable to what we have on Peiper, largely because they did not distinguish themselves by their association with war crimes in the West in the unfortunate way Peiper did.

"Joachim Peiper's tactics", rather than those of numerous others, are here being investigated for reasons largely unrelated to military matters and mostly because we have lots of information on him for all the wrong reasons.

This is emblematic of much W-SS-related research. However good this may be, by focusing on the Waffen-SS in minute detail and flooding the market in W-SS-related reading matter, the historical record is being distorted at the expense of the far more important, innovative and successful German Army.

Cheers,

Sid.

[ChristopherPerrien]

Without the "war-crimes" we would still be discussing Peiper quite a bit, as he did lead the main thrust of the "Watch on the Rhine" /BotB. Which was the last major attack of the Germans in WWII. Peiper represented the "pointy end of the spear" for the entire Wehrmacht and SS for that brief time, and he was just a Colonel?" So how he led that force, and his tactical ability would still be of great interest to military historians.

[Jochen S.]

Although a very interesting thread, I do believe this is too much. Why Peiper is or has become (in-)famous is clear. In addition name one personality on which a bio is published ‘cause he did not do something memorable, genius, terrible or anything at all? Indeed, if it wasn’t for Malmedy, I also doubt he would have become ‘known’ the way he is now…so what. If one is looking for more details on Peipers tactics then read books of Parker, Westemeier, Reynolds, the LAH history, even Agte aso, order his PA Akte and talk to veterans who were there with him. There are also a lot of posts here on AHF where this topic has been discussed and where a few knowledgeable people – including myself – provided info, or maybe not of enough interest?

The tactic(s) he used in the Ardennes was the socalled ‘Auftragstaktik’. Peiper’s job was to get a bridge over the Meuse – even if it was with only one tank as Krämer put it. At the start of the offensive he used – as common practice in the Regiment – a ‘Panzerspitze’(mostly with officers and NCO’s as punishment for offences like getting drunk, fistfights and bad performance during earlier battles – for some a ‘Himmelfahrtskommando’, for others a ‘ehrenvoller Auftrag’) with a ‘Spitzenkompanie’; in this case units of Preuß’s 10./SS Pz.gren.Rgt.2. One smaller primary goal was the bridge over the Ambleve at Ligneuville(Engelsdorf). Sternebeck achieved this, not with one but with 2 tanks(the others lost along the way). Not to worry about the flanks and securing of the area because this would be the task of the following infantry. If you look at the bigger picture it was the task of the 12th SS ‘HJ’ to secure the flanks of Peiper and the LAH, confirmed to me in writing by Hubert Meyer, Ia of the 12th SS. Even the attack on Stoumont during early morninghours on Dec. 19th, 1944 was ‘im Rahmen des Auftrags’ as Rolf Reiser, acting adjutant of Poetschke, told me. After that all was lost (with Peiper being aware of the failed attacks of SG Knittel, KG Sandig and later KG Hansen) and with only two choises left, fight till the end or escape, Peiper chose the latter.

So, did he deserve the awards? Was he military genius? Was he a warcriminal? Did he ‘invent’ a new style of warfare? Was he a capable commander? I believe you can read it in this thread without asking the same Q’s over and over and debate tactics used and converting them to modern military terms.

[Cult Icon]

I am much more interested in the combat experience and ops of KG-Bohm and other Kampfgruppen from 2.Pz and 116.Pz. This was the real main effort with the I SS PzK flaring out quick.

Without the "war-crimes" we would still be discussing Peiper quite a bit, as he did lead the main thrust of the "Watch on the Rhine" /BotB. Which was the last major attack of the Germans in WWII. Peiper represented the "pointy end of the spear" for the entire Wehrmacht and SS for that brief time, and he was just a Colonel?" So how he led that force, and his tactical ability would still be of great interest to military historians.

[Sid Guttridge]

Hi ChristophePerrien,

You write, with questionable accuracy, (as Cult Icon points out), "Peiper represented the "pointy end of the spear" for the entire Wehrmacht and SS for that brief time, and he was just a Colonel?" So how he led that force, and his tactical ability would still be of great interest to military historians.

You say, "Peiper represented the "pointy end of the spear" for the entire Wehrmacht and SS for that brief time". OK, who were the equivalent "pointy heads of the spear" across the Meuse in 1940? Or in Jugoslavia in 1941? Or anywhere in Russia in 1941?

There were dozens, probably hundreds, of German officers of similar rank and responsibility to Peiper who were successful "pointy heads of the spear" at various stages, yet we know of few of their names, and perhaps none as well as Peiper.

Why? I would suggest that this is because Peiper's high profile is primarily based on the war crimes he is associated with in the West, rather than any exceptional military aptitude or success displayed there. This provoked more profound biographical investigation of him than of his more blameless peers. Our in-depth investigation of Peiper on a military level follows on from our in-depth knowledge of war-crimes he was associated with, not the other way around.

Cheers,

Sid.

[eindhoven]

I would counter that KG Kuhlmann (12th SS-HJ), who had a separate established Rollbahn in Wacht Am Rhein, was no more flank support than KG Sandig was supposed to be. Their operational order was to exploit as Preuß stated 'without regards to the flanks just as in France in 1940'. All four of them had established routes. So do we disregard Preuß? If the point was to exploit it doesn't explain diverting each of the KGs off their rollbahn to support Peiper instead. They thereby burned out the other groups sent to aid him. I've already countered KG Hansen could've destabilized the entire St. Vith sector but was called off to go to Peiper's aid instead. Imagine if the opposite had occurred. A total waste of opportunity even to the point of uncommitted panzer reserves.

Peiper is not just Malmedy. He is not just December 1944. Himmler's adjutant would've been interviewed and investigated anyway like Rochus Misch was.

I'd also point out that Munin-Verlag did everything they possible could to build legends. Established by HIAG itself it was a force that even today is largely responsible for the decades of lamenting that lead to the 90s revisionism and rise in Nazi-apologists we see today. They wrote their own histories and edited it all themselves complete with the usual pathos and ethos that is Waffen-SS. Grandstanding and developing excuses to explain away inexplicable losses. Perpetuating their own form of hero in Wagnerian fashion such as Peiper, "the last of the fallen". The Bruce Quarries' of the world began to give them titles like Knights and Samurai denoting chivalry and obedience. Their former enemies fascinated by their idealism took up their cause interjecting moral relativism into the debate 'Well, we shot prisoners too'.

The funny thing about flower gardens is they all have worms beneath the pretty parts.

[ChristopherPerrien]

Hi ChristophePerrien,

You write, with questionable accuracy, (as Cult Icon points out), "Peiper represented the "pointy end of the spear" for the entire Wehrmacht and SS for that brief time, and he was just a Colonel?" So how he led that force, and his tactical ability would still be of great interest to military historians.

You say, "Peiper represented the "pointy end of the spear" for the entire Wehrmacht and SS for that brief time". OK, who were the equivalent "pointy heads of the spear" across the Meuse in 1940? Or in Jugoslavia in 1941? Or anywhere in Russia in 1941?

There were dozens, probably hundreds, of German officers of similar rank and responsibility to Peiper who were successful "pointy heads of the spear" at various stages, yet we know of few of their names, and perhaps none as well as Peiper.

Sid.

Meuse 40? Russia 41? Those are easy, Hans von Luck- Recon BN Leader- 7th Panzer Div. , Luck did have a little help from a guy named Rommel at the Meuse though .Yugoslavia, 41? IDK

But that is my point , Peiper was led element for the (vaunted/elite/over-rated /etc.) LLSAH 1st SS Panzer , 1 SS Corps, 6th SS Army - at The Battle of the Bulge, - Nazi Germany's and Hitler's last chance gamble in WWII
The 6th SS Army was fitted out/expected to be the Big Bad Spear for that whole show. The pointy end being Peiper at the tip of Hitler's namesake unit. If it had not been Peiper we would still know who led that formation at that time, and discussing their failure or success.

Any-whoo, I know far less of Peiper than I do Rommel or von Luck, I guess because they did alot more and they wrote books, which I own. I only know Peiper because of his failure during the BotB, war-crime aspects of the same being more related to the SS mind-set and some nebulous "no prisoner order's" that started a-lot higher up than Pieper.

"Joachim Peiper's tactics", rather than those of numerous others, are here being investigated for reasons largely unrelated to military matters and mostly because we have lots of information on him for all the wrong reasons.

This is emblematic of much W-SS-related research. However good this may be, by focusing on the Waffen-SS in minute detail and flooding the market in W-SS-related reading matter, the historical record is being distorted at the expense of the far more important, innovative and successful German Army.

I agree

[Harro]

I would counter that KG Kuhlmann (12th SS-HJ), who had a separate established Rollbahn in Wacht Am Rhein, was no more flank support than KG Sandig was supposed to be. Their operational order was to exploit as Preuß stated 'without regards to the flanks just as in France in 1940'. All four of them had established routes. So do we disregard Preuß? If the point was to exploit it doesn't explain diverting each of the KGs off their rollbahn to support Peiper instead. They thereby burned out the other groups sent to aid him. I've already countered KG Hansen could've destabilized the entire St. Vith sector but was called off to go to Peiper's aid instead. Imagine if the opposite had occurred. A total waste of opportunity even to the point of uncommitted panzer reserves.

The LSSAH Kampfgruppen had to share two establised routes, they did not each have their own Rollbahn:
- Rollbahn D: Peiper first, followed by Sandig
- Rollbahn E: first Hansen, followed by Knittel
As mentioned before, Knittel did not have a free role. He had strict orders to follow behind Peiper and Hansen, waiting until one of them had advanced far enough for his Fast Group to overtake one of them for an attempt to seize a bridge across the Meuse. On December 17, Knittel even waited in Born for III./SS-PGR1 to catch up with the rest of KG Hansen because his Schnelle Gruppe had advanced to fast and had to stay behind Hansen.

[Sid Guttridge]

Hi Christophe,

Thanks. You make my point for me.

How many books are there on von Luck? One, and he wrote it himself.

A quick look at Amazon shows eight different books on Peiper on the first page alone, not one of them penned by him!

Von Luck was at the innovative cutting edge of "blitzkrieg" tactics near the start. He was at the "tip of the spear" in arguably Germany's most decisive campaign - France 1940. By contrast, Peiper seems neither to have been demonstrably innovative, nor at the "tip of the spear" of any great German success. (In fairness, though, this would have been difficult in 1943-45).

Yet we have this mismatch in publications. I would suggest, again, that this is down to Peiper's association (1) with more than one war crime in Western theatres and (2) his personal association with Hitler, not any demonstrably exceptional military performance.

Peiper does not deserve this over attention at the expense of the numerous von Lucks, almost none of whom seem to have received literary attention at all. It is serving to distort the military historical record.

The W-SS proved incapable of winning the war on the ground, but its post-war publicists are having a good go at winning it for them in popular books.

Sadly, the mere existence of this thread adds apparent more weight to Peiper's claimed military exceptionalism.

Cheers,

Sid.

[seaburn]

Sid - you constantly post on and bemoan the multiple threads dedicated to the WSS, good or bad. I've read von Luck's bio recently and I'd be interested in gaining more insights into his war time career on the forum from those like yourself who are much more knowledgeable about the Heer than I am - By neglecting to do this and instead posting so often of WSS threads, you yourself are contributing to this imbalance which seems ironic as you obviously feel very strongly about this issue.

[dshaday]

Hi Sid

Hi ChristophePerrien,

You write, with questionable accuracy, (as Cult Icon points out), "Peiper represented the "pointy end of the spear" for the entire Wehrmacht and SS for that brief time, and he was just a Colonel?" So how he led that force, and his tactical ability would still be of great interest to military historians.

From what I understand, the Waffen SS (with Peiper in the lead) were given the primary goal of the offensive - which was Antwerp. The goal of the forces in the south was a secondary one. So yes, Peiper was "the pointy end of the spear' for the Battle of the Bulge. This is accurate. If you know differently, I would love to see your sources for this, and how the offensive's orders back this view.

I personally read Cult Icon's comment to mean that his interest was in the southern attack, and that in his personal view this became the de facto main effort (after the original plan went awry and the Waffen SS did not achieve the proper break through).

Regards

Dennis

[eindhoven]

The LSSAH Kampfgruppen had to share two establised routes, they did not each have their own Rollbahn:
- Rollbahn D: Peiper first, followed by Sandig
- Rollbahn E: first Hansen, followed by Knittel
As mentioned before, Knittel did not have a free role. He had strict orders to follow behind Peiper and Hansen, waiting until one of them had advanced far enough for his Fast Group to overtake one of them for an attempt to seize a bridge across the Meuse. On December 17, Knittel even waited in Born for III./SS-PGR1 to catch up with the rest of KG Hansen because his Schnelle Gruppe had advanced to fast and had to stay behind Hansen.

My breakdown was not completely accurate which I should have checked before typing from memory.

The other Rollbahn not listed were as follows.

Rollbahn A-B: SS-Hauptsturmführer Alfons Ott followed by KG Müller led by SS-Sturmbannführer Siegfried Müller
Rollbahn C: KG Kuhlmann led by SS-Sturmbannführer Herbert Kuhlmann followed by Schnellgruppe Bremer led by SS-Sturmbannführer Gerhard Bremer.

There were five and yes, these were established routes for each group. Fixed off best mobility with KG Peiper and KG Kuhlmann getting the best two.

That Wacht am Rhein became a Peiper show is accurate. Priess, Kraemer, and Mohnke wasted material resources and tactical opportunity in vain efforts towards Peiper alone when they could've exploited other KGs. Splitting Knittel off from KG Hansen in turn weakened KG Hansen. Diverting KG Sandig, then canceling that order, wasted time. And on and on it goes. All for Peiper.

Nowhere in 6. Panzer-Armee's operational order from 10 December 1944 does it state KG Peiper was to be the show boat it became.

The order read:

'On O-Tag at 6.00am, I.SS-Panzerkorps will break through the enemy positions in the sector Hollerath-Krewinkel with it's infantry divisions. It will then thrust to beyond the Meuse in the sector Liege-Huy with 12.SS-Panzer Division on the right and 1.SS-Panzer-Division on the left.

KG Kuhlmann who per Reynolds was more or less the same in strength as KG Peiper was given the 2nd best Rollbahn to advance on. (Source, Men of Steel, Michael Reynolds) That group was also under the operational control of the aforementioned leaders. Where was their support?


Your research disputes that of other authors. What is in fact the true story of either Schnelle Gruppe? They are reconnaissance units which Pallud states - "were supposed to probe along the side roads as an advance detachment, avoiding giving battle as far as possible, to capture and hold a bridge or bridges across the river"(Source, Ardennes 1944: Peiper and Skorzeny, Jean-Paul Pallud) You counter they were held in reserve behind the KG awaiting to exploit a far enough advance to race ahead, overtake the KG, and secure a bridge. This is counter intuitive to their very nature but I do not doubt your research given their locations behind the KG which is accurate. Had they been used properly they very likely could have prevented bridges being blown and reported on enemy disposition which would have assisted the KG leaders in choosing to bypass stronger areas of enemy concentration.

Peiper however is the focus not Schnelle Gruppe. For whatever reason all the eggs were put in Peiper's basket and still he failed.

[Harro]

Pallud wrote his books over 35 years ago, with the info available at that time and without ever giving his sources. Since the late 1970s, research made a lot of progress and a number of authors and researchers - including myself - have used multiple sources to pinpoint the errors in Palluds books. But if you do want to use Pallud: check the map in "Battle of the Bulge Then & Now", pages 140 and 141 as it tells you exactly where Knittel was on December 17, 1944, behind Peiper and Hansen.

In his own words:
"Der Auftrag der Abteilung war, im Angriffsstreifen der Leibstandarte - möglichst ohne Kampf - unter Ausnützung der Nebenstraßen, der am weitesten vorgedrungenen Regimentsgruppe dichtauf zu folgen bis zum Austritt aus dem Hohen Venn, um dann schnell und überraschend eine unzerstörte Maas - Brücke südlich Lüttich in die Hand zu bekommen und offen zu halten. Die Entscheidung, welcher Regimentsgruppe ich folgen sollte, lag bei mir." (NARA, Record Group 338, Box 7 und 35, Case 6-24 – Aussagen Knittels im Malmédy-Prozeß, datiert mit 9. April 1946).

Mentioned "Regimentsgruppen" where - obviously - Kampfgruppen Peiper and Hansen. It was not a matter of "proper use" or not, it was a matter of common sense: the narrow roads in the Ardennes were suitable for fast recce vehicles but the geographical situation didn't allow bypassing strong enemy forces as easy as these were used to on the fast Russian and Ukrainian plains, and by the end of 1944 an American Infantry Division could deliver blows to light recce vehicles which 1940-1943 French or Russian infantry could not. Bazookas, heavy MGs, mines, not to mention the dreaded American artillery support.

Knittel could have send Coblenz ahead with his light Schützenpanzerwagen or Leidreiter with his Schwimmwagen, yes he could even have thrown some of his 8-wheelers in the mix (but the Panzerkorps took half of them away from Knittel before they even left Stadtkyll), it would not have made any difference: they were soft targets and lacked the punch needed to overcome enemy resistance and lacked the manpower needed to secure bridges and hold on to them long enough for the Division to link up with them. Schnelle Gruppe Knittel was simply to vulnerable to perform in the classic Eastern Front style of deploying recce battalions and on top of that the terrain was totally unsuitable for such deployment too, that's why they needed the stronger Kampfgruppen to make the initial breakthrough and Knittel had to stay close behind but out of danger, in order to keep his unit intact for the intended rush for the Meuse.

In my opinion, the composition of the Kampfgruppen formed for the offensive was fundamentally wrong: a mixed Kampfgruppe with Panther tanks, motorized pioneers and a strong recce element backed up by motorized infantry would have made more sense (similar to the composition of Kampfgruppe von Fallois). But hindsight is usually the best advisor.

BTW, some pages back you wrote:

As for primary sources, yes, I have my own as well to formulate my own opinions from outside of any need to qoute someone elses research or opinion.

Since you've now quoted Pallud twice but offered no info from other sources, what do your primary sources say about the orders for Schnelle Gruppe Knittel?

[eindhoven]

My reference from Pallud is 28 years old. Your Then and Now being older of course which I do not own. Another from Danny S Parker is 24 years old. Men of Steel by Reynolds is 16 years old while his Devils Adjutant is 20 years old now. I'm sure we can all agree however that the primary sources these men have used such as ETHINT-10 (Jochen Peiper) or ETHINT 27 ( Fritz Kraemer) do not change while authors opinion or subjective viewpoint does. Reynolds for example contradicts himself within the same book in different chapters or another work of his even on the same subject. Westemeier's 1996 book on Peiper was even revised based on further reflection in 2007. Parker's latest offering on Peiper isn't even out of diapers yet.

As for primary sources I've listed just two above. They are from the horses mouth as was yours from Knittel.

This is counter intuitive to their very nature but I do not doubt your research given their locations behind the KG which is accurate.

I wrote that because yes your area of interest was behind the KG in not only Knittel's case but Bremer's as well. Clearly indicated either on maps or varied references. Reynolds is the author who has placed into written word that Knittel had free mind to change his route and mission as he saw fit with Reynolds using ETHINT-27 from Kraemer. Reynolds interview's with Coblenz may have swayed his viewpoint. Hopefully when your book is published new light from your lengthy research can be shed on these interpretations.

Knittel could have send Coblenz ahead with his light Schützenpanzerwagen or Leidreiter with his Schwimmwagen, yes he could even have thrown some of his 8-wheelers in the mix (but the Panzerkorps took half of them away from Knittel before they even left Stadtkyll), it would not have made any difference: they were soft targets and lacked the punch needed to overcome enemy resistance and lacked the manpower needed to secure bridges and hold on to them long enough for the Division to link up with them.

On page 13 of ETHINT 10 Peiper states the following:

And on page 17 in Peiper's words:

Maybe Peiper was too busy being impulsive or furious to have noticed a weak point easily exploited and held by a Schnelle Gruppe to capture a bridge since that was their exact purpose which you have stated. Or maybe, just maybe as in Russia he simply didn't care and was pushing on in his manner. Either way, Knittel was behind KG Hansen with Peiper having jumped to KG Kuhlmann's rollbahn.

I agree the composition was wrong. Peiper himself after his briefing by Mohnke laid out his columns and his method of attack. His choices. No one elses.

[eindhoven]

In ETHINT-10, 1st SS Panzer Regiment in the Ardennes (11-24 Dec. 1944) An Interview with Obst Joachim Peiper on pg 22 his Interviewer Major Kenneth W. Hechler questioned Peiper about communications. I insert this here because we have already had heard Dinse's words on Peiper being out of communications. I find it interesting that the American interviewer asks him this.

Peiper was being classic here. He did not radio he had cleared a route nor radio his position on KG Kuhlmann's route which was clearer further ahead of the restistance Kuhlmann was experiencing.

Peiper's commanders thereby lost an opportunity where Schnelle Gruppe Bremer could have been detached to move on Peiper's old route which was now free then move back onto KG Kuhlmanns route joining with Peiper where resistance was minimal. It is another example of Peiper's tactical shortcomings as well as his style of leadership.

In fact Peiper's answer shows 1. SS-Panzer-Korps had to contact him for a situation report a full day after the operation began instead of him updating them on when he had even moved out.