Why the Waffen-SS

[dshaday]

Hi Rob

I have added some comments to your previous post.

The main point is that we have different methods of determining a unit's combat performance and if it is of a high performance (say, elite). I think we will always disagree on this. We put different weightings on the units' combat engagements.

More to follow regarding the Republican Guard.

Hi Dennis - in your post 17 Jul 2014 18:19, you asked:

"By the way. Do you view the LSSH as an elite unit? Do you believe it to be on average inferior to elite army units, in the same ballpark or superior?"

To which I answered with the above comment on the Leibstandarte.

Thank you for answering that question. It was 5 days ago and I had frankly forgotten about it. At the time I wanted a one line answer and not necessarily a dedicated post (although that is of course fine also).

I have simply posted that some Waffen SS units are elite.

And I am, in a nutshell, arguing they are not.

OK . I see that you are saying that no Waffen SS units are elite.

That would have to be from a combat perspective only?
I take it that from your full-sized post from yesterday, your personal opinion is that “politicaly”, some Waffen SS units are elite. Is this correct?

The SS considered these divisions elite both in their propaganda and in their actual fighting performance (once initial teething problems were ironed out) . That is, when compared to regular army units of the same size, equipment etc.

And I am arguing that when you study the actual combat performance of Waffen-SS units, it varies - in other words, the performance was sub-par compared to regular army units.

That is because the wording gives it a generalisation that is not always true. This implies that all SS units were always sub-par compared to regular army units. It can certainly mislead a novice reader, which is what I would hate to see happen.

Your statement does not mention over what period. Pre-war, end war, for a couple of days, on average. Or all the time.
How about unit size: for comparable size unit, any size. As well as type of equipment.

You may want to modify that statement to make it useful?

Even some of the elite (my term) Waffen SS units had temporary periods of poor combat performance after prolonged combat. As well as deteriorating war conditions in recruits and equipment lowering average performances, compared to the earlier years. I am quite OK with saying that on average, and over the war period, the elite SS units I mentioned were elite (by my definition). This is all quite consistent with my earlier posts.
Politically, the SS divisions I nominated were pretty much always elite.

The decline in quality of the LSSAH that you point out also happened in the average German army units as well

And I am pointing out that when you a side by side comparison, despite the decline, at time Army units performed better. The Army’s 2nd Panzer Division came closer to the Meuse than the Leibstandarte did. Forum member Christoph can provide a half-dozen other examples.

I have no problem with this. Since your statement includes elite army units as well, and says that it occurred only at times.

This is not in contradiction with my view of elite SS units.

Please note that I am not saying that the Waffen SS won every battle they fought, but the premier units tried very hard and in line with their elite status.

And they did not - which is why Hitler issued the Cuff Band Order. Timo can tell you all about how Kampfgruppe Knittel gave a lackluster performance in the Battle of the Bulge. The 12th SS Division was known among the British Army corps for its predictable and poorly organized counterattacks at Caen. The division gave a tentative performance at Rocherath on Dec 16, 1944, failing to meet it’s first day objectives. You call call these units “elite” all you want, but I keep pointing out to you examples of how the actual combat performance doesn’t match up to the myth.

We both know that the cuff band order came very late in the war (1945). Coinciding chronologically with Hitler rants about the Army. So I would not go overboard on this one. Unless you want to agree that prior to this Hitler was happy with the SS combat performance??

This would be the same 12th SS who on 9 June who , while defending Caen, destroyed 53 Sherman tanks in one day’s engagement?
I would not focus on the predictable counter attacks policy, as all army and SS units in Normandy were ordered to recover all lost ground with immediate counter-attacks.

I will call any unit elite as long as I feel they comply to the “elite” yardstick that I posted earlier.
Raw data like these individual examples are not as meaningful as you want to portray. The raw data needs to be analysed. I use the method I already outline, you use – what?

I see we have a name for saying the SS is militarily inferior to the army - “The Myth “.

An “elite” status does not change/disappear because the unit (the LAH in this discussion) fails to achieve a goal assigned to it.

Logically, if a “elite” unit can’t achieve it’s objectives, then why should we consider it elite?

If you use http://www.dictionary.com you will find that elite is “the choice or best of anything considered collectively, as of a group or class of persons.”
You don’t see mention of “must meet every objective” .

That is why my personal definition of elite uses a comparison to a normal army unit (by size and equipment type) for comparison.

Now ask yourself, would a normal army unit, of the same size and equipment as the LAH, have achieved all the goals ever assigned to the LAH in the same circumstances?
If your answer is YES for a majority of those scenarios in WW2 then logically the LAH is not elite. In all other cases the answer is “elite”.
But please, no cheating where the LAH has been shattered in fighting. Use an army unit of the same strength.

No one can easily do this analysis if you focus on “objectives” only. Introducing opinion in its place can invite, of course, disagreement.

“Also, eliteness in combat performance needs to be compared to a performance standard. Be it your average army unit or the performance of your average enemy unit.”

Then you are welcome to create such a performance standard. Kit Bonn in his book When the Odds Were Even did such a systematic study and proved that American Seventh Army units in the 1945 Lower Voges campaign were better than the German units they faced - including the 6th SS Division.

If the book is a good read then lets give the author credit.

But please Rob, you know that I did not nominate the 6th SS Division as an elite. So why have you gone on a tangent and mentioned this book?

Don’t you agree?

No.

You should really quote the whole part of that post. Especially as it is yet another example of you miss-quoting me.

Despite Himmler’s wishes and SS propaganda, the LSSAH was too big, it’s training too standard, it’s recruiting standards dropped,its equipment lacking and its performance uneven. Ergo = not elite. Comparing the LSSAH to the US 45th Infantry Division, I’d say the latter is “elite.”

This sounds even more subjective than my definition of determining an elite. Perhaps this is why we will often disagree.

The uneven combat performance of the SS divisions nominated as elite is, for me, the key issue. But I look at an average trend as compared to the army (unit of comparable size and equipment at that same time). Again it is also subjective as we could find multiple examples of excellent combat results and combat failures. For the army and the SS.

Because they were more than just political. They achieved battle performances in the realm of an elite (See again my opinion on the description of a combat elite) OK?

And I disagree because I see, based on my research, the performance of the SS Panzer divisions was uneven.

This is your opinion reached after interpreting the relevant histories. Not everyone will come to the same conclusion in the interpretation that the uneven performance proves that no SS unit was a combat elite.

All the best

Dennis

[RichTO90]

I hate to get into this, but the lure of a discussion on combat effectiveness is too good to pass up...

Armies were developing yes, but did not introduce. Thinking is not the same as doing.

Its OK that you don't think its a grand scale innovation. So long as you have accepted that it is an innovation. Since that was my whole point.

Also, Infrared sensite SS-Liebermuster is almost an innovation in itself.

Italian M29 camouflage vies for the first large-scale issue. It is also considered the longest used, lasting with the Italian armed forces until 1992. It was also good enough for the SS to use extensively and preceded the Zeltbahn 31 by a few years.

The first Soviet issue - in apparently small scale - of camouflage over wear was in 1927. Large scale issue of the next pattern M1938 began in 1937-1938. The next large-scale issue was of the M1941 was in 1940-1941.

Granted, the anti IR capability was kinda neat. It might have been a help if the U.S. Army had actually deployed the Sniperscope, M2 to the ETO or if the British had ever deployed the Type K Monocular TABBY Night Vision Device with anyone other than COPP teams...

True. Only speculated by me on high probability.

As has been pointed out a number of times, high-probability speculation remains speculation. Nor have you provided much proof for the "high-probability" and have done little to disprove the evidence for the antithesis presented to you.

I suspect you are thinking of something else. Since the commander of Artillery OB West in 1944 was so impressed by this solution that he visited Sonnenstuhl's command post to see it in action for himself so he could pass this method onto other units. This is all I know at this time.

A "Sperrlinie" was simply a standing barrage. It's use was well recognized in both British and American artillery doctrine - and I suspect French and Soviet/Russian) and was developed in the Great War. Its use as preplanned final protective fires and blocking fires was well known and heavily used...I am more than a little nonplussed to see the claim that it was unknown to the HARKO in September 1944.

I look forward to your analysis of SS CEV.

Cheers!

[dshaday]

Hi RichTO90

Just to clarify

I hate to get into this, but the lure of a discussion on combat effectiveness is too good to pass up...

Armies were developing yes, but did not introduce. Thinking is not the same as doing.

Its OK that you don't think its a grand scale innovation. So long as you have accepted that it is an innovation. Since that was my whole point.

Also, Infrared sensite SS-Liebermuster is almost an innovation in itself.

Italian M29 camouflage vies for the first large-scale issue. It is also considered the longest used, lasting with the Italian armed forces until 1992. It was also good enough for the SS to use extensively and preceded the Zeltbahn 31 by a few years.

The first Soviet issue - in apparently small scale - of camouflage over wear was in 1927. Large scale issue of the next pattern M1938 began in 1937-1938. The next large-scale issue was of the M1941 was in 1940-1941.

It is buried in earlier posts, but I posted:

"the Waffen SS got the first world patents for disruptive camouflage clothing in the form of a helmet cover and smock/jacket. They were the first armed force in the world to introduce these items, and issue them on a general scale. They combined these garments with the fire and movement tactics in their assault training. So this is one original, military innovation that the Waffen SS introduced to the military art. "

"Anyway, the book mentions that the smocks and helmet covers were the first issued by any army in the world. They held the first patent. Even though camouflage ponchos were developed earlier by others."

"The initial German and Italian Army camouflage garments of the 1930s was a poncho/shelter quarter. It was not intended to be worn as an general camouflage garment. It was a tent, a raincoat in the wet and an clumsy de facto garment. Hardly ideal for the fire and movement drills."

So the innovation is in the world first use of dedicated smocks + helmet covers, with fire and movement tactics.

When I looked up the1927 I see an over-all type garment of a solid colour base. Having added fabric nodules to provide the disruptive effect. Is this correct? The camouflage was not a disruptive printed type like the Italian 1929 and the Reichswehr M31?

I suspect you are thinking of something else. Since the commander of Artillery OB West in 1944 was so impressed by this solution that he visited Sonnenstuhl's command post to see it in action for himself so he could pass this method onto other units. This is all I know at this time.

A "Sperrlinie" was simply a standing barrage. It's use was well recognized in both British and American artillery doctrine - and I suspect French and Soviet/Russian) and was developed in the Great War. Its use as preplanned final protective fires and blocking fires was well known and heavily used...I am more than a little nonplussed to see the claim that it was unknown to the HARKO in September 1944.

As per my earlier post I said that I found this mention on the net. The URL is http://www.defendingarnhem.com/Sonnenstuhl.htm

The map is in the URL but the text states:

"Sonnenstuhl was responsible for providing concentrated artillery fire against allied advancements and positions.

To achieve this, Sonnenstuhl created a Sperrfeurlinie (Artillery Blocking Line) which can be seen on the map below. It meant the forward observers only needed to provide a number and the whole Artillery Regiment would descend into that area in a short period. This of course halted any attack by the Allies and boosted the confidence of the defending Germans. Even the commander of Artillery OB West was impressed by this solution that he visited Sonnenstuhl's command post to see it in action for himself so he could pass this method onto other units."

Another site states:

"Sonnenstuhl commanded not only the artillery of the 10. SS-Panzerdivision, but all of the artillery that deployed in the battle area. Sonnenstuhl’s ar­tillery was vital in smashing the 30 Corps attacks north of Nijmegen

To maximize the effectiveness of his artillery Sonnenstuhl created the innovative Sperrfeurlinie (Artillery Blocking Line) artillery tactic. Sonnenstuhl divided the entire frontline area into simple, numbered map sectors. Each numbered sector was then pre-registered with every artillery formation under his command. Forward observers had only to request an artillery mission using the appropriate map sector reference number. This process could call down all available artillery in a concentrated barrage in a mere matter of minutes."

The source of these statements seems to be the online version of the book "It never snows in September" by Robert J Kershaw. Page 194. Credit is given to SS-Lieutenant-Colonel Zonnenstahl (different spelling). In the book version the same map is shown with the caption "SS-Lieutenant-Colonel Zonnenstahl's actual map used to co-ordinate the 10SS artillery blocking line covering the envisaged Allied approach to Nijmegen and Arnhem. Fire boxes were given a code name: 'Anna', 'Jutta', 'Kathe', which could be further subdivided 'a', 'b', 'c', and 'd'. The blocking line itself was numbered by squares 1 to 75. Upon receipt of a code word, number - or both — artillery fire could immediately be concentrated upon the area requested by ground commanders. The method was to prove devastatingly simple'". By Heinz Harmel, the Div Co.

The book quotes Harmel again as saying "'The area west of Arnhem and up to the Waal was covered by an imaginary belt or Sperrfeurlinie [artillery blocking line] drawn on the map. We had only to give a number from that strip and the whole weight of a regiment's artillery would descend on the ground, in that grid square, after only a short reaction time. SS-Lieutenant-Colonel Zonnenstahl's map shows us he was able to cover a frontage of 20 kilometres.16 The commander of Artillery OB West was so impressed with this solution that he visited our command post to see it in action for himself, so that the method could be passed on to other units. Prisoner of war interrogation reports suggest this lightning reaction demoralised the enemy."

I am not an artillery guy. Is this something new in the German army of 1944?

I look forward to your analysis of SS CEV.

I don't know what that means?


Dennis

[RichTO90]

Hi RichTO90

Just to clarify

Sure.

Armies were developing yes, but did not introduce. Thinking is not the same as doing.

Its OK that you don't think its a grand scale innovation. So long as you have accepted that it is an innovation. Since that was my whole point.

Also, Infrared sensite SS-Liebermuster is almost an innovation in itself.

How does this clarify anything for me, since it has nothing to do with what I posted? I don't think anything of the sort.

It is buried in earlier posts, but I posted:

Yes, I saw that. Why you think that a "helmet cover and smock/jacket" is more innovative than a Zeltbahn, smock, or other garment/wrap escapes me as does the significance of your assertion to "first world patents" by the SS.

"Anyway, the book mentions that the smocks and helmet covers were the first issued by any army in the world. They held the first patent. Even though camouflage ponchos were developed earlier by others."

Which book is that BTW?

"The initial German and Italian Army camouflage garments of the 1930s was a poncho/shelter quarter. It was not intended to be worn as an general camouflage garment. It was a tent, a raincoat in the wet and an clumsy de facto garment. Hardly ideal for the fire and movement drills."

Yes, in fact the Zeltbahn was intended to be worn as a "general camouflage garment" as well as a shelter half. The Italian camouflage pattern was utilized initially the same way and then for the Italian paratrooper's uniform from 1937 on and in general uniform use from 1943 on...including by the SS.

So the innovation is in the world first use of dedicated smocks + helmet covers, with fire and movement tactics.

So without "helmet covers" equals "non-innovative"? The Soviets began general issue of the M1927 pattern camouflage smock, with an attached camouflage hood in 1927. Initially it went to engineers, snipers, and the NKVD, but later was expanded. The 1941 pattern Mk and MKK suits also included attached hoods as did the M1943 pattern suits.

BTW, Red Army research on the camouflage suits began in 1919.

When I looked up the1927 I see an over-all type garment of a solid colour. Having added material nodules to provide the camouflage effect. Is this correct? The camouflage was not a disruptive printed type like the Italian 1929 and the Reichswehr M31?

So then a Ghillie suit doesn't count either?

I suspect you are thinking of something else.

Er, no, sorry, I suspect I am thinking of a Sperrfuerlinie and a stationary barrage. What do you suspect I'm thinking of?

Since the commander of Artillery OB West in 1944 was so impressed by this solution that he visited Sonnenstuhl's command post to see it in action for himself so he could pass this method onto other units. This is all I know at this time.

The best known version of this account appears in Kershaw's It Never Snows in September, p. 194, taken from Heinz Harmel's account on 27 October 1987. Sonnenstuhl's actual map appears on page 196 and is no different from any other artillery fire plan map I have seen used by the Wehrmacht...or from any OTHER artillery fire plan map I have seen from the period.

As per my earlier post I said that I found this mention on the net.

Yes, I understand that you found mention of it. That problem is I'm not as sure your acceptance of Harmel's 33-year ex post facto adulation of the system is justified.

I am not an artillery guy. Is this something new in the German army of 1944?

No afraid not. Not new in the Wehrmacht, the U.S. Army, the British Army...it's a Final Protective Fire Line, AKA a "standing barrage".

I don't know what that means?

CEV = Combat Effectiveness Value, which is a military operations research term coined by Trevor N. Dupuy circa 1972.

Cheers!

[dshaday]

Hi RichTO90

Its getting late at night and sometimes I make typos. Hence the odd beginning to my last post to you.

A smock/jacket + helmet cover is more effective than a poncho or bulky garment with a hood because it allows a better freedom of movement to perform the fire and movement tactics. It is not as clumsy and does not get in the way as much. The implementation of this innovation was recognised legally by the first patent in the world for a camouflage smock/jacket, to the SS.

The book I have been referring to earlier in this thread is " The Book of Camouflage: The Art of Disappearing" By Tim Newark.

So the innovation is in the world first use of dedicated smocks + helmet covers, with fire and movement tactics.

So without "helmet covers" equals "non-innovative"? The Soviets began general issue of the M1927 pattern camouflage smock, with an attached camouflage hood in 1927. Initially it went to engineers, snipers, and the NKVD, but later was expanded. The 1941 pattern Mk and MKK suits also included attached hoods as did the M1943 pattern suits.

Helmet cover does not equal innovation. We all know that British and German WW1 helmets are found with hessian helmet covers, and the Germans painted camouflage on their helmets. You need to look at (smock + helmet cover) with fire and movement = improvement. Improvement due to innovation.

In my usage of words, a smock is a waist length top/jacket clothing. Is the Russian M27 smock the same or is it a long, bulky garment?

When I looked up the1927 I see an over-all type garment of a solid colour. Having added material nodules to provide the camouflage effect. Is this correct? The camouflage was not a disruptive printed type like the Italian 1929 and the Reichswehr M31?

So then a Ghillie suit doesn't count either?

Is the M27 a smock? To me, a bulky (Ghillie) suit with hood is not comparable to the innovation of the smock + helmet cover. Results are not identical.

The best known version of this account appears in Kershaw's It Never Snows in September, p. 194, taken from Heinz Harmel's account on 27 October 1987. Sonnenstuhl's actual map appears on page 196 and is no different from any other artillery fire plan map I have seen used by the Wehrmacht...or from any OTHER artillery fire plan map I have seen from the period.

Yes, that is the book and page number I mentioned in my post.

That problem is I'm not as sure your acceptance of Harmel's 33-year ex post facto adulation of the system is justified.

So Harmel is wrong? That the fireplan his unit used is absolutely not special for the Germans in WW2?


Dennis

[dshaday]

Hi Rob

Again I respond to some of your posts

Of course Peiper did not invent night fighting with or without SPWs, and again I obviously never said that in the quote you present.

Innovation does not equal invention.

And I am pointed out that Peiper neither invented, nor innovated, nighttime-SPW attacks. If your argument rests on the parsing the subtle meanings of "invent" vs. "innovate" then it's not much of an argument.

My point relies in you reading the text properly, and not assuming words. I try to be careful in what I write.

Here is the difference between innovation & invention. As per dictionary:
Innovation: a new idea or method.
Invention: something that has never been made before, or the process of creating something that has never been made before

My point was that Peiper was a known SPW specialist.

He was (for a time) the SPW Battalion commander, I don't know if that makes him a "specialist" as opposed to any other SPW battalion commander in the German Army.

Forum poster/researcher Harro has said that Peiper was a “very competent and brave SPW battalion commander” and “Peiper was a very skillful, very impressive SPW commander”. Would that recommendation satisfy you?

He really liked that kind of night fighting and performed it often.

You should find a quote from Peiper that indicates this preference. As for "performed it often" - how many nighttime assaults can you list other than Jefrenovka and the other 2 villages attacked in Feb/March 1943?

Likely, much more often than your regular army unit.

And the burden of proof is on you..

Yes it is.

From this I postulated that Peiper (as a member of the SS) is very likely to have developed some innovative tactical twists to the attack.

[Historian Jens Westemeier describes Peipe's SPW attack style as "Hussar-like" which is in essence a more eloquent way of saying "Hey diddle diddle straight up the middle."

Apparently Agte says “The SPW Battalion used to attack Russian villages like a cavalry unit from all sides at full speed firing everything we had’. So not a frontal assault (your fond "Hey diddle diddle straight up the middle.").

Westemeier and I are both pointing out that a massive full speed cavalry charge with all guns blazing is not innovative, unless we want to consider the Charge of the Light Brigade innovative.

Are you and Westemeier drinking buddies now?
If Westemeir only refers to “Hussar-like” tactics then you are putting words in his mouth. You have not mentioned if he actually talked about surprise attacks from all sides at night. The Light brigade was a single front attack in daylight. So no comparison.
I know that the onus of proof is not on you but your presumptions of a plain frontal assault is not helpful if you present it as fact.

Also, if it is new to the army practise of the time then it would be innovative, simply by definition.

And why are you postulating? - By postulating you mean making assertions without offering proof.

Apart from some comments regarding Pipers tactics from this very forum, that is true.

See my last post to Sid in which I specifically detailed my assertion re Peiper and SPW night fighting.
That is why everything else you post after that sentence is irrelevant to what I have said.

It's not irreverent. You just don't like reading it because I keep providing evidence to counter your postulations.

I categorically said that the innovation is not of fighting at night, but using SPWs at night in the way Peiper did (as I elaborated to Sid). Your long paragraphs about the German Army already fighting at night (with no explanation of their tactics by the way) is preceded by the sentence:
"The idea that the Germany Army hadn't thought of using night attacks, or using SPWs in night attacks, until Peiper came along as an SPW commander in 1943 is illogical."

The irrelevant material you posted is not counter to what I have said. It just adds nothing. Which means I do not disagree with it. Dislike has nothing to do with it.

Do you see this?

No.

Do I need to post the text comparisons? I did it for Bill and it is very obvious.

Regards

Dennis

[RichTO90]

Hi RichTO90

Its getting late at night and sometimes I make typos. Hence the odd beginning to my last post to you.

It's okay, I sometimes post while toast.

A smock/jacket + helmet cover is more effective than a poncho or bulky garment with a hood because it allows a better freedom of movement to perform the fire and movement tactics. It is not as clumsy and does not get in the way as much. The implementation of this innovation was recognised legally by the first patent in the world for a camouflage smock/jacket, to the SS.

Are we talking combat effectiveness or fashion statements?

The book I have been referring to earlier in this thread is " The Book of Camouflage: The Art of Disappearing" By Tim Newark.

You would do better to look for his earlier work Brassey's Book of Camouflage.

Helmet cover does not equal innovation. We all know that British and German WW1 helmets are found with hessian helmet covers, and the Germans painted camouflage on their helmets. You need to look at (smock + helmet cover) with fire and movement = improvement. Improvement due to innovation.

How odd, we do seem to be talking fashion now.

In my usage of words, a smock is a waist length top/jacket clothing. Is the Russian M27 smock the same or is it a long, bulky garment?

It was a full camouflage uniform, jacket/smock with attached hood and, I believe (will have to check) pants.

When I looked up the1927 I see an over-all type garment of a solid colour. Having added material nodules to provide the camouflage effect. Is this correct? The camouflage was not a disruptive printed type like the Italian 1929 and the Reichswehr M31?

It is the Ghillie suit principle. It doesn't require fancy patterns to be camouflage.

Is the M27 a smock? To me, a bulky (Ghillie) suit with hood is not comparable to the innovation of the smock + helmet cover. Results are not identical.

Seems we have two different notions going here as to what constitutes innovation and effectiveness.

Yes, that is the book and page number I mentioned in my post.

So Harmel is wrong? That the fireplan his unit used is absolutely not special for the Germans in WW2?

Got it in one.

Cheers!

[BillHermann]

Dennis

So then I guess the whole CEF in World War One by your argument would be elite due to their use of artillery, concealment, coordinated night raids and breaking various old school traditions.

Your little comparison did nothing to teach me, and I would be carful bringing Harro into this.

[histan]

The example used by Dennis in Post 691 to illustrate that 12 SS Panzer Division was an elite formation is I think wrong, that is they did not destroy 53 Sherman tanks on 9 June 1944.

On 9 June 1944 they were defeating "infantry attacks supported by artillery". Source is FMS Study C-024 'I SS Panzer Corps in the West 1944' by its Chef Fritz Kraemer. "... stood up under the test of 9 June when infantry attacks, supported by heavy artillery fire, were absorbed and repelled almost everywhere."

The action being referred to, I am sure, was that on 13 June when 53 armoured vehicles were destroyed . Source "The drive on Caen Northern France 7 June -9 July 1944" Crown Copyright 2004. This action is discussed in great detail in the Wittmann thread on this forum. If you read that you will discover that only some of these were tanks (Cromwell with some Sherman) and most were infantry carriers.

The Tiger unit was part of I SS Panzer Corps (as Corps troops) and was not formally part of 12 SS Panzer Division but attached, so I don't thing you can count its actions as saying anything much about 12 SS Panzer Division.

This is in fact an excellent example of how a very good military action (and one of the few in Normandy where tanks were used in the role envisaged for them by German Army doctrine of shooting up infantry) is vastly inflated by the Waffen SS Myth makers to show they were an elite force and much better than the allies.

"Sonnenstuhl was responsible for providing concentrated artillery fire against allied advancements and positions"
I don't know if his map reference system was new but FMS C-024 says "After 10 June, upon orders of the Corps, the fire power of the entire artillery was coordinated by being placed under the control of Arko 1 and this factor was of great importance in our defence. We were able quickly and deftly to direct the fire to the most endangered sectors" Kraemer doesn't say whose idea it was (him as an ex-army officer or the Arko as an experienced SS artillery officer or someone else?)

Doesn't look like the tactical concept was new in September 1944, may be an improvement in implementation?

Regards

John

PS I'm getting a bit fed up of "cammo" as an example of brilliant innovation or invention. Wavell is reported as saying - when amateurs get together they talk tactics, when professionals get together they talk logistics. Who the heck talks "cammo"?!

[Rob - wssob2]

PS I'm getting a bit fed up of "cammo" as an example of brilliant innovation or invention. Wavell is reported as saying - when amateurs get together they talk tactics, when professionals get together they talk logistics. Who the heck talks "cammo”?!

Histan - BEST QUOTE EVER! bravo!

Hello again Dennis

The main point is that we have different methods of determining a unit's combat performance and if it is of a high performance (say, elite). I think we will always disagree on this. We put different weightings on the units' combat engagements.

The sense I got was that your method is personal opinion and mine is citing evidence.

That would have to be from a combat perspective only?
I take it that from your full-sized post from yesterday, your personal opinion is that “politicaly”, some Waffen SS units are elite. Is this correct?

As I mentioned before, I am not a fan of the “elite” appellation, as it is subjective opinion.
Throughout history, military dictators have formed “elite" military forces, (the Praetorian Guard, Imperial Guard, Waffen-SS, Blackshirts, Revolutionary Guard Corps, Republican Guards, etc.)

That is because the wording gives it a generalisation that is not always true. This implies that all SS units were always sub-par compared to regular army units. It can certainly mislead a novice reader, which is what I would hate to see happen.

I think the key phrase of my quote was “it varies”…

Your statement does not mention over what period. Pre-war, end war, for a couple of days, on average. Or all the time.
How about unit size: for comparable size unit, any size. As well as type of equipment.

Perhaps you could take two sample units from a particular campaign and run with the SS vs. Army comparison.

Even some of the elite (my term) Waffen SS units had temporary periods of poor combat performance after prolonged combat. As well as deteriorating war conditions in recruits and equipment lowering average performances, compared to the earlier years. I am quite OK with saying that on average, and over the war period, the elite SS units I mentioned were elite (by my definition). This is all quite consistent with my earlier posts.
Politically, the SS divisions I nominated were pretty much always elite.

Then I fail to see how “elite (my term)” means little more than “I admire them.”

We both know that the cuff band order came very late in the war (1945). Coinciding chronologically with Hitler rants about the Army. So I would not go overboard on this one. Unless you want to agree that prior to this Hitler was happy with the SS combat performance??

My point is that Hitler was dissatisfied with such sub-par performance from “elite” units.

Now ask yourself, would a normal army unit, of the same size and equipment as the LAH, have achieved all the goals ever assigned to the LAH in the same circumstances?

However is a hypothetical, speculative question outside the realm of history. I can’t tell you how the 7th Panzer Division would have fought in the Battle of the Bulge because it didn’t.

If your answer is YES for a majority of those scenarios in WW2 then logically the LAH is not elite. In all other cases the answer is “elite”

You’ve totally lost me.

No one can easily do this analysis if you focus on “objectives” only. Introducing opinion in its place can invite, of course, disagreement.

Again, your method is personal opinion and mine is citing evidence.

If a unit fails its objectives - then WHY did it fail is a reasonable line of questioning.

Innovation: a new idea or method.

Again, Peiper attacking at night wit SPWs wasn’t a new idea, but one practiced by the Army in 1941.

Why don’t you instead credit Major Dr. J. Eckinger with the innovation, and say that Peiper copied him?

Forum poster/researcher Harro has said that Peiper was a “very competent and brave SPW battalion commander” and “Peiper was a very skillful, very impressive SPW commander”. Would that recommendation satisfy you?

LOL well I’ll let Harro chime in if he wants but I think he and I are pretty well-versed on the strengths and weaknesses of Peiper’s command style.

I think RichTO90 pretty much demolished your Sonnenstuhl innovation allegation with a well-cited TOT barrage!

[dshaday]

Hi Bill

So then I guess the whole CEF in World War One by your argument would be elite due to their use of artillery, concealment, coordinated night raids and breaking various old school traditions.

If you are trying to say that performing innovations in combat automatically makes you elite, then be my guest to discuss this.

I myself posted some potential SS innovations because two posters believe that the SS did not introduce any original tactical innnovations to the military.

Your little comparison did nothing to teach me, and I would be carful bringing Harro into this.

Bill, my quotes are directly from Harro, on a thread about Peiper and SPW tactics on the Eastern front. I don't see a problem, unless Harro's views have recently changed.

What you learn (or not) is up to you.

Dennis

[dshaday]

Hi Rob

PS I'm getting a bit fed up of "cammo" as an example of brilliant innovation or invention. Wavell is reported as saying - when amateurs get together they talk tactics, when professionals get together they talk logistics. Who the heck talks "cammo”?!

Histan - BEST QUOTE EVER! bravo!

I also agree that cammo is talked about too much as an innovation. I am also surprised that mostly it is because some people cannot even see it as an innovation. The cammo introduced by the SS is just an innovative military tool. This is too hard for some to admit.

The main point is that we have different methods of determining a unit's combat performance and if it is of a high performance (say, elite). I think we will always disagree on this. We put different weightings on the units' combat engagements.

The sense I got was that your method is personal opinion and mine is citing evidence.

Strange, but I got the exact opposite view when reading your post.

That is because the wording gives it a generalisation that is not always true. This implies that all SS units were always sub-par compared to regular army units. It can certainly mislead a novice reader, which is what I would hate to see happen.

I think the key phrase of my quote was “it varies”…

The generalisation you gave did not use the words "it varies". Your phrase has the usual faults of a generalisation.

Your statement does not mention over what period. Pre-war, end war, for a couple of days, on average. Or all the time.
How about unit size: for comparable size unit, any size. As well as type of equipment.

Perhaps you could take two sample units from a particular campaign and run with the SS vs. Army comparison.

That is rather vague? The result would have little meaning wrt your generalisation.

Then I fail to see how “elite (my term)” means little more than “I admire them.”

Then you fail to understand the methodology I use to judge combat performance. That's OK .

We both know that the cuff band order came very late in the war (1945). Coinciding chronologically with Hitler rants about the Army. So I would not go overboard on this one. Unless you want to agree that prior to this Hitler was happy with the SS combat performance??

My point is that Hitler was dissatisfied with such sub-par performance from “elite” units.

And of the German army at the time. He was very upset about the war, you see.

Now ask yourself, would a normal army unit, of the same size and equipment as the LAH, have achieved all the goals ever assigned to the LAH in the same circumstances?

However is a hypothetical, speculative question outside the realm of history. I can’t tell you how the 7th Panzer Division would have fought in the Battle of the Bulge because it didn’t.

That is exactly why saying German Army Unit X would have done better than Waffen-SS unit Z is subjective.
This is what you had were trying to say/do earlier.

No one can easily do this analysis if you focus on “objectives” only. Introducing opinion in its place can invite, of course, disagreement.

Again, your method is personal opinion and mine is citing evidence.

I disagree for the reasons I have already stated.
You are cherry picking individual engagements and drawing conclusions using opinion.

My method is trying to look at the long term picture. Although it also involves drawing conclusion and opinion.

If a unit fails its objectives - then WHY did it fail is a reasonable line of questioning.

Of course.

Innovation: a new idea or method.

Again, Peiper attacking at night wit SPWs wasn’t a new idea, but one practiced by the Army in 1941.

Of course the idea of a night attack was not invented by Peiper. To say so would be foolish. That is why I have not made that statement. You fail to see this, and keep wasteing effort repeating it, and citing examples from books. Implying that I am illogical.

I am interested in the innovation Peiper added to the night fighting. The method. (see your re-quote of my definition of innovation). Has that finally got through to you? Especially as you now know what innovation means.

Forum poster/researcher Harro has said that Peiper was a “very competent and brave SPW battalion commander” and “Peiper was a very skillful, very impressive SPW commander”. Would that recommendation satisfy you?

LOL well I’ll let Harro chime in if he wants but I think he and I are pretty well-versed on the strengths and weaknesses of Peiper’s command style.

That is why I quoted Harro.

I think RichTO90 pretty much demolished your Sonnenstuhl innovation allegation with a well-cited TOT barrage!

Yes it does! RichTO09 certainly disagrees with the web site crediting Sonnenstuhl with an artillery innovation. It did look promising for a while. Especially the comment about the commander of Artillery OB West who wanted to see it in action (as per the book quote). Maybe the artillery General (?) saw it and then had lunch.

Dennis

[Christoph Awender]

Dennis,

You still know what and about what you want to argue?

1) If Peiper was or was not a good Pz.Gren.-or Panzerregiment commander does change something on the Basic Topic? One man in the whole Waffen-SS? We will never know when we weren´t serving under him and know all circumstances of defeat and success. All others is based on oppinions of others.

FACT is that such tactics were used before and were condemned if failed and cheered on when successfull.

2) The artillery barrage discussion brings up one point.. do you really believe the Quote and how it is written in the book by Kershaw?? Do you really think that after 5 years of war nobody had this idea? Coordinated fire on preset terrain and map points is a very old procedure. I think common sense tells us that this story wasn´t the way how it was interpreted by Kershaw.
FACT is that fire on preset Points is an old procedure.

3) You always mention fire and movement tactics. What should that be in your oppinion exactly? Do you think Heer infantry Units attacked in a sitting and not firing tactic?

FACT is that during early training the Waffen-SS performed an all up and running straight towards the objective attack which was then changed by order to the common tactics that one part jumps Forward while the Deckungsgruppe fires.

/Christoph

[dshaday]

Hi RichTO90

A smock/jacket + helmet cover is more effective than a poncho or bulky garment with a hood because it allows a better freedom of movement to perform the fire and movement tactics. It is not as clumsy and does not get in the way as much. The implementation of this innovation was recognised legally by the first patent in the world for a camouflage smock/jacket, to the SS.

Are we talking combat effectiveness or fashion statements?

Talking about combat effectiveness.

Helmet cover does not equal innovation. We all know that British and German WW1 helmets are found with hessian helmet covers, and the Germans painted camouflage on their helmets. You need to look at (smock + helmet cover) with fire and movement = improvement. Improvement due to innovation.

How odd, we do seem to be talking fashion now.

No, still talking about combat effectiveness. The innovation in the garments is the freedom of movement and the cammo which added to the effectiveness of the fire and movement tactics.

Seems we have two different notions going here as to what constitutes innovation and effectiveness.

Could be. I see the innovation of the SS cammo clothing as leading to greater combat effectiveness (and less losses). Compared to not using the garments (or that style of garment(s)).

Regards

Dennis

[BillHermann]

Dennis,

Manage your posts and comments as you last lost me. What were you saying?

Trying to give me the gears here only weakens your opinion.