Why the Waffen-SS

[Dren]

Sorry Dren you would do yourself best by seeing the big picture not just one part.

The "bad" side is what made them who they were. That is the camps, killings and pillaging. They were not just panzers and infantry racing across feilds. If so the would be like any other army.

They were who they were from the beginnings as Hitlers bodyguard to the Night of the Long Knives, to the formation of the first combat units, then to the full creation of the Waffen-SS. To the first poor performances to the limited successes in the early 40s To the camps , Warsaw ghetto clearing and the final Warsaw uprising through to the final Berlin battles and surrender. That was the Waffen-SS and its history. By the end of the war the SS was the Waffen-SS.

The Waffen-SS was an evolution from its parent agency. Its shared its history and had much of the same purpose. It was just larger and was better armed than its parent organiztion.

Knowing the full history and the bad elements gives you a better understanding of who they were and why they performed the way they did.

The bad side is very much one of the keys to their performace. Both with the Japanese and the SS / Waffen-SS. It's much easier to be ruthless on the battle feild when you dehumanize people and your enemy. It becomes easy to be nasty, cruel and efficient when you see your enemy as less than you.

So it's safe to say there was no "warrior code" (think Bushido-code) for the germans/waffen-ss - thats dissapointing , I was looking forward to reading some sort of western/modern warrior code - im still interested in why they fought(to the death), but this thread has made many good points and I think im looking in the wrong direction.

Next im trying to find information on is SS-officer training - that should really give the best glimpse into what made these men tick. I read that 20% of their time during their 10 month training was ideology - would be interesting to know what that entailed! Im suspecting alot of race related stuff and germanic history - I wonder what else.

[Cult Icon]

more from the same 2 books:

Regardless of their background, most of the division’s men, particularly the officers, shared similar qualities, one of which was a high degree of personal loyalty to Theodor Eicke, the first commander of the division, a characteristic that Eicke demanded from all who served under him. A second well-developed trait that was highly valued by the first commander of the division was obedience of orders, no matter how difficult the circumstances. .......

The important point about the SS-TK. This is once, again, quite Soviet-like and different from the Panzertruppen doctrine of flexibility and personal initiative among the mobile forces. One of the key take aways from 'Soldiers of Destruction' was that the SS-T was considered an 'brawler' division by Army Generals and Eicke was the head of a 'war cult' of sorts.

A tank attack moving frontally on a narrow axis of advance, over exposed ground that funneled down to an extensively fortified defensive position, was not tactically advisable. However, the men of the Waffen SS divisions prided themselves on obeying orders, no matter how difficult the assignment. As a division, Totenkopf was aggressive almost to a fault in offensive operations, and over the next few days, its men and officers were severely tested.

So the SS-T philosophy is in fact the opposite of the Calvary spirit (flexibility, recon, maneuver, raid, envelope) and the Calvary origins (3 out of 10 Reichswehr divisions were calvary, then from 1935 these 3 formed the core leadership and training of the panzer forces) of the Army.

July 30th, 1943 w/ 6th Army, attack of II SS PzK

The already weakened SS grenadier companies suffered serious losses of officers and NCOs, in addition to severe losses to the grenadiers. Leading from the front and by example was the expected method of leadership and command in the classic SS divisions and was carried almost to a fault in Totenkopf. While this provided aggressive leadership and immediate and violent reaction to combat situations, it resulted in casualties to junior officers during heavy fighting. On the first morning of the battle, Regiment Eicke quickly began to suffer heavy losses of small-unit commanders.

This is actually a general trait with the wehrmacht, but it is implied that it was carried to excess in SS-T.

SS-T, attacking within II SS Panzer Korps (3rd pz, 2.SS DR, 3.SS TK), took 26 officers, 468 nco/men casualties on this day with 48 of their tanks out of action. This was the first of a four day blood bath with the SS taking the lion's share of the losses.

For reference, in the Army unit histories I've read, (outside of Citadel) I have not read of much more than 300 casualties during a 'sturm angriff' day for a panzer division. And this occurred in Stalingrad. 200 was generally the upper limit.

[BillHermann]

I believe that the "warrior code" thing is largely a falicy even with the Japanese army. There may have been traditions but the vast majority of the junior ranks in the army would have been trained, given some history and propaganda and sent to the front. Much of the behaviour would have been coached and the performance in the first 3 years was more about the lack of preparedness of the enemy than the quality of the Waffen-SS / Japanese army or code,

[Sid Guttridge]

Hi Dren.

You write, "im still interested in why they fought(to the death),". There is an unspoken assumption in this that the Waffen-SS were more likely top fight to the death than others. There seems little hard evidence of this. Proportional Waffen-SS fatalities were not a great deal higher than those of the German Army (something like 32% to 26%). But the Waffen-SS had very few non-combatant elements because it relied largely on the Army's rear echelons for its logistics. Once you strip the shared Army logistical tail out of the equation, I very much doubt that Waffen-SS combat elements were demonstrably any more likely to die than Army combat elements.

I would suggest thaty all this "warrior" stuff is largely modern, US-derived, BS designed to pep up the self esteem of soldiers. (We Brits have since been infected with such things as the "Warrior Games"). I would argue that the only "warriors" around are of the likes of hard line ISIL fighters and the Chechens who fought the Russians in the 1990s. The US Marines, by contrast, are primarily effective because they are highly trained soldiers with advanced conventional skills. In modern history soldiers have almost always defeated "warriors". Colonial empires were built on this distinction. Countries like Japan and Argentina were consolidated by modern soldiery defeating Samurai and Gaucho armies.

Godsworthy's book on the Waffen-SS, Valhalla's Warriors, might be worth you getting, as it contains a fair amount about the culture of the Waffen-SS, including the proportions of officer training devoted to tactics, political education, etc., etc.

I wrote a review here on AHF:

http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic.php?t=140754

Cheers,

Sid.

[Cult Icon]

Are you analyzing the numbers correctly? A lot of W-SS divisions were fighting partisans rather than holding the line against the Red Army. In terms of raw casualties, i have seen that SS mobile divisions take more, and then get filled up to over-strength soon after operations. Basically, having 2 extra battalions plus support weapons gives their division commanders more people to use up.

Proportional Waffen-SS fatalities were not a great deal higher than those of the German Army (something like 32% to 26%). But the Waffen-SS had very few non-combatant elements because it relied largely on the Army's rear echelons for its logistics. Once you strip the shared Army logistical tail out of the equation, I very much doubt that Waffen-SS combat elements were demonstrably any more likely to die than Army combat elements.

[Cult Icon]

Some others..

1. Indeed, all the horse drawn infantry divisions needed mobile units, and any mobile unit, 1st or 2nd rate, division or reinforced battalion.. to help counterattack was gladly accepted. So this does not differentiate..

2. When writing about the performance of the SS PzK in Kharkov for instance, the performance and troop movements of GD, 3rd, 6th, 11th, 16th, 23rd and 24th Panzer Divisions during the same timeframe and factoring enemy make-up (and in the case of 6th/11th, similar combat conditions) factor in heavily as a basis of comparison. I think of Winter Storm, the Dec- March struggles, the fighting in the Caucasus, Blau I/Blau II, the breakthrough of the Stalingrad Ring, etc. The SS performance fell noticeably short in Feb-March 1943. In the past, I had formed the view that the senior SS were not as effective in offensive operations, but were fine in the defense.

3. If the senior SS was indeed an elite, then its performance and consistency of combat record should have been approx. at the same level as GD, which was often similarly equipped with the 'big' structure. I have seen a shortfall in actual formation ability. As far as GD goes, it went farther than the SS and it had some authority to take individuals from other formations for their specialized skills when it wanted to. It also remained a volunteer organization throughout its life. (Spaeter, PzK GD). So in effect, it was a 'reflection' of the wehrmacht in this sense- a weird division.

4.The Reichswehr was composed of 3 Calvary divisions and 7 Infantry divisions. The army's mobile units truly began to form around 1935 from cavalrymen. So as far as Army Panzer divisions and 'conscripts' go, the core- the bone and sinew- the officers and non-coms of the more successful divisions were a mixture of pre-war professionals, former cavalrymen (eg. The original panzer divisions, 6th- 9th Panzer division, 24th Panzer division (formed from 1st Calvary Division, Prussia)), and new men.

The core of these divisions were responsible for training, tactics, and the formation of battle plans, and thus had an disproportionate influence over recruits and so forth. Riflemen can be easily replaced; a good senior non-com or officer- not so much. The formation must be trained well, and be reactive and coherent in battle.

I believe that the calvary spirit is essential in the most effective deployment of mobile formations. It should achieve its objectives and preserve its combat strength wisely. In prisoners and booty, it should disproportionately capture rather than kill in the course of day to day operations. In combat actions, it should inflict disproportionate losses.

5. Excellent division and regimental commanders also factor especially heavily. I believe that the mediocrity (IMO) of the senior W-SS was largely contained in their officers and non-coms, which lead to divisions that could not exploit their generously allocated air force, equipment and manpower resources to the fullest extent. The expansion of SS mobile forces to me is tantamount to, say, suddenly favoring a mediocre unit like the 22nd Panzer Division because of its politics, and then giving it the big structure and bringing up to strength more often than norm for use as a fire brigade..

6. The most effective mobile division and panzer regiment commanders of the Wehrmacht in WW2, regardless of year were largely Army: professional soldiers like Rommel, Model, Hube, Balck, Bayerlein, Raus, von Edelsheim, von Hauenschild, von Manteuffel and regiment commanders like Graf strachwitz, Langkeit, and Bake. This was not a coincidence.

[Dwight Pruitt]

Hi Dren.



I would suggest thaty all this "warrior" stuff is largely modern, US-derived, BS designed to pep up the self esteem of soldiers. (We Brits have since been infected with such things as the "Warrior Games"). I would argue that the only "warriors" around are of the likes of hard line ISIL fighters and the Chechens who fought the Russians in the 1990s. The US Marines, by contrast, are primarily effective because they are highly trained soldiers with advanced conventional skills. In modern history soldiers have almost always defeated "warriors". Colonial empires were built on this distinction. Countries like Japan and Argentina were consolidated by modern soldiery defeating Samurai and Gaucho armies.



Sid.

At the risk of going off-topic, I could not agree more on the "warrior" aspect.

[Cult Icon]

In Nov 1943, after months of rest and re-arming, the SSLAH arrives to AGS with around 200 tanks. Accompanying it is the also powerfully equipped 1st Panzer Division, which saw 9 months rest. Unlike the panzer divisions on the eastern front, these two divisions were spared the most damaging battles. Much hope was placed on two divisions of Balck's 48th Panzer Korps as the Germans launch offensive operations west of Kiev. Also included in Nov 1943 was the shipping of the storied 16. Pz and low quality 25 Pz.

Opinions of the performance and asset utilization of SSLAH during this time? Were the SS men worth the resources that they consumed? Or were they wasteful in combat?

After numerous counteroperations, it was largely burnt out by Feb 1944 and it played a minor role during the Korsun pocket battle. However, 1st Pz. and 16 Pz. were still viable, and were two of the three important divisions operating there. Afterwards, SSLAH was involved in some smaller activities, in which it was moved to Belgium during April 1944.

[tonystark]

So curious what "tonyh" thinks of the opinion SS-Sturmbannführer Diercks (DKiG) expressed about the Waffen-SS.

[Sarge3525]

The Waffen SS was the foreign legion of Germany, and originally the political & warrior elite of Germany (division 1-3. LSSAH, Das Reich, Totenkopf).
As such it is just impressive and incredible. As an intellectual concept. When you read about Division Wiking or Hitlerjugend you can't help but think "EPIC EPIC EPIC".

But...This is the problem with Waffen SS. The hype and mythology of it.
This hype and mythology is mostly vehiculated by American "history" videos online.

I was victim of this hype. I really thought the SS were always the best.
But the problem is then you look at the combat records. And you realize that the Waffen SS as an organization failed below the Wehrmacht Heer organization. I absolutely love the idea of the Waffen SS: the camaraderie, the officer corps drawn from humble origin who treat their troops not like untermenschen (like Prussians in Wehrmacht who wouldnt even eat same food as their troops or at the same table as them).

But the problem is beyond all this "SS is cool" and "Idea is good", fact is...They fought not as good as the Heer. They were inferiorly trained. And in my opinion its because they discarded the Prussian military education in favor of "peasant humble education".
They basically discarded what made the German Army so good.

And the biggest problem of all is at the end of the day...You come to the conclusion that Waffen SS was big waste of manpower which could have been better trained in the Wehrmacht Heer.

Maybe keep division 1-3. But as soon as it went beyond to 38 divisions...This was ridiculous and useless.

[DukeOfPrussia]

Hi all,
I'm a newbie to this forum, and here's my take on the matter:

To many, the Waffen-SS fascinates because of the pseudo-mythical legend spun around them by the Allies in the postwar trials. I think the victors ensured that the 'legend' would continue to live on by declaring them a criminal organisation.

Thanks to Hollywood, most of us were bombarded by images of men in black, with red swastika armbands, and a sinister German accent.

I would say the most lasting impression of the WSS is twofold - evil death squads on one side, tenacious soldiers on the other. IMO, the WSS shouldn't be compared to the Wehrmacht, as both units had different ideologies. The Wehrmacht was an instrument of the State; the SS was a state within a state.

I've always felt that the fighting units of the WSS were, to a certain degree, victims of victor's justice. For every Dirlewanger psycho, there was a capable Dietrich.

If nothing at all, their infamy is cause enough for the WSS to continue to attract the attention of history buffs, 70 years on.

[j keenan]

capable Dietrich
of what ?

[Sid Guttridge]

Hi DoP,

Victors' justice? Yup. The key word is "justice".

The Waffen-SS was quite rightly declared part of a criminal organization. Out of 38 divisions, only one is not known to have contained at least one officer who served in the camps (and even this exception may be due to inadequate information). The camps were also a continuous (though minor) source of manpower for the W-SS. Furthermore, one third of the 1941 Einsatzgruppen operating behind the Eastern Front in 1941 were constitutionally composed of Waffen-SS men.

Furthermore, the Allies did not declare that mere service in the Waffen-SS was criminal. Like anyone else, they had to have committed a war crime.

I think you are right that the Allies perpetuated the Waffen-SS legend after the war. This is largely down to an active W-SS publishing industry, that needs to peddle the legend because the more mundane facts are less marketable.

There was virtually nothing distinctive, militarily, about the Waffen-SS. It was essentially a clone of the German Army in military terms.

Where it differed was in being the Nazi Party in arms, as opposed to the German Army, which was the German people in arms.

All Germany's conquests over 1939-42 were achieved without indispensible W-SS assistance, and the W-SS failed to turn the tide of war over 1943-45.

Why the Waffen-SS?

It still mystifies me. The inordinate amount of attention it gets, is bought at the expense of the reputation of the far more important German Army and therefore serves to distort the historical record.

Cheers,

Sid.

[DukeOfPrussia]

capable Dietrich
of what ?

Hi J Keenan,

He did manage a decent defence of Vienna, albeit unsuccessfully. He was also known for his bravery, as evidenced by the loyalty his men showed him.

More importantly, though, he was aware of his field command limitations, and 'picked the brains' of more technically capable officer. A marked difference from many WSS commanders who led without an inkling of strategy.

[DukeOfPrussia]

Hi DoP,

Victors' justice? Yup. The key word is "justice".

The Waffen-SS was quite rightly declared part of a criminal organization. Out of 38 divisions, only one is not known to have contained at least one officer who served in the camps (and even this exception may be due to inadequate information). The camps were also a continuous (though minor) source of manpower for the W-SS. Furthermore, one third of the 1941 Einsatzgruppen operating behind the Eastern Front in 1941 were constitutionally composed of Waffen-SS men.

Furthermore, the Allies did not declare that mere service in the Waffen-SS was criminal. Like anyone else, they had to have committed a war crime.

I think you are right that the Allies perpetuated the Waffen-SS legend after the war. This is largely down to an active W-SS publishing industry, that needs to peddle the legend because the more mundane facts are less marketable.

There was virtually nothing distinctive, militarily, about the Waffen-SS. It was essentially a clone of the German Army in military terms.

Where it differed was in being the Nazi Party in arms, as opposed to the German Army, which was the German people in arms.

All Germany's conquests over 1939-42 were achieved without indispensible W-SS assistance, and the W-SS failed to turn the tide of war over 1943-45.

Why the Waffen-SS?

It still mystifies me. The inordinate amount of attention it gets, is bought at the expense of the reputation of the far more important German Army and therefore serves to distort the historical record.

Cheers,

Sid.

Hi Sid,

I agree with your first point.

Another reason for the mythical status of the WSS is that in postwar Germany, there was a vital need to separate the WSS from the Wehrmacht, in the public's eye. This was due to the rebuilding of the Bundeswehr. By showing that both entities were different, the Allies were able to allow German army rebuilding without adverse objection from the victimised population.

In a way, the 'exalted' status the WSS seem to enjoy is very much evident in how the average joe romanticises the Mafia. I use this example conceptually, and not as an attempt to liken the two organisations.

Ultimately, one could say that the WSS was good at PR. They managed to gloss over their atrocities with 'souped up' stories of bravery and last stands.

A quick note on victor's justice - those who committed crimes, like the WSS, deserved punishment. My gripe is that that 'justice' was not universally applied. Soviet atrocities, for example, and the forced expulsion of millions of Germans from Prussia. But I think this is more suited for another topic.