Why the Waffen-SS

[offizier1916]

well im def. someone who is very critic towards the Wehrmacht/Waffen SS, but reading just the last few pages of this thread (and the Barbarossa thread), it seems that appox. 3 members have just the goal to "demystify" every german strategy, win, success etc, so that at the end - if you would just take the statements of those 3 members into account - the Wehrmacht and Waffen-SS(counting just 1,2,3,5,9,10,12 SS Division) were just a group of losers, bad trained and even worse commanded. Winning was just luck or the result of an error commited by the enemy.

back to topic: why the waffen-ss? I think the reasons are not as spectacular as you might think. Growing up in times of uncertainty (1919-1933-34), confused and disorientated due to the economical crises during the Weimarer Republic, promoted by their feeling of being hated and doomed, many young men needed a) a safe job, with the possibility of moving up in the career ladder and b) someone pushing their confidence and ego, telling them that they are "special", that the "germanic people" are special and "better than the others".

and the result is: waffen ss. Once joined the Waffen-SS, their national and xenophobic/anti-semitic thoughts and behaviour grow more and more

Furthermore, with their uniforms and - in comparison to the imperial army/reichswehr/whermacht - lack of nobility/bourgoise in their officer corps, the waffen-ss was a "perfect" antagonist regarding the Wehrmacht. kind of "freeing" themselves from the chains of this "rusty" hierarchy

[ML59]

Offizier,

your explanation is fitting to the full-time A-SS or TV of early/mid '30s, not really to the W-SS that were created much later. The rationale behind the creation of SS-VT, forerunners of the W-SS, was to have a readily available force of police reserve, directly under control of the Fuehrer (through the SS chief HH) to be deployed on the battlefield primarely to fight/suppress/neutralize all German Reich political and racial enemies, a task that was not assigned to the Armed Forces. Only later on the force developed into a real military organization, fully equipped with supporting weapons and services and only after Barbarossa the corps became a force to be reckon with. At the beginning of its short and violent history, the W-SS were mostly a bunch of young thugs; completely different was the situation in the full time A-SS organization that was full of young, clever, highly educated graduates.

[Sid Guttridge]

Hi ljadw,

I am no fan of blind Waffen-SS groupiedom, but I see no merit in the opposite blinkerdness either.

There is no doubt that from 1940 some motorized and later armoured Waffen-SS divisions were as good or better than some of their Army equivalents on occasion. I use the words "on occasion" advisedly, as circumstances change. For example, all the three senior W-SS divisions appear to have been effective in 1941, but were so run down by mid-1942 that they had to be withdrawn to rebuild and so missed the turning point of the war entirely. After over a year being built up with highly selected manpower, 12th SS Division fought very well in Normandy, but suffered so heavily there that it seems to have been burnt out in two months and never fully recovered.

However, this need surprise nobody given that all the divisions concerned were allowed the same equipment as the Army (indeed it was the Army's equipment) and were were allowed to recruit selectively.

The real problem in justifying the existence of Waffen-SS in military terms is that it very difficult to establish that it contributed an demonstrable "value-added" to the German War effort.

Cheers,

Sid.

[ljadw]

I like to see which one of the WSS divisions were as good or better than their army equivalents in 1940 :

Totenkopf ? What special did it in 1940 ?

Das Reich ? What special did it in 1940 ?


LSS ? What special did it in 1940 ?

The same for these divisions and Nord and Wiking in 1941 ?

[ljadw]

The following is from the Lexicon der Wehrmacht about the LSS:

Am 8.Juli 1941 folgte der Einsatz im Raum Sokolow-Miropol.Bie diesen ersten schweren Gefechten zeigte sich die mangelhafte Ausbildung der Brigade-Angehörigen vor allem im Einsatz mit den verbundenen Waffen.Das spiegelte sich in schweren Verlusten wieder .


A rough translation :On 8 july 1941 the LSS was committed in the area of Sokolow-Miropol . During these first heavy fightings,it became well known that the instruction of the men of the LSS was insufficient especially during the cooperation with the other weapons ( = cooperation with tanks and artillery).The result was big losses .


This was a constant during the whole war : on the one side big losses (bigger than at the army) which were not compensated by big performances .


The WSS were only amateurs commanded by officers and NCO's of whom a lot did not know their job,this resulted in big losses and poor performances .

Such units do not deserve the title of elite (title who is also meaningless ),after the war ,they claimed this title ,with as proof the big losses .

[ljadw]

Hi ljadw,

I am no fan of blind Waffen-SS groupiedom, but I see no merit in the opposite blinkerdness either.

There is no doubt that from 1940 some motorized and later armoured Waffen-SS divisions were as good or better than some of their Army equivalents on occasion. I use the words "on occasion" advisedly, as circumstances change. For example, all the three senior W-SS divisions appear to have been effective in 1941, but were so run down by mid-1942 that they had to be withdrawn to rebuild and so missed the turning point of the war entirely. After over a year being built up with highly selected manpower, 12th SS Division fought very well in Normandy, but suffered so heavily there that it seems to have been burnt out in two months and never fully recovered.

However, this need surprise nobody given that all the divisions concerned were allowed the same equipment as the Army (indeed it was the Army's equipment) and were were allowed to recruit selectively.

The real problem in justifying the existence of Waffen-SS in military terms is that it very difficult to establish that it contributed an demonstrable "value-added" to the German War effort.

Cheers,

Sid.

I like to see the proofs that the manpower of the HJ division was higly selected :as far as I know, it was not selected (no one could select his men in 1943): the men were volunteers of the HJ (and it is questionable that they were real volunteers),but that is not saying anything about their military quality .

I like also to see the proofs that the HJ fought very well in Normandy : as far as I know,they did not fight "better" than the army equivalents .

[Sid Guttridge]

Hi ljadw,

Take a look at the 1st W-SS Division in Greece in 1941. It is difficult to imagine that any Army motorized division could have done significantly better, (which is not to say that they would necessarily have done any worse, either). But then, 1st W-SS Division was one of only three German ground formations (the others being 2nd and 3rd W-SS) whose core was largely composed of pre-war uniformed regulars. By 1941 they had also had two years of combat experience under the wing of the German Army to learn their trade. The proposition that all the Waffen-SS were always poorly trained, poorly led, incompetents is as laughable as any blanket proposition that all the Waffen-SS were a military elite.

You can hardly write "the manpower of the HJ division.....as far as I know, it was not selected " and, in the same sentence, write "the men were volunteers of the HJ " and still retain credibility for your argument. How many Army divisions were able to recruit their rank and file largely from youthful volunteers from across the whole of Germany? I can think of possibly only one (care to guess which?). The Army, even the Panzerwaffe, was largely made up of conscripts and older reservists. Young male volunteers are the perfect demographic for military recruitment. They are motivated, fit, not burdened by outside responsibilities and impressionable. Whether it was militarily sensible to concentrate so much motivated, youthful manpower, much of it junior leader material, into one formation and take over a year to field it is open to question, but, I would suggest, its performance in Normandy is generally not. The loss by 12th W-SS Division of so much manpower of high potential in so short a period was perhaps the equivalent of the "Kindermord" of students 1914.

By your ludicrous overstatements you have forced me into a position I rarely have to take - that of defending the military virtues of some of the Waffen-SS.

Cheers,

Sid.

[Sid Guttridge]

Double post.

[ML59]

The HJ rank and file was largely made up of under-age boys of 16 and 17, subjected to massive propaganda and brain-washing from their Hitler Jugend leaders that combed all over Germany to put together the 15.000 men necessary to fill up the division TOE. According to witnesses the training was (purposefully) brutal, those young boys were traumatized and scared like hell of their NCOs and junior officers. Probably also as a consequence of this level of brutality, war crimes against civilians were committed by personnel of the division even before entering in combat on June 1944.

[ljadw]

Hi ljadw,

Take a look at the 1st W-SS Division in Greece in 1941. It is difficult to imagine that any Army motorized division could have done significantly better, (which is not to say that they would necessarily have done any worse, either). But then, 1st W-SS Division was one of only three German ground formations (the others being 2nd and 3rd W-SS) whose core was largely composed of pre-war uniformed regulars. By 1941 they had also had two years of combat experience under the wing of the German Army to learn their trade. The proposition that all the Waffen-SS were always poorly trained, poorly led, incompetents is as laughable as any blanket proposition that all the Waffen-SS were a military elite.

You can hardly write "the manpower of the HJ division.....as far as I know, it was not selected " and, in the same sentence, write "the men were volunteers of the HJ " and still retain credibility for your argument. How many Army divisions were able to recruit their rank and file largely from youthful volunteers from across the whole of Germany? I can think of possibly only one (care to guess which?). The Army, even the Panzerwaffe, was largely made up of conscripts and older reservists. Young male volunteers are the perfect demographic for military recruitment. They are motivated, fit, not burdened by outside responsibilities and impressionable. Whether it was militarily sensible to concentrate so much motivated, youthful manpower, much of it junior leader material, into one formation and take over a year to field it is open to question, but, I would suggest, its performance in Normandy is generally not. The loss by 12th W-SS Division of so much manpower of high potential in so short a period was perhaps the equivalent of the "Kindermord" of students 1914.

By your ludicrous overstatements you have forced me into a position I rarely have to take - that of defending the military virtues of some of the Waffen-SS.

Cheers,

Sid.

For the LSS : look at what the Lexicon of the WM said .

For the HJ : volunteers does not mean selected : some 20000 young Germans volunteered for the WSS on a total of 400000 and the WSS had no other option than to accept them .

A volunteer is not better than a conscript . Unless you have a proof that Muller who volunteered for the WSS was better than Schmidt who ;wisely, did not volunteer neither for the army, neither for the WSS .

No wise man would volunteer for the WSS in 1943 .Only a fool .And a fool makes not a good soldier .

To volunteer does not mean being motivated :how many oof the 20000 who volunteered for the WSS had political motivations ? A lot volunteered because the salary was better .

I have known someone who in june 1940 volunteered to work in Germany . The reason was that before the war he volunteered to fight in Spain with the International Brigades and when some months later the Gestapo knocked at his door, he was gone and no one knew where he was . He remained 5 years in Germany,well treated and enjoying a big salary .

It is even possible that the 20000 volunteers for the WSS were given up by the WM,because the WM could do nothing with them : the fact to volunteer is mostly a negative point for a recruitng officer .

By the way : the "Kindermord " of Langemark 1914 never existed : it all was German propaganda .

[petersjv]

But I had heard that the 19 SS- 2nd Latvian and the 8 SS -Florian Geyer were involved in camp transports at some stage. No authentic sources, just hearsay though.

I've been researching the Latvian Waffen-SS/Latvian Legion for some time now. I haven't come across anything indicating their divisions were anything other than front line units.

Peters

[Sid Guttridge]

Hi ljadw,

I would suggest you are making things up as you go along.

You write, "For the HJ : volunteers does not mean selected : some 20000 young Germans volunteered for the WSS on a total of 400000 and the WSS had no other option than to accept them." This is nonsense. in 1943 the Waffen-SS took 60,000 Reichsdeutsch "volunteers" alone. Nor were they forced on the Waffen-SS. The SS sent recruiting teams out deliberately to enlist youths under the Army's age of conscription. Volunteers also tend to be self-selecting, merely by the act of volunteering.

You write, "A volunteer is not better than a conscript ." In the generality, this is also nonsense. Volunteers tend to be self motivated, conscripts wait to be called up. if conscripts were self motivated to be soldiers, they would be regulars or volunteers.

You write, "No wise man would volunteer for the WSS in 1943 .Only a fool .And a fool makes not a good soldier ." Given that it appears that a W-SS combat soldier was no more likely to die than an Army combat soldier, this is nonsense, too.

You write, "To volunteer does not mean being motivated :how many oof the 20000 who volunteered for the WSS had political motivations ? A lot volunteered because the salary was better ." Again, nonsense. there were far more than 20,000 volunteers and, although I have asked here on AHF before, I have not been able to find out whether a W-SS man had a different salary from an Army man. (See: http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic. ... y#p1908783) I would suggest you are making this up, unless, of course, you have some evidence? What were the relative pay scales?

You write, "I have known someone who in june 1940 volunteered to work in Germany . The reason was that before the war he volunteered to fight in Spain with the International Brigades and when some months later the Gestapo knocked at his door, he was gone and no one knew where he was . He remained 5 years in Germany,well treated and enjoying a big salary ." What evidence are you offering for this anecdote? We can all make such things up.

You write, "It is even possible that the 20000 volunteers for the WSS were given up by the WM,because the WM could do nothing with them : the fact to volunteer is mostly a negative point for a recruitng officer ." Again, absolute nonsense. You are just inventing tosh. The SS sent out recruiting teams to get volunteers as an act of policy to try to cream off prime manpower while it was still under the age of Army conscription. The Army spent the entire war trying to limit the Waffen-SS's access to Reich manpower, but was unable to resist political pressure to allow the W-SS ever more men.

You write, "By the way : the "Kindermord " of Langemark 1914 never existed : it all was German propaganda ." Funny propaganda to exaggerate huge losses of one's own prime manpower! Although somewhat overstated due to an unwarranted assumption by writers that there were entire regiments of students, the loss of ill trained university students in disproportionate numbers at Ypres in 1914 was real enough because up to a third of some regiments were, indeed, such students.

Have you anything by way of facts to offer us, or are you simply engaged in trying to spoil a thread in which a lot of more knowledgeable people have invested far more expertise than either of us possess?

Cheers,

A disappointed Sid.

[Sid Guttridge]

Double post (again, dammit!)

[Richard Anderson]

Double post (again, dammit!)

And here I thought a whole week might go by before someone saw need to revive this monstrosity. Good on you Sid for spoiling it. Were you just bored and out of sorts after the Brexit vote?

Otherwise a fine post, even if doubled.

[ljadw]

Hi ljadw,

I would suggest you are making things up as you go along.

You write, "For the HJ : volunteers does not mean selected : some 20000 young Germans volunteered for the WSS on a total of 400000 and the WSS had no other option than to accept them." This is nonsense. in 1943 the Waffen-SS took 60,000 Reichsdeutsch "volunteers" alone. Nor were they forced on the Waffen-SS. The SS sent recruiting teams out deliberately to enlist youths under the Army's age of conscription. Volunteers also tend to be self-selecting, merely by the act of volunteering.

You write, "A volunteer is not better than a conscript ." In the generality, this is also nonsense. Volunteers tend to be self motivated, conscripts wait to be called up. if conscripts were self motivated to be soldiers, they would be regulars or volunteers.

You write, "No wise man would volunteer for the WSS in 1943 .Only a fool .And a fool makes not a good soldier ." Given that it appears that a W-SS combat soldier was no more likely to die than an Army combat soldier, this is nonsense, too.

You write, "To volunteer does not mean being motivated :how many oof the 20000 who volunteered for the WSS had political motivations ? A lot volunteered because the salary was better ." Again, nonsense. there were far more than 20,000 volunteers and, although I have asked here on AHF before, I have not been able to find out whether a W-SS man had a different salary from an Army man. (See: http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic. ... y#p1908783) I would suggest you are making this up, unless, of course, you have some evidence? What were the relative pay scales?

You write, "I have known someone who in june 1940 volunteered to work in Germany . The reason was that before the war he volunteered to fight in Spain with the International Brigades and when some months later the Gestapo knocked at his door, he was gone and no one knew where he was . He remained 5 years in Germany,well treated and enjoying a big salary ." What evidence are you offering for this anecdote? We can all make such things up.

You write, "It is even possible that the 20000 volunteers for the WSS were given up by the WM,because the WM could do nothing with them : the fact to volunteer is mostly a negative point for a recruitng officer ." Again, absolute nonsense. You are just inventing tosh. The SS sent out recruiting teams to get volunteers as an act of policy to try to cream off prime manpower while it was still under the age of Army conscription. The Army spent the entire war trying to limit the Waffen-SS's access to Reich manpower, but was unable to resist political pressure to allow the W-SS ever more men.

You write, "By the way : the "Kindermord " of Langemark 1914 never existed : it all was German propaganda ." Funny propaganda to exaggerate huge losses of one's own prime manpower! Although somewhat overstated due to an unwarranted assumption by writers that there were entire regiments of students, the loss of ill trained university students in disproportionate numbers at Ypres in 1914 was real enough because up to a third of some regiments were, indeed, such students.

Have you anything by way of facts to offer us, or are you simply engaged in trying to spoil a thread in which a lot of more knowledgeable people have invested far more expertise than either of us possess?

Cheers,

A disappointed Sid.

In 1943 the time of the countless enthusiastic volunteers for the WSS was over : the WSS was forced to use doubtful methods to obtain new recruits, with as result protests and complaints everywhere .

And the WSS knew what happened : there were no more volunteers:

Message of the SS Führungshauptamt in the spring of 1943 about the attitude of the " volunteers" :"Wenn Ich gezogen werde,kann Ich es nicht ändern,freiwillig gehe Ich nicht ."I will comply when I am drafted, but I will not volunteer .

February 1943 : Ergänzungsstelle Südost (Breslau ): the youngsters refuse to volunteer, a part of them is even publicly hostile to the WSS .

:Ergänzungsstelle Süd (München ) :the men refuse to volunteer

:Ergänzungsstelle Nürnberg : the men are not only hostile to the WSS, they reject even any form of military service .

The result was that the WSS had to raid outside the Reich: in the Alsace (2 SS at Oradour ), in the Balkans where they recruited even Muslims .


Source : Der Orden unter dem Totenkopf (H.Höhne ) .