German Tactic of Avoiding Artillery Bombardments

[Der Alte Fritz]

Charting the course of artillery avoidance tactics on the Eastern Front

The tactic of avoiding Soviet artillery barrages by moving just before the bombardment is seen in the following battles:
Battle of Lenino - 4th Army Heinricci 12th Oct 1943
Summer offensive against Lvov 1944
Battle of Seelow Heights April 1945 – Heinricci and Busse and Guderian's 'Grosse HKL'
East Prussia 1945
other examples needed!
Was certainly a tactic used in the Great War see reference to use on the Somme in “If Germany Attacks” - German defenders abandoning trench line and moving 200m into No Man's Land to set up a line in shell holes.

Possible authors of the tactic
General Edhart Raus (4th Panzer Armee) – quoted in “German defence against Russian breakthroughs” US Army pamphlet

General Gotthard Heinrici (4th Armee) – quoted in “Red Storm on the Reich” Duffy “....officer of the General Staff in the Great War and had observed with keen interest the cunning way the French had learned to thin out their troops before they were hit by German bombardments.”
Was supposed to have developed the tactic in Jan 1942 while in command of 4th Armee during the defensive fighting in front of Moscow – for which he received the Knights Cross. “The Fourth Army under Heinrici held out against the Soviet onslaught for ten weeks. Heinrici managed this even though his forces were sometimes out-numbered 12 to 1. During this time, Heinrici developed one of his most famous tactics: when he sensed a Soviet attack was imminent, Heinrici would pull his troops back from the line prior to the preliminary artillery barrage. Then, immediately afterwards, he would return them unharmed back to their lines to face the attacking Soviet troops.”

[mikel]

No doubt some facts exist related to this.
I would think an enemy would catch on pretty quick.

While areas are often designated for general bombardment , a lot of artillery is observed and adjusted for effect in real time.

Also damage assessment os a factor in this. Some poor fool gets sent to get as close a look at smoking evidence as possible.

How do you know when it is coming?
How effective observers adjusting fire to your new positions?

[Michate]

Similar tactics, based on the so called Großkampf-Verfahren, were used by 3Pz Army (again commanded by Raus), in particular, XXVI Corps, against the Soviet offensive in Northern East Prussia, starting 13 January 1945.

The Corps artillery commander (Arko) later wrote a short but interesting AAR, which stated for instance that the relocated artillery batteries remained, with one or two exceptions, completely undisturbed by Soviet artillery fire, probably because Soviet artillery recon had missed the relocation of the guns.

[Michate]

While areas are often designated for general bombardment , a lot of artillery is observed and adjusted for effect in real time.

The mentioned tactics were mainly used against larger scale Soviet attacks, which were staged as set piece battles, planned to considerate detail in advance.

Especially the artillery preparations of these attacks were mainly shot as pre-arranged and scheduled map fire, based on agent reports, air photo recon and recon in force during the preceeding weeks and days. Thus, with emphasis on strength of the preparation rather than reactivity.

Though 4th army during the beginning days of operation Bagration in June 1944 reported that the Soviets had learned to employ what the Germans called "flexible fire direction" as well, laying reactive fire on remaining German strong points after the start of the attack, which seems to have been an innovation at least in this front sector.

[Der Alte Fritz]

This is all true but none the less the tactic was used with some success.
How do you know when it is coming? boils down to good intel. - deserters coming over just before an offensive, radio traffic, etc, Germans had a good record in this area.
Was it worth doing? Yes some 60-70% of German casualties on the Eastern Front were caused by artillery fire and initial heavy Soviet bombardments were particularly destructive, being short - about 90- minutes, fired by many tubes - so rapid fire - and heavy about 2 fire units worth, typically - and very targeted due to the Soviets good tactical intelligence. These were pre-planned bombardments fired on registered targets but as many were fired at dawn so not necessarily adjusted by observers. Early morning fog was another factor, none the less the Soviets would often fire their bombardments blind.

Of course the Soviets became aware that the Germans were slipping away from their bombardments and the practice arose of putting in reconnaissance attacks before the main one to determine if they were still there or not. The Germans countered by leaving behind an outpost line with machine guns to make it harder to judge and the Soviets countered by putting in battalion sized attacks sufficient to sweep away outposts yet not too large to tip off the timing of the main attack. Be aware that Soviet practice was to put in battalion sized attacks before offensives if they were uncertain as to the precise location of the German lines. So Operation Rumyantsev saw this type of attack - as the Soviets only had 9 days to follow up and prepared for the Operation following the battle of Kursk. Fire plans were adjusted in the wake of this intel and fired accordingly.

[Der Alte Fritz]

Hi Michate
Are you back home now?

Though 4th army during the beginning days of operation Bagration in June 1944 reported that the Soviets had learned to employ what the Germans called "flexible fire direction" as well, laying reactive fire on remaining German strong points after the start of the attack, which seems to have been an innovation at least in this front sector.

I think this is mentioned in the 78th Sturm Nov 43 battle report and was due to the excellent observation of the relatively flat 4th Army sector which was over looked by a line of hills just to the east. Normally German positions were on a reverse slope so this was not possible and this would lead me to believe that this was a local response to an unusual tactical opportunity. But it is a good illustration of how Soviet artillery was gaining in skill in the last years of the war.

[Der Alte Fritz]

This article from Armchair General on General Heinrici and his artillery avoidance tactics:
http://www.armchairgeneral.com/wehrmach ... efense.htm

Another source to trace on this subject is:
Ein deutscher General an der Ostfront : die Briefe und Tagebücher des Gotthard Heinrici 1941/42 / Johannes Hürter Erfurt : Sutton 2001

[j keenan]

Into the Den of the Bear by Hermann Pfaeffle
Mentions this tactic with the 13th Panzer Division in august - september 43 in the Crimea
Fortunately,in the majority of attacks,our artillery observers-backed by air reconnaissance-brought
warning of an imminent barrage.We then moved our troops from the foremost postions
before the Russian artillery opened up,so that the Soviet rounds hit empty trenchs forward of our actual
location.As the barrage ended-always abruptly-their rifle battalions were launched and we would wait for
them to reach our first unmanned line.The enemy would often halt for cover in our former postions,effectively
stopping there advance.It was at this moment that Oberst von Holzer,one of our more efficient commanders would put into action a tactic he had spent time honing to a razor's edge,and one that would influence our ability to counter Soviet superiority for some time to come.
page 162
Best Jamie

[Der Alte Fritz]

Interesting post.
A little digging shows that the commander of the 13th Panzer Division in Auguust 1943 Generalleutnant Hellmut von der Chevallerie had served in the defensive battles of early 1942 before Moscow in the then 86th Motorised IR and later 10th Schutzen Brigade (part of 10th Panzer Division) which was part of 4th Armee under command of Gottahrd Heinrici.
Did he learn this tactic from his commanding general? Hard to prove. But interesting that a former AG Centre officer was using this tactic.

[Michate]

Did he learn this tactic from his commanding general? Hard to prove. But interesting that a former Centrak Front officer was using this tactic.

It is of course all speculation as well, but to me it seems more plausible such tactics evolve more from the bottom, i.e. the men on the spot, i.e. within the divisional framework. The emphasis on the role of decentralised intel agencies in practical application would seem to point to that direction as well. There was always considerable tactical variation/innovation at lower levels.

The role of the men at the top (field army, army group, theatre and national) is more to keep track of this tactical innovation and variation, select what works and disseminate and standardize (as well as occasionally enforce).

[Der Alte Fritz]

Yes that is prefectly true. But I do not know of any other Crimea division using this tactic - and ironically I have been reading low level accounts about this fighitng resently.

The aim of this thread is to try to establish when this tactic started, where it started and how widely it was disseminated throughout the OstHeer and the Heer in general.
I think that (at present) that it was not widely used outside of AG Centre until late 1944 and that divisions of the 4th Army developed this tactic during the winter fighting of 1941/42. Other instances of use seems to be quite rare, what I do not know at present is whether this was a 4th Army tactic or more widely used throughout AG Centre.

[Michate]

Well, one should not forget the division in question was a Panzerdivision (BTW, wan't it transferred out of Crimea into the sector of AOK 6 - there was no or little fighting in Crimea in August or September 1943). and these in defensive roles often tended to use more elastic tactics, being better able to rely on counterthrusts with their armored fists.

As to applications of artillery avoidance tactics by abandoning first lines, I guess the mater is more complicated than a simple dichotomy AG Centre/AOK 4 against the rest.

For instance, the detailed tactical instructions by general Martinek (CO XXXIX PzKorps) from July or August 1943 to his corps, after all a part of 4th army, which are reproduced in the book I mentioned in the Lenino thread, include nothing on this tactic, while instructions by general Model during his times as commander of AG North as well as AG North Ukraine emphasise use of a relatively deep "Vorfeld", which should be temporarily abandoned against stronger attacks.

[j keenan]

It was in support of 336 Infantry division at Melitopol in late august
sorry for any confusion
Best Jamie

[Der Alte Fritz]

As to applications of artillery avoidance tactics by abandoning first lines, I guess the mater is more complicated than a simple dichotomy AG Centre/AOK 4 against the rest.

I fully agree with you there.

For instance my recent posting of the Foreign and Military Studies account of 78th Sturm's November '43 "Highways battle" conducted under command of 4th Army does not use this tactic or mention it. You can understand the reason why as only the front trench of the HKL was completed, the second trench was incomplete as were the AT ditch behind and the two Barbara positions behind that. So in essence there was no place, to retire to. So 4th Army was not necessarily using this tactic the whole time. Perhaps it was only used in mobile warfare and not in positional warfare?

The current task is to gather together a collection of examples from which we can then produce an idea of when this tactic started, who used it and in what circumstances. Great War examples might be useful as a comparison.

Any chance you could post the

the detailed tactical instructions by general Martinek (CO XXXIX PzKorps) from July or August 1943

[Der Alte Fritz]

Michate
By a happy coincidence, while on holiday, I have been reading a source which links in with your one from General Martinek:
From the Dnepr to the Vistula (Art of War Symposia 1985 Glantz):
General Lemm describing Operation Bagration when he was commander of I/Fus 26 of the Mecklenburg 12 ID. He held part of the front line outside Mogilev and was under attack from the first day, his battalion holding a 4km sector with around 430 trench strength (companies 70-100 men). He had built a continuous HKL trench on a line of low mounds 30m higher than the surrounding river bank and about 300m back from it. He built a second fighting trench 400-600m behind this and retired to it when expecting and attack. Both trenches comprised of strongpoints of fighting positions linked by a continuous trench that was lightly held. 10 man bunkers were provided within the trench to man 3-5 fighting positions (ie 2 man Schutzen posts or the 6 man HMG post). On the 23rd June the front trench was completely destroyed but his men were unharmed in their second trench and they quickly occupied the remnants of it after the barrage and drove off the initial Russian attack. He repeated this tactic on the second day of the attack and again held his position. He only had two light Infantry Guns with him as the 14th Kompanie was deployed behind the lines covering the Rollbahn behind the II/Fus 26 and the PzJg Abt was away with the other regiments on the left.

Points of interest are:
1. Corps commander was Gen of Artillery Martinek of XXXIX PzKorps who had been in command since April 1944.
2. 12 ID only joined 4th Armee in March 1944 and had formerly been part of 3rd Panzer Armee further north.
3. Lemm based this tactic on his “his experience during the three battles of Vitebsk in early 1944 and Cholm in the winter of 1943.” ie during this 3rd Pz Armee time.
4. So we see several variants of this tactic one similar to the Great War experience where the line falls back a few hundred meters right through to Guderians Gross Kampf HKL where they are planning to fall back several kilometers.