Why the Waffen-SS

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doogal
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Re: Why the Waffen-SS

#1276

Post by doogal » 16 Nov 2015, 21:13

I suppose it depends on your criteria:

If we examine which units used volunteers pre and during the war and then examine the tactical and physical training, which needs to be of a higher standard than the "regular" army. We arrive at a list of some specialized forces, but then we have to consider which roles and the skills constitute the elite status as it has several meanings. I believe we use the contemporary meaning of elite retrospectively and incorrectly for the specialized forces of WW2.

I think the SS Panzer formations were in the same category (in military terms) as the armies formations they were all the cutting edge, and a small one which could constitute the use of the term elite but only in relation to the size of the army mass.

I think its opinion really you can only prove that they made up a tiny cutting edge of a huge mass army. You can prove that some units were better equipped. The Nazis certainly believed them to be an elite and on the battlefield they were seen differently by opponents. What I would say is that the SS have some similar characteristics which contribute to a military formation being considered elite.

I tend to dislike the use of the word elite with WW1 & WW2 formations as it is a transitional time for all armed forces. The integration and use of all arms in formations helped to destroy the older imperial meaning of "elite" formations and mechanisation and specialisation gave rise to specialised combat forms subverting the term.

dshaday
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Re: Why the Waffen-SS

#1277

Post by dshaday » 17 Nov 2015, 07:14

Hi
ljadw wrote: No :those who claim that the WSS was a military elite,that some of its units were a military elite,must produce proofs for their claim, and til today none has produced such claims .

The only reasonable conclusion is that they were not able to produce such proofs because the WSS/some of its units were no military elite .
Again, you choose to disregard my point.

To demonstrate, I will paraphrase you:

Those who claim that the WSS was not a military elite, that none of its units were a military elite, must produce proofs for their claim, and till today none has produced such proofs.

The only reasonable conclusion is that they were not able to produce such proofs because the WSS/some of its units were military elite .

ljadw wrote: I have NOT to prove that there were no military elite WSS units,
Since you did in fact claim earlier that it was obvious that no Waffen SS units were elite, the onus is on you to prove that claim. You have NOT done so. I even asked you for a published book that claims this to be the case - you provided none (although I provided some publications by specialiasts that claimed some Waffen SS to be elite when asked for examples).

We are only repeating ourselves. You believe that no Waffen SS unit was elite and I believe that some were.

Dennis


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Re: Why the Waffen-SS

#1278

Post by dshaday » 17 Nov 2015, 08:03

Hi doogal

You are quite right. "Elite" is a very rubbery concept to quantify.

Simplistically, you can look at the German armed forces as a whole and say that all the Armoured or motorised troops were elite. They were given special equipment, training and recruits were often selected for suitability to the task. They constituted a small, special part of the overall army - and are hence elite. Hence units of the Waffen SS were elite.

We can also talk about elite among the Panzer Divisions, or Motorised divisions etc. There must be a comparison that leads to the elite being the small percentage of units considered the "best".

Some cautious posters have talked about elite units within the SS, and avoid a comparison to the Army (I cannot blame them). Some try to rationalise the fact that those authors claiming the Waffen SS to be elite have been misinterpreted - they really mean political elite. Some hate the word elite for it's "role model" connotation. Some say the term is useless. Some say the term is useless but are convinced that the Waffen SS were never elite (go figure).

Mostly, the term elite is viewed through combat performances (it is irrelevant if the combat was a success or failure). Performance is yet another rubbery concept. We can come up with examples of the Waffen SS making mistakes/having problems and examples of the Army having the same. What does that prove?

We should accept that the whole thing is a subjective exercise, where no one position can be faulted as absolutely wrong or foolish. You have to make your own comparisons/conclusions and not be pressured by over-enthusiastic posters who have already made up their minds.

In my personal opinion (which may not be popular), the Waffen SS combat record is over-analysed compared to the Army because the SS was smaller, has a good paper trail, was in the public eye and easier to analyse. Similar issues (and problems/mistakes) made by the Waffen SS were surely made by the Army. Except these have not been analysed and publicised to the same degree, maybe they even get minimalized.

Complexity in making comparisons between Army and Waffen SS units is added because the Army started the war much stronger and better trained/equipped than the SS. As the war progressed, the Army weakened and the Waffen SS improved. By war's end, both were seriously weakened.

To do a serious comparison of Waffen SS units to Army units you want similar in-depth data on both.

I have said all these things in previous posts.

Dennis

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Re: Why the Waffen-SS

#1279

Post by ljadw » 17 Nov 2015, 09:01

doogal wrote:I suppose it depends on your criteria:

If we examine which units used volunteers pre and during the war and then examine the tactical and physical training, which needs to be of a higher standard than the "regular" army. We arrive at a list of some specialized forces, but then we have to consider which roles and the skills constitute the elite status as it has several meanings. I believe we use the contemporary meaning of elite retrospectively and incorrectly for the specialized forces of WW2.

I think the SS Panzer formations were in the same category (in military terms) as the armies formations they were all the cutting edge, and a small one which could constitute the use of the term elite but only in relation to the size of the army mass.

I think its opinion really you can only prove that they made up a tiny cutting edge of a huge mass army. You can prove that some units were better equipped. The Nazis certainly believed them to be an elite and on the battlefield they were seen differently by opponents. What I would say is that the SS have some similar characteristics which contribute to a military formation being considered elite.

I tend to dislike the use of the word elite with WW1 & WW2 formations as it is a transitional time for all armed forces. The integration and use of all arms in formations helped to destroy the older imperial meaning of "elite" formations and mechanisation and specialisation gave rise to specialised combat forms subverting the term.
Equipment and training are no criteria .

The only criteria are the realizations during the war ; there are no elite units in peace time.

Were WSS units decisive for the successes of German offensives ? NO

Were WSS units decisive to prevent catastrophes during the German retreat ? NO

One exemple : were WSS units responsible for the failure of Market Garden ? NO .

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Re: Why the Waffen-SS

#1280

Post by dshaday » 17 Nov 2015, 14:11

Hi ljadw
ljadw wrote: Equipment and training are no criteria .
I would personally disagree. Especially as they can directly influence the unit's" realizations during the war".
ljadw wrote: The only criteria are the realizations during the war ; there are no elite units in peace time.
I can appreciate that this is part of your criteria for "elite", which is absolutely fine. I personally accept elite units in peace time as part of my criteria. For me, wartime allows you to test/see if a unit performs in an elite way when it undertakes its missions. Failure to complete a mission is not the sign of a unit no longer being elite. Even the best unit in the world will fail if its mission is truly impossible/unrealistic.
ljadw wrote:
Were WSS units decisive for the successes of German offensives ? NO

Were WSS units decisive to prevent catastrophes during the German retreat ? NO

Were WSS units decisive to prevent catastrophes during the German retreat ? NO

One exemple : were WSS units responsible for the failure of Market Garden ? NO
All these points have nothing whatsoever to do with a unit being elite or not. How the WSS units performed in these instances will have a bearing on whether they could be elite (or not). It is all about how the units handle the challenges in the operations/goals assigned to them. Especially when things are difficult.

Dennis

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doogal
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Re: Why the Waffen-SS

#1281

Post by doogal » 17 Nov 2015, 19:39

Agree with Dennis

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Re: Why the Waffen-SS

#1282

Post by Cult Icon » 17 Nov 2015, 20:34

They couldn't have been very elite among pz divisions if it is difficult to find concrete evidence. From my personal studies, pre 44 the way the german generals almost always used their divisions was based on the combat readiness/value/strengths and not based on the brand name.

West of Kiev 43', the only division was clearly seen as an elite was the 7.Pz- the german command had great faith in this unit.

The LAH/DR/TK were definitely heavy hitters in winter/summer 1943. Afterwards, the DR/TK were weakened, and the refitted SSLAH took over in the fall of 1943 as the biggest division west of Kiev with 1.Pz close behind. This would be brief, and 16.Pz became the strongest unit (among the 1.PzA and 4.PzA) by early Jan 1944.

However, I certainly believe that the LAH was a good division in winter 43-winter of 44. But not afterwards.

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Re: Why the Waffen-SS

#1283

Post by ljadw » 17 Nov 2015, 21:32

dshaday wrote:Hi ljadw



All these points have nothing whatsoever to do with a unit being elite or not. How the WSS units performed in these instances will have a bearing on whether they could be elite (or not). It is all about how the units handle the challenges in the operations/goals assigned to them. Especially when things are difficult.

Dennis
The test for a unit is war .A unit that in peacetime is boasting to be elite,but fails to prove it in wartime is no elite .

The WSS divisions did not prove in WWII to be better than the other German units,thus they were not elite : if the WSS was elite,the whole WM was elite,and we know that this was not true .

I still expect exemples of cases where WSS units did better than other German units . Such cases do not exist: there were no elite units on German side,neither were there elite units on allied side .

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doogal
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Re: Why the Waffen-SS

#1284

Post by doogal » 17 Nov 2015, 22:09

The test for a unit is war .A unit that in peacetime is boasting to be elite,but fails to prove it in wartime is no elite .
If your criteria is combat alone is there a ceiling to reach in terms of defeats/victory to be classified elite.??

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Re: Why the Waffen-SS

#1285

Post by Pena V » 18 Nov 2015, 06:04

ljadw wrote:Were WSS units decisive for the successes of German offensives ? NO
Were WSS units decisive to prevent catastrophes during the German retreat ? NO
One exemple : were WSS units responsible for the failure of Market Garden ? NO .
I think you are right but let's analyze this a bit. First some facts. The number of German divisions on important dates. Date selection done by John Mullholland in Axis History Factbook. I have added the date of Market Garden because it's mentioned above and on the other hand excluded pre-WW II dates, dates which concern Italian army only and 12 April 1945 because most - if not all - Army and WSS divisions were not real divisions any more but only in name.

Date.........................Divisions...of which SS...SS%
The Invasion of Poland
Sep 1939....................112.........0...............0,0%
The Battle for France
May 1940...................165.........3................1,8%
Conflict in the Balkans
Apr 1941....................198.........4...............2,0%
The Invasion of the USSR
Jun 1941....................209.........6...............2,9%
Operation Typhoon
Oct 1941....................214.........6...............2,8%
The buildup to Fall Blau
Jun 1942....................235.........8...............3,4%
Prelude to disaster
Nov 1942....................270.........8...............3,0%
Kursk: Graveyard of the Panzers
Jul 1943....................287.........15...............5,2%
The collapsing Eastern Front
Dec 1943....................296........16...............5,4%
The Battle between two fronts
Jun 1944....................294........23...............7,8%
Operation Market Garden
Sep 1944....................257........23...............8,9%
The Ardennes aftermath
Dec 1944....................277.......26................9,4%
And then to conclusions. Is it even possible to expect WSS divisions (0,0% - 9,4% of all divisions) to achieve decisive successes of German offensives or prevent decisive catastrophes during the German retreat? What was expected from the rest (90%+) of German divisions?

Summary. Your answers are correct when you say NO to both decisive successes and decisive catastrophes. What went wrong is the question itself. It is impossible to think that 0,0% - 3,4% could achieve decisive succeses in offensives (mainly 1939 - 1942) or 5,2% - 9,4 could prevent decisive catastrophes (mainly 1943 - 1945). If you think it's possible I have to admit that your expectations of WSS divisions are very high indeed.

Regards,

Pena V

PS What is so special about Market Garden?

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Re: Why the Waffen-SS

#1286

Post by dshaday » 18 Nov 2015, 06:47

Hi
ljadw wrote:
The WSS divisions did not prove in WWII to be better than the other German units,thus they were not elite : ...
What "other German units" are you talking about. I am sure that Das Reich was not the worst unit in the whole German army.
ljadw wrote: I still expect exemples of cases where WSS units did better than other German units . Such cases do not exist: there were no elite units on German side,neither were there elite units on allied side .
If I remember correctly, you asked for an example where an SS unit, on its own, did better than Army units in the area. The quick, but specific, example I gave you was Belgrade 1941.

If you want more general example where one could say the Waffen SS behaved like an elite unit see my posts in the threads regarding Waffen SS military successes. But we both know that that will not satisfy you (since you also posted on that thread and should be aware of its contents).

Since I have already done what you asked for, how about you give me published sources where the Waffen SS are shown not to be elite? I have been asking and waiting a long time.

Dennis

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Re: Why the Waffen-SS

#1287

Post by dshaday » 18 Nov 2015, 07:03

Hi
Cult Icon wrote: They couldn't have been very elite among pz divisions if it is difficult to find concrete evidence.
I believe that the evidence is there in books, but there are always ways of minimising it. For example, the SS divisions were part of a larger team and cannot be given much credit. or, That author is an SS apologist, or, The action could not stave off eventual defeat in the larger picture etc.
Cult Icon wrote: From my personal studies, pre 44 the way the german generals almost always used their divisions was based on the combat readiness/value/strengths and not based on the brand name.
This is undoubtedly true.

I also remember several German generals being quoted in praise of the value of the SS divisions under their command.

Dennis

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Re: Why the Waffen-SS

#1288

Post by dshaday » 18 Nov 2015, 07:37

Hi Sid
Sid Guttridge wrote: Neither the Leibstandarte's Berlin depot units, nor Skorzeny's nearby commandos played any role, even though they could have walked to the Ersatzheer HQ in a few hours.
The short answer to why this happened is because Hitler (and Geobles/Himmler) instructed that the Waffen SS not become involved.

I have read of only the one case (from memory) in Berlin where an SS unit went to secure the radio station and did so in conjunction with an Army unit that had the same orders.
Sid Guttridge wrote: The Bomb Plot was generated within the Army without Himmler or any SS organs being aware of it and was supressed by Goebbels and the Army's GD Berlin guard battalion without their assistance.
It is correct that the bomb plot was not detected by the SS. Nor was it detected by the Army intelligence or security services.
The plotters were quite elaborate in their planning and were placed in critical Army positions. They also had legitimate access to Hitler.

I would not want to overlook the early role of Keitel in suppressing the expansion of Valkerie.
Sid Guttridge wrote: If the SS were Hitler's Praetorian Guard, which on a political level they arguably were, they proved spectacularly professionally inadquate on this occasion.
That is a bit harsh.

Hitler did not appear to blame Himmler for failure to detect the plot - in fact he rewarded Himmler with additional power and entrusted him to clear up the mess. Ironically, it was the Army and the Army Intelligence service that suffered. It was after all an elaborate Army affair involving skilled, trusted, high ranking Army officers with legitimate access to Hitler and his headquarters.

The decision not to involve the SS in potentially armed confrontations was the correct one. Especially as the plotters were telling subordinate unit commanders that Valkerie was activated to stop a putsch by the SS - which would have been exacerbated by the SS being on the streets.
As it turned out, there was no civil war between the SS and Army. Some Army units initially duped by the plotters began to realise the true situation when it was clear that the SS were not active.

Dennis

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Re: Why the Waffen-SS

#1289

Post by ljadw » 18 Nov 2015, 09:26

Pena V wrote:
ljadw wrote:Were WSS units decisive for the successes of German offensives ? NO
Were WSS units decisive to prevent catastrophes during the German retreat ? NO
One exemple : were WSS units responsible for the failure of Market Garden ? NO .
I think you are right but let's analyze this a bit. First some facts. The number of German divisions on important dates. Date selection done by John Mullholland in Axis History Factbook. I have added the date of Market Garden because it's mentioned above and on the other hand excluded pre-WW II dates, dates which concern Italian army only and 12 April 1945 because most - if not all - Army and WSS divisions were not real divisions any more but only in name.

Date.........................Divisions...of which SS...SS%
The Invasion of Poland
Sep 1939....................112.........0...............0,0%
The Battle for France
May 1940...................165.........3................1,8%
Conflict in the Balkans
Apr 1941....................198.........4...............2,0%
The Invasion of the USSR
Jun 1941....................209.........6...............2,9%
Operation Typhoon
Oct 1941....................214.........6...............2,8%
The buildup to Fall Blau
Jun 1942....................235.........8...............3,4%
Prelude to disaster
Nov 1942....................270.........8...............3,0%
Kursk: Graveyard of the Panzers
Jul 1943....................287.........15...............5,2%
The collapsing Eastern Front
Dec 1943....................296........16...............5,4%
The Battle between two fronts
Jun 1944....................294........23...............7,8%
Operation Market Garden
Sep 1944....................257........23...............8,9%
The Ardennes aftermath
Dec 1944....................277.......26................9,4%
And then to conclusions. Is it even possible to expect WSS divisions (0,0% - 9,4% of all divisions) to achieve decisive successes of German offensives or prevent decisive catastrophes during the German retreat? What was expected from the rest (90%+) of German divisions?

Summary. Your answers are correct when you say NO to both decisive successes and decisive catastrophes. What went wrong is the question itself. It is impossible to think that 0,0% - 3,4% could achieve decisive succeses in offensives (mainly 1939 - 1942) or 5,2% - 9,4 could prevent decisive catastrophes (mainly 1943 - 1945). If you think it's possible I have to admit that your expectations of WSS divisions are very high indeed.

Regards,

Pena V

PS What is so special about Market Garden?
MG was an allied failure ,and as one could expect, the WSS lobby claimed this German victory.

Compared to the total of the WM,the WSS strength was almost meaningless .

And I repeat : there are no such things as elite units : it is all propaganda .

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Re: Why the Waffen-SS

#1290

Post by ljadw » 18 Nov 2015, 09:36

dshaday wrote:Hi
ljadw wrote:
The WSS divisions did not prove in WWII to be better than the other German units,thus they were not elite : ...
What "other German units" are you talking about. I am sure that Das Reich was not the worst unit in the whole German army.
ljadw wrote: I still expect exemples of cases where WSS units did better than other German units . Such cases do not exist: there were no elite units on German side,neither were there elite units on allied side .
If I remember correctly, you asked for an example where an SS unit, on its own, did better than Army units in the area. The quick, but specific, example I gave you was Belgrade 1941.

If you want more general example where one could say the Waffen SS behaved like an elite unit see my posts in the threads regarding Waffen SS military successes. But we both know that that will not satisfy you (since you also posted on that thread and should be aware of its contents).

Since I have already done what you asked for, how about you give me published sources where the Waffen SS are shown not to be elite? I have been asking and waiting a long time.

Dennis

No : you are still unable to prove that the WSS were elite,you are even unable to define what elite is .
The WSS PzD were not better than the Army PzD, the WSS infantry divisions were not better than the army ID .

Besides : there were no elite units on German side : there is no proof that the 7Pzd was better than the 8 PzD ,etc.

And the same applies for the allies :the is no proof that the Guards division performed better than the 7 AD,or that the 1 batallion of the CG was better than the 1 batallion of the GGuards .

Belgrade 1941 is not a proof of an SS unit doing better than an army unit .For this being a proof,you have to prove that an army unit with the same strength failed to do what a SS unit with the same strength did .

the whole story of elite units is propaganda .

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