Why the Waffen-SS

[ChristopherPerrien]

What is so appealing about the Wafenn-SS? Why has fiction become fact to so many? Why do ithe SS and Waffen-SS get a special place in the hearts of so many? . Why are they so popular? Why do they get a get out of jail free card?

People even go so far to assume that the later divisions were just as great or special as the the first 5. They even try to wash the Waffen-SS of its involvement with the SS. We know that the Waffen-SS had a direct relation ship with the SS but many try and twist history on this.

Why are they such a hot topic .

Regards Bill

Cult of personality based on Adolf Hitler. It is as simple as that. The SS was originally formed as his own personal body guard , that grew into a Praetorian Guard; But the initial ideal and till the end was based on the man "Hitler". It remains so to this day, no matter about debating what the SS organization became later or did.

Such debates as this one, are arguing about the forest and forgetting the original tree.

[dshaday]

Hi Sid
I read your post with interest and am struck by the number of sweeping statements. Along with the no-compromising words that you selected to use. For example “completely unoriginal”, “clone” “without exception”, “failed” etc. The trouble for me is that this is like a challenge. I suspect that you have chosen the language you did to emphasise your point(s). The flip side is that some of your points can now be attacked. I have assumed that the wording you used was not because you have a strong bias against the Waffen SS, no matter what, and will always spin facts in a negative light against them.

Sid, you said
The Waffen-SS was militarily completely unoriginal. It contributed nothing new to the military art and in every branch was a clone of the Army.

Now, we all know (from lots of repeating in the last two posts) that the Waffen SS got the first world patents for disruptive camouflage clothing in the form of a helmet cover and smock/jacket. They were the first armed force in the world to introduce these items, and issue them on a general scale. They combined these garments with the fire and movement tactics in their assault training. So this is one original, military innovation that the Waffen SS introduced to the military art.
I am open to contributions from readers of any other innovations the Waffen SS may have made. The additional contributions I mentioned in a previous thread were more like modifying existing army innovations to suit, or implementing them more thoroughly than the army, eg
1/ Night time assaults with armoured infantry (see Peiper as recognised specialist)
2/ Further development and continued implementation of the existing Reichswher policy to break down the class structure in the army.

Sid, you said
The W-SS "elite" units were, without exception, motorized from the start and armoured later.

To be sure the 1st, 2nd and 3rd SS were elite formations and these are the one that I presume you refer to here.
In my opinion I would add the 12th SS Hitlerjugend and Wiking, and MAYBE the 9th and 10th SS Panzer. Not all of these went through the motorised and then later armoured stage.
The 12th SS had a higher calibre recruit base in its build up. Experience NCOs and Officers from the LSSAH were transferred into the Division. Specialist rolls were also filled from army officers who had had earlier HJ affiliation. They were formed as a panzer division (although always short of equipment) and shared special bonds with the LSSAH. The division fought hard in Normandy and was recognised by Allied soldier testimonies as a tough unit. It’s performance after being hastily rebuilt after Normandy was not spectacular, but since this was very late in the war (with all the manpower, equipment and time shortages), I do not hold that against them.

Wiking had a much longer history and performed very well in Russia.

The 9th and 10th SS were also formed late in the war and fought well in Normandy and Arnhem. So, maybe a possible elite.

Sid, you said
This necessarily meant that they accompanied the spearhead of the Army's operations from the beginning and were therefore present at its major victories.

I am mainly commenting on the patronising choice of words here, as these SS units were not ride-along bystanders to the campaign but active participants.

Sid, you said
However, at no point over 1939-41 was the W-SS contribution indispensible to the Army's victory in any campaign.

Exactly true. They were so relatively small in size to the Wehrmacht that If the case was otherwise, I would be shocked.
From 1942-45 the situation is different (and not just because the army victories were not happening). The Waffen SS resources became much more indispensable.

Sid, you said
Even on a political level the W-SS failed to justify its independent existence.

How is this so? Can you show me the list of responsibilities in the Waffen SS mission statement (from its political masters) that it failed to live up to? This statement sound more like a personal opinion.
From the material I have read, I understood that the role of the Waffen SS was to protect the Reich from its enemies. Even those outside the borders of the Reich. Presumably by using military force. It did not have to justify itself by recruiting foreigners first, or killing the most Bolsheviks per capita etc.
As you yourself said before, its justification was political. It was only allowed to existed because it continued to do so.

Sid, you said
Furthermore, up to the end of 1944, when records become confused, the Army had suffered a higher proportion of its losses against the ideological foe in the USSR than the W-SS.

Do you have the figures for that? That would be irrevocable losses such as killed in action + POW + missing in action, right?
I have seen one discussion thread on this site where the raw KIA data presented (as a percentage) was almost equal for the SS and Army. So I am curious if your figures show any significant disparity.

Sid, you said
Nor is it true that the W-SS significantly advanced social mobility.

There is no doubt that the Waffen SS presented new career opportunities in addition to those of the expanding army. Do you agree?
The key word here is if the extra opportunities were “significant”.

If you mean, did the Waffen SS positions offer a significant number of career opportunities? Then in absolute terms, maybe. Relative to the Army - maybe not.

If you mean, did the career opportunities offer a better quality career relative to that newly possible in the army? Then I would be inclined to say yes.

If you mean a fast track to a high SS rank? Then I have no idea. Nor have you shown this to be true or false.

Sid, you said
"Farmer's sons" rarely became officers in it, while established urban middle class officers were the norm and aristocrats were not unkown. Nor, given the extraordinary expansion of the 100,000 man Reichswehr into the 10,000,000+ Heer over 1933-45, was social advancement through the officer ranks a rarity in the traditional army.

Do you have any figures regarding the “Farmer’s sons” comment? Please don’t tell me that the statistics referred at the bottom of the post is the source for the statement, as I have issues with them.

Sid, you said
P.S. The following from a review I wrote elsewhere on AHF of Valhalla's Warriors by Goldsworthy:

"There is some confusion about the origins of the Waffen-SS officer corps, one source (p.49) stating that an (unlikely?) 90% of them were of peasant background in 1938, whereas an appendix on p.240 indicates that only between 3.4% and 5% of officers surveyed between Sturmbannfuhrer and Obergruppenfuhrer were even farmers.

(The same appendix also states that 23.8% of the ranks between Obergruppenfuhrer and Standartenfuhrer were ex-Army officers, 21.9% were from academic professions, 15.8% were ex-businessmen and 14.7% were ex-Police officials. By contrast ex-Army NCOs made up only 8.7% of these two ranks and a similar proportion (8.8%) of Obersturmbannfuhrer and Sturmbannfuhrer, whereas only 1.9% of these last two ranks were former Army officers. If true, it rather undermines the proposition that the Waffen-SS offered fast track promotion to high rank for significant numbers of Army NCOs and others from the civilian working classes. According to Valhalla’s Warriors, the Waffen-SS senior officer corps was dominated by ex-Army officers and their social equivalents from the civilian middle classes.)"

A collection of intriguing figures, that have little context and odd source.

Are the figures a snapshot in time? Then when? How did these figures trend over time?
I see that the source are CVs prepared by the officers. Did every officer submit one, or is this a sampling of the officer corps?
The figures cover only the middle to higher end of the SS officer corps. What about the junior to middle ranks which would probably comprise most of the officers by number?
Ideally we would need comparable army figures to draw further conclusions.

In any case I am amazed that they indicate:
1/ Previous army officers were the largest group to occupy the ranks of Colonel to General (Almost 25%), but did not bunch up at Major to Colonel (2%) . Is this because the Army did not give them this career opportunity so they transferred to the SS with a significant jump in rank?
2/ Previous army NCOs filled almost 9% of positions from Major to General. That is a way good career quality move for them !
3/ Percentage of senior officers who were farmers (and I assume not large land owning Junkers) are a small percentage. But what about the junior to middle officer stat?

All the best

Dennis

[j keenan]

Night time assaults with armoured infantry (see Peiper as recognised specialist)
Really ?
To be sure the 1st, 2nd and 3rd SS were elite formations ? After pulling on there camouflage uniforms ? Or before ?

[dshaday]

Hi Sid

Further to your last post to me about my comments:

I wrote
You write of LAH, "As I mentioned previously, it is my opinion that the combat “eliteness” of a unit is relative to the Sid wrote
performance a “normal” comparable size/equipped unit in the same army."

Sid, wrote
Only one German Army formation was recruited nationally like LAH and equipped similarly - the Grossdeutschland Division. In terms of sacrifice, it suffered more heavily than any "elite" Waffen-SS Division, given that it only became a division in 1942-43.

I am not familiar enough with Grossdeutschland to comment if it is equivalent for comparison purposes ( eg manpower, equipment, history etc). Its elite status is never in doubt.

I wrote,
"I said they were often in the thickest fighting."

Sid replied
I should hope so. It would have been a waste of their mechanization if they weren't.

Thank you for reinforcing my exact comment to Rob-wssob2.

Sid wrote
And yet the W-SS entirely missed the pivotal battle of the war at Stalingrad while its "elite" formations were being upgraded to armoured status by depriving the Army of almost exactly the same number of tank battalions.

Sid, the SS units needed re-building. Also, the Waffen SS and German Army are fighting on the same side. The tanks are not being wasted or depriving Germany of them in the war. So the exact negative impact of the tanks going to the SS is exactly zero.
Ask yourself this question. If instead of some SS units it was some army units being rebuilt. Would you still make a negative comment?

Sid wrote
The only Blackshirt Division comparable with the "elite" W-SS divisions is probably the strangely little known "M" Division of 1943, which was being equipped by the Germans but never saw action.

These divisions were for service in Russia and were slated for extra training and much better equipment.
But I was originally referring to the Blackshirt Divisions in North African (numbered 1 -4). They were given elite status by the party. In Africa they suffered badly and were destroyed relatively quickly and never re-built. I used them as an example of a military/party organisation with elite status that did not do well in combat (although it was not really their fault), and which are not as popular (or as known) as the Waffen SS.

Sid wrote
PanzerLehr was from the panzer equivalent of Ersatzheer sources and not directly equatable to any W-SS Division. Its original name had "Reserve-" in the title. It was the panzer equivalent of the Ersatzheer's training divisions deployed outside the Reich.

Thank you for reinforcing my comment to Rob-wssob2 that the Pnzer Lehr was not comparable to the LSSAH.

Sid wrote
As a matter of interest, what "Reichswehr standards" are we talking about?
The Reichswehr policy to reduce the class/rank barriers in the army.

Sid wrote
It was the German Army that first trialled multi-coloured camo in the mid 1930s, but couldn't adopt it due to expense at a time when the army was expanding so rapidly. The SS was reportedly able to put it into production after it was given industrial assets in the Protectorate. Furthermore, given that all SS men had army mobilization obligations until 1938 or early 1939, one wonders what the SS was doing supposedly trialling multi-coulured camo in 1937? That needs looking into.

Since the Munich Agreement was in late 1938,and the SS trialled the camo gear in 1937, the SS must have had limited production facilities prior to the industrial assets in the Protectorate. Also, Waffen SS men were exempt from Army call up exactly because of their Waffen SS service. Maybe you are thinking of the Allegemeine SS?

Regarding the camo trials, they are documented in book I reference in a thread to Rob.

Sid wrote
Above corps level the W-SS did not have the support services or "army" units of the German Army, but it nevertheless relied totally on their support. One reason why the W-SS had marginally higher proportional casualties than the Army was that it had proportionally more "teeth" than the Army, upon whose safer rear echelons it relied.

I am confused. Here you say that the Waffen SS had higher % casualties than the Army. Yet one of your previous post says that the Army had a higher % loss in Russia (and was therefore more motivated than the SS against the Bolshevik foe!) . What is going on?

Sid wrote
There seems to be no evidence W-SS units were prepared to make greater sacrifices than equivalent Army units.

Come on Sid, this sentence is a bit of a cope out. Remember Philosophy 101: Lack of proof is not proof of.
Maybe you have to look harder or not make this comment? Maybe it is too hard to tell.
Simply from an intuitive basis the SS in Russia would have fought longer and harder to not be captured by the Soviets. How significant is this factor anyway?
The bottom line is that the good Waffen SS and equivalent army units would have all fought their best. Why is it a competition?

All the best

Dennis

[dshaday]

Night time assaults with armoured infantry (see Peiper as recognised specialist)
Really ?

Yes, really. If you search this forum for the thread “Peiper's SPW tactics on the Eastern Front”, you will find comments from posters who have done research (eg Harro) that Pieper was a very skillful, very impressive SPW commander (but a bad panzer commander). Add to this the fact that the same thread acknowledges Peiper’s speciality in night/dusk fighting with his SPWs I made this tentative connection that the LSSAH had made some innovations in this type of fighting. It appears to be a very non standard tactic and possibly an innovation. So I listed it for discussion.

You remember the Peiper and SPW tactics thread? It is the one you posted comments in.

To be sure the 1st, 2nd and 3rd SS were elite formations ?

This is a solid YES. As indicated by their performance in combat, organisation, training etc. You may find yourself alone in pushing that barrow.

After pulling on there camouflage uniforms ? Or before ?

Oh dear. A live one.

Dennis

[j keenan]

Night time assaults with armoured infantry (see Peiper as recognised specialist)
Really ?

Yes, really. If you search this forum for the thread “Peiper's SPW tactics on the Eastern Front”, you will find comments from posters who have done research (eg Harro) that Pieper was a very skillful, very impressive SPW commander (but a bad panzer commander). Add to this the fact that the same thread acknowledges Peiper’s speciality in night/dusk fighting with his SPWs I made this tentative connection that the LSSAH had made some innovations in this type of fighting. It appears to be a very non standard tactic and possibly an innovation. So I listed it for discussion.

You remember the Peiper and SPW tactics thread? It is the one you posted comments in.
Yes thanks but what dusk/night attacks are you talking about ?

To be sure the 1st, 2nd and 3rd SS were elite formations ?

This is a solid YES. As indicated by their performance in combat, organisation, training etc. You may find yourself alone in pushing that barrow.
So after an 8 weeks training course your elite ?

After pulling on there camouflage uniforms ? Or before ?

Oh dear. A live one.
In one of your early post you said thats why there considered elite by all running around in camouflage uniforms.With the fire and movement tactics in there assault training.


Dennis

[dshaday]

Hi Jamie

Night time assaults with armoured infantry (see Peiper as recognised specialist)
Really

Yes, really. If you search this forum for the thread “Peiper's SPW tactics on the Eastern Front”, you will find comments from posters who have done research (eg Harro) that Pieper was a very skillful, very impressive SPW commander (but a bad panzer commander). Add to this the fact that the same thread acknowledges Peiper’s speciality in night/dusk fighting with his SPWs I made this tentative connection that the LSSAH had made some innovations in this type of fighting. It appears to be a very non standard tactic and possibly an innovation. So I listed it for discussion.

You remember the Peiper and SPW tactics thread? It is the one you posted comments in.
Yes thanks but what dusk/night attacks are you talking about ??

I am talking about Peiper’s preference and expertise to attack Russian positions at dusk and when it was dark. It caused maximum confusion and tended to un-nerved Russian defences. This is reference in the thread I gave you. For example read pages 1 and 3.

To be sure the 1st, 2nd and 3rd SS were elite formations ?

This is a solid YES. As indicated by their performance in combat, organisation, training etc. You may find yourself alone in pushing that barrow.
So after an 8 weeks training course your elite ?

That is not how things work. Even in 1944 basic infantry training was 12 weeks. Then you spend time in the Division’s replacement battalion (more training), then you are sent to a sub unit (who try to show you the ropes). This is all normal stuff. The elite part is the unit and the standards/behaviour they teach you while you are there, and which manifest in a higher combat performance.

If I use your initial inference, then no elite unit can be built or maintained . No matter what the army.

After pulling on there camouflage uniforms ? Or before ?

Oh dear. A live one.
In one of your early post you said thats why there considered elite by all running around in camouflage uniforms.With the fire and movement tactics in there assault training.

Please read my posts again. All my mention of camouflage uniforms (with/without fire and movement training) was made in regard to an example of a military innovation by the Waffen SS. Nowhere did I ever suggest that cammo made anyone elite. That would be a very silly idea. [/quote]


Dennis[/quote][/quote]

Dennis

[Rob - wssob2]

Fritz Bügelsack, Berliner, DKiG awardee and as longtime member of the LSSAH part of the "incrowd" was killed two weeks later. Or perhaps we should remark: got himself killed. After a drinking bout at the CP he decided to take out a nearby Russian MG-position single handedly. Armed with an MPi and handgrenades and acompanied by two of his dispatch runners, he set off in the dark, took out the MG-position but was shot by a guard when he returned because his alcohol infested brain did not comprehend that a password was demanded and the guards feared a Russian counter attack.

Thanks for sharing Timo - reading accounts like this convey the horror of the Waffen-SS experience in Russia and are quite different from the sanitized anecdotes we more typically see from authors like Gordon Williamson and Richard Landwehr.

\\\\

Hello Dennis Just some comments on your post:

By the way, was Mellenthin only commenting about the LSSAH, or was he referring to army units as well? Your reference was referring to the plural (more than one).

See Mellenthin, Panzer Battles, p.308. If I remember correctly, he’s just referring to the LSSAH.

If I remember correctly it was only the LSSAH (because of its special status) that had the privilege to recruit nationally.

And to clarify the Leibstandarte’s national recruitment drive in the 1930’s, let me add that I believe the effort was specifically targeted to General-SS members in the various regional SS districts - so they were targeting men who were already SS members as opposed to regular civilians unaffiliated with Nazi organizations.

A throw back to the Kaiser’s days. Many armies have emphasised local/regional recruitment for the unit bonding cohesion it generates. The British Pals or Sportsmens battalions are a classic example. Fully agree with this principal. The only drawback I can see is that in a long drawn out conflict you can decimate your recruiting base (young men) and demoralise the local region/demography (families , regional economy, etc).

Absolutely - Bartov mention’s how the Eastern Front’s massive casualties wreaked havoc on this regionally based system, effective destroying this cohesion in the German Army units - very similar to what happened to the British “Pals” battalions of WWI.

I did not know about the lower minimum educational standards for recruitment. Interesting.

If you ever get a chance, see if you can pick up Bernd Wegners The Waffen-SS: Organization, Ideology and Function which is an excellent sociological study of the early-war Waffen-SS. I believe it’s John Keegan in his book Asphalt Soldiers who first mentioned the 40% of SS officer candidates only having the equivalent of an eighth-grade education Reading Jay Hatheway’s In Perfect Formation, I was surprised by the lack of university-level curriculum offered by the SS Officer Candidate Schools. Very different from institutions like Sandhurst or West Point to which they are often (erroneously, IMO) compared.

Maybe this was so that recruits from marginal farming areas (from families who had little wealth/money and opportunity for schooling) could potentially join. I understand that this demographic was the strongest NSDAP loyalty base. Giving them a career possibility they were not likely to have in the regular army. I hope that the officers that were selected for higher military training went through a second screening !

Actually, the screening seems to have been rather rigorous and included psychological profile assessments of the candidates - Jens Westemeier includes excerpts from Peiper’s assessment in his biography, and its interesting how the assessment accurately captures some of the strengths - and weaknesses - of Peiper’s command style.

The Blackshirt divisions ….

Great points - if I were to do a comparison of Blackshirt/Italians Fascist units to Waffen-SS I would probably also include the RSI’s 1943-45 units like the Black Brigades and Decima X, units in which the ideology and “eliteness” and counterinsurgency functions became paramount.

I agree that picture books are a waste of time.

Their numbers are legion! It’s getting to the point that the same photos are getting published over and over again.

The analysis as you suggest would be interesting, have you seen one? I would like to see an unbiased comparison with apples compared to like apples. It would not be trivial.

No, but it would be interesting. You’d have to take two similar units from the same campaign - say the Leibstandarte and the Army’s 2nd Panzer Division in the Battle of the Bulge. Or for something more obscure, the Leibstandarte and the 7th Panzer Division in the battles at Kamenka-Federowka in December 1943.

As you know Panzer Lehr was a special army unit almost twice the size of a normal panzer division.

Yes very similar to Grossdeutschland - a unit often described as formed as an Army counterweight to the SS Panzer divisions.

[Rob - wssob2]

Hi Sid - wanted to respond to your comments:

The Waffen-SS was militarily completely unoriginal. It contributed nothing new to the military art and in every branch was a clone of the Army. The was no military justification for its independence status - only a political one.

I agree with you that the primary purpose of the Waffen-SS was never to be a military innovator. In The 1943 Organization Book of the Nazi Party (Organizationsbuch der NSDAP) defined the Waffen-SS purpose as follows:

“…the Waffen-SS developed out of the determination to provide the Fuhrer with a select body of long-service troops for the fulfillment of special assignments…it combines with soldierly attitudes a strict spiritual discipline and trains its men as political fighters.”

The three key points as 1) Serving Hitler himself as opposed to the German state 2) Undertake “special assignments” and be 3) Be trained as “political fighters”

We can probably safely assume that in the eyes of Hitler, Himmler, Berger, et. al. being select “political fighters” of the New Order meant winning lots of campaigns on par or better than the best units of the German Army, but this was only part of the Waffen-SS mission.

AFAIK Himmler never wrote down his long term vision for the Waffen-SS, which has led historians to different interpretations as to whether or not he wanted it to eventually replace the Army. I don’t think he did, but I do believe Himmler envisioned the Waffen-SS playing a large part in remaking both Western and Eastern Europe into German colonies. This of course has lead some historians to conjecture if Himmler wanted Germany evolving into some sort of SS state (or multinational white/Aryan European Federation in the minds of prominen starry-eyedt collaborators like Degrelle and post-war neo-fascists). I don’t think Himmler had much of a long-term vision, as the growth and deployment of the Waffen-SS was reactive instead of proactive, affiliated with SS occupation policies and ultimately due to wartime manpower needs.

The W-SS "elite" units were, without exception, motorized from the start and armoured later. This necessarily meant that they accompanied the spearhead of the Army's operations from the beginning and were therefore present at its major victories. However, at no point over 1939-41 was the W-SS contribution indispensible to the Army's victory in any campaign.

Maybe you could argue the March 1943 reconquest of Khakov or the elimination of the Gran bridgehead in Feb 1945. George Stein argues that the main contribution of the Waffen-SS was buying time for the Third Reich 1943-45, but I wonder if this view is too “SS-centric” and doesn’t take into account the contributions of the Army to the defense of the Reich.

Even on a political level the W-SS failed to justify its independent existence. It was the Army that first recruited non-"Germanics", not the racially sniffy W-SS. Furthermore, up to the end of 1944, when records become confused, the Army had suffered a higher proportion of its losses against the ideological foe in the USSR than the W-SS.

Note that recruiting wasn’t the only activity the Waffen-SS conducted on the “political level.” Raising Waffen-SS units in occupied territories was part and parcel of SS occupation policy, and the SS deliberately created is Troop Training Grounds and military installations on foreign soil. Waffen-SS units participated in genocide, in the looting of cultural artifacts, in the roundup of Jews and slave laborers and in counterinsurgency operations - these too were actions on the political level.

Nor is it true that the W-SS significantly advanced social mobility. "Farmer's sons" rarely became officers in it, while established urban middle class officers were the norm and aristocrats were not unkown. Nor, given the extraordinary expansion of the 100,000 man Reichswehr into the 10,000,000+ Heer over 1933-45, was social advancement through the officer ranks a rarity in the traditional army.

The SS Main Office did make some grandiose promises to Germanic volunteers (along the lines of “Fight for the duration and we’ll give you 100 acres and a dacha near Zhitomir”) but for the most part, for foreign conscripts or volunteers, there were no long-term political, social or economic benefits to serving.

[BillHermann]

Dennis,

A division in itself from an objective point of view can hardly be classed as elite, especially a whole organization, that would mean the cooks, post office, camp guards and AA batteries have the same abilities and training as the infantry and we know at the Waffen-SS organization level this is impossible.

As well, using from the beginning to the end, 1945 we know this is also impossible, I would suggest you read a little more on the composition of these top three you speak of. The 3rd Waffen-SS and others had to use captured Soviet armour at the regimental level in Russia and the 12th SS was fielded with young teenagers from the beginning. Both not what one would call elite, resourceful but not elite.

We could also discuss the composition of the 9th and 10th from their creation, with the exception of some of the veterans that were moved to these divisions they also in composition could not be called elite due size and make up. When you add the total of divisions and smaller SS units the percentage of units that were possibly equal to many army units in composition is quite small. Seeing as well that most SS units were created later in the war out of desperation. Elite forces are rarely created out of desperation in the 11th hour.

Besides Waffen-SS similarities to the army the only thing they were really good at was spreading the bosses word and helping to fulfill policies as that is what their purpose in their creation.

Night time assaults with armoured infantry?
Camouflage ?

Hardly as this has been debunked many times over, hardly innovative and hardly elite.

Peiper as recognised specialist? this too has been debunked he brought little innovation to the battlefield, there are many others including Waffen-SS officers that did far better than him.

The elite status as said before fits the Waffen-SS if you are discussing how they were seen by Nazi propaganda or by contemporary writers and followers that believe in the last 70+ plus years of energy and fiction that has been created about them in books, games and movies.

Feel free to discuss the strengths of the individual units however the Waffen-SS as an elite force from a historical point of view is more than questionable at multiple levels.

[dshaday]

Dennis,

A division in itself from an objective point of view can hardly be classed as elite, especially a whole organization, that would mean the cooks, post office, camp guards and AA batteries have the same abilities and training as the infantry and we know at the Waffen-SS organization level this is impossible.

You are wrong there Bill. We do say that a “such and such" a unit is “elite”.
We can use ”elite” to describe combat units and individuals also. Check out the many respected posters that have used the word this way, in this very forum thread. So yes, the cook in the LAH is part of an elite organisation if the LAH has been set up as elite etc. He does not have to be the best cook in the military.

Please re-read my discussion with Rob-wssob2 about what “elite” can mean. It appears earlier in this thread.

As well, using from the beginning to the end, 1945 we know this is also impossible, I would suggest you read a little more on the composition of these top three you speak of.

Logically, if the Waffen SS could not maintain an existing elite unit during the war, then how did the army do the same? Or maybe you believe that no German military unit was elite I WW2?

The 3rd Waffen-SS and others had to use captured Soviet armour at the regimental level in Russia and the 12th SS was fielded with young teenagers from the beginning. Both not what one would call elite, resourceful but not elite.

As already discussed in this thread, an “elite” unit can mean many things at the same time. Rob-wssob2 especially pointed this out.

Using captured equipment is not a sign of anything except an equipment shortage perhaps. It has nothing to do with “elite”. Nor does the look or build of an individual make one “elite,” or not.

Regarding the 12th SS, other posters have criticised the SS for using good quality recruits who could have been groomed for leadership roles in the army. Instead, wasting them as infantry. Amazing how you still put a negative spin on the SS by saying these same soldiers had no elite potential.

Maybe you need to stop and re-consider what “elite” really means. This is probably why we are at disagreement here.

We could also discuss the composition of the 9th and 10th from their creation, with the exception of some of the veterans that were moved to these divisions they also in composition could not be called elite due size and make up. When you add the total of divisions and smaller SS units the percentage of units that were possibly equal to many army units in composition is quite small. Seeing as well that most SS units were created later in the war out of desperation. Elite forces are rarely created out of desperation in the 11th hour.

Unit size has nothing to do with being “elite”. Nor does unit make up (in military terms). I see a re-occurring issue here Bill.

Most of the Waffen SS elite were not created late in the war at the 11th hour. You should know that from your reading.
I personally consider the 12th SS elite and it was created late in the war, but it had the luxury of prolonged training in France, and injections of trained and experienced officers and NCOs from other good SS and army combat units.

The 9th and 10th SS I have said, are possibilities for elite status. I fully understand your opinion is that they are not elite. That is OK with me.

Night time assaults with armoured infantry?
Camouflage ?

Hardly as this has been debunked many times over, hardly innovative and hardly elite.

As military innovations these points have not been debunked.
In fact I myself brought up the night time assaults by Pieper as a possible innovation (I do not believe that this has been discussed in this forum before now, so how has this been debunked many time??).

No where have I said that these two points equal “elite”. Where are you getting this idea from?

Peiper as recognised specialist? this too has been debunked he brought little innovation to the battlefield, there are many others including Waffen-SS officers that did far better than him.

Peiper as a very good SPW specialist has not been debunked. It has been discussed and confirmed by the thread in this forum that I mentioned in my last post.
Honestly Bill, do you actually read what I post, or are you just repeating non-sence to hold up some prior perceptions?

The elite status as said before fits the Waffen-SS if you are discussing how they were seen by Nazi propaganda or by contemporary writers and followers that believe in the last 70+ plus years of energy and fiction that has been created about them in books, games and movies.

And on the battlefield for those specific Waffen SS units that were elite.

Feel free to discuss the strengths of the individual units however the Waffen-SS as an elite force from a historical point of view is more than questionable at multiple levels.

For the Waffen SS as a whole this is correct., and I have said that several times myself. Even in this current discussion thread.
For a few specific Waffen SS units, it is clear that they were elite.

All the best

Dennis

[j keenan]

Their early widespread use of camouflage uniforms to ALL rank and file (and not just to specialist troops as other armies had done) came instantly to mind. It also helps in its perceived image TODAY of elite troops
This is your post which implies that wearing camouflage is the perceived image of elite troops today ?
As Rob as said if you look at the early members of the LAH they are mainly drawn from the general SS even right up to 39 when whole SS-Standarte were transferred in.You didn't even need to be in the Nazi party to join,they were ceremonial troops up till the start of the war.Even been used as film extras and used as propaganda in the flower wars.Why were General-SS allowed to have moments at the front to earn medals when having no combat experience ? At the end of the war Hitler said they were not fit to wear the cuff title.
@Rob
In 34 when the Verfügungstruppe were been formed was there use not going to be in putting down armed political unrest in the country? As Hitler did not trust the army? Then the same in 43 if they still believed in victory but for the the whole of the Reich and conquered territory.Political unrest rounding up of jews and so on ?

[j keenan]

Comparing losses for 12.43
LAH(Authorized strength 25,402 with a shortfall of 5,330)losses 2,437 31.12.43
k.i.a. 376
w.i.a. 1,106
m.i.a. 62
ill 128
other reasons 765
7 Pz.Div.(Authorized strength 13,014 with a shortfall of 3,396)losses 1,597 1.1.44
k.i.a. 205
w.i.a. 834
m.i.a. 183
ill 326
other reasons 49
8 Pz.Div.(Authorized strength12,046 with a shortfall of 3,442)losses1,466 1.1.44
k.i.a. 141
w.i.a. 411
m.i.a 524
ill 315
other reasons 75
source Kamen Nevenkin The Panzer Divisions

[BillHermann]

Dennis,

I have read much of your posts and I simply can not agree with much of what you say as there is little fact to back up some of your points. You are exaggerating much and much of what you say is not objective.

Your vision of the Waffen-SS is from the images we have been sold over the last 70 years the realty of what and who they were is much different then the fictional pedestal they have been put on.

I started this thread though not to discuss the "elite" status as that gets beaten around enough. The original question was and still is "why has much fiction been created about them and why are they so popular.

Truth is it has been answered with multiple points over the last 20 pages.

[dshaday]

Hi Rob

I have made a few comments and added some questions that your input prompted.
Maybe readers more knowledgeable than myself will post some of the answers.

Hi Sid - wanted to respond to your comments:

The Waffen-SS was militarily completely unoriginal. It contributed nothing new to the military art and in every branch was a clone of the Army. The was no military justification for its independence status - only a political one.

I agree with you that the primary purpose of the Waffen-SS was never to be a military innovator. In The 1943 Organization Book of the Nazi Party (Organizationsbuch der NSDAP) defined the Waffen-SS purpose as .... 1) Serving Hitler himself as opposed to the German state 2) Undertake “special assignments” and be 3) Be trained as “political fighters”

The Organizationsbuch der NSDAP book sounds very interesting, and makes a lot of sense. Is there a translated copy of the book on-line? I would love to read it.

By the way, I had a go at searching the Internet and found another possible military innovation (tactical) by the Waffen SS. One that demonstrate again that the Waffen SS WAS NOT “militarily completely unoriginal” and that IT DID make new contributions “to the military art”. I post a copy of the reference below:

SS-Sturmbannführer Hans-George Sonnenstuhl of 10th SS panzer Divisioncreated a Sperrfeurlinie (Artillery Blocking Line) . It meant the forward observers only needed to provide a number and the whole Artillery Regiment would descend into that area in a short period. This of course halted any attack by the Allies (at Arhhem) and boosted the confidence of the defending Germans. Even the commander of Artillery OB West was impressed by this solution that he visited Sonnenstuhl's command post to see it in action for himself so he could pass this method onto other units.

I will add this one to my list of Waffen SS innovations (open for discussion and additions from readers).

We can probably safely assume that in the eyes of Hitler, Himmler, Berger, et. al. being select “political fighters” of the New Order meant winning lots of campaigns on par or better than the best units of the German Army, but this was only part of the Waffen-SS mission.

Rob, on the sole basis of what you posted out of the Organizationsbuch der NSDAP, I would have to disagree that it is safe to assume that the Waffen SS had to be on par or better than the best units of the army. Perhaps the book explains it more fully??
Logically, it seems that the Waffen SS would only need to be as good enough to fulfil its political roll. It is logical that Himmler would personally want his boys to be the best in warfare from a prestige point of view.

Even on a political level the W-SS failed to justify its independent existence. It was the Army that first recruited non-"Germanics", not the racially sniffy W-SS. Furthermore, up to the end of 1944, when records become confused, the Army had suffered a higher proportion of its losses against the ideological foe in the USSR than the W-SS.

Note that recruiting wasn’t the only activity the Waffen-SS conducted on the “political level.” Raising Waffen-SS units in occupied territories was part and parcel of SS occupation policy, and the SS deliberately created is Troop Training Grounds and military installations on foreign soil. Waffen-SS units participated in genocide, in the looting of cultural artifacts, in the roundup of Jews and slave laborers and in counterinsurgency operations - these too were actions on the political level.

So based on the quote from the Organizationsbuch der NSDAP on the political role of the Waffen SS, can we say that the Waffen SS failed its political role (which is its justification to exist)? Was the Waffen SS supposed to suffer a higher proportion of its losses against the ideological foe in the USSR?? Maybe Sid is wrong in his assertions?

Nor is it true that the W-SS significantly advanced social mobility. "Farmer's sons" rarely became officers in it, while established urban middle class officers were the norm and aristocrats were not unkown. Nor, given the extraordinary expansion of the 100,000 man Reichswehr into the 10,000,000+ Heer over 1933-45, was social advancement through the officer ranks a rarity in the traditional army.

The SS Main Office did make some grandiose promises to Germanic volunteers (along the lines of “Fight for the duration and we’ll give you 100 acres and a dacha near Zhitomir”) but for the most part, for foreign conscripts or volunteers, there were no long-term political, social or economic benefits to serving.

Just wondering, Rob:
Would foreigners volunteering for the Waffen SS automatically receive German citizenship on par with a Reichs Deutsch? Along with its relevant advantages. A good Government job after the war?
Would the home country of foreign volunteers receive any political gain or benefit (financial or territorial) for supporting their countrymen in the SS?
Enlistmet in the Waffen SS (or even the German military) as a way of expunging a criminal record?
Satisfaction in destroying the “evil Bolshevics”? On political, religious or moral grounds?
A future carrer in a vibrant, “victorious?” German military?


All the best

Dennis