Why the Waffen-SS

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ljadw
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Re: Why the Waffen-SS

#2386

Post by ljadw » 04 Jul 2016, 20:03

"L'armée Giraud en Hollande " :the tanks of the 1st DLM were moved by train . The half of the French divisions who advanced in Belgium on 10 may 1940 moved by train : some 1000 trains were used .

PP 79/80.

Only weak (in fire power and manpower ) units of the 7th Army did not go by train : men in trucks, Bren carriers, with motorcycles....

Reasons were that there was a shortage of road space:from the same source on the same PP :"the first line units of the 7th army needed 1400 km of road space for their advance at a speed of 10 km per hour . " And that it was more economical to move "heavies " by train on a long distance (Giraud had to advance 300 km to Breda ) .

Also from the same source : "even a British armoured brigade was moving by train ." (but no further information was given ).


After Overlord, the tanks of 2 PzD were moving by train to Normandy,while the wheeled elements were going by road . They did the same as Giraud .

ljadw
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Re: Why the Waffen-SS

#2387

Post by ljadw » 04 Jul 2016, 20:10

Richard Anderson wrote:
ljadw wrote:1) Now you are moving the goals of the discussion : now you are talking about encirclement battles .
Nonsense. You brought up the claim that there were "no cheap,fast,deep ranging successes in WWII :tanks and motorised infantry could not do such things". An encirclement battle is a "fast,deep ranging successes in WWII". They were done with "tanks and motorised infantry".

Whether they were "cheap" or not though is YOUR moving of the goalpost. YOU are the only one to bring up the requirement the success be CHEAP.

NO :Sid talked about the cheap,fast,deep ranging successes of WWII, on which I replied that such things did not exist in WWII. And I add that encirclement battles were not done with "tanks and motorised infantry " .


ljadw
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Re: Why the Waffen-SS

#2388

Post by ljadw » 04 Jul 2016, 20:41

Richard Anderson wrote:
Nonsense again. HG-B consisted of 29 divisions, including 3 Panzer and 1 motorized infantry. It executed a classic holding attack on the allied forces in its front. HG-B consisted of 45 divisions, including 7 Panzer and 3 motorized infantry. It executed the deep penetration, spearheaded by the mechanized forces, which you claim never happened.
Hm : HG A had 7 PzD : 5 with von Kleist and 2 with Hoth .

HG B had 3 PzD : 2 with Hoepner and one in Holland .

But the majority of the forces of HGA (with only 2 PzD ) were north of the Ardennes and were not involved in Sichelschnitt ;the same for the whole AGB .

But the encirclement had 2 wings : the PzG Kleist in the south (10 divisions ) and the biggest part of AGA and the whole AGB in the north . And these forces did NOT execute a classic holding attack : they tried to encircle the opposing allied forces who had no other option than to retreat . If on 20 may (when the PzG Kleist arrived at the coast) ,the Belgians were still at the Albert canal and the BEF and the French at the Dyle, Sichelschnitt had failed . A few days later, the Germans were at the Lys , and I know from people who were present that the German (non motorised ) infantry tried to cross the Lys to advance to Dunkirk to encircle the BEF; this was blocked by the British Field Artillery, which was duelling with the German (horse-drawn ) artillery .

Much to importance has been given to the advance of the PzG Kleist ,which ... at the end failed .

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Re: Why the Waffen-SS

#2389

Post by Richard Anderson » 05 Jul 2016, 07:53

ljadw wrote:Hm : HG A had 7 PzD : 5 with von Kleist and 2 with Hoth .

HG B had 3 PzD : 2 with Hoepner and one in Holland .

But the majority of the forces of HGA (with only 2 PzD ) were north of the Ardennes and were not involved in Sichelschnitt ;the same for the whole AGB
Wow, you caught me in a typo. I suppose it is the B-A-C arrangement that throws me. A-B-C makes more sense.

Of course it makes little difference since you're still spouting nonsense. Your claim that "aiiacks by AGb and most of AG A (almost 120 divisions) in may 1940 who were not spearheaded by mechanised force" is simply drivel. 18. Armee seized Holland, with 9. Panzer taking Rotterdam. 6. Armee - spearheaded by Hoepner's XVI AK (mot) were fought to a stalemate by Prioux's CC at Gembloux-Hannut, which made little difference since Kleist's Panzergruppe crossed the Meuse as the spearhead of HG A.
But the encirclement had 2 wings : the PzG Kleist in the south (10 divisions ) and the biggest part of AGA and the whole AGB in the north . And these forces did NOT execute a classic holding attack : they tried to encircle the opposing allied forces who had no other option than to retreat . If on 20 may (when the PzG Kleist arrived at the coast) ,the Belgians were still at the Albert canal and the BEF and the French at the Dyle, Sichelschnitt had failed . A few days later, the Germans were at the Lys , and I know from people who were present that the German (non motorised ) infantry tried to cross the Lys to advance to Dunkirk to encircle the BEF; this was blocked by the British Field Artillery, which was duelling with the German (horse-drawn ) artillery .

Much to importance has been given to the advance of the PzG Kleist ,which ... at the end failed .
Sorry, but WTF did you come up with that from? Kleist had five Panzer and three motorized infantry divisions. AG-B wasn't strong enough to do more than push the allies and there was no "encirclement plan".

So exactly when did PzGr Kleist fail? 20 May?
Richard C. Anderson Jr.

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Richard Anderson
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Re: Why the Waffen-SS

#2390

Post by Richard Anderson » 05 Jul 2016, 07:55

ljadw wrote:"L'armée Giraud en Hollande " :the tanks of the 1st DLM were moved by train . The half of the French divisions who advanced in Belgium on 10 may 1940 moved by train : some 1000 trains were used .
Moved to the French border by train. Marched into Belgium.
Only weak (in fire power and manpower ) units of the 7th Army did not go by train : men in trucks, Bren carriers, with motorcycles....
yes, the famous French Bren carrier...
After Overlord, the tanks of 2 PzD were moving by train to Normandy,while the wheeled elements were going by road . They did the same as Giraud .
In German-occupied France.
Richard C. Anderson Jr.

American Thunder: U.S. Army Tank Design, Development, and Doctrine in World War II
Cracking Hitler's Atlantic Wall
Hitler's Last Gamble
Artillery Hell

ljadw
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Re: Why the Waffen-SS

#2391

Post by ljadw » 05 Jul 2016, 09:10

The PzG Kleist failed at Dunkirk .

ljadw
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Re: Why the Waffen-SS

#2392

Post by ljadw » 05 Jul 2016, 09:32

Richard Anderson wrote: 18. Armee seized Holland, with 9. Panzer taking Rotterdam.

Sorry, but WTF did you come up with that from? Kleist had five Panzer and three motorized infantry divisions. AG-B wasn't strong enough to do more than push the allies and there was no "encirclement plan".

?

1) 9 Pz did not spearhead 18 Army :18 army could have seized Holland without 9 Pz : 9 Pz was there to help 18 army;besides more than 9 Pz was used/needed to take Rotterdam .


2) While it is so that a relative majority of the PzD were concentrated in the PzG (5 of 10 ) , this is insufficient to talk about a Schwerpunkt in the Ardennes :Schwerpunkt of the PzD is not Schwerpunkt of the whole Westheer : the German Schwerpunkt was where (relatively ) most German divisions were engaged : north of the Ardennes .


3 ) About the encirclement plan : to encircle, you need two wings and the advance of HGB and the majority of HGA north of the Ardennes was essential for the success of the German plan :without the advance north of the Ardennes, the plan would be a stab in the dark .

In 10 days the PzG advanced some 300 km (Luxemburg-the coast) but during the same period (10-20 may ) units of HGB advanced also 300 km (Arnhem -Oudenaarde at the Scheldt) and other units of the same HGB advanced almost 500 km (Groningen-Scheldt) .The LSS who fought in Rotterdam (helping 9 PzD) also advanced some 300 km .

The forces north of the Ardennes (faced by the majority of the Allied forces : more than 70 divisions ) advanced at the same speed of the PzG,making possible the initial success of the PzG).

The German success in may 1940 (Fall Gelb) was was a collective success,and the PzD can not claim the monopoly .They can even not say that the advance of the PzG was more important .

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Re: Why the Waffen-SS

#2393

Post by Richard Anderson » 05 Jul 2016, 18:10

ljadw wrote:The PzG Kleist failed at Dunkirk .
Really? How? They reached the line of the Somme on 23 May, facing south and west. Through 24 May they "held" on orders, while establishing bridgeheads to the south and fending off French counterattacks. On 25 May Kleist turned north with seven divisions, seizing Boulogne, investing Calais, and reaching the line of the Aa Canal with the main body, while Hoth and two divisions encircled the French 1st Army at Lille in cooperation with elements of HG-B. 26 May was spent preparing for the attack across the Aa with the 1., part of the 2., and the 6. Panzer divisions, which was the thrust intended to cut off the allies from the coast. It failed, mostly because 6. Panzer got wrapped up in Cassel, which allowed the 3d, 4th, and 5th Division to establish a strong position anchored on Messines Ridge.

So they "failed" at Dunkirk to prevent the evacuation of the British and French remnants, which you have argued before was irrelevant to the end of the war. Now you are arguing that it was relevant. Aside from the typically scatterbrained shifting logic you love to use, it is irrelevant to the success Kleist had in destroying the Allied armies in France and Belgium, which resulted in the French armistice.

Never mind it all has zero to do with the topic of this thread or an understanding of combined arms.
Richard C. Anderson Jr.

American Thunder: U.S. Army Tank Design, Development, and Doctrine in World War II
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Richard Anderson
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Re: Why the Waffen-SS

#2394

Post by Richard Anderson » 05 Jul 2016, 18:51

ljadw wrote:1) 9 Pz did not spearhead 18 Army :18 army could have seized Holland without 9 Pz : 9 Pz was there to help 18 army;besides more than 9 Pz was used/needed to take Rotterdam .
Sorry, but who said anything about whether or not 18. Armee could seize Holland...oh, YOU did. Again trying to shift the goalposts. Did 9. Panzer's seizure of the Moerdjik bridges lead to Rotterdam's capitulation? Or do you believe III./IR 16. (LL) was able to do it alone.

That is an example of a "spearhead" - a penetration by a mechanized force to seize certain objectives and obtain - in this case - an operational result.
2) While it is so that a relative majority of the PzD were concentrated in the PzG (5 of 10 ) , this is insufficient to talk about a Schwerpunkt in the Ardennes :Schwerpunkt of the PzD is not Schwerpunkt of the whole Westheer : the German Schwerpunkt was where (relatively ) most German divisions were engaged : north of the Ardennes .
In addition to having no clue what combined arms warfare is you have no concept of what a schwerpunkt is.

Meanwhile, who was advancing on the right flank of Reinhardt? Oh, look, it's Hoth. Seven divisions were concentrated as the schwerpunkt of HG-A, not five. What followed in their wake? 4., 12., and 16. Armee. So yet again you falsify in an attempt to "prove" your point. That is mendacious.
3 ) About the encirclement plan : to encircle, you need two wings and the advance of HGB and the majority of HGA north of the Ardennes was essential for the success of the German plan :without the advance north of the Ardennes, the plan would be a stab in the dark .
Yet again, sigh. No. You do NOT need "two wings" to encircle.
In 10 days the PzG advanced some 300 km (Luxemburg-the coast) but during the same period (10-20 may ) units of HGB advanced also 300 km (Arnhem -Oudenaarde at the Scheldt) and other units of the same HGB advanced almost 500 km (Groningen-Scheldt) .The LSS who fought in Rotterdam (helping 9 PzD) also advanced some 300 km .
Sigh. No, 360 kilometers. The starting point center of mass was Bitburg. End point was Noyelles-sur-Mer. Versus 185 kilometers Aachen to Oudenaarde.

Again attempting to falsify reality in order to try to make your point. Again mendacious.
The forces north of the Ardennes (faced by the majority of the Allied forces : more than 70 divisions ) advanced at the same speed of the PzG,making possible the initial success of the PzG).
No, they did not. The forces "north of the Ardennes were Hoth's Panzerkorps - part of HG-A - and 6. Armee of HG-B, which advanced into Belgium. It had 12 divisions - not 70 (more falsification on your part) - and 18. Armee, which advanced into Holland. It had 13 divisions. The two together had 25 divisions, plus the 4 reserves later committed. So 29, not the 70 you use in your falsifying.
The German success in may 1940 (Fall Gelb) was was a collective success,and the PzD can not claim the monopoly .They can even not say that the advance of the PzG was more important .
No, it was a COMBINED ARMS SUCCESS spearheaded by the success of PzGr Kleist and Korps Hoth.
Richard C. Anderson Jr.

American Thunder: U.S. Army Tank Design, Development, and Doctrine in World War II
Cracking Hitler's Atlantic Wall
Hitler's Last Gamble
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ljadw
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Re: Why the Waffen-SS

#2395

Post by ljadw » 05 Jul 2016, 19:45

The forces north of the Ardennes were AGB (Holland is north of the Ardennes ) and the majority of AGA (only PzG Kleist ) was advancing in the Ardennes, and these forces were opposed by the majority of the Allied forces ,which were more than 7O divisions : BEF 11, Belgium : 22, Holland : 12 ,France more than 25 .

ljadw
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Re: Why the Waffen-SS

#2396

Post by ljadw » 05 Jul 2016, 20:04

Richard Anderson wrote:
ljadw wrote:The PzG Kleist failed at Dunkirk .
Really? How? They reached the line of the Somme on 23 May, facing south and west. Through 24 May they "held" on orders, while establishing bridgeheads to the south and fending off French counterattacks. On 25 May Kleist turned north with seven divisions, seizing Boulogne, investing Calais, and reaching the line of the Aa Canal with the main body, while Hoth and two divisions encircled the French 1st Army at Lille in cooperation with elements of HG-B. 26 May was spent preparing for the attack across the Aa with the 1., part of the 2., and the 6. Panzer divisions, which was the thrust intended to cut off the allies from the coast. It failed, mostly because 6. Panzer got wrapped up in Cassel, which allowed the 3d, 4th, and 5th Division to establish a strong position anchored on Messines Ridge.

So they "failed" at Dunkirk to prevent the evacuation of the British and French remnants, which you have argued before was irrelevant to the end of the war. Now you are arguing that it was relevant. Aside from the typically scatterbrained shifting logic you love to use, it is irrelevant to the success Kleist had in destroying the Allied armies in France and Belgium, which resulted in the French armistice.

Never mind it all has zero to do with the topic of this thread or an understanding of combined arms.

The German encirclment failed : the British escaped at Dunkirk .And the British escaped at Dunkirk because the PzG failed to prevent the escape . What Kleist was doing with 7 divisions (seizing Boulogne,etc..) is irrelevant : the BEF did nt escape at Boulogne : the fact is that the encirclment failed at Dunkirk .And the reason is very clear (but not for the tank lobby, because the reason is undermining the dogma of the tank superiority ) : on 25 may only parts of ONE PzD (1st) and of the LSS could threaten the escape from Dunkirk ,and the reason is that the PzD were advancing as cowboys without any coordination with the ID,resulting in the presence on 25 may of a few tanks and infantry,who totally were lacking sufficient manpower and firepower .

Other point : the PzG did NOT destroy the Allied armies in France and Belgium .Without the success of AGB and most units of AGA (= those who did not participate in the advance of the PzG Kleist ) the advance of Kleist would have resulted in a catastrophe .

Last point : that the Dunkirk escape was not relevant for the outcome of the war,does not mean that the escape was not relevant for the outcome of Sichelschnitt and for the failure of the tank dogma .

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Re: Why the Waffen-SS

#2397

Post by Sid Guttridge » 05 Jul 2016, 20:08

Hi ljadw,

You write, “There were a lot of encirclement battles who were not spearheaded by mechanized forces : exemple : the aiiacks by AGb and most of AG A (almost 120 divisions) in may 1940 who were not spearheaded by mechanised forces.

As already pointed out by others above, this is simply factually correct. Army Group A had the concentration of panzer divisions. Their armour reached the Channel coast, closing the encirclement. Army Group B’s infantry formed part of ring, but they didn’t create the encirclement – they just pressed the Allies frontally once they began to retreat in their attempt to evade encirclement by Army Group A’s panzer divisions. (See http://ww2db.com/images/battle_france23.jpg)

You will find similar features in almost all WWII German encirclement battles of which I am aware. Encirclement battles very definitely were closed with "tanks and motorised infantry" and mopped up by infantry. Without the proper employment of tanks and motorized infantry, the conditions of WWI on the Western Front were likely to be recreated, where frontal attacks were exchanged at very high cost without much movement of the line or a breakthrough being achieved by either side for years on end.

Sid

ljadw
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Re: Why the Waffen-SS

#2398

Post by ljadw » 05 Jul 2016, 22:25

Guderian would disagree with you as in 1941 he continuously complained that the encirclments were not closed (which was correct: a lot of Soviet forces always escaped from a Kesselschlacht )because the infantry (Kluge ) moved to slowly (which was not correct : Guderian refused to adapt his speed on the speed of the infantry and was cowboying):the reason that the Kessels were not closed,was that the PzD had not enough firepower and manpower . You need boots on the ground to close an encirclment,and the PzD had not enough boots on the ground .10 boots on the ground are better than 10 boots in a truck or in a tank .


Other point :the armour of AGA did NOT reach the coast:on 24 may 1940 only 2 of the 7 PzD of AGA did reach the coast : 2 Pz in Boulogne, 10 in Calais, but 5 Pz was still 80 km from the coast and did not close the encirclment (a tautology : an encirclment can not be closed ,as an encirclment is always closed ) .From Douai to the coast there were only parts of 10 German divisions, which was much to less for an encirclment, especially as they lacked firepower and manpower .

Distance Douai-Dunkirk : 115 km,the ID were closer : distance Courtai-Dunkirk : 106 km .

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Re: Why the Waffen-SS

#2399

Post by Richard Anderson » 05 Jul 2016, 22:34

ljadw wrote:The forces north of the Ardennes were AGB (Holland is north of the Ardennes ) and the majority of AGA (only PzG Kleist ) was advancing in the Ardennes, and these forces were opposed by the majority of the Allied forces ,which were more than 7O divisions : BEF 11, Belgium : 22, Holland : 12 ,France more than 25 .
It would help if you could be coherent. So now you acknowledge that HG-B committed 29 divisions and HG-A 45 divisions, of which the 29 divisions of HG-B and the two divisions of Hoth's corps attacked north of the Ardennes, while the 10 divisions of Kleist, followed by the other 33 divisions, transited the Ardennes, ending with 70-odd allied divisions facing 71 German divisions.

Glad we cleared that up.
Richard C. Anderson Jr.

American Thunder: U.S. Army Tank Design, Development, and Doctrine in World War II
Cracking Hitler's Atlantic Wall
Hitler's Last Gamble
Artillery Hell

ljadw
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Re: Why the Waffen-SS

#2400

Post by ljadw » 05 Jul 2016, 22:37

Sid Guttridge wrote:Hi ljadw,

. Army Group B’s infantry formed part of ring, but they didn’t create the encirclement – they just pressed the Allies frontally once they began to retreat in their attempt to evade encirclement by Army Group A’s panzer divisions. (See http://ww2db.com/images/battle_france23.jpg)



Sid
This is not correct : the Belgians retreated already on 10 may,before the PzG was at the Meuse, to prevent destruction and encirclment by the ID from AGB and from AGA .And when on 20 may 2 PzD was at Abbeville, the main part of the Belgian army was already destroyed by the German ID .

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