Why the Waffen-SS

[ljadw]

If more artillery/infantry could be brought on the German border, the advance could maybe continue (it would depend on the German resistance ): this proves my point that the tanks had advanced to fast and were unable to advance farthur without additional infantry and artillery,something which happened several times in the East, which happened at Dunkirk,which happened at MG ,where light-armed mobile units (airborne ) were defeated because of lack of firepower .

In all these cases,mobility was insufficient to defeat the enemy ,because artillery and infantry could not advance as fast as the more mobile units .

The theory of combined arms warfare was a good ...theory, practice showed that it was only theory . As it was in the past and as it is even today .

[Richard Anderson]

If more artillery/infantry could be brought on the German border, the advance could maybe continue (it would depend on the German resistance ): this proves my point that the tanks had advanced to fast and were unable to advance farthur without additional infantry and artillery,something which happened several times in the East, which happened at Dunkirk,which happened at MG ,where light-armed mobile units (airborne ) were defeated because of lack of firepower .

Sorry, but no. It was not lack of forces -the imbalance of forces was still large - it was the inability to supply those forces with fuel, rations, and ammunition. More "artillery/infantry" would not have changed anything, nor would more tanks.

Meanwhile, what defeated "light-armed mobile units" was that they were "light-armed", but not mobile. Airborne units had little of no mobility when dropped, which just compounded their lack of firepower especially when engaging units that were more mobile and had more firepower.

In all these cases,mobility was insufficient to defeat the enemy ,because artillery and infantry could not advance as fast as the more mobile units .

More gibberish. Motorized and mechanized artillery and infantry can advance every bit as fast as anyone else.

The theory of combined arms warfare was a good ...theory, practice showed that it was only theory . As it was in the past and as it is even today .

You are confused. Combined arms warfare isn't a theory; its been practiced for about 3,000 years or so.

[ljadw]

The latter phrase makes no more sense than the former. The American infantry division was never intended to defeat anyone by "mobility only".

Which "tank lobby"? Who comprised it and what were their publications?

1) On 28 august ,Patton said :"At the present time, our chief difficulty is not the Germans,but gasoline .If they would give me enough gas, I could go all the way to Berlin ."

Source : POL resupplying Patton :Refuel on the move:Resupplying Patton's Third Army .

What Patton said : more gas for tanks and I will go farther,is not correct .


2) From the same source : "Tactical doctrine of the day said that the armor division was primarily a weapon of exploitation to be used after the infantry achieved initial penetration into enemy defences."

This means that the armor division had a subordinate role . This means that mobility was subordinated to firepower and manpower.


3 ) From the Patton Society Research Library : The Third Army in WWII

"In september 1944 Eisenhower decided to let Montgomery put together a massive attack :MG ."

My comment : "massive " is exaggerated.

"Because of this,a large part of all available supplies were diverted to the British 2nd Army "

My comment : this is not correct .

"This includes supplies that should have gone to the Third Army " .

My comment : this is wrong .

"Without these supplies, Third Army was forced to slow down and finally to halt its rapid advance "

My comment : this is plainly wrong : the advance was stopped because the Germans were to strong and more supplies would not have changed anything .

The armor division was a weapon of exploitation,and the exploitation ( pursuit of a defeated enemy ) could continue only as long as the enemy was on the run . When he fought back, the advance was stopped til the infantry and artillery arrived . More supplies would not hasten this arrival .

The more mobile forces were (and are) the weaker they were,and the weaker they were the more mobile they were .

MG is the classic exemple : the AB units were very mobile, because they had no heavy arms, only a small amount of ammunition, etc :they were weak and could hold against the enemy only during a short time .And they were weak because they were mobile . The ground component was stronger,but advanced slower .

[Latze]

Could the moderator please split off the discussion whether 'tanks are cavalry' etc into another thread?

[Latze]

Some quotes from "Surrender invites death: fighting the WSS in Normandy" ( written by an author who is sympathetic to the WSS )

P 10 (about the LSS in the Dunkirk region in 1940 ) : once launched, the LSS progressed so slowly ,that Guderian was forced to commit 2 Pz to the battle .

So, you summarily dismiss the academic works I cited without even reading them and bring this popular book to the table? There is not even a footnote on page 10 of that book that would lead us to something tangible. So please specify: on what day did that attack take place and where is the evidence that Guderian was forced to commit a division he would have employed differently?

P 13 : the fighting performance of the WSS in France was on the whole acceptable,but not brilliant.

And the main argument advanced for that thesis are the legendary heavy losses. For this see the paper by Neitzel which I cited and that you ignored.

P 24 : (Barbarossa ) : Totenkopf lost in june/july 1941 during 16 days of fighting 10 % of its manpower, which drew criticism from Manstein who thought such losses excessive for the relatively modest gains from Totenkopf .

The source for that supposed remark by Manstein is given as "Syndor 140-146". But that reference is clearly wrong. On said pages the preparation and build up before Barbarossa is discussed. But Syndor writes on page 171 (footnote 34): "Manstein, for his part, praised the division highly on its departure from his panzer corps, and latter declared that he considered SSTK to be the best of all the Waffen SS divisions he had seen"

[Latze]

About Kursk : if WSS divisions were better equipped, one must expect and demand better performances (as the handicap in golf) , besides : better equipment does not mean elite, result means elite .

Töppel p 334: "... auch die militärgeschichtliche Forschung hat sich bislang durchweg des Begriffs der militärischen 'Elite' bedient , wenn von besonders kampfstarken, hoch motivierten, erfolgreichen und gut ausgerüsteten Verbänden die Rede war."

And results must be discussed considering enemy forces, terrain and missions .:if an infantry division has the order to stop a PzD ,and it succeeds during 2 days, and a PzD receives the order to conquer an enemy position defended by Volkssturm units, and it takes the PzD 1 day to do it , who has performed better ? the infantry divivision or the PzD ? And this is without counting losses on both sides .

Lieb and Tölpel are doing just that: discussion of results during specific campaigns under the perspective of enemy forces, terrain and missions. By doing that they arrive at conclusions fundamentally different than yours.

Last point : that Frundsberg had above average combat power does only prove that Frundsberg was stronger than other divisions , which is not elite, it does not prove that Frundsberg was doing what one could expect from a division with an above average combat power, average combat power of what ? of infantry divisions, of panzer divisions ? WSS divisions or army divisions ? And, what is combat power ? Manpower, firepower, mobility ?

No, you did not read properly! Frundsberg had the lowest number of tanks and assault guns of all tank divisions committed. Still its results were better than units with more tanks. It was doing more than could be expected from a unit with that TOE. That indicates that leadership, training and/or motivation were better.

[ljadw]

P 13 : the fighting performance of the WSS in France was on the whole acceptable,but not brilliant.

And the main argument advanced for that thesis are the legendary heavy losses. For this see the paper by Neitzel which I cited and that you ignored.

That is not the point : the point is that it has been claimed that in WWII the senior WSS units were elite .


For 1939 : the proofs are that it was not so .

For 1940 : there are no proofs that it was so ; all we have are heavy losses who were not compensated by brilliant performances .

Where were the brilliant performances of the WSS in 1940: brilliant performances from the LSS, Das Reich, Totenkopf, Polizei ?

All we have are heavy losses not compensated by brilliant performances and this indicates not performances which were average, but units the performances which were less than average .

Thus, let's move to 1941 .

[ljadw]

Töppel p 334: "... auch die militärgeschichtliche Forschung hat sich bislang durchweg des Begriffs der militärischen 'Elite' bedient , wenn von besonders kampfstarken, hoch motivierten, erfolgreichen und gut ausgerüsteten Verbänden die Rede war."

[qu

No, you did not read properly! Frundsberg had the lowest number of tanks and assault guns of all tank divisions committed. Still its results were better than units with more tanks. It was doing more than could be expected from a unit with that TOE. That indicates that leadership, training and/or motivation were better.

Which WSS divisions were at the same time "besonders kampfstärk ","hoch motiviert " "erfolgreich" and "gut ausgerüstet " ?


About Frundsberg : someone said that it had the lowest number of tanks and assault guns committed (was not that you ? ),thus it was not "gut ausgerüstet" ,thus it was not elite .

About the lowest number of tanks and assault guns: this is much to narrow a point to define the strength /weakness of a division : what about artillery, trucks,ammunition,etc..? When they arrived in Normandy, Frundsberg had 45 tanks and AG ,Hohenstaufen 58,but that does not indicate anything :it could be that Frundsberg was still stronger than other PzD . It also does not mention the mission of Frundsberg (defensive /offensive ? ) the terrain, the opposing enemy units .If Frundsberg was doing "as good " as PzL with less tanks and AG, but was faced by a weaker enemy than PzL, it would be very questionable to draw any conclusions about the performance of Frundsberg .

How to define "better than" ,"as good as " ?

Frundsberg and Hohenstaufen were two weak divisions when they arrived in Normandy, but they had battle experience, which other divisions had not . And there is no proof that they did "better" or "worse" than other divisions : LSS was even weaker . Who will say which one of the three (Frundsberg/Hohenstaufen, LSS ) was doing "better ", " worse", "best", " worst " ?

All we lnow is that none was "elite " .

[Richard Anderson]

1) On 28 august ,Patton said :"At the present time, our chief difficulty is not the Germans,but gasoline .If they would give me enough gas, I could go all the way to Berlin ."

Source : POL resupplying Patton :Refuel on the move:Resupplying Patton's Third Army .

What Patton said : more gas for tanks and I will go farther,is not correct .

No he did not, which anyone reading the passage would realize. Yet again, you are using the shoddy practice of inserting your words into other persons writing. I suggest you stop it.

2) From the same source : "Tactical doctrine of the day said that the armor division was primarily a weapon of exploitation to be used after the infantry achieved initial penetration into enemy defences."

This means that the armor division had a subordinate role . This means that mobility was subordinated to firepower and manpower.

Yet again, stop inserting idiotic misinterpretations into what wasn't written. The tactical doctrine of the day for the armored division was:

The objective of armored attack is to destroy the enemy. This is effected [sic] by breaking through his defenses and surrounding all or parts of his command. FM 17 Armored Force Field Manual, p. 23.

The role of the Armored Force and its components is the conduct of highly mobile ground warfare, primarily offensive in character, by self-sustaining units of great power and mobility, composed of specially equipped troops of the required arms and services. Combat elements of the Armored Force operate in close cooperation with combat aviation and with large units of ground troops in the accomplishment of a mission. U.S. War Department, FM 17-10: Armored Force Field Manual, 7 March 1942, p. 1.

3 ) From the Patton Society Research Library : The Third Army in WWII

"In september 1944 Eisenhower decided to let Montgomery put together a massive attack :MG ."

My comment : "massive " is exaggerated.

My comment: what does that have to do with anything?

"Because of this,a large part of all available supplies were diverted to the British 2nd Army "

My comment : this is not correct .

My comment: So what?

"This includes supplies that should have gone to the Third Army " .

My comment : this is wrong .

My comment: You are correct. So what? When did I ever say that MARKET-GARDEN caused the Allied halt?

"Without these supplies, Third Army was forced to slow down and finally to halt its rapid advance "

My comment : this is plainly wrong : the advance was stopped because the Germans were to strong and more supplies would not have changed anything .

My comment: Can you ever stick to the subject?

The armor division was a weapon of exploitation,and the exploitation ( pursuit of a defeated enemy ) could continue only as long as the enemy was on the run . When he fought back, the advance was stopped til the infantry and artillery arrived . More supplies would not hasten this arrival .

The more mobile forces were (and are) the weaker they were,and the weaker they were the more mobile they were .

Wow. You are really working hard to get on my ignore list aren't you?

MG is the classic exemple : the AB units were very mobile, because they had no heavy arms, only a small amount of ammunition, etc :they were weak and could hold against the enemy only during a short time .And they were weak because they were mobile . The ground component was stronger,but advanced slower .

How is an airborne division a classic example of an armored division?

[Sid Guttridge]

Hi ljadw,

It is not true that tanks were only an exploitation force. They were central to the initial breakthrough, as well. I would refer you to the following:

"The Germans referred to a Schwerpunkt (focal point) and to a Schwerpunktprinzip (concentration principle) in the planning of operations. They viewed the Schwerpunkt as a centre of gravity or point of maximum effort, where a decisive result could be achieved. Mechanised and tactical air forces were concentrated at this point of maximum effort regardless of the sacrifices it made necessary elsewhere. By local success at the Schwerpunkt, a small force could achieve a breakthrough and gain advantages by fighting in the enemy rear.............To achieve a breakthrough, armoured forces would attack an opposing defensive line frontally, supported by motorised infantry, artillery fire and aerial bombardment, to create a breach. Tanks and other motorised units could break out of the fortified zone without the encumbrance of slow-moving infantry moving on foot."

You write, "I disagree fundamentally with your claim that the armoured arm was the decisive one : the war was decided (as were all wars) by the infantry and artillery (aircraft not counted ) .Tanks are cavalry and cavalry is only exploiting the successes of the infantry and artillery .And when tanks are not protected by infantry/artillery, they fail, as in Poland 1939 and Dunkirk 1940 and in 1941/1942 in the Soviet Union ."

Certainly Germany conducted a combined arms war, but the key was not the old elements of infantry or artillery, but the new element of motorized and armoured divisions. Germany had had infantry and artillery aplenty in WWI, but never achieved the cheap, fast, deep ranging successes of WWII. Your argument here is untenable.

You write, "About the LSS at Dunkirk :the PzD also failed,thus organic armour was not the missing element : it was the LSS as such that failed and the reasons why it failed are obvious ." I am sorry, but the reasons aren't obvious. You appear to be condemning a W-SS failure without the support of tanks but not similarly condemning an Army failure with tanks. Surely this only implies that the W-SS was set a task beyond its resources, because a better equipped Army formation also failed?

You write, "About the criticism of the Totenkopf : Manstein criticised the Totenkopf ,because his judgment was that the losses were much to high for the gains ." It is worth pointing out that the Army's Grossdeutschland Division suffered as many casualties during the war as the Totenkopf, which was itself the W-SS division that suffered the most. What is more, the Grossdeutschland only became a division half way through the war, whereas the Totenkopf was one from 1940.

I would again urge you to be more nuanced and less simplistic about the W-SS's military performance.

Cheers,

Sid.

[ljadw]

You said : "armoured forces would attack to create a breach,supported by motorised infantry,artillery fire and aerial bombardment ."

Some comments :

1)Mostly (and this is an understatement ) artillery fire would create a breach and infantry (mostly not motorised) would break out,tanks were mostly not available : in 1940 the overwhelming majority of the German forces were situated north of the Meuse,and there were only 5 PzD north of the Meuse .What you are describing was not the norm,but only an exception : in june 1941 150 divisions (mostly non motorised infantry ,which does not mean slow-moving ) attacked the SU, only 17 of them were PzD .This means that in most attacks PzD were conspicuously absent .


2) If armoured forces were supported by infantry (mostly non motorised) and artillery ,this means that this support was needed and that motorised and armoured divisions were not the key .

3 ) There were no cheap,fast,deep ranging successes in WWII :tanks and motorised infantry could not do such things : when the 7th Army of Giraud (the so-called mobile reserve of Gamelin) was going to Breda in may 1940, its tanks were moving by train, because their tracks would not survive a trip of 300 km ,and because their was no road space enough.


4) Opposite to what are thinking a lot of people, infantry divisions and panzer divisions moved at the same speed,because the panzer divisions advanced at the speed of the slowest units,which were artillery and infantry :most infantry moved by foot ,not by truck .Mostly tanks advanced at the speed of the infantry(3 km per hour) because they needed the protection of the infantry,and this could only be done by infantry moving on foot .If the tanks moved to fast they were very quickly kneedeep in crocàdiles (as they said in Houston ) ,this happened in Dunkirk, in the Soviet Union, in september 1944 with Patton ,etc...


5) At Dunkirk and the LSS (who had no tanks) and the PzD (who had only tanks) failed . Thus, it was not a question of organic armour : the PzD failed because they had mobility ,but not enough manpower and firepower; the LSS failed, because the LSS was in may-june 1940 only a bunch of untrained amateurs .


6 ) In may 1940 50 % of the French divisions who entered Belgium,were moving by train, it was the same for the Germans . 75 years ago,tanks and trucks were unfit for long distances ,tanks were expected to break down every 50 miles , that was why,if possible, they moved by train . Train was essential:for moving forces and for transporting supplies .

[Sid Guttridge]

Hi ljadw,

You appear to have very little grasp of the subject.

1) Most German infantry divisions that were not actually static largely moved in the wake of the mechanized forces. I know of no major German encirclement battles in WWII that were not spearheaded by mechanized forces.

2) Nobody said that infantry and artillery were unnecessary. Indeed, the panzer divisions had both motorized infantry and motorized artillery in their organic establishment. What they had extra were tanks.

So the railways were widely used by the French and others. What is your point? Remember, one of the big German advantages was their experience of fast, deep operations in Austria, Czechoslovakia and Poland. Breakdowns in Austria, in particular, had taught them the need for enhanced recovery and maintenance facilities. The Allies initially lacked this experience. It is also worth pointing out that the Russian railway gauge was different from Germany's and so wasn't so useful initially until converted.

Sid.

[ljadw]

1) Now you are moving the goals of the discussion : now you are talking about encirclement battles .

2 ) There were a lot of encirclement battles who were not spearheaded by mechanized forces : exemple : the aiiacks by AGb and most of AG A (almost 120 divisions) in may 1940 who were not spearheaded by mechanised forces .In most cases,mechanised forces were not used by the Germans, because they were not available .

[Richard Anderson]

1) Now you are moving the goals of the discussion : now you are talking about encirclement battles .

Nonsense. You brought up the claim that there were "no cheap,fast,deep ranging successes in WWII :tanks and motorised infantry could not do such things". An encirclement battle is a "fast,deep ranging successes in WWII". They were done with "tanks and motorised infantry".

Whether they were "cheap" or not though is YOUR moving of the goalpost. YOU are the only one to bring up the requirement the success be CHEAP.

2 ) There were a lot of encirclement battles who were not spearheaded by mechanized forces : exemple : the aiiacks by AGb and most of AG A (almost 120 divisions) in may 1940 who were not spearheaded by mechanised forces .In most cases,mechanised forces were not used by the Germans, because they were not available .

Nonsense again. HG-B consisted of 29 divisions, including 3 Panzer and 1 motorized infantry. It executed a classic holding attack on the allied forces in its front. HG-B consisted of 45 divisions, including 7 Panzer and 3 motorized infantry. It executed the deep penetration, spearheaded by the mechanized forces, which you claim never happened.

[Richard Anderson]

You said : "armoured forces would attack to create a breach,supported by motorised infantry,artillery fire and aerial bombardment ."

Some comments :

1)Mostly (and this is an understatement ) artillery fire would create a breach and infantry (mostly not motorised) would break out,tanks were mostly not available : in 1940 the overwhelming majority of the German forces were situated north of the Meuse,and there were only 5 PzD north of the Meuse .What you are describing was not the norm,but only an exception : in june 1941 150 divisions (mostly non motorised infantry ,which does not mean slow-moving ) attacked the SU, only 17 of them were PzD .This means that in most attacks PzD were conspicuously absent .

Dear Lord, but you are truly divorced from all reality aren't you?

HG-N consisted of 15 infantry divisions in two armies and 4 Panzer, 2 motorized infantry, and 2 infantry divisions in PzGrp 4, which spearheaded the penetration. HG-M consisted of 21 divisions in two armies and 9 Panzer, 6 motorized infantry, 1 cavalry, and 6 infantry divisions in PzGrp 2 and 3. HG-S consisted of 2 infantry divisions in 3 armies and 5 Panzer and 4 motorized infantry divisions in PzGrp 1.

2) If armoured forces were supported by infantry (mostly non motorised) and artillery ,this means that this support was needed and that motorised and armoured divisions were not the key .

No, it simply means that infantry supported armor and vice versa. It is only your notion that one or the other was "key", which is the antithesis of combined arms warfare.

3) "when the 7th Army of Giraud (the so-called mobile reserve of Gamelin) was going to Breda in may 1940" ...snip nonsense already dealt with

The 7th Army was not Gamelin's "mobile reserve". That was Blanchard's 1st Army. And it was Billotte's reserve. Gamelin's mobile reserve was GC 1, and XXI and XXIII CA.

4) Opposite to what are thinking a lot of people, infantry divisions and panzer divisions moved at the same speed,because the panzer divisions advanced at the speed of the slowest units,which were artillery and infantry :most infantry moved by foot ,not by truck .Mostly tanks advanced at the speed of the infantry(3 km per hour) because they needed the protection of the infantry,and this could only be done by infantry moving on foot .If the tanks moved to fast they were very quickly kneedeep in crocàdiles (as they said in Houston ) ,this happened in Dunkirk, in the Soviet Union, in september 1944 with Patton ,etc...

Actually, no, mechanized formations on average over long campaigns only moved 10 to 20 percent faster, but over short operational periods they could move considerably faster.

In any case you are mixing strategic mobility, operational mobility, and tactical maneuverability and lumping them into one, which is part and parcel of your flawed understanding of combined arms warfare.

5) At Dunkirk and the LSS (who had no tanks) and the PzD (who had only tanks) failed . Thus, it was not a question of organic armour : the PzD failed because they had mobility ,but not enough manpower and firepower; the LSS failed, because the LSS was in may-june 1940 only a bunch of untrained amateurs .

Perhaps they failed because the combination of time, distance, resistance, and terrain were too great for them to overcome? In any case, I think the British and French had something to do with it.

6 ) In may 1940 50 % of the French divisions who entered Belgium,were moving by train, it was the same for the Germans . 75 years ago,tanks and trucks were unfit for long distances ,tanks were expected to break down every 50 miles , that was why,if possible, they moved by train . Train was essential:for moving forces and for transporting supplies .

Yes, over long strategic distances forces were moved by train - trains are incredibly economical. What does that have to do with anything? However, I find little or no evidence for the mass movement of French and German forces into Belgium by train. Do you have some sources for that?